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The question of this thesis is why the Vatican and China severed diplomatic 
ties in the 1950s to the extent that over 60 years later they still have not 
reached a rapprochement. In previous literature, this long-term stalemate 
was often regarded as the result of ‘incompatible identities’ (communism 
versus theism) between the PRC and the Vatican. However, this thesis 
argues that this rigid view of identity has led to a highly oversimplified and 
biased understanding of Sino-Vatican relations – the agency of Beijing and 
Rome in Sino-Vatican interactions was ignored. 
To get a deeper insight into the current stalemate in Sino-Vatican relations, 
we must return to the early period (1949-1958) in Beijing and Rome’s history 
of interaction and discuss why the stalemate was formed in the first place. 
In order to do so, this thesis covers major ‘flashpoints’ in Sino-Vatican 
relations from 1949-1958 and analyses the key texts from both Beijing and 
Rome. Borrowing from Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory, the dialogue 
between China and the Vatican will be regarded as the two states’ efforts to 
claim and fix the meanings of certain key signifiers in their discourse by 
forming ‘chains of equivalence’. This thesis uses a considerable amount of 
de-classified archival material on the Chinese side that has never been 
revealed before, which provides rich evidence to support a new 
interpretation of Sino-Vatican relations.  
The thesis concludes that the stalemate in Sino-Vatican relations can be 
attributed to Beijing and Rome’s mutual misunderstanding of each other’s 
key signifiers. The original contribution of this case study to IR theory and 
discourse theory is an analysis of how key signifiers in a state’s discourse 
matter and can cause serious misunderstandings. To avoid this kind of 
impasse, it is essential to precisely analyse the meaning of key ideological 
signifiers in state interactions and diplomacy.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Overview: the Two Deadlocks 
In 1951, soon after the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), 
the papal internuncio in China was expelled from the Chinese mainland. 
Since then, all formal diplomatic ties between China and the Vatican were 
broken. Up to the time of this research, the two countries still have not 
reached a rapprochement. The long period of an absence of formal relations 
between the PRC and the Vatican is quite unusual in today’s context, 
considering that both parties are important actors in the world scene. One 
of them is the most prominent emerging superpower, while the other is the 
heart of worldwide Catholicism. This is not to mention that China now has a 
burgeoning Catholic community whose number has now surpassed that of 
Ireland. 
More than 60 years later, the PRC and the Vatican still have not resumed 
their diplomatic ties even though there would be great benefits for both 
parties in doing so. For instance, the Holy See could extend its pastoral care 
to Catholics in mainland China and preach the gospel more efficiently there. 
On the other hand, with a rapprochement, the PRC could win the hearts and 
minds of millions of Chinese Catholics domestically, and greatly elevate its 
international reputation. In fact, both parties have made many attempts to 
improve relationships in the past two decades. The PRC mentioned several 
times through official media its willingness to talk with the Vatican.1 At the 
                                            
1 For example, on 25 Oct 2001, the spokesperson from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA) of China said: ‘China is willing to improve relationships with the Vatican and there 
are no changes to the two principles reiterated before.’  
 4 
same time, the Popes have issued many letters which encourage Chinese 
Catholics to love their own country and appeal for reconciliation2. However, 
despite all the benefits of reconciliation, PRC-Vatican relations still have not 
reached any formal rapprochement. There have been signs of reconciliation 
between them, but such contacts were often eclipsed by quarrels and 
mutual boycotts. 
Currently, the stalemate between the PRC and the Vatican is focused on 
two issues. The first issue is the Vatican’s diplomatic ties with Taiwan. The 
Holy See’s diplomatic relationship with Taiwan is a remnant of the Rome-
                                            
From: Xiao Feng, ‘MFA: China is willing to improve relationships with the Vatican, no 
changes to the two principles’,  China Daily (Chinese Online Version), 25 Oct 2001, 
<http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/gb/doc/2001-10/25/content_12090.htm> 
[accessed 12 Sep 2016].  
On 23 Jan 2007, the spokesperson from the MFA stated: ‘China always pays attention to 
the improvement of Sino-Vatican relations and makes efforts to reach this goal. Based on 
the two principles, China is willing to keep in contact with the Vatican and conduct 
dialogues, in the hope of finding out a way to improve relationships.’  
From: The State Council Information Office of the PRC, ‘The spokesperson of the MFA, 
Liu Jianchao, answered questions during press conference, 23th January’, The Official 
Website of the State Council Information Office, 24 Jan 2007     
<http://www.scio.gov.cn/xwfbh/gbwxwfbh/fbh/Document/310641/310641.htm> 
[accessed 10 Sep 2016]. 
2 Here are two examples: Pope John Paul II, ‘Message of the Holy Father John Paul II to 
the Catholic Church in China (8 Dec 1999)’, [The Official Website of the Holy See] 
<http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-
ii/en/messages/pont_messages/1999/documents/hf_jp-ii_mes_19991210_china.html> 
[accessed 10 Sep 2016]. 
Pope John Paul II, ‘Messaggio di Giovanni Paolo II nel 70° dell'ordinazione a Roma del 
primo gruppo di vescovi cinesi e nel 50° dell’istituzione della gerarchia ecclesiastica in Cina 
(24 Oct 2001)’, [The Official Website of the Holy See] 
<https://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-
ii/it/messages/pont_messages/1996/documents/hf_jp-ii_mes_19961203_china-
church.html> [accessed 10 Sep 2016]. 
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Nanjing relationship. In 1946, the Holy See sent the first Apostolic 
Internuncio, Antonio Riberi to China and the first Apostolic Nunciature was 
opened in Nanjing, the then capital of China. After the Chinese Civil War 
(1946-1949), the KMT were defeated and lost control over the Chinese 
mainland. However, the ROC government, having moved to Taipei, never 
renounced its claim over the whole of China. In 1971, the ROC’s 
representative to the United Nations was expelled by General Assembly 
Resolution 2758 and henceforth China’s UN seat was transferred to the 
PRC. After Taipei lost the UN seat, its international status suffered a 
dramatic fall as most states around the world shunned Taipei and switched 
their recognition to Beijing. In the year 2016, only 22 states formally 
recognized the ROC, most of which are in Africa and Latin America, with 
the Holy See being Taiwan’s last diplomatic stronghold in Europe. On the 
other hand, the ‘One-China Policy’ is one of the fundamental principles of 
Beijing’s diplomacy, according to which the PRC will refuse to build/maintain 
ties with any states that recognise Taiwan. Such a principle certainly applies 
to Sino-Vatican relations, and it is highly unlikely that the two countries can 
build any formal ties before the Holy See cuts off its diplomatic relationship 
with Taipei.  
The second ‘deadlock’ between Beijing and Rome is the consecration of 
bishops. The Vatican sternly insists that only the Pope has the right to 
appoint bishops. On the other hand, the PRC government strongly opposes 
the assertion that the Vatican has such rights in mainland China. Since 
1949, the PRC and the Vatican have quarrelled numerous times over the 
issue of appointment of bishops. It seems that both sides do not want to 
make significant compromises on this matter. For example, from late 2010 
to 2012, the officially-sanctioned church in China unilaterally appointed 
several bishops (Leshan, Shantou, Chengde and Harbin) without the Holy 
See’s consent. Rome warned the various episcopal candidates many times 
not to accept the officially-sanctioned church’s consecration. But the 
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officially-sanctioned church ignored the Vatican’s warnings and the bishops 
of these cities were consecrated without papal mandate. The Vatican then 
issued statements bitterly protesting against these consecrations.3 In reply, 
the officially-sanctioned church also made statements against the Vatican.4 
The series of incidents and disputes about the episcopal consecrations 
clearly shows how fragile and unstable Sino-Vatican relations are. However, 
before these unhappy events, from 2005 on, Sino-Vatican relations had 
shown some signs of rapprochement. In 2007, Pope Benedict XVI issued a 
long letter 5 to Catholics in the People’s Republic, in which he pointed out 
that the current stalemate is harmful both to the church and to the PRC 
government. The Pope reiterated that to change the secular political 
structure is not the mission of the Catholic Church and expressed his strong 
wish to realise a reconciliation with the PRC government. In 2009, the 
Vatican published a brand-new Chinese version of their official website 
(vantican.va). Chinese thus became the only non-European language 
                                            
3  The Union of Catholic Asian News (UCAN) published the Chinese version of the 
statement made on 3 Jul 2012 by The Congregation for the Evangelization of Peoples. In 
the statement the Holy See protested about the recent consecration in Harbin and 
reiterated that Fr. Yue Fusheng, who was consecrated by the official church, is now liable 
to the punishments stipulated by Church Laws. From: UCAN, ‘the Vatican issues a 
statement regarding the oncoming illicit consecration in Harbin’,  UCAN Chinese, 4 Jul 2012, 
< http://china.ucanews.com/2012/07/04/【文件】梵蒂岡對哈爾濱將舉行非法祝聖
發表聲明/ > [accessed 13 Sep 2016]. 
4 UCANEWS, ‘Vatican statement 'outrageous': Govt Says self-election and self-ordination 
will continue despite threats from Rome’, ucanews.com, 4 Jul 2012, < 
http://www.ucanews.com/news/vatican-statement-outrageous-and-shocking-
govt/54590> [accessed 13 Sep 2016]. 
 
5 Pope Benedict XVI, ‘To the Bishops, Priests, Consecrated Persons and Lay Faithful of 
the Catholic Church in the People’s Republic of China’ (2007) [The Holy See’s Official 
Website]<https://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-
xvi/en/letters/2007/documents/hf_ben-xvi_let_20070527_china.html> [accessed 19 Sep 
2016]. 
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offered by the official website of the Holy See. On 7 May 2008, on China’s 
initiative, the China Philharmonic Orchestra (CPO) made a historic visit to 
Vatican City. In the Paul VI audience hall, the CPO staged a concert in front 
of Pope Benedict XVI, in which they performed Mozart’s Requiem and 
several pieces of traditional Chinese music. The Chinese ambassador to 
Italy, Sun Yuxi, was also present at the event. After the concert, the Pope 
shook the hands of the conductor and other members of the orchestra, 
greeted them in Chinese and gave a speech, in which he expressed his 
good wishes that China would hold a successful summer Olympic Games.6 
This event received widespread media coverage in both China and the 
West. The Xinhua News Agency, the official press agency of the PRC 
government, defined the concert as ‘historic’ and ‘icebreaking’ in its news 
articles. 7  From 2006 to 2010, the Vatican endorsed many bishops 
appointed by the officially-sanctioned church8 and the majority of bishops 
appointed in this period tended to have approval from both sides.  
Unfortunately, all these positive signs and exchanges of goodwill ended up 
with bitter quarrels. Since late 2010, Sino-Vatican relations again returned 
to stalemate. Hearing about the Sino-Vatican dispute over consecrations, 
Ren Yanli, a scholar of Religious Studies and a previous member of the 
Chinese Social Science Academy, expressed his disappointment in an 
                                            
6  Xinhuanet, ‘the CPO enchanted the Vatican, the Pope gave a speech blessing the 
Olympic Games’, Xinhuanet, 10 May 2008, <http://news.xinhuanet.com/audio/2008-
05/10/content_8142157.htm > [accessed 13 Sep 2016]. 
7 Xinhuanet, ‘the CPO will stage a historic performance in the Vatican’, Xinhuanet, 4 May 
2008, < http://news.xinhuanet.com/audio/2008-05/04/content_8098200.htm > 
[accessed 13 Sep 2016]. 
8 For example, Li Shan, the Bishop of Beijing (consecrated 21 Sep 2007); Gan Junqiu, the 
Bishop of Guangzhou (consecrated 4 Dec 2007) Cai Bingrui, the Bishop of Xiamen 
(consecrated 14 May 2010). 
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interview with Catholic News Asia: ‘the four years (of reconciliation efforts) 
is now in vain!’ 9 He pointed out that: 
‘The dispute over the Chinese bishops’ appointment again breaks out. It is just like an 
old drama shown repeatedly for over 60 years, which makes its audience sick. The 
story is always the same: China would unilaterally appoint a bishop, whose 
consecration ceremony would have to be “escorted and protected” by a large swarm 
of officials. The Vatican then would issue a statement in protest, which would be 
criticised by the Chinese authority. After the event, several bishops participating the 
event would repent of their deeds to the Vatican. The Catholics in China would be 
deeply upset by the dispute.’ 10 
Indeed, Ren’s comment is a good description of a ‘typical round’ of the Sino-
Vatican conflict. The PRC-Vatican stalemate is characterised by a 
stereotypical pattern of conflict. We can observe repetitively from their 
interactional history, that the PRC and the Vatican always quarrel over the 
same issues with an almost identical pattern. The conflict usually starts with 
a unilateral act of consecrating bishops from one party, which is quickly 
followed by bitter accusations from the other side. Both sides will then 
strengthen their gestures and stances, which quickly escalates the conflict. 
The confrontation usually ends up with a propaganda war and the PRC 
government’s house arrest of the pro-Vatican priests. This is followed by 
religious penalties and excommunications on the Vatican’s part. It seems 
that the two countries are locked into a vicious circle, in which the mutual 
trust and goodwill accumulated over four or five years would suddenly be 
destroyed in an outbreak of wrangling. After China’s re-opening to the world 
                                            
9 UCAN, ‘China observer points out that the consecration in Chengde is “inexplicable”’, 
UCAN Chinese, 3 Dec 2010, < http://china.ucanews.com/2010/12/03/【特稿】中國觀
察家直指承德祝聖禮「莫名其妙」/> [accessed 13 Sep 2016]. 




in the late 1970s, the two countries made many attempts to engage with 
each other. The diplomatic efforts of this period culminated in the visit to 
Beijing in 1987 of the Archbishop of Manila, Cardinal Jaime Sin, who was 
received by the then Chinese Communist Party General Secretary, Zhao 
Ziyang. However, the furthering of dialogue in the two decades always led 
to unexpected serious conflicts. 
It would not be fair to say that the two countries did not make efforts to 
improve their relationship, only that their efforts over the past forty years 
have been almost fruitless. The stalemate continues to exist and trouble the 
Sino-Vatican relationship and seems to be reinforced by every new quarrel. 
What is also surprising is that the main patterns of the stalemate have not 
changed much in the past 60 years, despite the great changes that have 
occurred in the two countries and in the entire world. Six decades ago, the 
world was at the dawn of the Cold War. The People’s Republic of China was 
a newly established republic deeply wounded by the devastating Civil War 
while the Holy See was finding its position in a post-World War II world. 
However, over the next 60 years, the two countries and the entire world 
have undergone great changes that were hard to imagine by previous 
generations.  Despite these changes, the basic patterns of the Sino-Vatican 
stalemate still have not changed. Why is this so? Why can China and the 
Vatican not build a stable relationship when many former sworn enemies 
have become friends?  
Many scholars have discussed the reason why the PRC and the Vatican still 
cannot normalise their relationship. Usually, they see the current situation 
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of the PRC-Vatican relationship as the result of ‘different concepts’11, the 
Chinese tradition of ruling without external interference12, the oppressive 
nature of an atheist/communist regime and its ideology13, and conflicting 
authorities14. However, almost all the observers studied the relationship 
from a ‘rationalist perspective’. The term ‘rationalist’ is the opposite of its 
‘constructivist’ counterpart. In the study of International Relations (IR), 
                                            
11 For example, Cindy Chu argues: ‘it is very difficult for the Vatican to establish diplomatic 
relations with China, as both sides embrace different concepts.’ From: Cindy Chu, The 
Catholic Church in China: 1978 to the Present. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p.7. 
12 Cindy Chu comments on the official church’s unilateral consecration: ‘This resulted from 
Beijing’s refusal to have Chinese people - namely, Catholic converts - pledging loyalty to 
an external force, the Roman Catholic Church.’ (Chu, p.13) She also summarises at the 
end of her book: ‘China has always been suspicious of foreign interference in its domestic 
affairs.’ (Chu, p.134.) 
13 For example, Mariani argued, based on his interpretation of party documents, that the 
ultimate goal of the Chinese Communist Party is to destroy the whole Catholic Church in 
China: ‘So what did the regime want? Party documents answer the question. By 1959, the 
CCP would tacitly admit that, once the regime was strong enough, it would actually destroy 
the church.’ (p.4.) ‘But why did the CCP consider the Shanghai Catholic community its 
enemy? .... There were two major reasons for this. First, Marxists were atheists who wished 
to liberate their compatriots from the idols of their own making.... Second, playing the 
nationalist card, the CCP knew the growth of Catholicism in China was a mixed legacy...’ 
(pp.3-4.). From: Paul P. Mariani, Church Militant: Bishop Kung and Catholic Resistance in 
Communist Shanghai (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2011). 
Leung argues: ‘In a Communist party state, due to ideological differences (atheism vs 
theism), the political leaders always have problems in dealing with a universal religion.’  
From: Beatrice Leung, Sino-Vatican Relations: Problems in Conflicting Authority 1976-1986 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p.5. 
14 For example, Leung argues that ‘The Chinese government looks at the whole thing from 
political and cultural points of view and would regard acknowledging that mainly the moral 
and to some degree the temporal authority rested with a foreign state - i.e. the Vatican - as 
an act of counter-revolution, because the Chinese political leaders would not allow their 
authority to be shared with a religious leader such as the Pope.’ (Leung, p.147) ‘After 
surveying religious problems in China over the last forty years, one may feel that it is the 
Magisterium (the authority to teach) that has been the main reason for church-state conflict 
in PRC.’ (Leung, p.340). 
 11 
Alexander Wendt used the term ‘rationalist’ to define the traditional school 
of IR thought, especially the dominant neo-realism. Wendt pointed out that 
the major difference between the two schools is that constructivism sees 
identities and interests as ‘processes that need to be socially sustained’ 
while rationalism sees them as ‘fixed objects that are in some sense outside 
of social space and time’.15 In other words, rationalists take identities and 
interests as given while constructivists do not. Previous studies on Sino-
Vatican relations tend to adopt a rationalist view, according to which the 
identities and interests of China and the Vatican are given before 
interactions and remained constant during interactions. To be more specific, 
the authors of previous literature noticed that China and the Vatican held 
different identities (communist government vs religion), pointed out that 
these identities were affecting Sino-Vatican interactions, but did not explain 
where these identities came from. The constructivist impact of interaction 
on the identities of the PRC and the Vatican was ignored. 
In contrast to the rationalist approaches, constructivist theory holds that 
identities are not pre-determined but are sustained and shaped by 
interactions. Therefore, from a constructivist perspective, the identities of 
the PRC and Vatican are “what they made of it”.16 By this, I mean that they 
are constructed during their interaction and continue to be shaped, modified 
or strengthened in every interaction. This research focuses on the PRC-
Vatican interactions and studies them from a constructivist perspective and 
the methodology of discourse analysis will be adopted. 
                                            
15 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), p.36. 
16  Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy is What States Made of it’, International Organization, 46 




1.2 Research Question 
The question of this thesis is simple, namely, how did PRC-Vatican 
interactions impact on their identities, and influence their relationships from 
1949 to 1958? To be more specific, the focus of this thesis is the first 9 years 
of interaction between Beijing and Rome.  On the part of China, the first time 
period sees the establishment of the PRC and the consolidation of the 
Communist Party of China (CPC)’s rule over mainland China. On the part 
of the Vatican, this period coincides with the last years of Pius XII’s rule. 
The aim of this research is to provide a new answer to old questions: Why 
are the PRC and the Vatican not able to trust each other and build a good 
relationship? Why do the two countries confront each other, and why do 
such confrontations escalate into conflicts in their further contacts? I argue 
that the current mutual distrust between Beijing and Rome originated from 
their pattern of interaction in the 1950s. Hence, to understand the current 
obstacles preventing Beijing and Rome from reaching a rapprochement, we 
need to understand how these obstacles were formed in the 1950s. 
However, before putting forward my own answers to these questions, let us 
first examine the previous scholarly opinions on this topic. 
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2.  Previous academic discussions on 
Sino-Vatican relations 
2.1. Overview of Previous Literature 
Sino-Vatican relations is a ‘small’ topic and previous literature dedicated to 
the topic is limited. However, the paucity of literature does not mean that the 
richness of content is compromised. Indeed, the efforts of previous scholars 
have resulted in scholarly works that are interesting, informative and 
insightful, from which we are shown a vivid picture of Sino-Vatican relations 
in the past 60 years. In this chapter, I attempt to give an overview of the 
previous literature on Sino-Vatican relations, provide a preliminary analysis 
of important works in this field and point out both their contributions and 
limitations.  
Martyrdom Literature 
The first, and by far the biggest, category of existing literature could be 
called ‘martyrdom literature’ because it tries to reveal how Catholics in 
China suffered under communist rule. I define the word ‘martyrdom’ here as 
‘the situation where Catholics suffer/die for the cause of Rome’.17 One 
example of these books is the personal account of hard times and the 
collection of martyrdom stories. They reflect the subjective experience of 
                                            
17 Special attention should be given to the word ‘martyrdom’. The word ‘martyrdom’ here 
is a usage from the viewpoint of the Roman Catholic Church as different Christian 
denominations could have very different interpretations over the true meaning of 
‘martyrdom’. For example, during the Reformation era the Protestants who died opposing 
the Pope could also be defined as ‘martyrs’ by their Protestant peers. 
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religious freedom in China, which is often not academic and contains little 
analysis. Su18 gives us a detailed account about the tribulations undergone 
by Catholics since 1949 in a chronological order. Catherine Ho19, a Catholic 
who spent many years in labour camps during the Cultural Revolution, 
narrates her life, marriage and faith in an adverse environment. The book 
expressed her deep loathing of the PRC government and the oppressive 
campaigns against Catholics in China. Father Aedan McGrath20, one of the 
major leaders of the Legion of Mary in China, wrote about his experience in 
a communist prison. McGrath described his missionary efforts in China 
before the communist takeover and his endeavours to bring the Legion of 
Mary into China,21 his arrest by the PRC government22 and the three-year’s 
ill-treatment he received in a prison cell.23 In the concluding part of his book, 
Father McGrath used the word ‘bandits’24 to denote the PRC government 
and argued that the ‘peace’ promoted by Beijing is merely a method of 
communist infiltration. 25  He condemned the Chinese Catholic Patriotic 
Association (CPA)’s argument that ‘nobody outside China’26 could control 
or give orders to the Chinese Church. According to him, the officially-
                                            
18 Ruoyi Su, The Historical Material of the Martyrdom in China from 1948-1957 (Taipei: Fu Jen 
University Press, 2000). 
19 Catherine Ho, The Lark and the Dragon: Experiences of a Chinese Women Prisoner of Conscience 
(Taipei: Caritas Printing Training Centre, 1996). 
20 Aedan McGrath, Perseverance through Faith: A Priest’s Prison Story (Bloomington: Xlibris, 
2008). 
21 Ibid., pp. 13-35. 
22 Ibid., pp. 54-63. 
23 Ibid., pp. 112-197. 
24 Ibid., p. 203. 
25 Ibid., p. 203. 
26 Ibid., p. 207. 
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sanctioned church ‘is a façade’.27 In sum, despite their subjective nature, 
these books often contain valuable first-hand experience and historical 
material, which is useful to research projects on Sino-Vatican relations. 
The second type of ‘martyrdom literature’ sees academic studies of good 
quality. They are systematic studies of Catholics’ efforts to resist Beijing’s 
iron first and their suffering under communist rule. The writers of these 
books studied the suppression of the Catholic Church and the tribulations 
of Catholics in China from an academic perspective. Myers’ book Enemies 
Without Guns is the first comprehensive academic study28 of the PRC’s 
campaign against the Catholic Church in the 1950s. As the name of the 
book suggests, Myers focused on the enmity between the PRC government 
and the Catholic Church and tried to show the brutality of the PRC’s 
campaigns against the Catholic Church. According to Myers, even before 
1949, the communist Party of China (CPC) 29  had begun to persecute 
Catholics in communist-controlled areas.30 Anti-religious tendency is an 
inherent part of Mao’s and the CPC’s ideology,31 under the guidance of 
which the communists started a campaign aimed at destroying the Catholic 
Church.32 The Catholic Church suffered greatly under Mao’s regime, foreign 
missionaries were expelled and pro-Vatican priests were jailed and tortured. 
                                            
27 Ibid., p. 208. 
28 James T. Myers, Enemies Without Guns: The Catholic Church in the People’s Republic of China 
(New York: Paragon House, 1991), p. xi. 
29 There are two, often interchangeable ways of translating the name of the ruling party of 
China in English: The Communist Party of China (CPC) or the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP). In this thesis I shall use the official abbreviation – CPC. However, it should be 
noticed that some previous authors on this topic also used the abbreviation ‘CCP’. When 
quoting from these authors their original wording will be retained.  
30 Myers, pp. 1-21. 
31 Ibid., pp. 21-28. 
32 Ibid., pp. 57-103. 
 16 
But a lot of Chinese Catholics showed their strong faith in their tribulations.33 
Myers translated many original Chinese documents and texts to 
demonstrate the PRC’s hostility towards Catholicism; the harsh treatment 
of imprisoned priests and the sufferings undergone by ordinary Catholics. 
The main arguments of Myers’ book regarding the relationship between the 
PRC government and the Catholic Church are as follows. First, the PRC 
government, especially under Mao’s regime, had the clear intention to 
destroy religions 34  and the campaigns against Catholicism were ‘a 
deliberate policy conceived at the top levels of the Party and executed with 
ruthless single-mindedness over a period of years.’35 Second, the church’s 
hard times will continue as long as the Communist Party keeps tight political 
control over the Chinese people.36 Third, the future of the church in China 
depends on the domestic politics of China and is closely related to the 
leadership/ideology of China and the performance of the regime.37 
Mariani’s book Church Militant made a significant contribution to the 
historical studies of the Catholic Church in China in the 1950s.38 Being one 
of the latest books examining the church in China, Mariani vividly illustrated 
the Catholic resistance against the communist government and the church’s 
underground tactics in Shanghai under the leadership of Bishop Kung. The 
period covered by his book is the same as that in Myers’ Enemies Without 
Guns, but Mariani’s book is more systematic and rich in detail, as the writer 
                                            
33 Ibid., pp. 121 -217. 
34 Ibid., p. xiv. 
35 Ibid., p. 229. 
36 Ibid., p. 312. 
37 Ibid., pp. 318-320. 
38 Paul P. Mariani, Church Militant: Bishop Kung and Catholic Resistance in Communist Shanghai 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2011). 
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had better access to archives and material from both the Chinese side and 
the church side. The aim of Mariani’s book was to find out why the Catholics 
in the city of Shanghai were able to resist the PRC government’s policies 
for so many years after other groups in China had long been subdued.39 
Mariani’s narrative starts from the year 1949 when the communist army took 
control of Shanghai. Despite the initial peaceful coexistence with the city’s 
population and the church, the newly established communist authority 
quickly started to exert pressure on the Catholic Church in terms of taxes, 
school curricula and religious policy.40 Facing such a situation, the church 
taught Catholics ‘to yield in secondary matters, but remain firm in the 
essentials.’41 The government then started to compel the Catholic Church 
in China to cut off ties with Rome. Subsequently, the newly appointed 
Bishop Kung encouraged the religious fervour of Shanghai Catholics42 and 
many Catholic mass organizations (including the Legion of Mary) were 
created in the Catholic community.43 The fast expansion and the militant 
nature of Catholic organizations 44  quickly raised the suspicions of the 
communist government, which soon led to a suppression campaign against 
the papal internuncio,45 the Catholic Central Bureau46 and the Legion of 
Mary.47 Massive arrests and the expulsion of missionaries occurred in the 
Diocese of Shanghai and an intensive propaganda war was waged against 
                                            
39 Ibid., p.7. 
40 Ibid., pp. 32-39. 
41 Ibid., p. 38. 
42 Ibid., p. 45. 
43 Ibid., pp. 46-53. 
44 Ibid., pp. 62-67 
45 Ibid., p. 69. 
46 Ibid., p. 71. 
47 Ibid., pp. 75-86. 
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the pro-Vatican priests.48 In the final stage of the campaign, the government 
arrested Bishop Kung and forced many of his colleagues to denounce him.49 
Kung and many of his peers were tried for ‘counterrevolutionary crimes’ and 
were put into prison. 50  The Catholic Patriotic Association (CPA) was 
created 51  under the auspices of the government and the church was 
rendered deeply divided until today.52 
To discuss the political relationship between Beijing and Rome is not the 
focus of Mariani’s book. However, a study on the Chinese Catholic Church 
would inevitably touch upon Sino-Vatican relations. Mariani’s viewpoint 
regarding Sino-Vatican relations is very similar to that of Myers. He believes 
that the Communist Party of China, due to its atheist nature, is a natural 
enemy of Catholicism and aims to destroy the church from the start. The 
PRC’s oppressive campaigns against Chinese Catholics and foreign 
missionaries failed to destroy the church but succeeded in dividing it. The 
priests who cooperated with the PRC government caused damage to the 
church and hurt the feelings of Chinese Catholics. Reconciliation between 
‘the two churches’ (open and underground) is needed. In sum, Mariani’s 
book, alongside the one written by Myers, are the most detailed academic 
studies in the English language on the Chinese Catholic Church in the 
1950s. Since the Chinese Church in the 1950s is the focus of my project, 
this thesis draws much from the two books (Mariani, Myers) but disagrees 
with them in the interpretation of historical events. Furthermore, this thesis 
will critique the conclusions drawn by Myers and Mariani in the light of a rich 
amount of newly discovered archival material. 
                                            
48 Ibid., pp. 109-142. 
49 Ibid., pp. 143-168. 
50 Ibid., pp. 190-205. 
51 Ibid., p. 183. 
52 Ibid., pp. 206-227. 
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Comment on the ‘Martyrdom Literature’  
The ‘martyrdom literature’ narrates the twists and turns of the Catholic 
Church in China from the perspective of personal/group experience. 
Reading these books, we can see how the mistrust between Beijing and 
Rome could bring great suffering to millions of Catholics in China. However, 
there are two questions awaiting answers: Why did Rome and Beijing 
become enemies (in the 1950s)? Were the conflicts between them really 
inevitable? If we follow the discourse of the ‘martyrdom literature’, the 
following conclusions could be drawn: 
First, the PRC is a staunch atheist and communist state that has no common 
ground with Catholicism. Second, the PRC is determined to destroy the 
Church in China. Third, Chinese Catholics should follow the examples of 
martyrs in the 1950s, showing their faith to Rome despite suffering trials and 
tribulations. There is ‘no fellowship between light and darkness’ and 
Catholics should never cooperate with the Patriotic Association (CPA), 
which is a schismatic movement against the Pope.  
However, this thesis argues against the above conclusions for an important 
reason – I argue that the mind-set behind the ‘martyrdom literature’ is mainly 
based on a highly oversimplified and demonized image of Beijing in the 
1950s. The narratives in previous literature are one-sided and do not shed 
light on the nuances of Beijing’s’ policymaking regarding the Catholic 
Church. Here, I would like to quote the words on the back cover of Father 
McGrath’s book, which is a good example of this rigid, anti-Beijing mind-set: 
‘Father W. Aedan McGrath took on a regime that knew no limit to its hatred and 
vengeance. Now, almost sixty years later, people in the West are looking with different 
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eyes toward Communist China and its booming economy… The China before us here 
and now is the China, still, in part, rooted in the drama of Father McGrath.’ 53 
In other words, in the mind of many writers of ‘martyrdom literature’, even 
today’s China, despite its reforms and economic growth, is still a regime that 
cannot be separated from its radical communist past and its inherent enmity 
towards religions. Therefore, the Sino-Vatican enmity in the 1950s was 
unavoidable and it would be unwise for the Vatican to make any 
compromise regarding the officially-sanctioned church in China. According 
to this mind-set, there are not many things that the Vatican could do. As 
long as the ‘brutal regime’ in Beijing continues, the church in China cannot 
expect better treatment. This reasoning is simple and seems convincing to 
many people in the West – but can we really ignore the Vatican’s agency in 
Sino-Vatican relations? Is ‘waiting until the communist regime collapses’ 
really a good option for Rome?  
To conclude, the ‘martyrdom literature’ tells us a lot about the tragedy of 
Chinese Catholics in the 1950s but does not tell us how the long-standing 
conflict between Beijing and Rome had been formed in the first place. 
Instead of seeking to find the deeper roots of the Sino-Vatican stalemate, 
the ‘martyrdom literature’ attributes all the suffering of Chinese Catholics to 
the atheist nature of the communist regime. It is interesting to think how 
these books would influence Rome’s China policy if the Vatican’s decision-
makers drew their impressions of China mainly from such books. 
Biographies/Memoirs of Important People 
Apart from ‘martyrdom literature’, the second category of the previous 
literature is the biographies and memoirs of key persons in Sino-Vatican 
relations. These works more or less reflected the authors’ understandings 
                                            
53 McGrath, back cover. 
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of global communism and the regime of Beijing. For example, the architect 
of Rome’s Ostpolitik (Eastern Policy), Cardinal Casaroli, has written a 
book, 54  Il martirio della pazienza, which is a valuable account of the 
Vatican’s foreign policy towards the communist states in the latter years of 
the Cold War.   
In his book, Casaroli expressed his views of communism. According to him, 
at the time when the Holy See started to engage with the communist states, 
communism still looked powerful and stable. In every aspect, the communist 
states in Europe that were established after the first and second World War 
continued to exist decades after their foundation. And the people in these 
countries seemed willing to follow the Communist Party and give the party 
support.55 On the one hand, the Western states did not have a strong and 
collective will to act against the communist bloc. On the other hand, there 
was no strong opposition force inside the Communist states and the 
Western states did not give effective help to the opposition force.56  
Casaroli further discussed whether there could be a version of non-atheist 
communism (un comunismo non ateo).57 According to him, communism 
claims itself to be ‘scientific’ and made the promise of realizing a communist 
paradise in the world. Those who refuse to accept the communist paradise 
are considered as ‘reactionaries’ who will spare no efforts to prevent the 
realization of the communist society. Hence the vanguards, intellectuals and 
workers should struggle against the reactionaries with an ‘iron fist’ when 
                                            
54 Agostino Casaroli, Il martirio della pazienza: la Santa Sede e i paesi comunisti, 1963-89 (Turin: 
Einaudi, 2000). 
55 Ibid., p.32. 
56 Ibid., p.39. 
57 Ibid., p.29. 
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necessary.58 On the way to communism there would be some recalcitrants 
who would draw people away from the communist paradise on earth. And 
followers of religion are certainly among these recalcitrants because the  
promise made by religion, concerning life after death, is totally incompatible 
with communism’s promise on earth. The Catholic Church, in the eyes of 
the communist states, is systematically diffusing the ‘opium’ amongst the 
people. The church’s teaching of ‘loving your enemies’ is in direct opposition 
to communism’s teaching about class struggle.59 The communists accused 
the church of maintaining an unequal social order and declared the church 
to be a dangerous enemy, against which an iron fist should be used. 
However, in their campaigns against the Catholic Church, the communist 
governments always claim that they are acting against ‘anti-state activities’ 
instead of cracking down on religious activities. In short, Casaroli’s 
evaluation of the communist government more or less represented the 
general view held by Vatican high officials towards the states ruled by 
communist parties, including the PRC. 
Apart from Cardinal Casaroli’s book, many other biography/autobiography 
works offer different perspectives and personal accounts regarding the 
relationship between Rome and Beijing. Coppa, in his biography 60 of Pope 
Pius XII, discussed Pius XII’s China policy in the 1950s and its implications. 
Two prominent bishops in China, Bishop Dominic Tang 61  and Bishop 
                                            
58 Ibid., p.31. 
59 Ibid., p.33. 
60 Frank J. Coppa, The Life and Pontificate of Pope Pius XII: between History and Controversy 
(Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 2013). 
61 Dominic Tang, How Inscrutable His Ways!: Memoirs (Hong Kong: Condor Production 
Limited, 1994). 
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Aloysius Jin Luxian 62  published their autobiographies, which contain a 
wealth of historical material on the situation of the church during the 1950s 
and the 1980s. 
DiGiovanni’s study on the life of Cardinal Ignatius Kun Pin-mei filled a 
biographical niche about the only Cardinal created in mainland China after 
1949.63 The author stated in the foreword that the purpose of his writing was 
to advocate Bishop Kung’s canonisation. Starting with Bishop Kung’s 
Christian name ‘Ignatius’,64 DiGiovanni highly praised Kung’s loyalty to the 
Holy See and compared him to Saint Ignatius of Antioch and Saint Ignatius 
of Loyola. According to DiGiovanni, Bishop Kung’s life perfectly illustrated 
that ‘one can be both a faithful Catholic and a faithful citizen’.65 He prayed 
for the opening of Bishop Kung’s Cause of Canonisation and ‘for China.’66 
DiGiovanni’s book reviewed the entire life of Bishop Kung. Tracing back to 
the early life of Bishop Kung, DiGiovanni pointed out that Kung had a clear 
sense of right and wrong since childhood 67 . After Kung’s seminary 
formation, he was appointed as the first Bishop of Shanghai with Chinese 
Nationality.68 After the founding of the PRC, Kung became the leader of the 
Catholic resistance in Shanghai.69His non-compromising attitude towards 
                                            
62 Luxian Jin, The Memoirs of Jin Luxian Chinese Version: Vol.1 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong 
University Press, 2013). 
63 Stephen M. DiGiovanni, Ignatius: The Life of Ignatius Cardinal Kung Pin-mei (Scotts Valley, 
California: CreateSpace, 2013). 
64 Ibid., p.i. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid., p.ii. 
67 Ibid., p.2. 
68 Ibid., pp.11-14. 
69 Ibid., pp. 38-59. 
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the communist government led to his arrest and trial.70 In the 30-year-long 
imprisonment, Kung showed his outstanding perseverance in faith and 
loyalty towards Rome by refusing again and again to collaborate with the 
government in exchange for liberty.71 In the late 1980s Kung was finally 
released by the PRC government and exiled to the US. 72  DiGiovanni 
narrated the last years of Bishop Kung and concluded that ‘his dedication to 
the Catholics of Shanghai, and his decades of suffering and imprisonment 
made him one of the great confessors of the Faith.’73 
Regarding the Chinese Church, DiGiovanni’s book took a stance similar to 
that of the Pope before the 1960s: the ‘three-self’ movement 74  in the 
Chinese Church after 1949 is a schismatic move against the Pope.75 Only 
the underground church is truly loyal to Rome; the PRC government is the 
enemy of Catholicism. DiGiovanni praised Kung’s repeated refusal to 
cooperate with the government and his uncompromising attitude towards 
the officially-sanctioned church and seminaries. 76  At the same time, 
DiGiovanni criticised Fr. Aloysius Jin Luxian, another prominent figure in the 
Diocese of Shanghai who later cooperated with the PRC government.77 
Briefly, DiGiovanni’s book, similarly to Myers and Mariani, is highly critical 
of the Chinese government, regarding it as a sworn enemy of Catholicism.  
                                            
70 Ibid., pp. 59-81. 
71 Ibid., pp. 81-94. 
72 Ibid., pp. 94-102. 
73 Ibid., p.101. 
74 ‘Three-self’ movement was initiated by Beijing in the Christian churches in China in the 
early 1950s. The aim was to clear the churches in China of their ‘imperialist influence’, 
namely their political and economic ties with the West. The literal meaning of ‘three-self’ 
is ‘self-preaching, self-governing and self-funding’.  
75 DiGiovanni, p.81. 
76 Ibid., p.93. 
77 Ibid., pp.93-94. 
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Books Studying Sino-Vatican Relations from an IR 
Perspective 
The third category of the previous literature is the books studying Sino-
Vatican relations from an IR/diplomatic perspective. The works in this 
category examine the relationship between the governments of the PRC 
and the Holy See. My current research also belongs to this category. In the 
study of international relations, ‘Sino-Vatican relations’ is a ‘small’ topic 
comparing to the ‘big’ topics (e.g. Sino-American relations) and the books 
exclusively dedicated to Sino-Vatican relations are rare. We will now give a 
brief outline of two milestone works in this field. 
Beatrice Leung is an important author on Sino-Vatican relations from the 
perspective of international relations. Her book78 Sino-Vatican Relations: 
Problems in Conflicting Authority 1976-1986 is the first book-length study 
on the topic and still by far the most important study on Sino-Vatican 
relations written in English. Although her research was focused on a 
different historical period from this thesis, her main viewpoints were still 
relevant to my research. As the title of the book suggests, Leung’s central 
argument is that the PRC and the Vatican did not manage to normalize their 
relationship because they were conflicting with each other over authority. 
To be more specific, this conflict of authority could be traced back to the pre-
modern era of China. In the late-Ming dynasty (late 1500s) many local 
officials persecuted Catholicism and the church in China was under attack 
from many Confucian scholars with the fear that the foreign religion would 
challenge the imperial authority of China.79 Although the Chinese emperor 
                                            
78  Beatrice Leung, Sino-Vatican Relations: Problems in Conflicting Authority 1976-1986 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
79 Ibid., p. 18. 
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and Catholicism enjoyed a brief period of ‘honeymoon’, the emperor Kangxi 
of Qing Dynasty banned Catholicism in China as his imperial authority was 
challenged by Rome in the Chinese Rite Controversy.80 After China was 
defeated in the Opium War, Catholicism re-emerged in China under the 
protection of Western colonial powers. 81  Some Catholic missionaries 
worked closely with the Western colonists and participated in their 
endeavour of colonizing China. 82  In this period, the clergy in China 
consisted mainly of foreign priests. However, Rome tried to initiate the 
localization of the church.83 Both the Chinese government and the Holy See 
wanted to abolish the French Protectorate of Missions in China and 
establish formal Sino-Vatican diplomatic ties.84 In 1942 the two countries 
finally established diplomatic relations.85 
After the founding of the People’s Republic, the communist government was 
eager to impose its authority on all aspects of social life, including religion. As 
the Vatican also did not want to lose its authority over the Chinese Catholic 
Church, the two sides fiercely contested with each other to assert their 
authority over the church, which led to the breaking-up of relations. After a 
decade of political turmoil in China, the Vatican started to make overtures to 
China under the policy of ‘Ostpolitik’, which was greatly informed by the Holy 
See’s experience in the USSR and other communist states in Eastern Europe. 
Despite having had an uneasy history86 with the Catholic Church during the 
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Mao era, China had started its reform policies and granted more freedom to 
the Catholic Church in mainland China under the new religious policy.87 But 
the church’s freedom was still seriously constrained by the government to 
ensure that the government’s authority was not undermined.88 Hence, the 
new religious policy of China, though promising ‘religious freedom’ to citizens 
of the PRC, was still harsh towards the Catholic Church as the government 
refuse to share authority with the Vatican.  Moving towards reconciliation 
would not be easy, as both sides had their own concerns89 and did not want 
to renounce their authority over the Chinese Catholic Church.  As a 
conclusion, Leung argues that the main reason for the conflict between the 
PRC and the Vatican is that the PRC cannot tolerate the Magisterium 
(teaching authority) of the Holy See.90  
Apart from Leung, two scholars from Taiwan, Chen and Jiang, who have 
many years of working experience in the Vatican, have also written in 
Chinese a comprehensive diplomatic history of relations between China and 
the Vatican from Taiwan’s perspective. The two authors’ major source of 
research came from Taiwan. At the time of writing, Chen was the Director 
of the Fu Jen Catholic Historical Institute in the Fu Jen Catholic University 
in Taiwan while Jiang was an editor at Radio Vaticana. Both writers have 
close connections with the Taipei’s diplomats in charge of Vatican affairs. 
All these contributed to the academic quality of their book, which is the only 
book that has full and detailed coverage of the historical events that 
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89 Ibid., pp.257-287. 
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occurred in the triangular relationship between Rome, Beijing and Taipei 
after 1949.  
Cheng and Jiang’s review of Sino-Vatican history starts from pre-modern 
times (1200s) but focusses on modern times. The Vatican’s earliest contact 
with the Chinese rulers can be traced back to the Yuan Dynasty.91 During 
the Ming and early Qing Dynasty, the Catholic Church gradually increased 
its influence in China, but the Chinese Rite Controversy gave the church a 
serious blow. After the Opium War, the church in China was under the 
French Protectorate.92 Both China and the Vatican struggled to bypass the 
French Protectorate 93 and in 1922 the Vatican managed to send Celso 
Costantini, the first Apostolic Delegate to China. 94  During the Sino-
Japanese War (1937-1945) the second Apostolic Delegate to China, Mario 
Zenin, had shown an ambiguous attitude towards Japan and its puppet state 
– Manchukuo. 95  After WWII, the KMT government in Nanjing formally 
established diplomatic relations with the Holy See.96 However, in 1949 the 
KMT government was defeated and lost control over mainland China. In the 
light of the new situation, the Holy See refused to accept the new 
ambassador sent by Taipei and ordered the papal internuncio to stay in 
mainland China. However, Sino-Vatican relations quickly deteriorated and 
the internuncio was expelled from the Chinese mainland in 1951.97 In these 
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circumstances, the Holy See resumed its relationship with Taiwan and sent 
the papal internuncio to Taipei.98  
Pope John XXIII used the word ‘schism’ to define the situation in mainland 
China and upgraded diplomatic relationship with Taipei from envoy level to 
ambassador level.99 After the opening of the Second Vatican Council, the 
Pope refrained from using the word ‘schism’ to describe the Chinese 
Church, taking advice from the bishops from Taiwan.100 During Paul VI’s 
reign, the Vatican started to seek dialogue with Beijing.101 The Pope also 
expressed his support for allowing Beijing to join the United Nations.102 In 
1971 Taipei was expelled from the United Nations in favour of Beijing. The 
Holy See quickly downgraded its ties with Taiwan by ceasing to send Papal 
Nuncios to Taipei.103 Pope John Paul II ‘knocked on the door of China’ in 
1981 with his speech in Manila.104 However, the Vatican’s overture towards 
China was interrupted by the Bishop Tang incident, in which the Vatican’s 
appointment of the Archbishop of Guangzhou (Canton) was fiercely 
attacked by Beijing.105 The Pope made further attempts to engage China, 
but none of them achieved the desired outcome.106 In the meantime, Taipei 
expressed its deep worries about the possible rapprochement between 
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Rome and Beijing.107 In the late 1980s, positive signs were shown in Sino-
Vatican relations, culminating in Cardinal Sin’s visit to Mainland China and 
his meeting with the Chinese Premier, Zhao Ziyang.108 However, the 1989 
Tiananmen incident again dampened the hope of a Sino-Vatican 
rapprochement.109  
2.2 Conclusion: A Rigid View of Identity 
In the above part I have given a concise review of previous literature that 
discussed Sino-Vatican relations after 1949. To conclude, previous 
literature on Sino-Vatican relations could be divided into three categories, 
namely martyrdom accounts, biographies and IR/diplomatic studies. Most 
works belong to the category of ‘martyrdom literature’ and focus on the 
sufferings of Chinese Catholics in the 1950s. Among the ‘martyrdom 
literature’, two works, namely Myers’ Enemies Without Guns and Mariani’s 
Church Militant, are by far the most academic and systematic; while among 
the IR/diplomatic studies Leung’s Problems in Conflicting Authority and 
Chen and Jiang’s A Sino-Vatican Diplomatic History are milestone works in 
the field. As my research focus is on the period from 1949 to 1958, this 
thesis will carry out intensive dialogue and debate with the previous books 
that cover the same historical period (especially the works of Myers, Mariani, 
Jiang and Chen). However, I argue that the previous works on Sino-Vatican 
relations share a common, and indeed serious, shortcoming. To be more 
specific, the previous authors often attribute highly stereotypical 
identities/ideologies to China and to the Vatican and use these 
identities/ideologies to explain the deeds of the respective states.  
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These pre-attributed identities are so prominent in previously published 
literature in this field that they led to a serious oversimplification of Beijing-
Rome interaction and hampered deeper understanding of Sino-Vatican 
relations. Let us see first how such oversimplification happens when the 
previous authors attribute fixed identities to Beijing – namely, the previous 
writers always consider the PRC as a staunch ‘communist’ and ‘atheist’ 
regime, and these two identities were used by previous authors to explain 
virtually all the conflicts between Beijing and the Catholic Church. According 
to the accounts of previous authors, Beijing’s ‘communist’ and ‘atheist’ 
identities were totally incompatible with Catholicism and the fierce clashes 
between the regime and the church were somewhat inevitable.  For 
example, when Mariani was evaluating the PRC government’s harsh 
measures against Catholics in the 1950s, he asserted that all these 
measures were Beijing’s effort ‘to hasten a communist utopia’ and they were 
part of ‘an epic struggle between the forces of theism and atheism’.110 The 
underlying rationale of the CPC regime, as Mariani put it, lay in the fact that 
‘Marxists were atheists who wished to liberate their compatriots from the 
idols of their own making’.111  Another important author, Myers, also argued 
that the communist identity, ‘the nature of the sanctioning ideology of the 
PRC, namely: Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought’ was the root of 
Sino-Vatican conflicts.112 Myers further contended that ‘Mao Zedong’s views 
on religion were not different in any substantial way from those of Lenin’113 
and argued that ‘much of the pattern of anti-religious activities in the early 
years of the USSR was to be repeated in China many years later’.114 In other 
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words, Myers regarded Beijing as the same kind of regime as Moscow and 
attributed all the reasons for state-church conflict to Beijing’s ‘communist’ 
nature. Apart from Mariani and Myers, Leung also argued in his book: ‘In a 
Communist party state, due to ideological differences (atheism vs theism), 
the political leaders always have problems in dealing with a universal 
religion.’115 
Hence, following the logic of these authors, as long as the ‘communist’ 
regime continued to rule China, Catholics in China could not expect better 
treatment. Dr. Richard Walker, in his introduction written for Myers’ Enemies 
Without Guns, made such an evaluation about the prospect of the church in 
China: ‘The story is not a pleasant one, nor are the prospects for the church 
in China at all encouraging as long as the Chinese Communist Party 
remains in power.’116 Regarding the goal of Beijing’s Catholic policy, both 
Myers and Mariani argued that the communist regime’s ultimate goal was 
to eradicate the Catholic Church in China. For example, Myers argued in 
the preface of his book: ‘The government’s effort, of which no secret was 
made, was to penetrate, control, and eventually eliminate religion from 
Chinese life.’117 Mariani also argued that ‘the regime ultimately wanted to 
destroy the Catholic Church’.118 Based on this assumption, Beijing’s iron fist 
attitude towards the church, according to Myers and Mariani, was long 
determined by the nature of the CPC even before the establishment of PRC 
– the harsh measures against the church after 1949 were simply the step-
by-step implementation of the regime’s eradication policy. 
So what was the implication of such a view from previous literature of Beijing 
as a regime with a fixed ‘communist’ identity? I argue the implication was 
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indeed great and negative. The first, and the greatest negative implication 
is that such a rigid view of identity led to a one-sided and highly biased report 
of Beijing’s Catholic policy. This tendency is well illustrated by the narrative 
structure of the books of Myers and Mariani – both writers focused almost 
entirely on reporting how Beijing ‘persecuted’ the church, while Rome’s 
agency in Sino-Vatican relations was largely, if not completely, ignored.  
Here I will take Myers’ account as an example. According to the narrative 
structure of his book, the CPC had some time previously begun persecution 
of the Catholic Church in the ‘liberated areas’ controlled by the 
communists.119 After the establishment of the PRC, Beijing soon started to 
exert pressure on church life from many angles: the government interfered 
with church-operated schools/universities and imposed communist 
propaganda on them. The church’s leadership in these institutions was 
greatly hindered and reduced. 120  Massive seizure/occupation of church 
properties was carried out in China, which dealt heavy blows to the financial 
situation of the church.121 To make things worse, the government imposed 
hefty taxes and fines on the church, which impoverished the church and the 
clergy. 122  Following the consolidation of the communist government, 
harsher measures were carried out against the church. The PRC 
government began to demand that the Catholic Church in China should 
sever its ties with the Vatican.123 After a reckless campaign against Rome 
and the pro-Vatican priests, the church in China was finally subdued and 
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the officially-sanctioned church was created.124 However, the creation of the 
officially-sanctioned church was accompanied by the mass arrest and 
imprisonment of Chinese Catholics, many of whom later languished and 
died in prisons and labour camps.125 To put it briefly, Mariani’s narrative 
could be considered as a long list of Beijing’s harsh measures against the 
church, which largely ignored Rome’s role in this Sino-Vatican conflict. A 
similar narrative structure is also seen in the work of Mariani, who regarded 
Beijing’s Catholic policy simply as a four-step approach to destroy the 
church, namely ‘targeted attack’, ‘arrest and expulsions’, ‘assault’ and ‘final 
operations’.126 In sum, previous literature, as exemplified by Myers and 
Mariani’s books, depicted Sino-Vatican relations in the 1950s as Beijing’s 
unilateral persecution of the church. But regarding the question of ‘whether 
Rome played any role in this conflict’ and ‘whether interactions had any 
impact on Sino-Vatican relations’, previous literature is largely silent and 
sheds almost no light on these issues.  
The second negative implication of the rigid ‘communist’ view in previous 
literature is evidenced by their malevolent reading of Beijing’s actions 
towards the church and their hasty conclusions based on scanty evidence. 
For example, when discussing the impact of the Korean War on Sino-
Vatican relations, Myers argued that it merely gave Beijing a pretext to put 
pressure on the church.127 Mariani, when evaluating the benign wording of 
the PRC’s temporary constitution, remarked that ‘the CCP would often 
publicly call for restraint, all the while practicing violent coercion.’128 Both 
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Myers’s book and Chen and Jiang’s book held a negative opinion of 
Beijing’s open expression of Catholic policy and regarded it as mere 
propaganda. 129  In discussing Beijing’s attempt to establish a pro-
government church in Shanghai, Mariani argued that this officially-
sanctioned church was merely a ‘puppet church’ and those priests who 
joined were likely to be motivated by ‘self-aggrandizement’ and the 
‘temptations’ coming from Beijing.130 Briefly, in the eyes of many previous 
authors, virtually all Beijing’s actions towards the church arose from 
extremely malicious intentions. In some cases, to support their malevolent 
reading of the PRC’s Catholic policy, the previous authors may even make 
definitive claims based on scanty/anachronistic evidence. For example, 
when discussing whether Beijing made a genuine attempt to seek Roman 
approval regarding the elected vicar capitular in Shanghai in 1956, Mariani 
drew a hasty conclusion that Beijing was presenting a fait accompli to Rome 
– based on only two sentences from a Chinese source.131 Both Mariani and 
Myers highlighted the existence of a 1959 anti-religion party document to 
support their claim that the CCP had always been seeking to destroy the 
Catholic Church – regardless of the fact that this alleged party document 
was issued in 1959, when the PRC’s overall policy was greatly radicalised 
due the turmoil of the Great Leap Forward. In sum, from these examples in 
previous literature we can see how such a rigid view of identity prevents a 
deeper and more balanced understanding of Sino-Vatican relations. 
The third negative implication of the rigid view of identity is the insufficient 
attention given to the sources from the PRC government and biased attitude 
in data collection. Previous works derived their argument almost entirely 
from church sources and little attention was paid to the original historical 
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sources from the side of the PRC – let alone any in-depth analytical efforts. 
It could be argued that the difficulty of accessing historical archives from the 
Chinese side was part of the reason, however, even the key open 
documents (e.g. the government’s open expression of Catholic policy in the 
early 1950s) from Beijing drew hardly any attention from previous writers – 
they simply mentioned these key documents briefly in their works and made 
hardly any analytical efforts regarding them. Indeed, such negligence 
largely resulted from the previous authors’ highly negative view of Beijing – 
if Beijing was considered a villain and reckless persecutor of religion from 
the very beginning of the 1950s, would there be any necessity to analyse 
Beijing’s expressions? Among previous writers in English, only Mariani 
made some effort to access and use historical archival sources from the 
side of the PRC. However, according to my point of view, Mariani’s rigid 
view of Beijing still led to a major flaw in data collection – his focus of data 
collection was almost entirely on the local-level records of Beijing’s harsh 
measures against the church. In other words, the underlying purpose of 
Mariani’s archival research was simply to find more incriminating evidence 
of ‘how Beijing persecuted the church’ – I think this attitude in data collection 
was highly biased and unhelpful in presenting a balanced report to readers. 
It is hoped that my current project, which is based on rich sources from the 
Chinese side, could somehow remedy this situation and make a contribution 
to a more balanced understanding of Sino-Vatican relations. 
The rigid view of identity led not only to an unbalanced report of Beijing’s 
Catholic policy, but also to an idealised image of the church in China (and 
Rome) in the 1950s. To be more specific, previous authors more or less 
sympathised with the Vatican and regarded the church as an innocent 
martyr under a brutal regime – all the church did in the 1950s was merely to 
ensure her survival in China. For example, Mariani made such an evaluation 
regarding the Shanghai Catholics’ reactions to the government: ‘The CCP’s 
ultimate goal, then, was clear. The goal of Shanghai Catholics was also 
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clear: to fight for survival whatever the cost.’132 Later on in his book, Mariani 
reiterated this view and argued that the only reason Catholics were found 
‘guilty’ by Beijing was that they were ‘defending their church’.133 In other 
words, in the eyes of previous authors, the church and the Vatican were 
purely victims in the face of Beijing the persecutor – all the actions made by 
the church in China and the Vatican were natural reactions towards a 
repressive regime while all the blame for the church’s sufferings should be 
laid on Beijing. In fact, such a pro-Vatican tendency is not strange – 
considering that most of the previous writers on this topic have a Catholic 
background. However, I argue that such sympathy is really unhelpful in 
realising a deeper understanding of Sino-Vatican relations. In fact, the 
relationship between Beijing and Rome, just like any other relationship, is 
never a unilateral matter – what the Vatican did towards Beijing in the 1950s 
would certainly affect the outcome of this relationship. In other words, the 
deterioration of state-church relationships in China should not be attributed 
solely to Beijing. A balanced study should shed light on Rome’s agency in 
this relationship.  
In the above part I have provided an evaluation of previous key works on 
Sino-Vatican relations in the 1950s and pointed out that they share a serious 
shortcoming, namely the rigid view of identity. This rigid view, I argue, has 
led to a highly oversimplified and biased understanding of Sino-Vatican 
relations, which could be summarised as ‘Beijing the reckless persecutor 
versus Rome the innocent victim’. Such a biased understanding is the root 
of many significant flaws in previously published literature, namely the 
malevolent readings of Beijing’s Catholic policy; the one-sided account of 
church history in 1950s; the ignoring of historical sources from the side of 
Beijing; the hasty conclusions based on scanty evidence and the strong pro-
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Vatican tendency – I think all these flaws are very unhelpful in reaching a 
deeper, balanced and rational understanding of Sino-Vatican relations in 
the 1950s. By portraying the church in China as an innocent and passive 
sufferer and laying all the blame on the PRC government, the church’s own 
agency and the implication of the Vatican’s diplomatic policies were totally 
ignored. In other words, previous literature may be quite successful in 
conveying a demonized image of Beijing to the readers, but failed entirely 
to show the nuances in Beijing’s Catholic policy and the impact of the 
interaction between Beijing and Rome – this is a huge gap left by previous 






In the last chapter I have given an overview of previous literature on Sino-
Vatican relations in the 1950s and argued that their common shortcoming 
is the rigid view of identity. In other words, the previous authors regarded 
identities in Sino-Vatican relations as something pre-determined and 
ignored the agency of Beijing and Rome and the possibility of change. 
Therefore, with the objective of filling the gap, this thesis will try to discard 
this rigid view of identity and study Sino-Vatican relations in the 1950s from 
a constructivist perspective. Before carrying out the substantive study of 
Sino-Vatican relations in the 1950s, I will discuss in this chapter the theories, 
methodology and sources on which this research is based. 
The first section of this chapter (3.1) discusses the question ‘are Sino-
Vatican relations state-to-state relations?’ This is an ontological question. 
How we answer it will certainly affect our fundamental judgements about 
Sino-Vatican relations and the theories and the methodology we choose. 
Despite some debate about the Vatican’s status as a state, I argue for an 
affirmative answer and assert that Sino-Vatican relations should be 
considered as state-to-state relations. The implication of this affirmative 
answer is that we will then be confident that the state-centric IR theories can 
be used to examine Sino-Vatican relations.  
Section 3.2 attempts to connect Sino-Vatican relations with mainstream 
International Relations (IR) theories, I will apply mainstream IR theories to 
Sino-Vatican relations and evaluate their explanatory power on this issue. 
In saying ‘mainstream IR theories’, I mean three schools of IR theories, 
namely realism, liberalism and constructivism. The discussion in this section 
will show that the theories based on materialist ontology do not have enough 
power to explain Sino-Vatican relations. By contrast, constructivism offers 
us more insights into this topic. By taking a constructivist position, this thesis 
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argues that more attention should be paid to the identity formation process 
between Beijing and Rome. Based on this argument, the thesis will discuss 
how we should study Sino-Vatican relations in a plausible way based on a 
constructivist worldview.  
In section 3.3, an examination of the concept of identity will be given and its 
connections with Sino-Vatican relations will be pointed out. The thesis will 
then proceed to introduce and define the idea of discourse and explain its 
relationship with identity. The core argument is that Beijing and Rome, as 
states, derive their ways of identifying from their respective discourses. In 
other words, their patterns of self-identification can be understood as 
‘snapshots’ of discourse. By analysing the sources related to the important 
moments in Sino-Vatican interactions, we can discover the discourses 
behind the texts and the identity-articulation process of Beijing and Rome. 
After the theoretical discussion, the final section (3.4) will introduce readers 
to the rationale behind our selection of time periods, the sources and the 
analytical framework.  
 
 
3.1 Are Sino-Vatican Relations State-to-state 
Relations? 
Before applying any IR theories to the study of Sino-Vatican relations the 
thesis needs to discuss whether the two parties in this relationship can be 
qualified as ‘states’. In other words, the question is ‘are Sino-Vatican 
relations state-to-state relations?’ In fact, when studying typical inter-state 
relations (e.g. US-China, UK-US), such discussion on statehood could be 
considered redundant. But in our case, the relationship between Beijing and 
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Rome is so unconventional, which makes a reflection on their statehood 
necessary.  
Indeed, much ambiguity regarding this question arises from the Vatican’s 
side, because Rome is a very peculiar participant in international politics. A 
discussion about the Vatican’s statehood inevitably involves the definition 
of ‘state’ in international relations. Here our analysis will be based on 
Wendt’s definition because his is a syncretisation of the major schools, 
namely Marxist, Weberian and Pluralist, regarding the definition of the state. 
According to Wendt,134 if a political entity is to be qualified as a state, it 
should at least have five properties, namely ‘(1) an institutional-legal order, 
(2) an organization claiming a monopoly on the legitimate use of organized 
violence, (3) an organization with sovereignty, (4) a society, (5) 
territory.’ 135    
In these properties, territory is so essential to the extent that Wendt asserted 
that ‘No territory, no state’. 136  Even if we do not take territory into 
consideration, the Vatican as a political entity does not seem to fit into the 
first four criteria of Wendt’s definition. Regarding (1), the Vatican has a 
structure very different from other states – it does not have a fully-fledged 
legislature regulating secular affairs and does not own any means of 
production apart from a small-scale tourist economy. The Vatican does not 
have any armed forces apart from the ceremonial Swiss Guard. Regarding 
(2), the Vatican needs to rely on Italy to police the areas open to the public. 
In rare cases, the Vatican also needs to ‘borrow’ Italy’s prison cells so that 
those judged by the Vatican as criminals could serve their terms there. 
Regarding (3), the Vatican does not have the right to vote in the UN; and 
                                            
134 Wendt, Social Theory, p. 202. 
135 Ibid. 
136 Ibid., p.211. 
 42 
the Pope usually appears on the world stage as the head of Catholic Church 
instead of as the monarch of Vatican City State. Concerning (4), the Vatican 
does not have a society in the traditional sense. Indeed, with a population 
of less than 1000, it is hard to imagine that any well-developed ‘society’ in 
secular terms could ever be formed. Hence, judging from Wendt’s ‘five 
properties’, it could be argued that the Vatican City’s possessions do not 
make it a state. This poses a question to our study – Why not treat the 
Vatican as a part of the Catholic Church, or simply as an international 
organisation?  
In fact, the Vatican is a unique actor in international politics, to the extent 
that it has both the characteristics of a state and an international 
organisation — the boundary between these two aspects is never clear-cut. 
Interestingly, even Rome itself holds an ambiguous attitude regarding the 
exact definition of the Vatican’s nature. When the Vatican wants to highlight 
its role as the heart of Catholicism and its transcendence over secular 
politics, it will distance itself from the notion of a conventional state. For 
example, when creating diplomatic ties with other states, the Vatican would 
never refer to itself as ‘the Vatican City State’, which may convey a sense 
of being a secular state. Instead, the title ‘the Holy See’ is always used to 
highlight the Vatican’s religious nature. When speaking about the statehood 
of the Vatican, Pope Paul VI stressed that the Vatican was 'one of the 
smallest states’ (uno dei più piccoli) and it has only ‘minuscule, almost 
symbolic secular sovereignty’ (minuscola, quasi simbolica sovranità 
temporale). Therefore, in terms of politics, the Vatican ‘has no secular power 
at all, nor any ambition of competing with you (the secular states)’ (‘Egli non 
ha alcuna potenza temporale, né alcuna ambizione di competere con 
voi.’)137 Briefly, in international affairs, the Vatican tends to downplay its 
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status as a state in the traditional and secular sense and attempts to draw 
attention to its religious nature.  
On the other hand, when the Vatican hopes to show that the papacy is not 
subjugated to any secular power, it emphasises the sovereignty of the Holy 
See and the Vatican City’s status as an independent state. Such an attitude 
can be best illustrated by the Vatican’s approach to the Italian state. In 1870, 
the newly founded Kingdom of Italy captured Rome and declared the 
Eternal City as its capital. Facing Italian occupation, Pope Pius IX protested 
fiercely and declared himself a ‘prisoner of the Italian state’ — therefore 
initiating a 59-year-long stalemate with the Italian regime. During the 
standstill, the Italian government offered a legge delle guarentigie (Law of 
Guarantees) as a proposal to solve the problem. Under this law, the Italian 
state promised to respect the inviolability and the honour of the Pope and to 
give an annual stipend to the Vatican.138 However, the Popes refused to 
accept this solution because they did not want to comply with a ‘law’ 
unilaterally imposed by the Italian state. The ‘Roman Question' was solved 
only in 1929 when the Holy See and the Italian government signed the 
Lateran Pacts. By these pacts, the Vatican City State was established as 
the basis of the Holy See's inviolable sovereignty, both in its relations with 
the Italian government and other secular regimes in the world. After the 
signing of the pacts, Pope Pius XI thus defined the significance of 
sovereignty based on the Vatican City State: ‘a certain territorial sovereignty 
is the universal condition recognised by every real jurisdictional sovereignty 
as indispensable.’ Therefore, the importance of the Vatican City State was 
that it provided the Holy See with ‘the minimum territory which is enough to 
support the sovereignty itself.’ (‘una qualche sovranità territoriale [era] 
condizione universalmente riconosciuta indispensabile a ogni vera 
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sovranità giurisdizionale’) Without this territory, the Holy See’s sovereignty 
will have ‘no place to rest’ (‘non avrebbe dove poggiare’)139 In sum, the 
Vatican also regards state sovereignty as indispensable to the church’s 
existence as an independent actor in international politics.  
As we can see from above, the Vatican itself maintains an ambiguous 
attitude towards its statehood — this approach could be regarded as a wise 
strategy that can ensure that the Holy See gets ‘the best of both worlds’:  in 
interaction with secular regimes, the Vatican often downplays its statehood 
and highlights its features as a religious organisation. But when facing 
pressure from secular governments, the Vatican uses its statehood to 
defend the Pope’s independence and immunity. The peculiar nature of the 
Vatican is a unique phenomenon in international politics. In fact, ‘whether 
the Vatican is a state’ is still a matter of academic debate and scholars have 
not yet reached a consensus regarding the exact status of the Vatican in 
international politics. Some scholars argue against the Vatican’s statehood 
while others argue for it.  
To engage in an in-depth discussion on the Vatican’s statehood is beyond 
the scope of this thesis. Indeed, scholars from both camps can find evidence 
to support their respective claims that the Vatican is/is not a state. However, 
in this research, I would like to side with the camp arguing in favour of the 
Vatican’s statehood. The reason is that the Vatican has many ‘state-like’ 
features that clearly distinguish it from typical international organisations. 
These features have exerted significant influence on Sino-Vatican relations 
and could be easily overlooked if we were to take a non-state approach. I 
shall now illustrate these state-like features of the Vatican, again drawing 
analogies with Wendt’s ‘five essential features' of a state.  
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The first point that distinguishes the Vatican from conventional international 
organisations is that it rules the worldwide church by law instead of non-
binding regulations. In this sense, the Vatican is fully qualified as an 
‘institutional-legal order’. Rome has fully-fledged state organs (institutions 
and departments) and a highly-developed legal system (Canon Law) that 
has high prestige in the history of Western law. The laws of the church lay 
out a strict hierarchical order -  at the head of which is situated the Pope, 
who acts as an absolute monarch over the entire church.   Canon Law 
stipulates that ‘the Roman Pontiff, by virtue of his office, not only has power 
in the universal church but also possesses a primacy of ordinary power over 
all particular churches’ 140 .The core church institutions, such as the College 
of Bishops and the Cardinals, all derive their authority from the Pope and 
could not function without the Pontiff.141 The Pope’s power covers not only 
the core institutions but also the bishops and dioceses worldwide. Canon 
Law specifies that ‘the Supreme Pontiff freely appoints bishops’ 142  and 
strictly excludes secular regimes from influencing episcopal 
appointments.143 According to Canon Law, the Roman Curia is the means 
used by the Pope to carry out his policy.144 Briefly, the highly centralised 
structure of the Catholic Church, as reflected in Canon Law, ensures that 
the Pope and the Roman Curia hold absolute power over other parts and 
institutions of the church around the world. This strictly hierarchical 
relationship between local units and central organs distinguishes the 
Catholic Church not only from other branches of Christianity but also from 
ordinary international organisations — the Vatican acts as the ‘central 
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government’ that rules the worldwide Catholic Church by law, rather than a 
‘headquarters’ of an international organisation.    
The above-mentioned hierarchical structure enables the Vatican to exert 
direct influence on local churches around the world. This is not to say that 
the Vatican prefers to take every single diocese under its absolute control 
— on the contrary, the local churches over the world enjoy a good degree 
of autonomy in most cases. It should also be noticed that the Holy See, after 
the Second Vatican Council, gives more freedom to local churches and 
actively encourages their indigenisation. However, when necessary, the 
Vatican can still exert a strong and direct influence on a particular local 
church and all its members. In fact, in its China policy, the Vatican can exert 
control over the local churches in China in several ways: by giving (or not 
giving) the means of production to them (i.e. funds and other material aids); 
by punishing local priests that are perceived to be deviant from Canon Law 
and denouncing a certain political ideology (e.g. communism) as not 
compatible with the Catholic religion; by promulgating the church’s teaching 
on issues related to human reproduction (e.g. the use of contraceptives, 
abortion). Therefore, in the religious life of Chinese Catholics, the Vatican 
acts as an ‘alternative institutional-legal order' whose laws and decrees are 
directly applicable to ordinary Catholics in China. No international 
organisations can do similar things and apply their laws directly to the lives 
of millions of Chinese citizens in the wat that the Vatican does.  
The second point that differentiates the Vatican from ordinary international 
organisations is that Rome holds the ‘monopoly on the legitimate use of 
organised violence’ that could not be shared with secular regimes. The strict 
hierarchy based on Canon Law ensures that the Pope should have the 
ultimate authority in meting out disciplinary actions against rebellious 
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priests. According to Canon Law,145 ‘There is neither appeal nor recourse 
against a decision or decree of the Roman Pontiff.’ In the case of China, the 
Vatican can directly mete out religious punishment against groups and 
individuals in the Chinese Church. (e.g. excommunications to those who 
join the Patriotic Association; denial of Holy Communion to those who 
cooperated with the communists). In the latter part of this thesis, we will see 
that the Vatican’s monopoly on religious punitive measures was a powerful 
weapon against the PRC government in their conflict over the church in 
China — the possible excommunications against Chinese priests effectively 
prevent local bishops and priests from collaborating with the government. 
Interestingly, the Vatican’s monopoly on the use of religious punitive 
measures were both envied and appreciated by communist officials, who 
attempted to break this monopoly, or at least share some of its power (with 
only very limited success). In sum, Rome’s monopoly over the legitimate 
use of punitive measures equipped it well in its contest with the PRC 
government. This points further differentiates Rome from ordinary 
international organisations.  
With regards to sovereignty, the Vatican qualifies well on this criterion. The 
Holy See was widely regarded as an independent sovereign actor in 
international politics, and the Pope enjoys the same dignity as other heads 
of state. In terms of citizens and culture, the tens of millions of Catholics 
worldwide can be considered the Holy See’s ‘spiritual citizens’ and they 
share a common religious culture. Indeed, in the latter parts of this thesis, 
we will see that Catholics in China formed a strong society based on their 
faith. In the conflicts between Beijing and Rome, they were often compelled 
to make hard choices regarding their political loyalty. Concerning Wendt's 
last criterion 'territory', the Vatican has an effective administrative system 
based on division into dioceses. The authority of the dioceses largely lies 
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with their bishops, who, in turn, were appointed by the Vatican. With the 
Holy See’s ultimate authority over the bishops, Rome can influence many 
aspects of the life of the local church. To put it briefly, by drawing analogies, 
it can be shown that the Vatican as a state fits Wendt’s ‘five properties’ well. 
However, unlike ordinary states, the Vatican state’s properties in terms 
of ’society' and ’territory' overlap with the jurisdiction of other secular states. 
In Sino-Vatican relations, Beijing and Rome compete over the loyalty of 
Chinese Catholics and the administrative rights of local dioceses.  
In the above apart, I have shown that Wendt’s ‘five properties of an essential 
state’ can still be used to reveal the Vatican’s key features as a state. 
Regarding the ‘five properties’, we can see that the Vatican as a state fits 
them well. So, if the Vatican can be considered a state, what would be the 
implications for the study of Sino-Vatican relations? One implication, I 
argue, is that we should not downplay the Vatican’s statehood in the study 
of Sino-Vatican relations. According to my point of view, previous literature 
on this topic did not pay enough attention to the Vatican’s statehood. This 
insufficient attention had led to two tendencies in this field, which I shall 
briefly discuss below.  
The first tendency is that the previous writers often view church-state conflict 
in China as a ‘domestic’ problem, rather than an ‘international’ one. To be 
more specific, most previous books on Sino-Vatican relations have 
assumed that the conflict between the church and the government is all due 
to China’s internal political circumstances and Beijing's Catholic policy. By 
contrast, the Vatican’s agency as a sovereign state in its relationship with 
Beijing and with the local churches was largely overlooked. For example, 
Myers' book Enemies Without Guns dedicated most of its chapters to 
describing and discussing how the PRC government’s domestic situation 
and harsh policies affected the church in China — as if the entire issue was 
purely a problem within the Chinese border. Following the same logic, 
Mariani’s book, Church Militant, has a similar narrative structure which 
 49 
‘internalised’ the state-church conflict. According to my point of view, such 
‘internalisation’ is unhelpful towards a balanced understanding of Sino-
Vatican relations in that it ignores the fact that the Catholic Church, unlike 
other religious organisations in China, can never be run without influence 
and directives from the Vatican. The domestic situation of China and the 
PRC government’s policies are not the only determinators of the relationship 
between Beijing and the Chinese Catholic Church.  
The second tendency caused by insufficient attention being given to the 
Vatican's statehood is that the previous authors often, either explicitly or 
implicitly, regard the Vatican as an actor not bounded by selfish state 
interests. In other words, previous authors often downplay the Vatican’s 
status as a state in international relations and focus almost entirely on its 
religious side. This tendency is salient in both Myers’ and Mariani’s books 
as both writers saw the Vatican as an innocent victim of the PRC’s 
persecution. Chen and Jiang, the authors of Sino-Vatican Diplomatic 
History, also claimed that the Holy See’s aim of diplomacy was to promote 
the peace and welfare of other states. However, I argue such ‘Vatican 
exceptionalism’ held by these authors does not comply with the fundamental 
presuppositions of mainstream IR theories — that states are selfish, 
interest-oriented actors in international politics. The hidden assumption of 
the Vatican as an ‘altruistic actor' demonstrates the previous writers’ strong 
sympathy for Rome. But such sympathy is not conducive to an impartial 
analysis of Sino-Vatican relations. In the light of this, this thesis attempts to 
remedy this situation by treating both Beijing and Rome as typical, interest-
driven actors in international relations.  
In the above section, this thesis made two arguments. First, by drawing 
analogies from Wendt’s ‘five properties’, the Vatican should be considered 
as a state in its interactions with Beijing. Second, the downplaying of the 
Vatican’s statehood in previous literature prevents deeper understanding of 
Sino-Vatican relations from an IR perspective. In the next section I shall use 
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mainstream, state-centric IR theories to examine the relationship between 
Beijing and Rome. 
 
 
3.2 IR Theories and Sino-Vatican relations 
The previous section discussed whether Beijing-Rome relations are ‘inter-
state’ and argued for an affirmative answer. Hence, after confirming the 
statehood of the Vatican, I will use mainstream IR theories to examine Sino-
Vatican relations and see their respective explanatory power. By the word 
‘mainstream’ I mean realism, liberalism and constructivism, which are 
widely accepted as the three most important schools in the study of IR. They 
represent different focuses in international politics. To put it very briefly, 
realism highlights the power politics in inter-state relationships; liberalism 
puts stress on interdependency, democracy and human rights; 
constructivism draws people’s attention to the process and possibilities of 
change in international politics. Although IR scholars from different schools 
may have dramatically different viewpoints on a certain issue, there are no 
clear-cut lines between different schools and scholars frequently borrow 
from their intellectual opponents. The debates between IR scholars on 
issues between states give many insights and increase people’s 
understanding of international politics.  
To this day, there is still no scholarly work that contains a thorough 
discussion of Sino-Vatican relations in the light of different IR theories. The 
lack of such discussion is one of the major flaws of previous studies on the 
topic, which contributes to the trend of oversimplification on this topic. In the 
following parts I shall examine Sino-Vatican relations using concepts from 
the three schools respectively. The examination in this section will also lay 
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the foundation for subsequent parts, where the concept of identity 
(identification) and discourse will be discussed. 
Realism and Sino-Vatican Relations 
When using IR theories to study a certain inter-state relationship, realism is 
usually the starting point. In fact, it could be argued that realism is the most 
important IR tradition because the other schools are built on the critiques of 
it. The core concept of realism is Realpolitik. This concept was proposed by 
the first generation of realists in their criticism of so-called ‘idealism’ – a 
trend of thought prevalent in the times between the two World Wars. Due to 
the traumatic experience of Europe in the First World War, scholars and 
politicians had a strong desire to prevent such a disaster from happening 
again in the future. It was this desire that gave rise to the school of thought 
which was later called by realists ‘idealism’. The ‘idealists’ believed that by 
subjecting international politics to reason and ‘public opinion’, future great 
wars could be avoided. To this aim, ‘idealists’ made many attempts in the 
inter-war years to promote international peace – the most famous example 
of these attempts was the foundation of the League of Nations. However, 
the League of Nations, the favourite brainchild of idealists, was considered 
to be a complete failure in the late 1930s and was unable to prevent another 
World War. Thanks to this defeat, idealism was discredited in the post-WWII 
years and became largely a synonym of ‘naivety’. E. H. Carr, the founding 
father of modern realism in IR, branded it ‘utopianism’ in his famous treatise 
The Twenty Years’ Crisis. 
How does this connect with the relationship between Rome and Beijing?  In 
fact, I argue that utopianism, despite being a debunked form of thought in 
mainstream IR, is still visible in contemporary scholarly works on Sino-
Vatican relations and can be seen in the Holy See’s China policy. So before 
introducing Realpolitik to the study of Sino-Vatican relations, it would be 
helpful if we have a few glances at utopian ideas on this topic. Following the 
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utopian line, the current stalemate between Beijing and Rome is the result 
of sheer irrationality on the part of Beijing. This claim was based on the 
assumption that the Holy See’s diplomacy is unique. To be more specific, 
the religious and moral nature of the Vatican differs from that of secular 
states in that it only seeks to benefit the citizens of other states. Its foreign 
policy is perhaps the world’s only ‘altruist’ diplomacy because it does not 
seek any selfish material gains.  
Two important scholars on Sino-Vatican relations from Taiwan, Chen and 
Jiang, express such view in their comprehensive historical work on this 
topic. According to them, the Vatican is the only state that has altruist 
diplomacy: the goal of Rome’s dealing with a secular government is not to 
obtain worldly interests, but to increase the welfare and happiness of the 
citizens in that country.146 With this opinion, Chen and Jiang contend that 
the Vatican’s only aim in its China policy was to benefit Chinese 
Catholics.147 Hence, it is a pity that the Chinese government has been 
showing a cold face to the Vatican. In their work, the Chinese government 
was portrayed as an arrogant and irrational regime that was insensitive to 
religious mind-sets. In their account of the Beijing-Rome dispute over the 
appointment of the Archbishop of Canton in 1982, they argue that it was the 
Chinese government who had taken advantage of the Vatican’s goodwill. 
The abuses from Beijing had certainly ‘made the Pope suffer greatly’.148 
Hence, following this logic, Beijing should understand the transcendental 
nature of the Catholic Church and the altruist aims of the Vatican -- only 
then will the problems between the two states be solved. 
                                            
146 Fangzhong Chen and Guoxiong Jiang, Sino-Vatican Diplomatic History (Taipei: Taiwan 
Commercial Press, 2003), p.424. 
 
147 Ibid. 
148 Ibid., p.367. 
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Briefly, Chen and Jiang showed a utopian tendency in their evaluation of 
Sino-Vatican relations and regarded the Vatican as an altruistic actor in its 
dealings with the PRC government. However, such a tendency is 
incompatible with the fundamental presumptions of mainstream IR theories, 
especially realism. To be more specific, the core concept of realism is 
Realpolitik, which implies that the nature of international relations is power 
politics. Based on this belief, realists contend that the ultimate concern of 
states in international politics is, and should be, their own interests. Morality, 
by contrast, is at best a secondary concern of states, at worst a façade 
behind which states hide their selfish motives. The basis of the  realists’ 
claims is the fact that there is no world government in international politics 
and states can only rely on self-help to protect their interests – hence the 
concept of ‘anarchy’ in realist thinking. The world arena, in the eyes of 
realists, is a dangerous place where every state strives to survive. Gains for 
a certain country always mean relative loss for other states and the prospect 
of honest international cooperation is dim.  
What will happen if we view Sino-Vatican relations in this way? First of all, 
the relationship between Rome and Beijing will become not so unique – both 
are driven by self-interests. It could be argued that for Rome the survival of 
the church and the loyalty of Catholics in secular states is its ultimate 
interest. In addition to that, the material basis of the church (i.e. the church 
institutions, properties and other assets in secular states) is also an 
important part of the Vatican’s interests. These interests are of the Vatican’s 
utmost concern in its dealings with secular states. By contrast, the well-
being of secular governments is less important to the Vatican – when the 
Vatican perceives that the church’s interests are not compatible with those 
of a secular government, it will take actions to defend the church’s interests 
even if that means the secular government’s counterpart will be 
undermined. And indeed, Rome fought many secular governments and 
undermined many rulers in the course of its history. The most famous 
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example in pre-modern times was perhaps the Pope’s dispute with Henry 
IV, the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire. Pope Gregory VII (1072-85) 
successfully undermined the power of Henry IV by excommunicating him. 
From the late 19th century on, despite the fact that the Pope had lost his 
secular power, the Vatican still took actions against secular states to 
safeguard its interests. In sum, from a realist perspective, the Vatican’s aim 
in foreign policy is less utopian and falls short of altruism. Indeed, it’s aim is 
also motivated by self-interest and therefore not very different from the aims 
of secular states. In other words, out of self-interest, Rome may take hostile 
actions against secular governments and these actions often have 
undermining effects on the target government. Following such realist logic, 
it could be argued that the Vatican’s claim of transcendence in terms of 
secular politics is questionable – at worst, it is only a façade covering 
Rome’s self-interests.  
In the eyes of realists, Beijing certainly is no exception to the concept of 
Realpolitik. Similar to other states, the ultimate interest of Beijing lies in the 
survival of the state. The Catholic Church in China, as an institution that has 
innate foreign connections, will certain be subject to extra scrutiny from 
Beijing. From the viewpoint of realism, the expansion of the Catholic Church 
in China could be a potential threat to the PRC government, because the 
Vatican has the capability to undermine Beijing’s rule using its influence 
over Chinese Catholics. In fact, such a threat seemed quite real to Beijing 
in 2014, when a large number of demonstrators launched the ‘Umbrella 
Movement’ against the PRC government and occupied the city centre of 
Hong Kong for three months. Cardinal Joseph Zen Ze-Kiun, an outspoken 
critic of the PRC government, became one of the leaders in this movement 
and actively encouraged Catholics to participate and protest against Beijing. 
Though there was no evidence of the Vatican’s direct intervention in the 
‘Umbrella Movement’, the active participation of Zen, one of the most high-
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ranking clergymen in China appointed by the Vatican149, would certainly 
convince Beijing that the church is a threat. Later on in the movement, 
Cardinal Zen claimed in his personal blog150 that Pope Francis expressed 
his support for the movement implicitly during Zen’s ad limina visit to Rome. 
Hence, from a realist perspective, the growth of the Catholic Church in 
China goes against the interests of Beijing because the Vatican, as an 
external power that is out of Beijing’s control, may use its influence over 
Catholics in China to undermine Beijing’s rule. Therefore, it could be argued 
that a zero-sum game exists between Rome and Beijing – either one’s gain 
will entail the other party’s loss. For Rome, Beijing’s rule over China is an 
obstacle to the church’s development in China; for Beijing, the church’s 
growth in China is a potential threat. So taking hostile actions towards each 
other seems the only option according to each other’s interests. To realise 
their respective interests, both states have to resort to power politics. 
In the realist mind-set, power politics is the nature of international relations 
and Sino-Vatican relations are also governed by power. But here a question 
arises – what is ‘power’ and how should we measure power in Sino-Vatican 
relations? In realist thinking, ‘power’ was widely regarded as a state’s 
capability to make other state(s) fulfil its desires. But as to the exact content 
and the measurement of power, no consensus is reached among theorists. 
Kenneth Waltz, one of the most prominent scholars in the realist lineage, 
argues that the power of a certain state should be measured by its 
‘combined capabilities’. 151 To be more specific, Waltz evaluates states’ 
                                            
149  It should be noted that thanks to Hong Kong’s autonomous status as a Special 
Administrative Region in the PRC, the Vatican can directly appoint bishops and Cardinals 
without much interference from Beijing.  
150  Ze-Kiun Zen, ‘My Rome visit was meaningful for this word of encouragement’ 
[Cardinal Zen’s personal blog, 19 Oct 2014]<http://oldyosef.hkdavc.com/2014/10/19/
我為這一句鼓勵的話來了羅馬也很值得/ >[Accessed 12 Sep 2016]. 
151 Waltz, Theory, p. 131.  
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power by estimating ‘how they score on all the following items: size of 
population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military 
strength, political stability and competence.’ 152 In making this argument, 
Waltz insisted that all these aspects of state power should be measured 
together. He was against the view that a state could be counted as powerful 
if it only scored highly on some of these criteria.153 
However, if we apply Waltz’s argument to Sino-Vatican relations, it is quite 
clear that the Vatican’s power becomes negligible compared to that of the 
PRC. In fact, the situation is somewhat like an ant’s dance with an elephant. 
As discussed in previous sections, the Vatican does not possess a 
population, territory, resources, or economy in the traditional sense, let 
alone armed forces. Even if we use an analogy by considering worldwide 
Catholics as the Vatican’s citizens, Rome will still score very low according 
to Waltz’s criteria because it lacks the means to have material control over 
Catholics: in modern times the church usually cannot collect taxes from 
believers; the Vatican does not have any police system to enforce Canon 
Law; even for the most serious offenders of the church laws, Rome cannot 
take any coercive action against them apart from excommunication. In 
international politics, a modern Pope can no longer use armed forces to 
defend the church’s interest – hence the famous quote from Joseph Stalin: 
‘The Pope? How many divisions does he have?’ 
Therefore, if we measure the power of Rome and Beijing using Waltz’s 
criteria, then Rome appears extremely weak and does not have any 
leverage in dealing with Beijing. But is that really the case? In fact, the 
Vatican is far from powerless in its dealings with Beijing. Under Rome’s 
uncompromising guidelines in the 1950s, Catholics in China boycotted for a 
long period and caused much trouble to Beijing’s religious policy. 
                                            
152 Ibid. 
153 Ibid., p.130. 
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Throughout the 1950s, Rome’s power and influence over Chinese Catholics 
vexed Beijing so much and compelled Beijing to adjust its Catholic policies 
many times. Only in 1958 did Beijing work out a mechanism to deal with the 
Catholic Church in China – after almost a decade’s struggle with the 
Vatican. However, the mechanism devised by Beijing did not solve the 
‘Vatican problem’ in the Chinese Catholic Church and the Holy See 
continues to exert its power over Catholics in China to this day. Taking these 
facts into consideration, should we still regard the Vatican as powerless in 
its relationships with Beijing? 
Interestingly, if we view this issue at a higher level and see the Vatican’s 
position in the international order, we would find that Waltz’s criteria are 
equally untenable. Despite being without material capability, the Vatican is 
a powerful agent on the international stage and its influence rivals big states 
– in 2016, when Chinese President Xi Jinping was visiting the US, Pope 
Francis was also carrying out his papal visit there. (The two, however, did 
not meet each other during their respective visits). The Economist remarked 
that Chinese officials were ‘shocked and flabbergasted’ by the different 
responses to the two leaders’ visits to the US because the Pope got more 
applause and media coverage than President Xi.154 In other words, the 
microstate Vatican sometimes outshines states as powerful as China in 
international politics. How could this be the case if Waltz’s criteria are 
infallible? 
In fact, Waltz, as the founder of neo-realism in the study of IR, was critiqued 
by later theorists for his materialist tendency. Due to his reliance on theories 
of economics and his objection to ‘reductionist theories’, Waltz did not take 
                                            
154 ‘Catholics: Party and Pontiff’, The Economist, 9 Apr 2016 
<http://www.economist.com/news/china/21696511-two-articles-examine-chinas-often-
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the influence of ideas into consideration. However, neo-realism is not the 
only strain of realist thought. If we have a glance at the earlier supporters of 
realism, we would find that classical realism did take ideas into account. E. 
H. Carr regards ‘power over opinion’ as an essential part of state power.155 
In arguing this, Carr thinks that ideas are no less important than economics 
and the military when evaluating state power. For Carr, the way of realising 
this ‘power over opinion’ is propaganda – it can be carried out either 
domestically, or against another state as ‘an instrument of policy’.156 When 
discussing ‘power over opinion’, the first example given by Carr is the 
Catholic Church: ‘it was the Catholic Church which first understood and 
developed the potentialities of power over large masses of opinion.’157 Carr 
then argues that the mediaeval church was ‘the first propaganda 
organization’ and ‘the first totalitarian state’. These comments show that 
Carr paid full attention to Rome’s influence over ideas and regarded it as a 
good case of ‘power over opinion’ – Rome is no longer powerless if we take 
ideas into consideration. 
However, it should be noted that Carr has some reservations regarding the 
concept of ‘power over opinion’. To be more specific, Carr insists that ‘power 
over opinion cannot be dissociated from other forms of power.’158 In other 
words, Carr maintains that this power cannot work on its own and has to be 
supported by the economic and military clout of a state. This reservation 
again seems to be causing difficulties in my efforts to apply realism to Sino-
Vatican relations – Can Rome still be considered powerful if it does not have 
the economic/military means to support its ‘power over opinion’? In fact, 
such a problem is not hard to solve. First, we should consider the historical 
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circumstances of E. H. Carr’s times. His major intellectual opponent was 
‘utopianism’, which was overly focused on the power of morality. Carr 
needed to distance himself from utopianism in his writing, so he was quite 
cautious when discussing ‘power over opinion’ and argued that it has to be 
supported by a material basis. Second, even if we follow Carr’s logic, the 
Vatican (especially in the 1950s) could still be considered powerful if we 
take the Holy See’s de facto alliance with the West against the communist 
bloc during the Cold War. Indeed, the Holy See’s close relationships with 
the US had made the church presence in China very suspect in Beijing’s 
eyes during the Korean War. In other words, the West’s economic and 
military might, combined with Rome’s spiritual influence, had exerted real 
pressure on Beijing. Hence, according to Carr’s theory, the Vatican can be 
considered a powerful opponent of Beijing in their contest over the hearts 
and minds of Catholics in China.  
However, I would like to take the realist analysis further and argue that the 
lack of material power is actually Rome’s advantage in its struggle with 
Beijing over ideas. The reason is simple: Beijing cannot use conventional 
coercive measures (economic sanctions/military deterrence) against Rome. 
These measures could be highly effective against typical states, but not 
Rome. With this advantage, Rome gets an upper hand in its ant’s dance 
with Beijing as the elephant – an elephant could crush everything on the 
ground with its mighty trunk and feet, but an ant is the creature most likely 
to survive the elephant’s might. It can remain unscathed either by hiding 
under a pebble, or simply climbing onto the elephant’s body. With the same 
logic, the Vatican is immune to Beijing’s material sanctions while keeping its 
continuing influence over Chinese Catholics. 
To be more specific, from a realist perspective, the Sino-Vatican dispute is 
a war of ideas and each side wants to maximize their influence on Chinese 
Catholics’ opinions. In this contest, Beijing cannot subject Rome to its will 
by economic and military coercion. In fact, when dealing with typical states, 
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Beijing can often use conventional means to reach its political aims. For 
example, on the issue of Taiwan, Beijing can use its huge economic and 
military might to deter Taiwan from declaring independence and sanction 
the states that wish to build formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Indeed, 
Beijing’s conventional deterrence against Taiwan is quite effective – to the 
extent that no major states in the world recognise Taiwan’s sovereignty and 
the United Nations has been shunning Taipei since 1971. However, 
Beijing’s conventional deterrence does not work well on the Vatican and 
Rome still maintains diplomatic ties with Taipei to this day. Due to its lack of 
economic and military strength, the Vatican has almost nothing to lose in 
the face of Beijing’s sanctions. Hence, the seeming weakness of Rome 
actually becomes its edge in Sino-Vatican relations – the Vatican is 
unaffected by Beijing’s material sanctions and can always exert its influence 
over Chinese Catholics.  
Therefore, in this war of ideas, Rome has the upper hand. Facing Rome’s 
strength in ‘power over opinion’, Beijing does not have effective options to 
curb Rome’s influence over Chinese Catholics. Indeed, for a secular 
government, the most direct way of dealing with threats from a religious 
organisation is to attack its personnel. In the 1950s Beijing took many harsh 
measures against the Vatican’s presence in China. The papal internuncio 
was humiliated and expelled from mainland China, together with virtually all 
the foreign missionaries. Local churchmen loyal to the Vatican were 
arrested and imprisoned for a long time (e.g. Bishop Kung). However, these 
harsh measures were largely unsuccessful in containing Rome’s influence. 
Worse, it antagonised many Chinese Catholics and made them ever more 
pro-Vatican. Beijing certainly realised this and its approach towards priests 
has become more benign since the 1980s. Apart from expulsion and 
arrests, another option for a secular government is to cut off the local 
church’s contact with Rome and therefore isolate it from foreign influence – 
for example, little is known about the Catholic Church in today’s North 
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Korea. However, Beijing is certainly different from Pyongyang in terms of 
openness. Moreover, China is a huge country and it is impossible to seal 
the border completely. (In fact, in latter parts of this thesis we will see that 
the Chinese border is quite porous when facing the Vatican’s influence.) To 
put it briefly, denying contact between the local church and the Vatican is 
not a viable option for China. Even if this policy works to its full potential, it 
could only shelve the problem instead of solving it – despite the loss of 
contact between Rome and the church in China during the Cultural 
Revolution, Rome quickly became influential again for Chinese Catholics 
when China again opened to the world. 
A third option for a secular state against the church is to confiscate its 
institutions, properties and other assets, therefore depriving the church of 
her material basis. We can find many such attempts made by secular 
governments in European history (e.g. during the Reformation). Similarly, in 
the early 1950s, Beijing did confiscate many church properties and 
nationalised Catholic universities and other educational institutions in China. 
These measures caused financial difficulties to the church in China but did 
not make the Vatican less influential among Chinese Catholics. In later 
times, Beijing also used a reverse method to deal with the church, namely 
to give the church financial aid and help the church in China build 
institutions, including church buildings and seminaries. Since the 1980s, 
Beijing has given many formerly seized church properties back to the church 
and has handed out stipends to priests. The purpose was to encourage the 
priests to affiliate with the government and become more ‘patriotic’. 
However, the government’s material help could not replace the Vatican’s 
power over ideas. Despite the government’s efforts, the Vatican’s influence 
is still there in the Chinese Catholic Church. Hence, it is clear that Beijing’s 
material means could not wipe out the Vatican’s influence over the church 
in China. 
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Under the realist mind-set, the nature of Sino-Vatican relations is a power 
struggle and a zero-sum game. Beijing would try its best to suppress the 
church’s influence in China while Rome would encourage Catholics to 
boycott and sabotage Beijing’s rule. In fact, such a viewpoint complies with 
the situation described by Myers’ book title – Catholics in China are the 
‘enemies without guns’ of the PRC government; and to eradicate 
Catholicism was in Beijing’s interest. However, is that really the nature of 
Sino-Vatican relations? Is power politics the only reality between Beijing and 
Rome? Is war the only viable option for each state? 
Liberalism and Sino-Vatican relations: The End of History? 
In this section I will try to bring liberalism into this study and discuss its 
relevance to Sino-Vatican relations. As one of the mainstream schools of 
IR, liberalism has better confidence in the good side of human nature and 
maintains that genuine cooperation between states, even under an 
international anarchy, is possible. Liberal thinkers put much more focus on 
the rule of law, democracy and human rights in international relations. 
Moreover, liberals advocate free trade and inter-dependence between 
nations and regard it as a good way towards world peace.  
In the post-Cold War world, the greater role played by the UN, the expansion 
of liberal democracy in the world and the deepening of regional cooperation 
(e.g. the European Union) made liberal scholars more confident in their 
debates with realists. Though also acknowledging international anarchy and 
regarding states as guided by interests, liberals believe that states can work 
together for a better future and every individual can participate in this 
process by advocating and following liberal values. 
So how does liberalism connect with Sino-Vatican relations? The first insight 
we could get from this school of thought is that conflict and power struggles 
are not the full picture in Sino-Vatican relations. Dialogues and 
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communication could happen between Beijing and Rome and they can work 
towards a rapprochement. Indeed, after 1980, the ice between the two sides 
had thawed and many positive signs appeared in their communications. 
Both sides have been expressing ‘sincere wishes’ to improve mutual 
relationships and ‘let bygones be bygones’. Moreover, compared to the 
situation in the 1950s, the intensity of conflict between Beijing and Rome 
has been greatly reduced and they no longer take harsh measures against 
each other. All these signs seem to comply with a liberal vision – despite 
international anarchy, Beijing and Rome can still engage in meaningful 
dialogues and seek common interests. Beijing might realise that a thriving 
church in China and its communion with Rome is not a threat, but an 
opportunity for Beijing to build a better society and show the world that 
religious freedom fully exists in China. On the other hand, Rome could 
realise that a good relationship with Beijing will do a huge service to the 
church in China and facilitate the church’s effort to evangelize the Chinese 
masses. In sum, the improvement of Beijing-Rome relations is in each 
other’s interest. Hence, both parties should seek reconciliation and abandon 
the zero-sum mind-set.  
Such analysis is based on the innate optimism of liberal thinking. However, 
how is it possible to realise such an ideal vision between Beijing and Rome? 
For relations between typical states, possible liberal advice is to engage in 
free trade and increase inter-dependency – when two sides share enough 
common interests and one cannot prosper without the other, peace will be 
realised between the two parties and wars will become unthinkable. 
However, this advice is not applicable to Sino-Vatican relations due to the 
lack of economic dimension in it. So the focus should be on the other tenet 
of liberalism – democracy. For liberals, the prevalence of democracy in the 
world is crucial for maintaining world peace because true democracies will 
never fight each other. War still exists in this world only because of the 
existence of non-democratic states. Either the non-democracies will fight 
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each other, or they may wage wars against democracies for selfish gains. 
Hence, by promoting liberal values on the world stage and transforming 
non-democratic countries into democracies, world peace will be maintained 
and consolidated.  
Such ‘Democratic Peace Theory’ reflects the confidence of liberals in liberal 
democracy as the best political system in the history of human beings. This 
confidence is best illustrated by Francis Fukuyama’s book, The End of 
History and the Last Man, in which he boldly asserts that liberal democracy 
is the best system of government in human history and it will ultimately 
triumph over other non-liberal political systems. Indeed, both Democratic 
Peace Theory and the notion of ‘the End of History’ concentrated their focus 
on the political systems of individual countries, hence it could be argued that 
for liberals spreading democratic values to non-democracies is more 
important than power politics and balancing in their pursuit of maintaining 
world peace.  
For liberals in the West, China is one of the world’s biggest non-democratic 
regimes and certainly an important target to convert. Fukuyama was 
optimistic about the possibility of regime change in communist countries, 
including China. He argues: ‘the desire for recognition has also played a 
critical role in bringing about the anti-communist earthquake in the Soviet 
Union, Eastern Europe, and China.’ 159  For Fukuyama, ‘the desire for 
recognition’ is an innate human need for dignity and prestige. This basic 
human need motivates people to pursue democracy and gives them the 
courage to sacrifice their lives for it if necessary. Such a desire also cannot 
be assuaged by mere economic reforms and the rise in living standards. 
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Therefore, following Fukuyama’s logic, China’s economic reform in the 
1980s, despite raising its citizens’ living standard, would not satisfy the 
people’s desire for recognition. The Chinese masses would stand up to the 
illiberal regime and demand democracy due to their ‘lack of a voice’.160 
Therefore, in a liberal analysis of Sino-Vatican relations, based on the above 
theories, the likely conclusion would be that Beijing’s non-liberal political 
system (‘totalitarian’ or ‘authoritarian’ in the mouths of many liberals) is the 
reason behind the Beijing-Rome disputes. The solution to these disputes 
lies in a future regime change in China. When Beijing is transformed into a 
liberal democracy and reaches ‘the End of History’, it will no longer 
‘persecute’ the church in China and peace will be realised between China 
and the Vatican. In other words, liberals assume that when China becomes 
fully democratic (i.e. like the US) the Sino-Vatican dispute and other 
religious problems in China will be solved once and for all.  
So what is the Vatican’s position in this liberal campaign against Beijing? In 
fact, from the perspective of those who believe that China’s illiberal political 
system is the origin of every problem, the Vatican’s dispute with Beijing is 
part of the free world’s effort to transform China to a democracy. The 
suffering of Chinese Catholics in the 1950s was the inevitable consequence 
of living under a totalitarian regime and the resistance of Chinese clergy and 
laity is part of the Chinese people’s struggle against a repressive state. 
Following this line, even the Vatican’s recent efforts to approach Beijing 
become less acceptable in the eyes of liberals, because reconciliation with 
an ‘authoritarian’ regime cannot be justified from a liberal perspective. 
Cardinal Zen, the former Bishop of Hong Kong, speaks against a Rome-
Beijing rapprochement under the current conditions and argues that to talk 
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with a communist government is like the situation where John the Baptist 
negotiates with Herod. 161 Similarly, Taipei also tries to persuade Rome to 
keep Rome-Taipei diplomatic ties because Beijing does not obey liberal 
values while Taipei is a fully-fledged liberal democracy. Taipei’s 
ambassadors to Rome often stress that Taipei and Rome share many 
values and goals – democracy is certainly one of them. For example, in 
1997, Raymond Tai, Taiwan’s Ambassador to the Holy See, stated that 
Taiwan and Rome have a ‘common desire’, which is to ‘join hands in making 
Mainland China free’. 162 
In sum, from such a stance, the Vatican’s dispute with Beijing is part of the 
liberal campaign against authoritarian regimes worldwide. In order to 
convert China to a full democracy, the Vatican should support Chinese 
Catholics’ struggle against a repressive Beijing. Rome should not seek any 
reconciliation with the Chinese regime until it embraces liberal democratic 
values. Interestingly, here the prescription of liberalism becomes not very 
different from that offered by realism. Both would suggest that Rome should 
not seek a rapprochement with Beijing: either Rome’s interests will be 
compromised by Beijing, or Rome risks becoming an accomplice of an 
authoritarian regime and doing a disservice to China’s democratization.  
In the above section I have proposed a possible liberal prescription for the 
Vatican in dealing with Beijing. According to this vision, Rome’s contest with 
Beijing should be understood in the context of a world struggle between 
liberal democracies and authoritarian regimes. Rome should support the 
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Chinese masses in their effort to realise democracy’s ‘manifest destiny’ in 
China. However, does this notion fit under the actual circumstances? Let us 
start from the side of Rome. The first point I would like to put forward here 
is that historically Rome could hardly be considered an ally of liberalism. In 
pre-modern times, Rome had a long record of anti-liberal practice, including 
persecution of heretics and suppression of free speech. Only the in 1960s 
(after the Vatican II) did Rome openly embrace some liberal values and 
become an advocate of religious tolerance.  
Secondly, the Vatican’s political system is far from the liberal ideal. Far from 
being a liberal democracy, Rome is Europe’s only absolute monarchy and 
the Pope is never elected by universal elections. The ruling style of Rome 
is highly centralised and separation of powers is non-existent. Despite many 
calls for reform, the way Rome runs the church is by no means similar to 
the liberal ideal and the decision making process (including that of state 
finances) is far from transparent. Thirdly, today’s Rome does not agree with 
all the liberal creeds. For example, the Vatican differs from typical liberals 
in its attitude towards issues like abortion, contraception and gay marriage. 
Hence, it is clear that Rome is not a full advocate of liberalism, both 
historically and contemporarily.  
In fact, Rome shares many traits with Beijing in terms of the system of 
government: both have a centralised political system and complex 
hierarchical bureaucracy; both have a strong government that exerts control 
over local units; both states’ leaders are chosen by a small group of the elite. 
Therefore, it could be argued that in terms of a political system Rome is 
more similar to Beijing than to the liberal democratic states in the West – 
the notion that Rome is a natural ally of liberalism becomes untenable. In 
fact, from modern historical experience we can see that it is possible for 
Rome to maintain stable (if not cordial) relations with non-liberal or even 
despotic governments, to name but a few: The Chilean regime during 
Pinochet’s rule; Francoist Spain; the Estado Novo regime in Portugal and 
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Ngô Đình Diệm’s regime in South Vietnam. Hence, the non-liberal nature of 
the PRC should not be regarded as the origin of every problem in Sino-
Vatican relations. 
Now let us proceed to discuss the side of Beijing and see whether the liberal 
notion works in China. Firstly, it is quite clear that the Chinese leadership 
does not agree with the superiority of Western-style democracy. Such an 
attitude could be summarised by a famous quote from Mr. Xi Jinping in 
2009: ‘It seems that some senseless foreigners really like to make indiscreet 
remarks about our own affairs. However, firstly China won’t export 
revolutions, secondly China won’t export hunger and poverty; thirdly we 
never interfere with others. So how can they still say such groundless 
things?’163 Indeed, the Chinese leadership has long expressed their apathy 
towards Western-style democracy while regarding the West’s efforts to 
promote democracy in China as attempts to topple the PRC government. 
The West’s sponsorship of Chinese dissidents is bitterly criticised by Beijing 
as aiming to destabilise Beijing’s rule and to smear Beijing’s reputation. 
Hence, the leadership is sceptical of the West’s liberal campaign and does 
not show Fukuyama’s concept of ‘desire for recognition’.   
But how about ordinary people? Are they more enthusiastic about the 
democratization of China? I would argue for a ‘no’ to this question. Since 
1989, there have never been any nation-wide mass demonstrations with the 
aim of causing a regime change in China. The younger generation and 
university students are generally not interested in promoting Western-style 
democracy in China. For example, in 2011, some Chinese dissidents, 
inspired by the ongoing Arab Spring, issued an anonymous online call for a 
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‘Chinese jasmine revolution’ and suggested some dates and places for 
mass demonstrations in major Chinese cities. This call greatly alerted 
Beijing and the security measures in major Chinese cities were tightened. 
However, the actual response to the revolutionary call was so cold that on 
the appointed day, the suggested meeting places of demonstrators were 
filled almost entirely with policemen and foreign journalists.   
Apart from the coldness shown towards liberal democracy, the Chinese 
grassroots are actually highly nationalist and would easily be offended by 
the West’s liberal pressure on China. In 2008, before the Summer Olympics 
in Beijing, the Chinese publicity campaign for the event in France met with 
many protests and boycotts from pro-democratic and pro-Tibetan-
independence activists. When reports of such protests appeared in the 
Chinese media, an outcry occurred on the Chinese Internet and many 
Chinese cities saw anti-French demonstrations. In sum, in contemporary 
China, both the Chinese leadership and the grassroots show little interest 
in liberal democracy and the West’s promotion of liberal values is widely 
regarded as a conspiracy  to de-stabilize China – this is quite different from 
Fukuyama’s prediction for China, where the grassroots would fight the 
government in their ‘desire for recognition’.  
To conclude, liberal thinking tends to attribute the reason for the Sino-
Vatican dispute to the fact that the Chinese regime is not a liberal 
democracy. With this mind-set, the solution is the democratisation of China 
and the Holy See should contribute to this process. However, this thesis 
argues that such a liberal picture could be both misleading and unrealistic. 
Firstly, it is misleading because Rome itself is not a natural ally of liberalism. 
Secondly, it is unrealistic because Beijing does not fit into the ‘End of 
History’ notion. Neither the leadership nor the grassroots in China show a 
strong tendency for the ‘desire for recognition’. In fact, two decades after 
publishing The End of History, even Fukuyama himself has somehow 
revised his viewpoints in his recent works. The confidence of liberalism is 
 70 
waning today. If we consider the ‘Arab Winter’, the brutal civil war in Syria 
and the resulting waves of migrants travelling to Europe, together with the 
rise of far-right political parties and politicians, it is quite clear that liberal 
values are in deep crisis. By contrast, Beijing, the regime who is sceptical 
of liberal values, still maintains its trend of growth and becomes more 
assertive in face of the West. Hence, in this situation, does the liberal notion 
regarding China still hold true? Is it really wise for Rome to join the liberals 
in their campaign against Beijing, or should Rome wait for a future regime 
change in Beijing? 
 
Constructivism and Sino-Vatican relations 
In the above sections I have applied two schools of IR thought, namely 
realism and liberalism, to Sino-Vatican relations and examined their 
respective explanatory power. Using their key concepts, I attempted to draw 
two different pictures of the Beijing-Rome relationship and discussed their 
implications. My argument is that while the two schools offer us insights into 
some aspects of Sino-Vatican relations, neither of them has adequate 
explanatory power for the Beijing-Rome relationship. Despite their different 
views, both may lead to a conclusion that Rome should maintain a 
confrontational stance against Beijing, either for self-interest or liberal 
ethics. I argue that both viewpoints miss many aspects of the Beijing-Rome 
relationship. Furthermore, it is not helpful in conflict resolution because if 
the policymakers of both Beijing and Rome all follow their own prescriptions, 
the stalemate between the two sides would not be solved in the foreseeable 
future. Considering the shortcomings of traditional realism and liberalism, 
we need another perspective to give more insights into the relationship 
between Beijing and Rome. To be more specific, we need a theory that 
takes both changes and reasons behind those changes into account – that 
is constructivism, the third major perspective in the field of IR.  
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In fact, constructivism does not belong exclusively to IR. It is a general 
philosophical viewpoint that human knowledge does not necessarily reflect 
objective truth, but is constructed by social interactions. Constructivism’s 
modern origins can be traced to Jean Piaget’s psychological theories in the 
1960s and its offshoot in sociology is called social constructionism. Despite 
its relatively long history in the humanities, constructivism only became 
influential in IR in the 1990s, thanks to Alexander Wendt’s efforts to combine 
social constructivism with IR theories.164 Hence, constructivism in IR can be 
considered as a school that interprets international relations from a social 
constructivist perspective. 
So what is the main difference between constructivism and the other two 
major IR schools? In fact, the difference originates from their different 
assumptions about human knowledge. A very succinct summary of the 
basic premises of social constructivism comes from Burr: 165  
a) A critical approach to taken-for-granted knowledge: our knowledge of 
the world should not be treated as objective truth. 
b) Historical and cultural specificity: we are fundamentally historical and 
cultural beings and our views of, and our knowledge about, the world 
are the ‘products of historically situated interchanges among people’.  
c) The link between knowledge and social processes: our ways of 
understanding the world are created and maintained by social 
processes. 
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Hence, when applying these principles to the study of IR, it is clear that 
constructivism will offer viewpoints strikingly different from those given by 
realism and liberalism. Considering the importance of constructivism to this 
thesis, in the following part I will provide a brief review of Alexander Wendt’s 
constructivist theory, by far the most influential one in the constructivist 
camp. My following account of Wendt’s thought mainly comes from his 
treatise Social Theory of International Politics, which is the most 
comprehensive elaboration of his constructivist theory.166 
Wendt’s book is long and rich in content. However, following Burr’s logic, I 
have summarised Wendt’s critique of traditional IR approaches as follows: 
a) The key assumptions of realism and liberalism (i.e. the material 
nature of international systems) were actually taken-for-granted 
knowledge that should be critiqued. 167 
b) The anarchical nature of international politics described by 
realism and liberalism are culturally specific and are not 
universal truth. Indeed, there are different kinds of anarchy and 
each will lead to a different world picture.168 
c) The ways states understand self and others are created and 
maintained by social interactions. 169 
Following this framework, In the following part I will briefly explain Wendt’s 
critique of traditional IR schools, namely realism and liberalism. 
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The first aspect of Wendt’s critique of traditional IR schools is focused on 
the materialist tendency of neo-realism and neo-liberalism. According to 
Wendt, in the eyes of neo-realists, the international system is ‘a distribution 
of material capabilities’; while for the neoliberals it is ‘capabilities plus 
institutions’.170 In other words, both schools view material as the basis for 
and determinant of international relations. In Wendt’s time, the dominant 
school of IR was neo-realism and neo-liberalism. However, Wendt’s critique 
of traditional IR schools is mainly directed against neo-realism because he 
thinks neo-liberals share the same materialistic belief with neo-realists and 
are therefore equally ‘caught in a Realist trap’.171 In other words, his critique 
of neo-realism would be also valid towards neo-liberalism. 
The neo-realist thought is best represented by Kenneth Waltz’s work Theory 
of International Politics. So it is not strange that it should become the major 
target of Wendt’s criticism. In this work, Waltz argued that the structure of 
the international system is determined by the distribution of material 
capabilities – the more economic/military capabilities a state has, the more 
powerful it is in the international system. Waltz insisted that material 
capabilities are the only reliable determinants of behaviour in the 
international system and refused to take in beliefs, intentions and ideologies 
as variables. Regarding this materialist view, Wendt expresses his strong 
disagreement and argues that the international system can only be 
understood when taking ideas into consideration.  
To be more specific, Wendt attacks Waltz’s neo-realist theory by pointing 
out that it does not actually have any explanatory power without some 
hidden constructivist assumptions. In other words, neo-realist theories were 
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‘cheating’ by ‘building implicit cultural elements into their claims’. 172  To 
illustrate this, Wendt first highlights the two assumptions of Waltz’s theory: 
(1) security is the most important concern of states; (2) states are selfish 
and only care about their own interests.173 Then Wendt points out that both 
assumptions rely on ideas – if security is the essential concern of states, 
what is security and how can it be realised? (The answer given by a 
‘revisionist’ state and ‘status quo’ state will be radically different). 174 If states 
care only about their own interests, how is it possible to explain the mutual 
trust between the US and Canada, and that between Britain and France in 
today’s international politics?175 Using these arguments Wendt reveals that 
Waltz’s concept of material capabilities ‘rests on implicit assumptions about 
the distribution of interests’, which is, in turn, made up of ideas.176 
The second aspect of Wendt’s critique of traditional IR thought draws the 
reader’s attention to the important role of culture in international politics. 
After showing that ideas are the real basis of the international system, 
Wendt proceeds to examine another key concept in realist and liberal 
literature, namely anarchy. While admitting that anarchy exists in 
international politics, Wendt does not agree with previous IR scholars about 
its implications. As I have discussed earlier in this chapter, anarchy in 
international relations is one of the fundamental claims of traditional IR 
schools (especially realism). Realists argue that because of anarchy, states 
can only rely on themselves to protect their interests and their policies have 
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to be self-serving. However, Wendt questioned this logic and regarded it as 
taken-for-granted knowledge.  
While agreeing that anarchy does exist in state-to-state relations, Wendt 
argued that anarchy does not necessarily warrant self-help and selfish state 
policies. In fact, as Wendt put it, ‘Self-help is an institution, one of various 
structures of identity and interest that may exist under anarchy.’177 In other 
words, self-help and selfish policies are only one of the possible reactions 
of states to international anarchy. States can also regard each other as 
friends and build mutual trust. Wendt argued that the concept of anarchy 
and power politics does not have much explanatory power over many 
international issues. 
Wendt’s critique of the traditional view of anarchy is based on his argument 
that there are different cultures of anarchy and each of them leads to 
different consequences.  Wendt posits that there are three cultures of 
anarchy, namely Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian. The first type of culture, 
Hobbesian, depicts a savage international environment where every state 
regards the others as enemies. The second type of culture, Lockean, is far 
more benign than the Hobbesian one because the ‘kill or be killed’ savage 
logic is no more.178 States in this system have learnt to respect each other’s 
sovereignty and no longer try to annihilate others. The third type of 
anarchical culture is Kantian. In this culture, states trust each other and 
regard one another as friends. War is no longer regarded as an option to 
settle disputes and states will come to each other’s mutual aid whenever 
there is a threat.  
Wendt points out that the key aspect of social learning is interaction. When 
states interact with each other, they will acquire or confirm identities and 
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interests. Wendt illustrates the process of how states build their identities 
during interaction with his “Ego and Alter model”. He divides an interaction 
into four “scenes” as shown below: 
Scene 1: Based on its a priori definition, Ego sends a signal to Alter to 
“teach” its definition of the situation to Alter. 
Scene 2: Alter interprets the meaning of Ego’s action. Such interpretation is 
guided by its own, a priori definition. 
Scene 3: Based on his new definition of the situation, Alter engages in an 
action of his own. 
Scene 4: Ego interprets Alter’s action and prepares his response.  
In this way, the two actors learn and reinforce their identities in response to 
how they are treated by one another. The essence of the above process is 
a mutual exchange of signals. In addition, the sending and interpreting of 
these signals are all based on “a priori definitions”. Wendt points out that 
this process is a ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’: 
‘By treating the Other as if he is supposed to respond a certain way Alter and Ego will 
eventually learn shared ideas that generate those responses, and then by taking those 
ideas as their starting point they will tend to reproduce them in subsequent 
interactions. Identities and interests are not only learned in interaction, in other words, 
but sustained by it.’179 
To conclude, Wendt offered a powerful critique of traditional IR thought’s 
materialist tendency and oversimplified view of anarchy. He used the ‘three 
cultures’ model to incorporate the views of realism and liberalism into a 
single constructivist model and highlighted the potential of and possible 
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methods towards a better future. So how does his theory connect with the 
relationship between Beijing and Rome? 
In fact, Wendt’s theory offers us an alternative way to understand Sino-
Vatican relations. With this perspective we can see many things in the 
Beijing-Rome relationship that could not be offered by realism and 
liberalism. The reason behind this is that both schools tend to hold an 
essentialist view of states. By them term ‘essentialist’ I mean that both 
Beijing and Rome are regarded as actors with a series of fixed, stable 
attributes. For example, in the realist image, both states have certain fixed 
national interests and will automatically take hostile actions against each 
other to defend these interests. On the other hand, in the liberal picture there 
is a hidden assumption that adhering to liberal values is states’ moral 
responsibility. Hence, Beijing is not moral because it does not subscribe to 
liberal values while Rome was attributed a moral responsibility not to 
compromise in the face of Beijing. In sum, despite the differences between 
realism and liberalism, they actually offer very similar advice to 
policymakers and certainly miss many nuances in the Beijing-Rome 
relationship. In the light of this, we need to introduce a third IR perspective 
into our study – that is constructivism.  
Constructivism is built on its critique of the traditional two schools of IR, 
namely realism and liberalism. It differs from the two schools with its anti-
essentialist tendency – it rejects the determinism hidden in realist/liberal 
thinking and regards the interests and values in international relations as 
being in fact constructed ideas. Hence, from a constructivist perspective, 
Rome and Beijing will no longer be considered as actors with pre-ordained, 
fixed identities and interests (e.g. authoritarian regime, subversive and 
threatening external power). Instead, the concept of identity is regarded as 
the result of interaction. In other words, Beijing and Rome’s respective 
identities and interests, if there are any, are the result of their deeds and 
gestures towards each other. Since these identities are not fixed, there is 
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always a possibility that the two parties will change their mutual identities 
and become friends of each other. The dispute in Sino-Vatican relations will 
be regarded as the result of a constructivist process instead of pre-given 
interests/moral values and principles. 
A Preliminary Analysis Using Wendt’s Constructivism 
If we use Wendt’s framework of constructivism to examine Sino-Vatican 
relations, what will happen? I will do a preliminary analysis here. The first 
point constructivism offers us is that the interests and values in Sino-Vatican 
relations are actually made of ideas, which change over time. For example, 
it could be argued that Rome’s interest lies in the survival and the loyalty of 
the church in China. But what exactly this interest is made of and how it can 
be realised depends on how one perceives it. In other words, interest 
becomes nothing when it is devoid of ideas.  
So, in the case of China, the Vatican’s decision-makers need to ponder over 
different options if they want to realise their interests. For example, should 
they encourage the church in China to boycott the government, or instead 
keep a low-profile to ensure the survival of the church? Different decisions 
reflect different perceptions and will exert different impacts on Sino-Vatican 
relations. Similarly, Beijing’s interests are also made of ideas and can only 
be realised by different decisions. For the Beijing leadership, they need to 
decide on a series of questions when carrying out religious policy. For 
example, they need to decide: to what extent does the church pose a threat 
to the regime; which is the most effective way to deal with the church; 
whether or not the church should be tolerated. To sum up, although the 
leadership of Beijing has ‘state security’ as its interest, the perception of 
such interest and the way to implement it all depends on ideas. Therefore, 
from a constructivist viewpoint, when discussing interests in Sino-Vatican 
relations, we should know that they are made of ideas themselves and are 
therefore not unchangeable.  
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The second point to be noticed when applying constructivism to Sino-
Vatican relations is that the identities of both countries also change in the 
course of history. In fact, since Catholicism entered China four centuries 
ago, Rome and the Chinese regime have taken many different stances 
towards each other. For example, due to the early missionary efforts made 
by the Jesuits in China, Catholicism won the good feelings of the Chinese 
rulers. The church during this period showed respect for Chinese culture 
and portrayed herself as a co-defender of Confucian ethics. In return, the 
Chinese emperors were happy to play the role of Catholicism’s protector. 
However, such ways of identifying underwent a dramatic change after the 
‘Chinese Rites Controversy’ in the 1700s, where Rome banned Chinese 
Catholics from venerating their ancestors and paying tribute to Confucius. 
After such a ban, the church suddenly became a cult and heresy to the 
Chinese regime and the Chinese emperors and other elites turned into the 
church’s persecutors. After 1842, when the Chinese Empire was forced to 
open up to European powers, the church re-entered China ‘under the 
protection of foreign gunboats’ and hence became an accomplice of 
colonialism in the eyes of Chinese rulers. However, later on in history, in the 
early 1900s, the Chinese ruling elites realised Rome’s diplomatic value to 
China and made many efforts to build formal diplomatic ties with Rome. 
Now, Rome’s identity again changed in the eyes of Chinese rulers and 
became a friend in fighting colonialism. When it came to the 1940s, Rome 
again showed a kind face to the KMT Government of China, who also 
considered Rome as a valuable friend. In sum, from historical experience, 
we can see that the mutual identities of Rome and the Chinese regimes 
changed many times. This is in accordance with the constructivist view of 
identity and shows a picture far more complex than the ones provided by 
realist/liberal analysis. 
The third point to be noticed in carrying out a constructivist analysis on Sino-
Vatican relations is that interaction really matters and exerts a huge 
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influence over the outcomes. As we will see in the latter chapters of this 
thesis, Beijing and Rome were not each other’s enemies at the very 
beginning of their interactions in 1949. Indeed, the two sides managed to 
co-exist peacefully for a year. Secondly, regarding the Beijing-Rome 
dispute, there was a long escalation process in the 1950s and an equally 
long de-escalation process later on in their history of interactions. The 
existence of such long periods of escalation and de-escalation means that 
the outcome of Sino-Vatican relations is determined by interaction instead 
of by pre-given interests and identities. In sum, in Sino-Vatican relations 
both Beijing and Rome were closely watching each other and their actions 
were made according to what the other side did. For example, looking from 
the Chinese side, Beijing would be ‘ego’ and Rome would be ‘alter’. If ‘alter’ 
treats Beijing as an enemy, then hostile actions would be carried out by 
Rome against Beijing. This would provoke Beijing’s (‘ego’)’s punitive 
measures against Rome (‘alter’). These punitive measures will further 
strengthen Rome’s perception that ‘Beijing is an enemy’ and cause more 
hostile deeds from Rome. Hence a vicious circle would be formed and Sino-
Vatican relations would reach a stalemate. This mutual feedback process in 
interaction is crucial to a deeper understanding of Sino-Vatican relations. 
Last but not least, in conducting a constructivist analysis of Sino-Vatican 
relations, one should not assume that changes, especially positive changes, 
could happen easily in the interactions between Beijing and Rome. In fact, 
the two states, when dealing with each other, were under the heavy 
influence of their dramatically different cultures and views of the world. Their 
initial perceptions towards each other are equally crucial in their 
policymaking. On the side of the Vatican, Pope Pius XII had been staunchly 
anti-communist and Rome had had a history of confrontation with the Soviet 
Union and other communist states. Similarly, for Beijing’s part, the PRC 
government at the time had long noticed the cordial relationship between 
the Vatican and the KMT regime – the archenemy of the Communist Party 
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of China (CPC). In the context of the Cold War, it was easy for policymakers 
of both sides to divide the world into two opposing camps: for the Vatican, 
that was the Catholic faithful versus the atheist regimes; for Beijing, the 
progressive power of ‘the People’ versus the reactionary forces of 
imperialism. All these different worldviews exerted great impact on the 
subsequent interactions and should not be ignored by researchers taking a 
constructivist approach. Indeed, Wendt’s constructivism had also taken this 
factor into account. In his theory, all these preconceptions are part of the ‘a 
priori definitions’ and there is no ‘tabula rasa’ status in modern state-to-state 
relations. In later parts of this thesis, I also intend to show the persistence 
of ‘a priori definitions’ in Sino-Vatican relations. 
In sum, a ‘Wendtian’ analysis will show at least three things in Sino-Vatican 
relations. First, in their interactive history, Rome and Beijing had ‘taken’ 
many roles with respect to each other and went through many mutual 
identifying processes. Second, these identity changes could be quite 
dramatic, and it is possible for Rome to suddenly become the ‘enemy’ of 
Beijing (due to the Chinese Rites Controversy). Third, these identity 
changes are sustained by interactions, which means how the two sides 
behave towards each other will impact their future mutual identities. A 
Wendtian conclusion will be that the stalemate between Beijing and Rome 
was not pre-determined, but something ‘they made of it’.  By studying the 
identity-casting manner between Beijing and Rome in the first decade of 
their interaction, it is possible to find out the interactional root of their long-
standing stalemate and this therefore gives us useful advice about a 
possible future rapprochement.   
Conclusion: A Constructivist Approach is More Suitable 
In the above section I have used concepts from three mainstream IR 
theories to examine Sino-Vatican relations and found that constructivism 
has the most explanatory power in connection with Sino-Vatican relations. 
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Differing from realism and liberalism, constructivism holds that ideas are 
central to IR and states’ identities can be changed by interaction. With this 
view, we can understand better the constructivist nature of Sino-Vatican 
relations and avoid the oversimplified notions of ‘incompatible interests’ and 
‘democracy versus an authoritarian regime’. I have also provided a 
preliminary analysis using Wendt’s analytical model in Social Theory. 
However, it should be noticed that this relatively simplified style of analysis, 
especially the usage of the term ‘identity’, is itself not unproblematic. 
In the next section I will further discuss why this kind of analysis raises 
problems and how to solve these problems. During the discussion I will 
review Wendt’s concepts of identity, use critiques from other scholars and 
clarify my own attitude towards this issue. A tailored definition of ‘identity’ in 
this thesis will also be given. 
 
3.3 The Concept of Identity and Discourse 
The Question Relating to the Term ‘Identity’ 
The aim of this research is to shed light on the identity articulation process 
in Sino-Vatican relations. Therefore, it is clear that the concept of identity is 
important to this thesis. Before applying the word ‘identity’ to Sino-Vatican 
relations, it is better to have a general reflection on the term ‘identity’. In fact, 
despite its appearance as a common and straightforward word, the term 
‘identity’ was criticized by some scholars as a vague and overladen term. 
Hence, before conducting any substantive research, it is essential to justify 
the use of this term in research and clarify its exact meaning in this thesis. 
Therefore, in this section I will discuss the concept of identity, namely: what 
did previous debates say about it? What is my definition of identity? How is 
it related to, and different from other scholarly definitions and why do I put 
forward a definition like this? 
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As my IR theoretical basis is Wendt’s constructivism, it is helpful to see how 
Wendt defines the concept of ‘identity’. He briefly defined identity as 
‘relatively stable, role-specific understandings and expectations about self’ 
180 in his famous paper Anarchy is What States Make of It and made many 
other defining attempts in Social Theory of International Politics, to name 
but a few: 
‘To have an identity is simply to have certain ideas about who one is in a given 
situation, and as such the concept of identity fits squarely into the belief side of the 
desire plus belief equation. These beliefs in turn help constitute interests.’181 
‘Identities refer to who or what actors are. They designate social kinds or states of 
being. Interests refer to what actors want. They designate motivations that help explain 
behavior… Interests presuppose identities because an actor cannot know what it 
wants until it knows who it is, and since identities have varying degrees of cultural 
content so will interests.’182 
‘(Identity is)…a property of intentional actors that generates motivational and 
behavioral dispositions.’183 
It can be seen from the above definitions that Wendt’s view of identity is 
quite straightforward – he regards it as the relatively stable basis/belief that 
generates self-understanding, personality, desire and motivation. In saying 
‘straightforward’ I am arguing that Wendt’s definition is quite close to the 
everyday meaning of this word, namely the dictionary definition of ‘identity’: 
‘the fact of being who or what a person or thing is; the characteristics 
determining who or what a person or thing is’.184 Hence, in Wendt’s works, 
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183 Ibid., p.224. 
184 Oxford Dictionary of English [e-version, on the OSX Apple Dictionary 2.2.1]. 
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the word ‘identity’ refers to the intuitive sense of this term and points to some 
essential attributes of an actor. In Social Theory of International Politics, 
Wendt also used this word to analyse state interactions in a simple and 
uncomplicated manner. When discussing structural changes in international 
systems, Wendt assumes two actors, Ego and Alter, who take different 
identities in their interactions. Wendt thinks that these interactions include 
two aspects, namely ‘role-taking’ and ‘altercasting’. 185 In the meantime, 
Wendt also gave a few examples of the content of identities, for example: 
‘conqueror, explorer, trader, proselytizer’.186 
We can discern at least three points from Wendt’s usage of ‘identity’ in his 
analysis. First, in using the terms ‘Ego and Alter’, Wendt is assuming that 
states can be compared to human individuals and possess unified, clear-
cut identities. Indeed, Wendt anthropomorphizes states and argues that 
‘states are people too’. 187 Second, in saying ‘role-taking’ and ‘altercasting’, 
he is hinting that identity is ‘something out there’ that can be ‘taken’ and 
‘cast’ by state actors – something that can be considered a case of 
reification. Third, the examples of state identities given by Wendt are usually 
one-word and all denote certain roles, which implies that state identity is 
equal to role and can be defined in a single word. All these show that 
Wendt’s view and usage of ‘identity’ is oversimplified and vulnerable to the 
criticism of essentialism.  
In fact, Wendt himself must have realised this danger because he puts 
several ‘disclaimers’ in his work. First, in the opening chapter of Social 
Theory, Wendt declares that his major research interest is in abstract 
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ontological discussion and that he will only dedicate a small part of his book 
to ‘substantive theories’: ‘Even with respect to substantive theorizing, 
however, the level of abstraction and generality in this book are high. 
Readers looking for detailed propositions about the international system, let 
alone empirical tests, will be disappointed.’188 Second, Wendt distances his 
theory from more radical versions of constructivism and labels it as ‘a 
philosophically principled middle way’ between traditional IR approaches 
and postmodernism. (In fact, he calls his version of theory ‘thin 
constructivism’.)189 Third, Wendt dedicates a chapter to defend scientific 
realism and argues that social science ‘gives us knowledge, albeit always 
fallible, about the world out there.’ He then argues that his theory is a ‘via 
media’ between positivism and post-positivism.190 Last but not least, to 
avoid the ‘reification’ accusation, Wendt argues that ‘reification is 
sometimes useful’ and asserts that for the purpose of convenience 
sometimes identities and interests should be treated as ‘given’.191 He also 
stresses many times in his works that ‘identities and interests are a 
continuing outcome of interaction, always in process’ and ‘sustained by 
interactions’192  
Despite all these ‘disclaimers’, Wendt’s treatment of ‘identity’ is still relatively 
weak compared to the other parts of his theory. So it is not strange that such 
an oversimplified view of identity is vulnerable to attacks from other 
scholars. Moreover, Wendt himself did not provide any example of detailed 
analysis of state identity changes in his Social Theory, which further 
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192 For example, Wendt, Social Theory, p.316. 
 86 
questioned the reliability of his simplified view of identity as an analytical 
tool. For example, choosing Wendt’s state-centric view of identity as a 
target, Adamson and Demetriou challenge the view that the state can have 
a clear-cut identity ‘coterminous’ with the state boundary. 193 Zehfuss also 
points out the reifying problem lies in Wendt’s concept of identity: ‘Identity 
change is merely about shifting from one relatively stable identity to another. 
States are unitary actors with minds, desires and intensions.’ 194 However, 
the most powerful critique of such an oversimplified view of identity comes 
from Brubaker and Cooper, which I will discuss below: 
In 2000, Brubaker and Cooper published a paper Beyond ‘identity’ which 
soon established itself as one of the major works in the field of identity 
studies. This paper does not address Wendt directly but its critique of the 
usage of ‘identity’ is highly relevant to Wendt’s simplified view of state 
identity. Despite being a paper on identity, the aim of Brubaker and Cooper 
in writing it was not to add more content to the term ‘identity’, but to 
dismantle it. In this paper, the two authors acutely questioned the validity of 
the term ‘identity’. According to them, the word ‘identity’, after several 
decades of extensive usage in social science, had already become 
extremely vague and overladen. As a solution, they argue that scholars 
should discard the term ‘identity’ and opt for other terms to avoid ambiguity. 
Brubaker and Cooper pay special attention to how constructivism deals with 
the term identity and highlight the common practice of ‘stipulating that 
identities are constructed, fluid and multiple’. They argue that this ‘attempt 
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to “soften” the term’ is not helpful at all. 195 According to Brubaker and 
Cooper, the use of the term ‘identity’ is so popular and abused in 
constructivist literature that it becomes part of ‘clichéd constructivism’. They 
argue: 
‘Weak or soft conceptions of identity are routinely packaged with 
standard qualifiers indicating that identity is multiple, unstable, in flux, 
contingent, fragmented, constructed, negotiated, and so on. These 
qualifiers have become so familiar – indeed obligatory – in recent years 
that one reads (and writes) them virtually automatically. They risk 
becoming mere place-holders, gestures signalling a stance rather than 
words conveying a meaning.’196 
Such trenchant criticism indeed deals a heavy blow to the popular usage of 
‘identity’ in constructivist literature – Wendt’s definition of identity is certainly 
not immune to it. Why is this so? Brubaker and Cooper point out that the 
reason lies in the innate connection between the term ‘identity’ and its 
everyday meaning, which always refers to some essential attributes of a 
person (‘hard understanding’197 of identity, in Brubaker and Cooper’s own 
words) Therefore, no matter how one stresses the belief that ‘identity’ is 
constructed and fluid, there is always a hint that something tangible is out 
there – the essentialist connotation of ‘identity’ could never be wiped out. 
Even if the theoretician manages to ‘soften’ the concept of identity, the term 
will become ‘too weak to do useful theoretical work’, argue Brubaker and 
Cooper, ‘in their insistence that that identities are multiple, malleable, fluid, 
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196 Ibid., p.11. 
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and so on, soft identitarians leave us with a term so infinitely elastic as to 
be incapable of performing serious analytical work.’198 
If ‘identity’ is already hopelessly vague and clichéd, what kind of terms 
should be used instead? Brubaker and Cooper recommend the use of three 
alternatives, namely ‘identification’, ‘self-understanding’ and 
‘commonality/connectedness’. The first term, identification, derives from the 
verb ‘identify’ and is therefore less vulnerable to reification. By using 
‘identification, as Brubaker and Cooper argue, the readers’ attention will be 
drawn to the one who identifies – ‘it invites us to specify the agents that do 
the identifying.’199 To be more specific, the identifier could be one’s self 
(‘self-identification’), or others (‘external identification’). Brubaker and 
Cooper point out that the modern state is also one of the most powerful 
identifiers and this identifying process can be understood in a Foucauldian, 
discursive way.200 However, as Brubaker and Cooper put it, ‘even the most 
powerful state does not monopolize the production and diffusion of 
identifications and categories; and those that it does produce may be 
contested.’201 The third term, self-understanding, denotes the subjective 
experience of an actor: ‘one’s sense of who one is, of one’s social location, 
and of how (given the first two) one is prepared to act.’202 In other words, 
the term ‘self-understanding’ can replace the ‘soft’ understanding of identity 
(which is always in a flux) and thus avoid the essentialist connotation of the 
term ‘identity’. According to Brubaker and Cooper, ‘self-understanding’ is 
not very different from ‘self-identification’ – the only difference is that self-
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identification ‘suggests at least some degree of explicit discursive 
articulation’. 203  The last alternative to ‘identity’ actually consists of two 
closely related terms, namely commonality and connectedness. The two are 
used to replace ‘identity’ when it denotes ‘sameness among group 
members’.  Brubaker and Cooper argue that ‘identity’ fails to show the 
difference between mere sympathizers of a group (commonality) and the 
actual group members (connectedness).204 
In the above part I have reviewed Wendt’s view of identity and highlighted 
its vulnerability, which comes from the innate essentialist connotation of the 
term ‘identity’. I have also introduced Brubaker and Cooper’s critique of 
‘identity’ and their solution. Hence, taking these into consideration, should 
we keep, or discard the term ‘identity’ in this thesis on Sino-Vatican 
relations? Regarding this question, my answer is this: I will follow Brubaker 
and Cooper’s advice and use ‘identification’ and ‘self-understanding’ to 
replace the vague term ‘identity’. However, considering some merits of 
‘identity’, I will keep this term in some cases to denote ‘a snapshot of 
discourse’. In the following part I shall justify my claim. 
In a study on Sino-Vatican relations, the terms ‘identification’ and ‘self-
understanding’ have great advantage over the traditional term ‘identity’ 
because they allow for more nuances in this relationship than the traditional 
term does. In fact, if I wish to show the ‘constructivist’ process in the Beijing-
Rome interactions, Wendt’s simplified model is far from enough. His original 
way of defining state identities with one-word nouns (e.g. friends, enemies, 
proselytizers) is overly essentialist and actually has unavoidable 
connotations of the ‘rationalist model’ he critiqued. If I follow Wendt’s original 
analytical model, then the mutual ‘identities’ between Rome and Beijing in 
                                            
203 Ibid., p.18. 
204 Ibid., p.20. 
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the 1950s could only be defined as ‘enemies’ – but how will that be different 
from the Myers’ notion of Enemies without Guns? Indeed, no matter how I 
stress the idea that identities between Rome and Beijing are constructed, 
fluid and in constant change, the analytical framework will be not much 
different from the ‘clichéd constructivism’ critiqued by Brubaker and Cooper.  
By contrast, Brubaker and Cooper’s alternative terms give me new 
analytical possibilities in this study on Sino-Vatican relations. Firstly, using 
the term ‘identification’ in this thesis will draw readers’ attention to the 
ongoing identifying process between Beijing and Rome. In fact, the picture 
of this process is more complicated than the notion of ‘identity’ can show. 
For example, during the interactions between the two governments, the 
cases where both take clear-cut ‘identities’ towards each other are actually 
very rare. In latter part of the thesis I will show that in the 1950s, Beijing 
identifies Rome as a ‘troublemaker’ but also tacitly regards Rome as the 
‘giver of authority’ in the Catholic Church and made some attempts to 
‘borrow’ some authority from Rome. Here, the term ‘identification’ works 
better than the rigid ‘identity’ because it can show the hidden, inner 
contradiction in this process.  
Apart from the above point, the use of ‘identification’ and ‘categorisation’ 
encourages readers to think about ‘who is the identifier and who is the target 
of identification’ in Beijing-Rome interactions. This differentiation could not 
be shown by the traditional usage of ‘identity’. In fact, the question of ‘who 
identifies and who is the target’ is very important in Sino-Vatican 
interactions. As state governments, both Beijing and Rome are powerful 
identifiers. How they identify each other and how they categorise the church 
in China bears huge influence on the outcome of Sino-Vatican interaction. 
First, how Rome and Beijing identify each other will determine what kind of 
action they take against each other. For example, when the People’s 
Republic of China was established in 1949, Rome had different options to 
identify it – should Beijing be regarded as the continuation of the traditional 
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Chinese state, another satellite state of the Soviet Union, or an independent 
nationalist republic? Indeed, considering the historical circumstances, all 
these options have their respective reasons, but how Rome decided to 
identify Beijing would determine the actions it would take towards Beijing. If 
Rome identifies Beijing as ‘another communist regime’, then the action to 
be taken will be largely drawn from Rome’s previous experience of dealing 
with a ‘typical communist regime’. Similarly, how Beijing categorises Rome 
would determine Beijing’s Catholic policy. Should Rome and the church in 
China be considered a potential supporter, a sympathizer of the KMT 
regime, a fully-fledged religion, a spy organisation or a superstitious cult? 
Such categorisation is hugely influential in the making of Beijing’s religious 
policies.  
Beside the mutual identification between Beijing and Rome, how the two 
regimes categorise Chinese Catholics is equally important to the outcome 
of Sino-Vatican interaction. The traditional term ‘identity’ is ill-suited for 
describing this categorisation process. Both Beijing and Rome regard 
Chinese Catholics as their citizens and attempt to categorise and 
differentiate them according to their perceived loyalty. On the Chinese side, 
Beijing categorised Catholics into two major categories in the 1950s, namely 
‘patriotic Catholics’ and ‘reactionaries’. According to the regime’s need, 
such categorisation could be modified into more detailed versions. For 
example, in the mid-1950s, Beijing’s internal documents categorised 
Catholics in China into three groups: high-ranking clergymen, who were 
usually more conservative and pro-Vatican; low-ranking priests, who were 
more likely to cooperate with the government; ordinary Catholic laity, who 
should be educated via ‘publicity campaigns’. The aim of such 
categorisations was to apply different policies to different groups. On the 
other hand, Rome also categorise Chinese Catholics according to their 
closeness to Rome – an antithesis between ‘loyal Catholics’ and 
‘compromised ones’ existed in Rome’s categorisation in the 1950s. Rome 
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used various ways to encourage the ‘loyal’ group and meted out 
punishments (e.g. shunning, excommunications) against the ‘compromised’ 
ones. To sum up, the different categorisations adopted by Beijing and Rome 
allow them to apply different policies to different sectors within the church in 
China and therefore reach a ‘divide-and-rule’ effect. When a zero-sum mind-
set prevailed in Sino-Vatican interactions, one’s imposition of its 
categorisation on Chinese Catholics was at the expense of the other side. I 
believe that Brubaker and Cooper’s concept of ‘categorisation’ is better than 
the term ‘identity’ in discussing this process. 
Last but not least, the traditional term ‘identity’ would not show the dynamics 
of the state ideology formation. The process by which states attempt to 
impose ideologies on its citizens cannot be faithfully reflected by the 
essentialist term ‘identities’.  As Brubaker and Cooper point out, despite 
being powerful identifiers, states are unable to monopolize the identification 
process, let alone citizens’ self-understanding.  Facing the categorisations 
and ideologies offered by the state, citizens have the possibility not only to 
comply with, but also to resist them. I base this claim on the fact that the so-
called ‘corporate identity’ of a state is not the same as individual 
consciousness. To be more specific, although in IR studies states are often 
regarded as similar to human beings (e.g. Wendt’s argument ‘states are 
people too’ 205), the ‘self-understanding’ at state level is quite different from 
the individual counterparts. A state is a leviathan made of tens of millions of 
citizens. It is impossible that all the citizens could ever share the same 
thought. Even the most totalitarian regime could not manage to completely 
unify the ideas of its citizens. Hence, in this respect, the state is certainly 
different from individual human beings.  
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In order to maintain the coherence of the state, the government (especially 
those of non-liberal democratic regimes) tends to offer its desired version of 
a ‘thought paradigm’ (ideology) to the citizens. In other words, the 
government dictates statements of ‘how you should be’ to the citizens and 
attempts to change their self-understanding. To ensure that such dictation 
is successful, the government will use its power – all kinds of means, 
persuasive or coercive, to make the citizens follow the state ideology. 
However, in my opinion, individual citizens have the possibility of accepting 
or resisting the identities offered by the state. And the resistance from the 
citizens will compel the state to adjust its policy: it either can become more 
coercive to force the citizens to accept the state ideology; or can opt for a 
more benign policy and make compromises regarding the desired version 
of the ideology.  
Viewing Sino-Vatican interaction from this perspective, the self-
understanding and self-identification of Chinese Catholics becomes an 
important variable. Because Rome does not have its own territory and 
people, the two governments are sharing citizens. In this circumstance, 
each government offers Catholics in China their version of the desired state 
ideology. In turn, Catholics in China have the possibility of accepting or 
refusing at least part of them. Such feedback will be closely monitored by 
the two governments and will make them adjust policies, which will 
ultimately influence the outcome of Sino-Vatican interaction. To sum up, this 
is a process of ‘ideology feeding – feedback – monitoring – policy changing’. 
In this process, ideology feeding is not one-way (from states to citizens), but 
two-directional because the citizens have the option to boycott the state 
versions of ideologies. This process is more salient in Sino-Vatican relations 
than it is in any other inter-state relations because Beijing and Rome share 
Chinese Catholics as their citizens. In the latter parts of this thesis we will 
see more details of such a triangular ideology feeding process. Briefly, this 
process of ideology imposition and its resistance from citizens could be aptly 
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reflected by the usage of more differentiated terms (identification, 
categorisation) instead of the rigid term ‘identity’. 
In sum, I have explained the reason why I opt for Brubaker and Cooper’s 
alternative terms instead of the traditional concept of ‘identity’. I argue that 
compared to the traditional term of ‘identity’, ‘identification’ and 
‘categorisation’ have several advantages. First, they do not have strong 
essentialist connotations and draw attention to the ongoing process. 
Second, the new terms work better than the term ‘identity’ in reflecting the 
three aspects of Sino-Vatican interaction, namely mutual identification 
between Rome and Beijing; the relationship between categorisation of 
Catholic and state policy; and the state’s effort to change citizens’ self-
understanding. In the analysis of Sino-Vatican relations, Brubaker and 
Cooper’s alternatives perform better than the undifferentiated term ‘identity’ 
and convey far more nuances than ‘identity’ does. Therefore, in this 
research I will mainly use the terms suggested by Brubaker and Cooper. 
However, considering the current popularity of the term ‘identity’ in today’s 
academic work and its prevalence in social science, I will not abandon the 
term ‘identity’ completely: while avoiding its undifferentiated use, I will 
regard it as a shorthand denoting a moment of the identification process. In 
other words, when I occasionally use the word ‘identity’ in this thesis, 
readers are advised to think of it as a ‘point’ in the ongoing constructivist 
process. 
Discourse 
In the above section I have discussed the traditional concept of identity and 
the critique of it. I have also explained why I prefer Brubaker and Cooper’s 
terms to ‘identity’. After this clarification, now I need to answer the question 
‘how to investigate the identification process’. My answer to this is discourse 
analysis. The rationale, put very briefly, is this:  the entire constructivist 
process (identification, categorisation and self-understanding) is mediated 
 95 
and completed via discourses. Therefore, by analysing discourse, we can 
understand the constructivist process in Sino-Vatican relations and reach a 
depth unrivalled by previous research that depends on the interpretation of 
historical events from the perspective of pre-given identities. In the following 
part I will define what discourse is and explain what I mean by ‘discourse 
analysis’. After that, I will build an analytical framework which will be used 
in the main body of this thesis. 
What Kind of Discourse Analysis? 
Firstly, this thesis will attempt to clarify what we mean by ‘discourse 
analysis’. In fact, like ‘identity’, the term ‘discourse analysis’ is another 
vague term in the humanities because it covers such a wide range of 
academic areas. Without a proper definition, it is hard to know what kind of 
‘discourse analysis’ we are involved in. 
Let us start from the word ‘discourse’. Following the Oxford English 
Dictionary’s definition, we can see that the everyday usage of this word 
implies ‘written or spoken communication or debate; a formal discussion of 
a topic in speech or writing’. Thus, it is not hard to discern the word’s close 
relationship to language and linguistics. In fact, it was the linguists who first 
coined this term.  
In 1952, the term ‘discourse analysis’ saw its first usage in Zellig Harris’s 
paper Discourse Analysis, in which Harris described the method simply as 
‘the analysis of connected speech’.206 He further pointed out that the aim of 
such analysis is to study language at a macro level and find out the 
connection between language and cultural context.207 In many aspects, 
                                            




Harris’s discourse analysis is similar to algebra as he used symbols to 
represent different components of connected speech/writing. To be more 
specific, letters (a, b, c…) are used to denote a unit in the analysed text until 
the entire text was simplified into a series of letters. In this way, Harris hoped 
to find out the deeper structure of the target text and reveal the connections 
between different parts of it. However, Harris’ prototypical method can only 
be used to deal with uncomplicated texts with many repetitive elements 
(Harris himself took a short paragraph from a ‘hair tonic’ advertisement as 
an example) and is ill-suited for longer, complicated or vague texts. Hence, 
despite being credited as the first example of discourse analysis, Harris’s 
method has largely been forgotten by today’s researchers. Nevertheless, 
this thesis is indebted to Harris not only because he is the father of discourse 
analysis; but also because he invented the concept of a ‘chain of 
equivalence’ – I shall return to this concept later on in this chapter. 
In Harris’s original articulation of discourse analysis (DA), we can already 
see that the methodology of DA has its focus on the rules behind ordinary 
language activities. In the following decades, DA has become a 
multidisciplinary and highly heterogeneous methodology. Although it 
originated from the field of linguistics, we can now see its application in 
almost all the subjects in the humanities and social sciences. DA can be 
used in the study of applied linguistics and language teaching, in which it 
can help teachers to improve the teaching outcome; it can be used in a 
medical context; it can be used to analyse the language in advertisements 
and the media; it can be adopted to expose the hidden inequality, sexism 
and racism in everyday language and help activists in their pursuit of a more 
equal society. In addition to its wide usage in many academic fields, DA also 
enjoys a diversity of study objects, which vary from individuals to groups; 
from communities to nations and states; from spoken/written texts and 
gestures to video clips.  
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Due to its wide academic usage, scholars from different fields may have 
quite different approaches and focuses in doing discourse analysis. But 
most analysts will agree that the aim of DA is to find out the hidden rules 
and implicit meanings under the surface of language. It is not a study about 
isolated words and sentences, but about language-in-use, namely language 
use in its context and the relationship between different kinds of language 
use. 
By saying language use in context we are actually touching upon one of the 
most important features of doing discourse analysis: that the material should 
always come from naturally occurring usage of language and never be 
abstracted outside its context. Hence, in conducting our research, the 
analysis will be based on naturally occurring textual208 exchanges between 
China and the Vatican. When analysing these texts, this research will 
always take into consideration their historical context and the relationship 
between different texts.  
Definition of ‘Discourse’ 
A clear-cut definition of the term ‘discourse’ is surprisingly hard to find. 
Jorgensen and Phillips point out that ‘“discourse” has been a fashionable 
term. In scientific texts and debates, it is used indiscriminately, often without 
being defined.’ 209  Mills argues that ‘discourse’ is both popular and ill-
defined: ‘The term “discourse” has become common currency in a variety of 
disciplines … so much so that it is frequently left undefined, as if its usage 
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were simply common knowledge… It has perhaps the widest range of 
possible signification of any term in literary and cultural theory, and yet it is 
often the term within theoretical texts which is least defined.'210 The term’s 
definition becomes vague as it has different meanings in different contexts. 
According to Bloor and Bloor, the main uses of the word ‘discourse’ include: 
(1) ‘all the phenomena of symbolic interaction between people’ (2) ‘spoken 
interaction’ (3) the ‘whole act of communication involving production’ (4) 
‘communication that takes place in specific institutional contexts’ (5) ‘a 
particular text.’ 211 In the light of the high diversity of the meanings of the 
term, a clear definition of ‘discourse’ and ‘analysis’ is needed to suit our 
research purpose. 
This research, following the tradition of social-constructivism and post-
structuralism and inspired especially by Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse 
theory, defines the term ‘discourse’ as a language system regulating a 
certain social area, which is the only way to perceive reality. 
Identification, categorisation and self-understanding are all mediated 
and completed by this language system. The snapshot of such a 
system is called ‘identity’. Using such a definition, I hope to connect the 
concept of identification with its underlying linguistic process and therefore 
make it analysable. In the following part I will explain this definition and 
discuss its implication for the analysis.  
In saying that discourse is a language system, I am returning to the linguistic 
root of this concept. Indeed, originating from the study of linguistics, the 
concept of discourse has always maintained its relationship with language. 
Indeed, almost all previous definitions of this concept would contain 
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keywords such as ‘speaking’ ‘communication’ ‘text’ ‘speech’ – all of them 
belong to the field of language. In this respect, the term ‘discourse’ is far 
less ambiguous than ‘identity’ because almost all major definitions agree 
that it is made of elements of human language. In this research, I define 
‘discourse’ as a part of the human language system that regulates a certain 
social area – hence there are many kinds of discourses (e.g. political, 
economic, religious) and each can be considered a guideline of ‘how one 
should speak and behave’ in a given social context.  
Regarding discourse’s relationship with knowledge, this research 
subscribes to Laclau and Mouffe’s view that discourse is people’s only way 
of perceiving reality. Indeed, among discourse analysts there is no 
consensus about whether there are any realities ‘outside discourse’. In other 
words, should there be any distinction between ‘discourse’ and ‘non-
discursive matters’? Faced with these questions, Laclau and Mouffe deny 
that there are any pre-discursive/non-discursive realities and argue that 
‘every object is constituted as an object of discourse’.212 To further illustrate 
this point, they argue: 
‘An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that certainly exists, 
in the sense that it occurs here and now, independently of my will. But 
whether their specificity as objects is constructed in terms of “natural 
phenomena” or “expressions of the wrath of God”, depends upon the 
structuring of a discursive field.’ 213 
In fact, Laclau and Mouffe’s viewpoint agrees with the constructivist/post-
structuralist premise that there are no absolute objective facts in the world. 
The reality is constructed by the subject’s way of interpretation. This is not 
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to deny the existence of material facts, but only to argue that how the subject 
perceives the facts is essential. As Jorgensen and Phillips point out: 
‘with language, we create representations of reality that are never mere 
reflections of a pre-existing reality but contribute to constructing reality. 
That does not mean that reality itself does not exist. Meanings and 
representations are real. Physical objects also exist, but they only gain 
meaning through discourse.’214  
With this view in mind, the discourses in which the leadership of China and 
the Vatican were situated would determine how the leaders in the two 
countries interpret the facts. In Sino-Vatican relations, the governments of 
China and the Holy See will ‘decode’ the facts via their respective 
discourses. As they may follow dramatically different discourses, they may 
interpret an action very differently. In their interaction history, we can often 
see that an act intended by one party as a friendly gesture could be 
perceived by the other party as offensive. In fact, discourses impose strong 
constraints on Sino-Vatican relations. As discourse is the ‘lens’ through 
which the subject perceives reality, it will actually delimit the subject’s 
boundary of thinking. Discourse will prescribe what is meaningful and what 
is not. There are some utterances that will never be uttered because they 
are deemed as ‘not meaningful’ by the discourse. States (including China 
and the Vatican) are run by human beings, and human beings are highly 
social. With regard to language, there is no such thing as a ‘private 
language’ because every case of language use, even only in somebody’s 
own mind, is acquired from the social. The same applies to discourse – there 
is no action made by members without the guidance of the discourse 
system. Following the same logic, the entire identification/categorisation 
process, including the formation of self-understanding, are all mediated and 
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regulated by discourse. Hence, in order to get insights into the identification 
process we have to study the related discourses. 
Now let us consider the history of Sino-Vatican relations again from a 
discursive perspective. Sino-Vatican relations are always under the strong 
constraint of discourses. In the 18th century, China and Catholicism had a 
short ‘honeymoon’ period thanks to the efforts of the Jesuits in China. But 
the inter-governmental relationship suddenly turned sour in the Chinese 
Rite Controversy, which was caused by the conflict between the Confucian 
discourse and its counterpart held by the Holy See. In the early 20th century, 
the Holy See managed to build a good relationship with the KMT 
government in China. This was the result of the Holy See’s better 
understanding towards the KMT discourse and its willingness to cooperate 
with the KMT regime. The discourses in the Chinese Catholic Church in the 
1940s show clear signs of convergence with the KMT state ideology. 
However, the Holy See’s affiliation with KMT discourse became a historical 
burden after 1949, when the communists controlled mainland China. We 
can see from Sino-Vatican interaction history in the 1950s that the Holy See 
tried to maintain the previous discourse in the Chinese Catholic Church, 
which nevertheless proved to be unacceptable to the patriotic discourse 
established by the People’s Republic. In the following nine years (1949-
1958) the discourse system in China and the Vatican saw many major 
changes, and state behaviour also changed greatly following the discursive 
change. Indeed, discourse is not an unchangeable, static system. With the 
passage of time, the structure of discourse will also be changed by the 
agency of members. Sometimes the change is so great that the new 
discourse system is almost unintelligible to the former one. This process is 
similar to the linguistic relationship between Old English and Latin compared 
to Modern English and Italian.  In the first decade of Beijing-Rome 
interaction, the discourse systems in China and the Vatican have undergone 
major changes. And it is this process of change to which this research pays 
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special attention. In other words, this research aims to analyse the 
discursive changes related to Sino-Vatican relations from 1949 to 1958 and 
find the reasons behind these changes – which is the agency of the 
members in the discourse system.  
3.4 Analytical Framework: How to Study Discourses 
in Sino-Vatican Relations 
In the above sections, I have tried to lay a theoretical foundation for 
substantive research on Sino-Vatican relations. I have defined discourse as 
the language system regulating a certain social area and the only way to 
perceive reality. However, up to now the discussion is still at the level of 
abstract concepts and I need to apply them to the actual analysis. Hence, 
in this section I will try to build an analytical framework tailored for this 
research. 
My analytical model is based on Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory. The 
two authors consider themselves ‘post-Marxist’, which means that they build 
their theory based on critical appraisal of the traditional Marxist beliefs. 
However, unlike traditional Marxism, Laclau and Mouffe reject the dogma of 
‘orthodox’ Marxism that there is a unified ‘working-class’ and a universal 
class struggle and ‘Revolution’ against Capitalism. They argue that this 
notion is an essentialist idea, which was deeply affected by historical 
determinism. In their critique of orthodox Marxism, Laclau and Mouffe 
developed their own theory of discourse. Their definition of ‘discourse’ is 
based on four concepts, namely articulation, discourse, moments and 
element: 
‘We will call articulation any practice establishing a relation among 
elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory 
practice. The structured totality resulting from the articulatory practice, 
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we will call discourse. The differential positions, insofar as they appear 
articulated within a discourse, we will call moments. By contrast, we will 
call element any difference that is not discursively articulated.’215 
This definition is highly abstract and can only be understood in the context 
of structuralism and post-structuralism. Structuralism, as a school of 
philosophy, is based on the linguistic theory of Saussure, which argues that 
(a) the relationship between signifier and signified is arbitrary 216 and (b) the 
meaning of a signifier comes from its positional difference from other 
signifiers in the same language system.217  It could be argued that the 
structuralist view of a language system is like a huge net interwoven with 
signifiers, whose meanings depend on the relative position between them. 
Post-structuralism accepts the structuralist view of language as a ‘fishing-
net’ made of signifiers that are different from each other, but denies that this 
‘fishing-net’ is static and unchangeable.218 The names and contents of the 
signifiers in this ‘net’ are always subject to changes and re-definitions. Here 
we come to the starting point of Laclau and Mouffe’s definition of discourse. 
According to Laclau and Mouffe, discourse is the totality of moments. And 
moments are articulated signifiers. To be more specific, Laclau and Mouffe 
differentiate between two kinds of signifiers, namely the elements and 
moments. And elements can be turned into moments by means of 
articulation. To articulate is to reduce the multiple meanings in elements, fix 
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one meaning while driving the rest of meanings to the field of discursivity. 
On the other hand, to articulate elements is to create relations between 
different elements and create a chain of equivalence, in which many 
signifiers are connected with each other (as if an ‘equal sign =’ is drawn 
between them). In creating a chain of equivalence, a chain of difference 
would also be formed, which shows the opposite meanings in the chain of 
equivalence. It is by the chains of equivalence and their chains of difference 
that the political boundary is drawn and the identities of ‘self’ and ‘others’ 
are formed.  
The aim of political actors is to establish their own hegemony in the 
discourse system. To realise this, they need to use every means to fix the 
meaning of the signs in the discourse, and this process is called hegemonic 
intervention. A successful hegemonic intervention can suppress all the 
competing meanings in the system and realise a temporary hegemony. In 
this circumstance, the meaning of signs in the discursive ‘fishing net’ were 
partially fixed and reach a relative stable condition. (As have discussed 
before, I will use the term ‘identity’ to denote such a point in time when 
hegemony is achieved in discourse.) However, the signs in the discourse 
are always fluid and any hegemony is contingent. The signs will be open to 
further challenges and the temporary hegemony can be weakened and 
subverted.  
If we apply Laclau and Mouffe’s theory to our current study, then the 
linguistic phenomena and communications between the PRC government 
and the Holy See can be regarded as a discourse sustained by key signifiers 
and chains of equivalence. In this discursive structure, the two parties are 
always trying to gain the upper hand and try to establish hegemony in the 
discourse related to the Chinese Catholic Church. 
In the Sino-Vatican dispute over the Catholic Church, Beijing and Rome are 
contesting within a ‘Catholic’ discourse system. In saying that we imply that 
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the two parties are trying to fix the definitions of a series of key signifiers in 
a category named ‘Catholicism’. This point will become clearer if we make 
a comparison between the officially-sanctioned church in China and the 
Church of England during the English Reformation. Many people pointed 
out that the establishment of the officially-sanctioned church in China is 
similar to the founding of the Church of England, where the secular ruler 
used his/her power to force the church’s separation from Rome. It is true 
that the two historical events bear many resemblances. However here I 
would argue that there is a crucial difference between the officially-
sanctioned church in China and the Church of England in that the Catholic 
Church in China was never ordered by the government to become fully 
independent in name. 
It could be argued that being fully independent in name does not make a 
huge difference as the church in China is usually under the government’s 
strong intervention and was forbidden to obey Rome freely during the 
1950s. But no matter how Beijing and Rome clashed with each other, the 
church in China was still allowed to carry the name ‘Catholic’. The PRC 
government legally recognises the existence of the Catholic Church in 
China and, according to Chinese law, Catholics have the freedom to profess 
their religion and the religious activities of Catholicism are protected by law.  
Those who are critical of the Chinese government would see these 
freedoms and protection promised by law with disapproval and regard them 
as paying only lip-service. However, I would like to point out that the 
recognition and protection granted by Chinese law to the Catholic Church 
leaves a permanent discursive ground for Beijing and Rome to contest. The 
Chinese Catholic Church, as long as it carries the name ‘Catholic’, can 
never escape the influence of Rome.  
In the English case, the monarch was installed as the supreme leader of the 
church, removing the authority of the Pope. During the English Reformation, 
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the Church of England was created, the Pope’s influence was totally denied 
and Catholicism was purged and deemed illegal. In the state discourse, the 
ruler created a new sign ‘Church of England’ while scrapping the old sign 
‘Roman Catholic’ and trying to make the Catholic Church invisible. But in 
China, the government has kept the sign ‘Catholic’, which has never 
disappeared from the official discourse and public sight. The fact that the 
sign ‘Catholic’ was kept in China has huge implications for the development 
of the church in China. The Church of England, though highly similar to 
Catholicism in its early years, gradually drifted away from Rome in terms of 
dogma. The rift between the Church of England and Catholicism became 
great enough that today few doubt that they are independent from each 
other. (The recent ordination of female priests has made the rift greater). 
However, in China, instead of drifting away from Rome, the Chinese Church 
keeps closely to Rome in dogmatic aspects.  
In sum, in the post-1949 Chinese Catholic Church, the signifiers of the 
discourse of Catholicism were kept and maintained. The nodal points in the 
‘fishing-net’ are still there, keeping the same names and are open to 
challenges. The PRC government and the Holy See are still playing in the 
same arena. They are struggling with each other to establish hegemony in 
the discursive system. With their hegemonic interventions, both players are 
turning elements into moments via articulation. The signs in the Chinese 
Catholic Church’s discourse were connected, interwoven with each other 
and chains of equivalence were created. But no matter how hard the two 
governments try to fix the meaning of the key signifiers and drive the other 
meanings into the field of discursivity, the signifiers can only be temporarily 
fixed. The struggle over the Chinese Church’s discourse persisted for the 
whole of the 1950s and this research will endeavour to reveal this process 
of struggle. 
In order to apply Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory to actual research 
and realize the aim of revealing the structure and agency in Sino-Vatican 
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discourse, 4 steps are developed as guidelines for our analysis, shown 
below: 
Step 1: Identify a ‘flashpoint’ and locate important texts (documents/speeches). 
Step 2: Analyse the major texts. Find out the key signifiers and their definitions in 
the text and try to summarise them into chains of equivalence. 
Step 3: Evaluate the ambiguities in the text and discuss how it affects Beijing-Rome 
interactions. 
Step 4: Investigate the changes that occurred in the discourse system, namely in the 
nodal points and chains of equivalence. Discuss how these changes in discourse 
affect identities in Sino-Vatican relations. 
In this section I attempt to explain in detail my framework for analysis. 
By carrying out step 1 I hope to draw the reader’s attention to the research 
focus and to clarify what are, and are not, the aims of this research. Despite 
the fact that this research draws heavily on historical books, documents and 
sources, my aim in this thesis is not to provide another comprehensive 
historical work on the topic, but to give insights into the discourse and 
identify the formation process. Therefore, instead of covering all the details 
of the target time periods, my research will only focus on the ‘flashpoints’ in 
Sino-Vatican relations. By ‘flashpoints’ I mean the events that exert 
significant impact on the Beijing-Rome relationship. As their name suggests, 
flashpoints entail clashes between the two governments. In most cases 
during the target periods, the clashes between Beijing and Rome occurred 
in a fierce manner – both sides vehemently expressing their accusations 
and taking hostile actions towards each other. But in some cases, there was 
no open crossfire between the two sides and the clashes between them 
unfolded in a hidden and subtle manner. Indeed, many of these hidden 
flashpoints were totally ignored by previous historians on this topic. 
Therefore, by focusing on flashpoints instead of the entire historical records, 
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I aim to carry out a more in-depth analysis of the state identity changes than 
previous works on Sino-Vatican relations; by drawing the reader’s attention 
to the ‘hidden flashpoints’, I hope to show a more nuanced picture of identity 
articulation between Beijing and Rome.  
In fact, a ‘flashpoint’ in Sino-Vatican relations can be regarded as a 
‘snapshot’ of discourse and the process of identification is part of this 
snapshot. Discourse is a concept denoting process (something in a constant 
flux) and ‘flashpoints’ are points in this process. To be more specific, 
although showing fluidity in Sino-Vatican relations is one of the major aims 
of this research, by starting from ‘flashpoints’ I hope to draw readers’ 
attention to the relatively ‘static’ points in discourses between Beijing and 
Rome for two reasons.  
First, it allows comparison of different time points and lets us understand 
better the changes that occurred in Sino-Vatican relations. Starting from a 
flashpoint and taking a ‘snapshot’ of the underlying discourse enables me 
to carry out a comparison of different time points in Sino-Vatican discourses. 
By these comparisons we will understand better how great the differences 
were between the previous discourses and more recent ones.  
Second, by starting from ‘flashpoints’ I hope to reflect the ‘temporary 
fixation’ in Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory and draw readers’ attention 
to the relatively stable ‘moments’ in discourse. According to Laclau and 
Mouffe, the meanings of signifiers in a discourse could never be totally fixed, 
but on the other hand ‘there have to be partial fixations’. 219 If not, the 
differences between different signifiers could not be maintained and the 
‘fishing net’ of discourse will fall apart. In other words, we need to be 
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cautious not to put too much focus on the fluid side of discourse – its status 
at given time points is also important to the analysis.  
The second action in step 1 is locating important texts. Unlike previous work 
on Sino-Vatican relations, this research is based on in-depth textual 
analysis. Even though I have limited the research scope to the ‘flashpoints’, 
it is impossible to analyse all the details of Beijing-Rome interactions. 
Hence, my analysis will focus on the key texts (including speech 
transcriptions) at these flashpoints. So what can be counted as ‘important 
texts’? The selection criteria are threefold: first, the text should come from 
the documents officially issued/endorsed by the two governments (or 
quoted by these official documents); second, the text should exert huge 
influence on Catholics in China. For example, papal messages regarding 
China would usually have a large impact in the minds of Chinese Catholics; 
third, the text should, preferably, reveal traits of the ‘thinking process’ of 
state leadership. For example, documents from Beijing often include 
comments and evaluations of the recent gestures made by Rome – these 
texts can certainly help us understand more about how interactions 
influence Sino-Vatican relations. To sum up, with these criteria I hope to 
focus my analysis on the most important texts in Sino-Vatican relations. The 
analysis of these texts will show the process of identity articulation between 
Beijing and Rome.  
Now comes step two. After focusing on flashpoints and locating key texts, 
my task now is to carry out detailed analysis of them. How should this be 
done? Indeed, a major difficulty in doing this research is that the original 
texts in Sino-Vatican relations are not easy pieces for discourse analysis. 
The texts are very different from each other in style; some are extremely 
long (e.g. papal encyclicals) and defy word-by-word analysis; let alone the 
fact that they are originally written in different languages. So is there any 
way to build a coherent structure for these original sources? As have 
discussed in the last section, I will use Laclau and Mouffe’s concept of a 
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‘chain of equivalence’ to organise my analysis and the interaction between 
Beijing and Rome will be regarded as a struggle where both governments 
strive for a discursive hegemony among Chinese Catholics. I believe this is 
an effective and succinct way to conduct such analysis. The method of 
dealing with a key text would be like this: 
(1) An introduction to the background and main content of the text will be 
given. (e.g. under what condition was the document issued? Who was the 
author of the document? Who were the intended audience? Why is it 
important?) 
(2) Locate the nodal points (key signifiers). As determined by my research 
focus, the nodal points I chose are those most connected with identity 
formation. They either directly refer to state governments (e.g. ‘The Roman 
Curia’), or hint at them (e.g. ‘the one who seeks earthly power and 
interests’), or denote the groups within the church crucial to the Sino-Vatican 
contests (e.g. ‘Bishops’ ‘Imperialist elements’)  
(3) Find out how these nodal points are connected with other signifiers and 
arrange them into chains of equivalence. For example, in a papal letter, how 
does the nodal point hint at Beijing’s connection with other signifiers? (e.g. 
Beijing = the one who persecutes the church = preventing bishops from 
exercising their authority) Similarly, what was the situation in Beijing’s 
documents? What kind of identities did they convey?  
(4) See whether a chain of difference was constructed. More often than not, 
a chain of equivalence implies a chain of difference. For example, in the 
apostolic letter Cupimus Imprimis, the Pope used many words to illustrate 
the transcendent nature of Catholicism and stressed that the only aim of the 
church was ‘to pursue celestial things’. Therefore, the Pope constructed a 
chain of equivalence ‘the church = the entity aiming at celestial things’. 
However, in doing so he also implicitly created a chain of difference: ‘the 
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church’s opponent (Beijing) = the one who seeks earthly gains and 
interests). The creation of chains of equivalence and chains of difference 
were prevalent in Sino-Vatican interactions and they give many insights into 
the identity construction process between Beijing and Rome.  
In sum, with the above procedure I attempt to illustrate the identification 
process in Sino-Vatican relations in a clear and succinct way. However, 
using the concept of chain of equivalence alone we may still miss many 
nuances in Sino-Vatican identity articulation. Hence the need to carry out 
the next step of the analysis. 
In step 3, after revealing the chains of equivalence (and difference) I will 
draw the reader’s attention to the ambiguities in Sino-Vatican interactions. 
By ‘ambiguities’ I mean the linguistic elements in the original texts that are 
open to different interpretations. In fact, ambiguities are widespread in the 
documents and speeches in Sino-Vatican relations. Sometimes a friendly 
message could be interpreted as unfriendly due to different interpretations. 
For example, a papal message that intended to show a benign message to 
Beijing could be interpreted as implicitly subversive due to the wording and 
style. Vice versa, even in Beijing’s seemingly hostile messages towards 
Rome there could be some subtle signs reflecting a desire for reconciliation. 
So how did these ambiguities come into being in the first place? Is there any 
linguistic basis for these and are there any unintended messages 
conveyed? In sum, in this step I hope to reveal an important aspect of Sino-
Vatican interactions that have been rarely noticed by previous authors.  
In the last step, based on the analysis done in the previous steps, I will try 
to track the changes that occurred in the discourses in Sino-Vatican 
relations. The questions I would like to ask during this step include: are there 
any differences between a certain chain of equivalence/difference and 
similar chains in the past? If so, what is the reason behind such change? 
How does this change affect identity construction? For example, when 
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comparing the documents issued by Beijing in the late 1950s with those 
issued in the early 1950s, it can be clearly seen that the chains of 
equivalence regarding the Vatican had undergone many changes.  
3.5 The Time Period to be Studied and the Main 
Sources 
Time Period Selection 
The time period to be studied in this research is 1949-1958. So what is the 
rationale behind this choice of research periods? First and foremost, this 
period, according to my point of view, is the most crucial period in PRC-
Vatican relations because the two actors had completed a full round of 
identity articulation – the two ‘deadlocks’ of the Sino-Vatican stalemate, 
namely the Vatican’s diplomatic ties with Taiwan and the PRC’s ‘self-
consecration’ mechanism were all formed in this 9-year period. As we will 
see in the next chapter of this thesis, even to this day, the pattern of 
interaction between Beijing and Rome was not fundamentally different from 
what it was in the 1950s – it is indeed a long-standing stalemate. Hence, 
understanding how this stalemate was formed in the 1950s will certainly 
help us better understand today’s Sino-Vatican relations. In this regard, the 
interactions between Beijing and Rome in the 1950s are not merely 
historical facts, but part of the two states’ experience that still exerts a great 
influence on their relationships today. 
Secondly, the year 1958 is an important turning point in Sino-Vatican 
interactions. Before 1958, Beijing did not have a clear position on the 
Vatican’s role regarding the church in China. Despite the quarrels and the 
contests between Beijing and Rome, before 1958 Beijing had never formally 
ordered that the Vatican should be excluded from having any say in the 
appointment of bishops. In 1958, the officially-sanctioned church passed a 
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formal resolution which openly rejected the Pope’s authority for appointing 
bishops in China. With Beijing’s active support, the officially-sanctioned 
church ‘self-elected and self-consecrated’ the first batch of bishops without 
papal consent. This set a precedent for subsequent episcopal consecrations 
in China and its mechanism precluded the participation of the Vatican. 
Therefore, after the 1958 ‘self-consecrations’, Beijing formally excluded the 
Vatican from the episcopal appointing mechanism.  The strong antagonism 
caused by this event interrupted direct interactions between Beijing and 
Rome. 
Thirdly, the year 1958 saw major political changes in both Beijing and Rome. 
In 1958, Mao Zedong launched the Great Leap Forward and China started 
to sink into political turmoil. China was plagued by devastating political 
movements and became isolated from the rest of the world. Due to the 
isolation and harsh political environment, contact between Rome and the 
church in China was lost. On the other hand, the year 1958 was also a 
turning point for the Vatican because Pope Pius XII died in that year. 
Successive Popes showed to some extent a more benign attitude towards 
Beijing. But the Vatican’s attempt to reach China in the next two decades 
met with almost no response from Beijing. Therefore, due to the lack of 
interaction between Beijing and Rome in the following two decades, the year 
1958 is a good cut-off point for research focused on interaction.   
The Sources 
The main Chinese language sources this research used are collected from 
the Archive of the Bureau of Religious Affairs, Hunan Province. In the 
autumn of 2013, I managed to make contact with the Bureau of Religious 
Affairs, Hunan Province. I discussed my research aims and needs with the 
officials of the bureau and asked for their help. To my delight, the officials in 
the bureau were willing to support this research and allowed me to consult 
historical documents in their archive. At that time, this archive had not yet 
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been opened to researchers on this topic so I really cherished this chance 
and intended to make full use of it. In December 2013, I went to Changsha, 
the capital of Hunan Province and visited the Hunan Provincial Archive. 
(The Archive of the Bureau of Religious Affairs is a sub-branch of the 
Provincial Archive). With permission from the bureau, I entered the archive 
reading room and started to consult historical documents. In the course of 
three weeks I went to the reading room every working day to research 
relevant materials. 
The Archive of the Religious Bureau holds a huge amount of original internal 
documents from the 1950s and the early 1980s. As the bureau ceased to 
function during the long political turmoil of China, the archive lacks records 
from the mid-1960s to 1979. These documents are faithful records of the 
Chinese government’s religious policies towards the five officially 
recognized religions of China (Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, Protestant 
Christianity and Catholicism) in the 1950s and early 1980s. Originally 
intended for the internal use of bureau officials, these documents are de-
classified now but are not open to the general public. Despite being a 
provincial archive, most of these documents were issued by the central 
government in Beijing and therefore represent national policies. On the 
other hand, the archive also contains many reports sent by provincial 
officials to central government regarding the local situation of religions.  
During my stay in the reading room I focused my energy on locating the 
historical documents related to the Catholic Church. The consulting process 
is far from easy because the index system of the archive was only 
rudimentary. (Sometimes I had to locate documents about the Catholic 
Church among large numbers of documents related to Buddhism and 
Taoism.) However, the most daunting aspect of data collection was that 
cameras and photocopiers were strictly forbidden in the reading room – so 
how to faithfully transcribe these documents became a major challenge. 
Fortunately, the staff of the archive allowed me to use a digital voice 
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recorder in the reading room. This greatly facilitated the data collection 
process: whenever I found a valuable document I would ‘whisper’ the 
original text word by word to the voice recorder. In this way I ensured that I 
got hold of original material as much as possible in the absence of other 
transcribing methods. Later on I would listen to these digital recordings and 
re-transcribe them into texts. During the recording I made a huge effort to 
make sure that I pronounced every word clearly (despite speaking in a 
‘whispering’ tone) so I am confident that this transcribing process has not 
affected the faithfulness of the sources. 
The data collection was very productive and I managed to record a fair 
number of key documents related to Sino-Vatican relations and the Chinese 
government’s policies towards the church in China. The majority of these 
documents have never been released before and therefore can be 
considered a major contribution to the study of Sino-Vatican relations – to 
my knowledge, no previous works in English on this topic have ever used 
this amount and quality of internal archival material from the side of the 
PRC. These first-hand materials will also benefit further research on church 
history in China and on the development of the Chinese government’s 
religious policy in general. My current thesis is based on archival material 
dated from 1950 to 1958 and I plan to publish further studies on Sino-
Vatican relations using the material of other historical periods. 
 
4. A Fundamental Rift (1949-1951) 
In this chapter I shall discuss the first two years of Beijing-Rome interaction. 
As has been discussed in the methodology part, this thesis does not intend 
to be a comprehensive historical study of Sino-Vatican relations. Instead, it 
will focus on the ‘flashpoints’ in Beijing-Rome interactions. Hence, what 
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should be considered as the first flashpoint in Sino-Vatican relations after 
the foundation of the PRC? Indeed, we are inevitably led to the beginning 
of Beijing-Rome interactions in the earliest days of the People’s Republic. 
Within two years of the PRC’s foundation, Sino-Vatican relations 
deteriorated rapidly and the Vatican’s internuncio to China was humiliated 
and expelled from mainland China. I argue that the expulsion of the papal 
internuncio should be regarded as the first flashpoint as this event marks 
the end of the Holy See’s direct diplomatic presence in mainland China.  
The expulsion of the papal internuncio was done in a less than friendly 
way.220 On 4 Sep 1951, the internuncio, Archbishop Antonio Riberi was 
summoned to the Public Security Bureau of Nanjing and underwent 
interrogations. At the end of interrogations, the officials read the expulsion 
order out to the internuncio and announced that he had offended Chinese 
law on three issues. First, supporting spying activities; second, organizing 
counterrevolutionary secret societies; third, inciting Catholics to oppose the 
government. For these crimes, the internuncio should be ‘expelled from the 
Chinese land forever’. Afterwards, in the late evening of that day, the 
internuncio was escorted by policemen to his residence to pack his luggage. 
In the early morning of 5 Sep, the internuncio boarded a southbound train 
under police surveillance. After a two-day journey, he finally reached the 
Chinese border at Shenzhen and entered Hong Kong, a British colony at 
that time – that was the end of the Vatican’s direct diplomatic presence in 
the Chinese mainland. 
Why should Beijing treat the Vatican’s internuncio in this unfriendly way? In 
fact, the expulsion of the internuncio was not an isolated event. It was 
actually the culmination of tension between Beijing and Rome over the 
previous two years. Hence, in discussing this flashpoint we should not forget 
                                            
220 For details of Riberi’s expulsion please see: Chen and Jiang, pp.242-243. Mariani, pp.69-
71.  
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that it is closely related to the previous two year’s events. So what happened 
over the previous two years? The previous authors had all noticed that the 
church had been subjected to pressure on two fronts, namely the loss of 
church properties and personnel, and the initiation of the ‘three-self’ (‘self-
governing, self-preaching and self-funding’) movement. The important thing 
is how to interpret these historical events. In fact, in interpreting this 
historical period, three tendencies from previous literature are worthy of 
attention.  
First, previous authors tend to hold the view that Beijing’s actions towards 
the church were determined long before the war and that the outbreak of 
the Korean War simply provided Beijing with a pretext for attacking the 
church. For example, Myers argues that the Korean War ‘made it easier for 
the authorities to justify squeezing and pressuring the missions through the 
already-established methods of taxes and confiscations.’221 Another major 
author, Mariani, also supports the view that ‘the war provided the perfect 
cover for the CCP to effect a more complete cultural transformation of the 
country, plans that had been drawn up long before.’222 In other words, 
Beijing had long decided how to deal with the church in China and the 
Korean War gave the regime a chance to implement such a decision. No 
matter how the church behaved, it could not escape from the government’s 
harsh measures. Indeed, as Mariani put it, ‘the party had already articulated 
its long-term policies; the Korean War allowed for an accelerated 
implementation of these policies.’ 223  
Second, the previous account of Beijing’s actions towards the church in 
China is one-sided and only concerns ‘how Beijing persecuted the church’. 
                                            
221 Myers, p. 67. 
222 Mariani, p. 54. 
223 Ibid., p.54. 
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The description of these harsh measures was aimed at portraying a highly 
negative image of Beijing. Soon after the outbreak of the Korean War, 
Beijing initiated the ‘suppression of counter-revolutionaries’ campaign to 
purge perceived domestic threats. In discussion of this campaign, Myers 
denounces it as ‘an open reign of terror’ and posits that ‘the human toll of 
this terror can only be estimated but it was surely enormous, probably in the 
millions.’ He further argues that this campaign was conducted below 
Western standards: ‘the Chinese authorities were not operating according 
to a Western concept of law and legality…anything less than complete 
enthusiasm for the goals of the revolution, therefore, left one vulnerable to 
the charge of “counterrevolutionary activity”.’224 Many priests and sisters 
were arrested in the ‘suppression of counterrevolutionaries’ campaigns and 
large numbers of foreign clergy were expelled from China.  Mariani also 
portrayed Beijing’s actions towards the church from 1950-1951 as brutal 
and reckless. The regime not only imposed ‘draconian taxes’ on the church 
to render it penniless, but also seized church assets and confiscated 
schools and charities owned by the church.225 To be more specific, by taxing 
the church and cutting off the church’s economic ties with the West, Beijing 
dealt a heavy blow to church finances. The government’s interference with 
the curricula offered by church schools/universities finally led to the 
nationalisation of these institutions and the church could no longer offer 
Catholic education in mainland China. Moreover, the church’s charity 
institutions in China were also under attack. The government accused 
Catholic orphanages of abusing, neglecting and killing large numbers of 
babies and children. This accusation led to the arrests of many sisters 
working in orphanages and the confiscation of church charity institutions in 
                                            
224 Myers, pp. 84-85. 
225 Mariani, pp. 32-39. 
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China.226 To make the situation worse, the church lost a huge number of 
properties in rural areas due to ongoing Land Reform where the assets of 
the ‘landlord class’ were confiscated and divided among poor farmers.227 In 
sum, during this historical period, previous literature tends to look only at 
Beijing’s harsh measures against the church and does not discuss whether 
interaction between Beijing and Rome played any role in it.  
Last but not least, previous authors paid too little attention to texts from 
Beijing’s side and regarded them as mere propaganda texts. During this 
period, Beijing issued many important documents and texts, for example, 
the PRC’s provisional constitution the Common Program, key newspaper 
editorials/articles conveying Beijing’s religious policies and the 
‘declarations’ relating to the government-sponsored ‘three-self’ movement. 
In fact, the previous authors had noticed the existence of these texts and 
mentioned them in their works. But they tend to dismiss them as government 
propaganda texts and did not make any in-depth analysis of them. For 
example, on 30 Nov 1950, in Sichuan Province, a priest named Wang 
Liangzuo led several hundred local Catholics and announced the Manifesto 
on Independence and Reform. This manifesto was considered as the start 
of the ‘three-self’ movement in the Catholic Church in China. The Manifesto 
was quickly supported and encouraged by the PRC government. Following 
Father Wang’s Declaration, the government quickly launched a publicity 
campaign in various newspapers throughout China. Newspapers published 
many manifestos signed by local Catholics supporting the ‘autonomy 
movements’. However, both Myers and Mariani argue that these reports 
were full of slogans of propaganda and therefore likely to have been 
                                            
226 Laszlo Ladany, The Catholic Church in China (New York: Freedom House, 1987),      pp.16-
17. 
227 Myers, pp. 62-65. 
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fabricated by the government.228 Mariani also points out that ‘many of the 
signatures on the manifestos were either false or obtained through 
deception.’ 229  After this judgement, both writers quickly switched their 
attention to narrate how these ‘autonomy movements’ were refuted and 
boycotted by Chinese Catholics. In other words, even if these documents 
were mentioned by previous major authors, they are used to portray an ugly 
image of Beijing. No attempts were made to analyse these texts in detail, 
let alone to discuss their implications for Sino-Vatican relations.  
In sum, the previous works have major flaws in discussing Sino-Vatican 
relations from 1949 to 1951. I argue these tendencies are not helpful to a 
better understanding of Sino-Vatican relations because they reflect a rigid 
view of identity. If we are to be confined by this view, the constructivist 
process behind Beijing’s change of religious policies will become invisible. 
Beijing would always be a ‘brutal communist regime’ that continually 
persecutes the church. The church under communist rule would always be 
the victim of the regime and could expect no better treatment as long as 
communist rule persists. Every part of Beijing’s religious policies, no matter 
how harsh or benign, can be explained by such a supposed ‘communist 
identity’. But is this explanation really helpful? What kind of role did 
Rome/the church play during this period? How did this role affect the identity 
formation process in Sino-Vatican relations? Had the church (and Rome) 
acted differently, would the result be any different? Previous literature has 
given us virtually no answer regarding these questions.  
The texts to be analysed 
In fact, from the latter half of 1950 to the following year, the PRC expressed 
several times its security concerns about foreign influence on the churches 
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in China. To clear the potential threats, the PRC started to encourage the 
autonomy of the local churches. Faced with these actions of the PRC, the 
Vatican had also given many speeches and taken a series of measures to 
secure the ties between the local churches and Rome.  
From the side of Beijing, this section will analyse three texts. Firstly, the 
thesis will examine a newspaper article named A correct understanding, 
which was the first systematic formal declaration of the PRC’s attitude and 
policy towards the church in China. Secondly, the thesis will go on to 
analyse the PRC’s provisional constitution the Common Program and 
discuss its significance for Sino-Vatican relations. Afterwards, attention will 
be given to the Manifesto on Independence and Reform, which marked the 
PRC’s first attempt to promote the ‘three-self’ movement in the Chinese 
Catholic Church. From the Vatican’s side, besides the papal internuncio’s 
speeches and gestures in China, special attention will be paid to Fr. 
Matthew Chen’s treatise Holy and Catholic and the church’s anti-Beijing 
leaflets discovered in the Hunan Provincial Archive. Their effects on identity 
articulation will be discussed. 
4.1 Beijing Speaks out: Three Texts on the Church in 
China 
Prelude: A Benign Period 
On Oct 23, 1949, Nanjing, the capital of China at that time, fell into the hands 
of the CPC. When the leadership of the city changed, most foreign diplomats 
in Nanjing chose to leave. The embassies were quickly evacuated. Some 
diplomats retreated to their home countries, while some followed the fleeing 
KMT government to the city of Guangzhou. Contrary to the reactions of 
other states to the communist takeover, the Holy See chose to “stay in 
China” by ordering the Catholic priests and missionaries, including the papal 
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internuncio, Archbishop Riberi to stay in mainland China. Pope Pius XII, 
after learning of the communist takeover of Nanjing, immediately took four 
measures. First, the Pope ordered Catholic foreign bishops and 
missionaries ‘to remain in their posts.’ 230  Second, The Pope ordered 
Cardinal Tien Ken-Sin and Archbishop Yu Pin to return to mainland 
China.231 Cardinal Tien was the Archbishop of Beijing (Peiping) and Yu was 
the Archbishop of Nanjing (Nanking). At that time, they were the two most 
influential archbishops in the Chinese Catholic Church. When Nanjing fell 
into the communists’ hands, Tien and Yu were abroad. The Pope ordered 
them to return to their dioceses immediately.232 When the two showed 
hesitation about returning to mainland China, the Pope was angry.233 Third, 
the Vatican refused to accept the new ambassador from the KMT 
government despite the fact that the latter was more than eager to return to 
                                            
230 Weimin Gu summarised in his Annals of the Chinese Catholic Church the Vatican’s order to 
the priests. “Regarding the retreat of the Chinese Catholics, the Vatican had clearly 
expressed its attitude: First, students from the major seminaries should be relocated to the 
safe zone (i.e. the areas not directly affected by the Civil War) and continue their studies. 
Second, students from the minor seminaries should be relocated to the hinterlands of China 
since it is almost impossible for them to continue their studies. Third, the Pope ordered that 
all the priests should remain in their posts. Only the ones who are in special danger can 
retreat.”  From: Weimin Gu, Annals of the Chinese Catholic Church (Shanghai: Shang Hai Shu 
Dian Publishing House, 2003), p.525.  
231 Chen and Jiang, p.227. ‘Regarding the situation, Tien Ken-sin is quite typical. He did 
not return to Beijing despite the fact that Riberi repeatedly ordered him to.’ ‘Yu Pin may 
also have received orders from the Vatican, which commanded him to return to China 
although he had already been accused by the Communists of being a “war criminal”.’ 
232 The two archbishops never managed to go back to Mainland China, as they were 
affiliated with the KMT government in Taiwan. The exiled government in Taiwan did not 
wish them to do so.  
233 According to Chen and Jiang, Pope Pius XII was extremely unhappy about Tien Ken-
sin’s lingering presence in Hong Kong. When someone interceded with the Pope on 
Cardinal Tien’s behalf, the Pope harshly criticised Cardinal Tien: “A Cardinal should obey 
the Pope rather than obey the laity!” From: Chen and Jiang, p.228. 
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the Vatican.234 Fourth, The papal internuncio, Antonio Riberi, chose to stay 
in Nanjing.235 Despite urging and an invitation from the KMT Government, 
he refused to move away from Nanjing. 
On the other hand, the communists tolerated Riberi’s stay in Nanjing and 
did not try to expel him. Moreover, the activities of internuncio Riberi, and 
other missionaries remained generally undisturbed. As records 
demonstrate, Riberi had personal freedom which enabled him to travel to 
other cities and perform the consecrations of new bishops. His freedom of 
speech was also undisturbed and he could freely contact and send 
telegraphs to his peers in China and abroad.236 
In sum, though the PRC and the Vatican were holding 'a priori conditions' 
which may tempt them to regard each other as potential enemies, these 
'pre-definitions' did not lead them to take hostile action towards one another 
automatically. Following the fall of the KMT capital in 1949, the Holy See 
made an important initial decision to stay in mainland China despite the 
exodus of diplomatic officials from other countries. Although there was no 
direct contact between the communist government and the Vatican, the 
Pope's decision to "remain in China", and his cold attitude towards the KMT 
government, had certainly sent positive and friendly messages to the 
Communist Party, which was now the rising power. On the other hand, we 
can see that despite the anti-communist impression of the Vatican, the CPC, 
                                            
234 Ibid., p.228. According to Chen and Jiang, the Vatican sent a message to the KMT 
government: ‘As we are now in a delicate condition, the Holy See hopes that the Chinese 
government can delay the appointment of an ambassador to the Vatican.’  
235 Ibid., p.220. 
236  Mariani, pp.28-29. ‘On July 18,1949, Anthony Riberi, the Vatican internuncio to 
China, wrote to Fernand Lacretelle, the Shanghai Jesuit Mission superior, and told him 
that the present Shanghai Diocese would be subdivided into two dioceses and two apostolic 
prefectures.’ ‘On October 7, 1949, Riberi himself consecrated Kung at St. Ignatius Church 
in Xujiahui.’ 
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seeing the Vatican's action of staying in China, did not take proactive action 
to stop it. At least, the CPC allowed Cardinal Riberi to stay in Nanjing, and 
did not try to limit his personal freedom. Therefore, when revisiting the first 
several months of the PRC-Vatican encounter, we discover that both parties 
behaved with restraint. Nobody tried to communicate with each another and 
at least peace was kept between the two parties. However, such a status 
quo could not be maintained in the following interactions.  
Even writers that are highly critical of the CPC’s religious policy did not fail 
to notice the initial peace between the new regime and the church. Mariani 
noticed that the normal life of the Catholic Church in Shanghai remained 
undisturbed after the communists’ takeover of Shanghai.237 He also noticed 
that the priority of the new regime’s education policy was not to eliminate 
religious influence, but to wipe out KMT influence.238 Moreover, the schools 
and universities run by the church could operate as usual. Mariani attributed 
the initial peaceful situation of Shanghai to two factors: first, the communists 
were still preparing their security apparatus; second, the CCP ‘needed all 
the friends it could get’, which means that the regime did not want to 
‘antagonize groups that could – at least temporarily – contribute to national 
stability’ before securing its power over China. In other words, Mariani 
implied that the benign policy adopted by the CCP towards the church was 
only for reasons of expediency. When Beijing consolidated its power, it 
would crush the church. Myers also reported the communists’ initial benign 
treatment of Catholics, especially in the ‘newly liberated areas’.239 But he 
also drew a similar conclusion that the benign policy was only temporary. 
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Their arguments seem hard to refute. It is true that soon after Beijing 
established firm control over China, its policy towards the church was 
quickly tightened to the extent that the church struggled to survive. But this 
thesis argues that to see Beijing’s policies toward the Catholic Church as 
fulfilling an a priori aim of destroying the church is an oversimplification. We 
will see from the later parts of this thesis that the two core issues of the Sino-
Vatican stalemate were formed in a long process of nine years and were 
closely related to the interactions and feedback between the two countries. 
For the same reason, we should not regard Beijing’s initial benign attitude 
towards the Catholic Church as mere expediency. It was, in fact, an initial 
move made by Beijing towards the church and the Vatican, and this move 
would be adjusted by Beijing according to the church’s feedback.  
Deducing the initial intention from the result is easy. But in many instances 
the result was only partly related to, or unrelated to the initial intention. The 
same reasoning applies to Sino-Vatican relations. Indeed, Beijing adopted 
harsh measures against the church and the pro-Vatican priests in the 
1950s. But these things alone cannot prove that Beijing’s initial purpose in 
the early 1950s was to destroy the Catholic Church by forceful and harsh 
means. It was true that the new regime of Beijing, ruled by communists, had 
atheism in its ideology. But this did not warrant powerful state intervention 
in the Catholic Church. In studying Sino-Vatican relations, more attention 
should be paid to ‘how mutual feedback impacted each country’s policies’, 
and, in the study of their relationship in the 1950s, to ‘why Beijing changed 
its initial benign policy towards the Vatican to a harsher version and what 
kind of role was the Vatican playing in this process?’  
 
Engaging with Christianity: A Correct Understanding 
So, what was Beijing’s initial expression of its attitude towards the church? 
In fact, Beijing’s policy towards religions, especially towards Christianity, is 
 126 
openly expressed in a key historical text, namely A Correct Understanding 
of the Issues Related to Catholicism and Protestantism. On 20 Nov. 1950, 
this article appeared in all the major newspapers in mainland China, which 
is the first time that the PRC government systematically expressed its 
attitude towards the Christian (Catholic and Protestant) churches in China. 
At this time, Beijing had already sent armed forces to the Korean battlefield. 
Under the pretext of war, the PRC expressed its worries about the possible 
‘imperialist influence’ on the churches in China, made some promises and 
offered solutions.  
As the first detailed, formal expression of Beijing’s attitude towards 
Christianity, the text of Correct Understanding certainly deserves a 
prominent place in the key documents of Sino-Vatican interaction. However, 
the previous literature on this topic paid hardly any attention to this text and 
no serious analytical effort was made regarding its original text.  
Here, in order to shed light on Beijing’s first formal message towards the 
church, I shall use Correct Understanding as the first text to be studied in 
this thesis. In fact, I intend also to use it to illustrate how I conduct discourse 
analysis and how the concept of ‘chain of equivalence’ works in studying 
the identification process. To put it briefly, this style of analysis involves in-
depth reading of the original text and makes extensive use of the concept 
of ‘chain of equivalence’. By arranging the key signifiers into chains of 
equivalence, I hope to clearly show how the actors were connected to other 
signifiers and their relative positions in the discourse. By reading the chains 
of equivalence, readers will easily be able to perceive how different actors 
were identified and categorised and what the author’s self-understanding 
was in the discourse. Indeed, to my knowledge, this is the most explicit and 
extensive usage of Laclau and Mouffe’s original concept in discourse 
analysis and I believe the analytical framework established in this thesis will 
have the potential to be used in future research in social science.  
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One of the chain of equivalence’s greatest advantages is that it can 
summarise long texts in a concise and succinct way. In fact, this thesis 
involves the study of many original texts that are too long to be presented 
in full – in this case chains of equivalence will be a good method to show 
the readers the information most relevant to this thesis (i.e. identity 
articulation). However, the use of the chain of equivalence certainly involves 
some degree of subtraction and omission from the original text. Therefore, 
how can the researcher ensure that this subtraction does not affect the 
reliability of the chains of equivalence? Indeed, this could be a hard question 
to answer. The method of chains of equivalence, just like any other 
analytical method in social science, could be affected by the researcher’s 
own prejudice and partiality. The decision of ‘what should be included and 
what should be omitted’ also depends on the researcher’s own 
interpretation and judgement. Hence, how should one address this potential 
problem? 
The first point I would like to make here is that this thesis, as one following 
the social constructivist approach, does not claim absolute objectivity. 
Indeed, the anti-essentialism embedded in social constructivism tends to 
deny the very existence of ‘objectivity’. Nonetheless, the denial of absolute 
objectivity does not mean that one could interpret texts on his/her whim, let 
alone distort and freely add meanings to the original text. How should I 
ensure that my analysis faithfully reflects the original ideas in the texts? To 
maintain good research quality, the following three principles are followed 
as my ‘code of conduct’ in discourse analysis: 
1. Before putting forward the chains of equivalence, the reader should 
be informed of the overall structure and content of the original text. 
The historical background should be introduced and previous 
scholarly debates should be presented to the readers.  
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2. When building chains of equivalence, best efforts should be made to 
retain the original wording of the text. Paraphrasing will only be 
adopted when there is little chance of different readings.  
3. All elements in a chain of equivalence should have an actual textual 
basis that can be traced to the original text. In fact, in most cases, 
when explaining a chain of equivalence, I will give the original 
sentences/wordings from which the chain is derived. 
In the following part I will provide my own full translation of Correct 
Understanding from the original Chinese text and illustrate my entire 
analysis paragraph by paragraph. I hope to give my readers a clear example 
of my style of discourse analysis and see its advantages for showing the 
identification process of both states.  
The Text Source, Translation, Summary and First Impressions 
No full translation of Correct Understanding was given in previous academic 
literature and therefore this is the first attempt to provide the full text for 
English readers. In fact, Correct Understanding is an ideal piece to illustrate 
my method of analysis because it was not overly long (around 1600 words 
after translation) and has enough complexity to show the nuances of my 
analytical model. The original text was published in Renmin Ribao (the 
People’s Daily), the official newspaper of the CPC, on 20 Nov 1950. I 
retrieved the original Chinese text from the official digital archive (1946-
2006) of Renmin Ribao 240 and translated it into English. To be faithful to the 
original text, I retained the original paragraphing and followed the Chinese 
                                            
240 Renmin Ribao, ‘A Correct Understanding of the Issues Related to Catholicism and 
Protestantism’, Renmin Ribao, Page 3, 20 Nov 1950 
<http://58.68.146.102/rmrb/19501120/3> [accessed 17 Sep 2016]. 
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sentence order and way of expression when possible. The word count after 
translation was 1670. 
After a first reading of the text, the first step of my analysis was to get a 
general sense of its structure, summarise the main content of the text and 
list the central issues it contained. In the case of Correct Understanding, the 
original text has a clear, three-part structure, which can be summarised 
below: 
Summary of the structure and main content of Correct Understanding 
1. The situation of Catholicism and Protestantism in China. 
The religious issues should be handled correctly. A dichotomy exists in 
Christian religions in China: on the one hand, they are the belief systems of 
the people; on the other hand, they are utilised by imperialists to invade 
China. There are large numbers of foreign missionaries in Christian churches 
and the charities and schools owned by the church are heavily funded by the 
West.  
2. The Marxists’ attitude towards religions 
Marxists are atheists. However, religious issues should be solved by 
administrative orders and other simplified, radical methods. Although 
Marxists do not agree with believers of religions, the two groups can form a 
united front in the face of imperialist threats. Church affairs should be free 
from imperialist influence and be fully managed by the Chinese people. 
3. Some specific issues for Catholicism and Protestantism  
Believers should not proselytise outside church buildings while other people 
should not promote anti-religious views inside church buildings. During land 
reform church activities should be suspended until land allocation is 
completed. Schools and other charities can continue to exist as long as they 
obey the Common Program. The government should not occupy church 
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properties by force. Instead negotiation should be carried out between the 
government and the church.  
After getting the general gist of the text content, I would attempt to figure out 
what my analytical focus should be. My principal research aim in this thesis 
is to find out the identity articulation process in their discourses of Beijing 
and Rome. This process was represented by the defining/identifying efforts 
made by each side, and when both Beijing and Rome attempt to realise 
hegemony in fixing the meaning of key signifiers. However, not every 
signifier in the discourse is relevant to identity building. In studying the 
discourses between Beijing and Rome, I have to locate the key signifiers in 
the text and focus on those that are most related to identification process. 
Indeed, at this early analytical stage, I have already obtained a preliminary 
impression of what kind of signifiers I should pay attention to. Namely, extra 
analytical attention should be paid to the signifiers related to ‘the 
government’, ‘the religious believers’, ‘the imperialists’. This assumption is 
based on my knowledge of the background of the original text. As important 
guidance on religious policy issued in the CPC’s official newspaper, it would 
certainly contain Beijing’s self-identification as the government of the newly 
born PRC. Secondly, as a document intended to be read by readers 
nationwide, it will certainly touch upon Beijing’s understanding of religious 
believers in China. Lastly, at the time of issue, Beijing was at war with the 
West on the Korean Peninsula so it can be expected that the threat from 
‘the imperialists’ would certainly be one of the central issues. Therefore, I 
shall pay special attention to how the author of Correct Understanding uses 
signifiers to represent these political actors and the relationship between 
these actors. However, readers should notice that the above reasoning 
should be regarded as a ‘warm-up’ before the actual analysis of the text. 
After ‘diving into’ the original text we shall find many pieces of new 
information that may compel us to revise our preliminary guess about the 
nodal points/key signifiers. 
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Textual Analysis 
Now I shall start to analyse Correct Understanding paragraph by paragraph. 
Here is the title and opening paragraph of the original text: 
Editorial: 
A Correct Understanding 
of the Issues 
Related to Catholicism and Protestantism 
(20 Nov 1950, Page 3, Renmin Ribao) 
1.  The general situation of Catholicism and Protestantism in China 
In China, the issues related to Catholicism and Protestantism, are on the one 
hand religious issues, namely the belief issues of the people occurred in 
a certain social condition; on the other hand, these issues are related to the fact 
that Imperialism is utilising religions as tools to invade the Chinese People. We 
should fully grasp both sides of this issue; know the connections and differences 
between the two sides and deal with the religious issue correctly according to the 
policy of the Central People’s Government. 
When I started to read chapter 1, my attention was drawn to the main actors 
who appear in this paragraph. As in the opening paragraph, the actors 
mentioned here tend to be the most crucial ones. Therefore, I have marked 
the signifiers related to these actors in bold. Here we can see three actors, 
namely ‘Catholicism and Protestantism’, ‘Imperialism’, ‘the Central People’s 
Government’. Some attention should be paid to the pronoun ‘we’ – to whom 
does it refer?  
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The answer could be a little tricky because from this paragraph alone we 
could not be entirely sure about the exact meaning of the pronoun ‘we’.  
When mentioning the actors, the author also linked them with some actions. 
For example, the actor ‘imperialism’ was connected with the action ‘utilising 
religion to invade the Chinese People’. The pronoun ‘we’ was linked with 
the obligation to ‘fully grasp both sides of this issue’. I use underlining to 
mark out the actions that are directly connected to the actors in the text. The 
relationship between these different actors and their connections with 
different kind of signifiers will become clearer in the analysis of the following 
paragraphs. 
Catholicism and Protestantism had first entered China long time ago, but their 
rapid development came after the Opium War. After the Opium War, because of 
the fact that a large number of foreign missionaries came to China, the influence 
of Catholicism and Protestantism has gradually expanded in China. From the 
very start, the activities of the two religions were closely related to imperialism’s 
invasion of China. Both religions own many churches, schools, hospitals and 
other cultural and charity institutions. Most of these institutions receive foreign 
funds and have foreign missionaries as de facto leaders. Hence, it is easy for 
imperialism to influence and control the activities of the church. Some church 
organisations are used by imperialism as organs for spying.  
This paragraph examines the history and the current situation at the time of 
the two Christian churches. In fact, Correct Understanding does not make 
much differentiation between Catholicism and Protestantism and frequently 
uses ‘both religions’ to denote them. Hence, the signifier ‘Catholicism and 
Protestantism’ and ‘religions’ are equivalent in this text. (Catholicism and 
Protestantism = the two religions = both religions).  
It should be noticed that a new actor, ‘foreign missionaries’, appears in the 
text. This actor has a close relationship with ‘imperialism’ and ‘the two 
religions’. First, foreign missionaries contributed to the rapid development 
of the two religions after the Opium War. It should be noticed here that the 
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signifier ‘Opium War’ has special significance in the PRC official discourse 
– it was regarded as the beginning of a century-long humiliation of China 
under Western colonialism. Second, foreign missionaries are de facto 
leaders of church-owned institutions and make the church vulnerable to 
imperialist influence. Hence, the following chain of equivalence regarding 
‘foreign missionaries’ can be formed: 
Foreign missionaries = the ones who expanded the church rapidly = coming after 
the Opium War = leaders of church schools and institutions  
Similarly, another chain of equivalence, ‘both religions’, can also be derived 
from this paragraph. I use bracket to denote the use of paraphrasing: 
Both religions = related to Imperialist invasion = owning many assets = receiving 
foreign funds = (having) foreign missionaries as leaders = (vulnerable to imperialist 
influence) 
Besides ‘missionaries’ and ‘both religions’, there is another important actor 
in the paragraph, which is ‘imperialists’, however, the chain of equivalence 
related to it needs to be constructed using the information from the next 
paragraph. 
According to statistics, among the Catholic clergy (i.e. the fathers and friars who 
depend on religion for their living), almost half are foreigners (5500 out of 12,000 
persons); Among the Protestant clergy, there are 17% foreigners (1700 out of 
10,000). In both religions the UK and the US denominations are predominant but 
in recent years the influence of US denominations has already surpassed that of 
UK ones. After the liberation, the imperialist influence in both religions underwent 
a heavy blow and many patriotic Chinese believers have gradually understood 
imperialism’s conspiracy of using the churches to invade China. Nonetheless, the 
imperialists do not want to retreat. Even up to now, they are still keeping large 
numbers of foreign clergymen in the churches of both religions and possess 
power through economic means and from their assets. They struggle to retain the 
imperialist influence in the church and their de facto leadership while 
sowing dissension among believers and continuing their anti-revolutionary 
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propaganda and spying. Concerning these activities, the patriotic people of 
China must raise their alertness and deal heavy blows to them.  
This paragraph examines the composition of the two religions’ clergy. It 
continues to discuss the foreign missionaries’ significance in the Chinese 
churches. Therefore, according to the new information conveyed in this 
paragraph, the chain of equivalence ‘foreign missionaries’ can be 
expanded: 
Foreign missionaries = the majority of clergymen in Chinese churches = mostly 
belong to denominations from the UK or USA. 
Apart from information about foreign missionaries, this paragraph also 
informs us of the actions taken by the ‘imperialists’. As the major ‘villain’ in 
this text, now we have already obtained enough information to form a chain 
of equivalence: 
Imperialists = received a heavy blow but do not want to retreat = using the church to 
invade China = keeping missionaries in the church = de facto leadership in the 
church = sowing dissension = engaging in anti-revolutionary activities 
From this chain of equivalence, we can see the imperialists’ image in the 
PRC discourse, which is largely hostile, subversive and damaging towards 
the new regime. Correct Understanding uses ‘they’ to denote the 
imperialists and points out that they were attempting to use the church in 
China to sabotage Beijing’s rule. However, it is worth asking: what is the 
relationship between ‘imperialists’ and ‘missionaries’? Are they the same?  
In fact, attention should be given to the signifier ‘leadership’ – if we look back 
at the chain of equivalence for ‘missionaries’, we will notice that it specified 
that foreign missionaries are de facto leaders in the Chinese churches. 
Hence, here the nodal points ‘missionaries’ and ‘imperialists’ are connected 
to the same signifier, ‘leadership’. The author of Correct Understanding was 
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implying that both the missionaries and imperialists did the same thing: 
occupying leadership positions in the Chinese churches. However, being 
connected to the same signifier does not necessarily mean that ‘imperialists’ 
and ‘foreign missionaries’ are the same thing. We should continue our 
reading and analysis to clarify their exact relationship.  
Catholicism and Protestantism have converted many among the Chinese 
people. According to statistics, there are 3 million Catholics in China and 80% of 
them are in rural areas. There are 700 thousand Protestants and 70% of them are 
in rural areas. Protestantism has some outreach organisations such as the YMCA 
and YWCA in cities. Among believers there are 50% women. The reason why 
these people believe in religions is that they lived a miserable life under the 
burden of the systems of the old society and their political awareness was not 
properly enlightened. Hence, they wanted to seek comfort in religious belief. After 
the liberation, especially in the areas where the Land Reform had been completed, 
the influence of religions had already waned due to the raised awareness of 
workers and farmers. However, religions will continue to exert influence and 
power for a considerably long historical period.  
This paragraph starts to discuss the relationship between Christianity and 
‘the Chinese People’. The author points out that many of the Chinese people 
have become Christians and most of them were living in rural areas. 
(Though more efforts were made to expand the church’s influence in the 
cities.) The author then draws a conclusion that the reason for their belief 
was that they suffered under KMT rule and therefore wished to seek comfort 
in religion. In saying this, it could be argued that the author of Correct 
Understanding showed a subtle sense of superiority and was confident that 
religion’s influence would reduce when the standard of living improves. 
Furthermore, the author argues that when awareness was raised among 
‘workers and farmers’’, the influence of religions will see further decreases. 
Hence, from this paragraph, we can see the image of typical Christian 
‘believers’ in the PRC official discourse, namely: 
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Believers = among the Chinese People = lived a miserable life = (mainly) workers 
and farmers 
Because of the victory of the People’s Revolution and the rise in anti-imperialist 
sentiment, the patriotic movements appear also among Chinese Protestants. 
Recently, people like Wu Yaozong have issued a manifesto named Chinese 
Protestants and their Way to Contribute to the Development of New China. This 
manifesto appeals to churches to move away from imperialist influences and 
economic relationships and implement self-governing, self-funding and self-
propagating methods. It has already been signed by six thousand believers and 
the signing movement is now expanding.  The National Christian Council of China 
has already expressed their support for this manifesto in their 14th annual meeting 
in Shanghai, on 18 Oct. A reform movement of progressive significance has 
already begun in the Chinese Protestant Church. We should pay attention to this 
movement and give it appropriate help by its side. This is an important task 
regarding the policy towards the church.   
After drawing the typical image of Chinese Christians, the author of Correct 
Understanding went on to examine the recent ‘patriotic movement’ among 
Chinese Protestants. The author mentioned Wu Yaozong, a pro-
government church leader who initiated the ‘three-self’ movement in the 
Chinese Protestant churches. This movement aimed at cutting off the 
church’s ties with the West and was actively supported by Beijing. The 
author here pointed out that more and more believers had already become 
supporters of this movement and called for more help for it. It is worth 
noticing how the author defined the ‘three-self’ movement there, namely that 
it was ‘a reform movement’. Furthermore, attention should be given to the 
pronoun ‘we’ in the penultimate sentence of the paragraph. If we read it in 
the context of this text it is not hard to discern that this ‘we’ refers to those 
who implement the government’s religious policies (i.e. the officials dealing 
with religions). Hence, the following chain of equivalence could be formed: 
Patriotic movement = reform movement = found among Protestants = moving away 
from imperialism = self-governing, self-funding and self-propagating = (should be 
supported by ‘us’) 
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The latter part of this chain of equivalence (‘moving away from imperialism’ 
and ‘self-governing’) was the aim of Beijing in promoting the ‘three-self’ 
movement in the churches. However, this chain of equivalence also had a 
hidden effect, which may not have been intended by Beijing in the first place: 
the fact that this movement was first initiated by Protestants may not sound 
very pleasant to a Catholic reader. To be more specific, in Correct 
Understanding, the author defined the ‘patriotic movement’ as ‘a reform 
movement with progressive significance’. However, the wording ‘reform’ 
could make a Catholic reader think of the Reformation several centuries ago 
– is Beijing going to initiate another Reformation in the Chinese Catholic 
Church? The signifier ‘reform’ would sound very suspicious to Chinese 
Catholics and the Vatican because it may lead to schism. Here we would 
see how the vagueness of the text would affect understanding: Beijing was 
addressing both Catholicism and Protestantism in Correct Understanding 
and used the undifferentiated signifier ‘both religions’ to denote them. 
However, treating the two branches of Christianity as the same would have 
a negative influence on Beijing’s Catholic policy – the word ‘reformation’ 
may be acceptable to the Protestants, but not to Catholics. Such 
undifferentiated use of the signifier ‘reform’ would cause difficulties in 
Beijing’s interaction with the Catholic Church and the Vatican.  
2. The attitude and guiding principles of Marxists towards religions 
Marxists are absolute atheists. However, regarding religious issues that have 
popular characteristics, Marxists always consider them to be social issues that are 
determined by historical circumstances. Lenin said: ‘We should explain from a 
materialist perspective why religious beliefs are still popular among the people.’ 
(This quote comes from The Attitude of the Workers’ Party to Religion) Therefore, 
Marxists always oppose the wrong opinion and wrong actions which rely on 
administrative orders and other oversimplified and hasty methods to solve religious 
issues.  
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In the text of Correct Understanding, this paragraph contains more Marxist-
Leninist message than any other parts in that it openly defines the state 
ideology as ‘Marxist’ and ‘atheist’. Although the text does not specify ‘who 
the Marxists are’, from the context we can easily discern that it refers to the 
ones who led the regime in Beijing, namely the CPC. It should be noticed 
that every sentence of this paragraph carries at least one signifier related to 
communism, namely ‘Marxist’ ‘atheist’ and ‘Materialist’. Such distribution of 
‘communist’ signifiers may give a Catholic reader a strong first impression 
of anti-religion. The mentioning of Lenin and the concept of ‘materialism’ 
may further strengthen this first impression. In other words, at the first 
glance, the equivalence constructed by this paragraph is like this: 
(The government) = Marxists = atheists = Lenin(ists) = materialists 
Indeed, many of its meanings are hidden in the quote from Vladimir Lenin. 
It should be noted that when the author quoted a sentence from Lenin’s 
work The Attitude of the Worker’s Party to Religion, s/he created 
intertextuality, a concept widely used in discourse analysis to denote the 
situation where one text derives its meaning from other pre-existing texts. 
Therefore, in this paragraph, Correct Understanding draws meaning from 
Lenin’s work The Attitude. So what did Lenin try to convey by saying this? 
Let us see the original paragraph from The Attitude where the quotation is 
located: 
Marxism is materialism. As such, it is as relentlessly hostile to religion as was the 
materialism of the eighteenth-century Encyclopaedists or the materialism of 
Feuerbach. This is beyond doubt. …We must combat religion—that is the ABC of 
all materialism, and consequently of Marxism. But Marxism is not a materialism 
which has stopped at the ABC. Marxism goes further. It says: We must know how 
to combat religion, and in order to do so we must explain the source of faith and 
religion among the masses in a materialist way. The combating of religion 
cannot be confined to abstract ideological preaching, and it must not be reduced 
to such preaching. It must be linked up with the concrete practice of the class 
movement, which aims at eliminating the social roots of religion. …. The deepest 
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root of religion today is the socially downtrodden condition of the working masses 
and their apparently complete helplessness in face of the blind forces of capitalism, 
which every day and every hour inflicts upon ordinary working people the most 
horrible suffering and the most savage torment, a thousand times more severe 
than those inflicted by extra-ordinary events, such as wars, earthquakes, etc. “Fear 
made the gods.” … No educational book can eradicate religion from the minds of 
masses who are crushed by capitalist hard labour, and who are at the mercy of the 
blind destructive forces of capitalism, until those masses themselves learn to fight 
this root of religion, fight the rule of capital in all its forms, in a united, organised, 
planned and conscious way.241 
The sentence in bold is the one quoted by Correct Understanding. (The 
wording of this sentence is different from that in Correct Understanding 
because my own translation was based on the original Chinese document). 
It is not hard to discern how similar the paragraph in Correct Understanding 
is to Lenin’s work. Indeed, the author of Correct Understanding imitated the 
‘move structure’ in Lenin’s work. Both authors defined the ‘atheist’ nature of 
Marxists at the beginning of the paragraph and pointed out that religion has 
no place in Marxist ideology; both argued that belief in religion was 
determined by social/historical circumstance and both offered their solutions 
to the religious issues.  
However, compared with Correct Understanding, Lenin’s work is far more 
explicit in articulating the communist goal in religious policy. First, Lenin 
clearly pointed out that Marxism was the sworn enemy of religion and the 
battle against religion was an indispensable part of it. Second, Lenin argued 
that ‘the forces of capitalism’ were the root of religious belief and to make 
religion disappear, its capitalist root must be eradicated. Third, such 
eradication, as Lenin put it, could not be done by ‘ideological preaching’ 
                                            
241 Vladimir Lenin, ‘The Attitude of the Workers’ Party to Religion’, Proletary, No. 45, 13 
May 1909, in Lenin Internet Archive 
<https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1909/may/13.htm> [accessed 14 Sep 
2016]. 
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alone – in other words, one could not beat religion’s influence simply by anti-
religious propaganda. By contrast, in Correct Understanding, Lenin’s 
communist goals became less visible: the author of Correct Understanding 
pointed out that religious issues were ‘determined by social circumstances’ 
but did not specify what kind of social condition it was.  
In quoting Lenin, the author of Correct Understanding simply suggested that 
readers should take a materialist perspective but did not make the aim of 
taking such a stance clear. Moreover, unlike Lenin, the author of Correct 
Understanding refrained from using words that sound aggressive towards 
religion, for example ‘relentless’, ‘hostile’, ‘combat’, ‘eradicate’. Last but not 
least, when explaining Beijing’s general policy towards religion, the author 
of Correct Understanding simply said that relying on administrative orders 
and oversimplified measures is ‘wrong’ – this is an expression far more 
restrained than Lenin’s counterpart. In sum, even though the author of 
Correct Understanding was modelling their writing on Lenin’s work, Lenin’s 
stance towards religion was somehow watered down and softened. What 
was the reason behind it? We need to continue our reading to find more 
clues.  
The patriotic people of China do not consider Catholicism and Protestantism 
as religions that should be banned. They only oppose that imperialism should 
utilise their churches to invade (China). In the battlefront of thoughts, materialists 
could not, and should not mix with believers of religions; however, in the political 
actions of defending the motherland, developing the motherland, opposing 
invasion and striving for peace, the materialist and the believers of religions can, 
and should unite together. Chairman Mao said in his On New Democracy: ‘The 
communists can build anti-imperialist and anti-feudalist united front with some 
idealists and even religious believers in political actions, but they should not 
agree with their idealism and religious creeds.' Therefore, all the Chinese patriotic 
people (including patriotic believers) should use this principle to deal with 
Catholicism and Protestantism: protect religious freedom. However, in all 
religions, the imperialist influence should be cleared. Instead, patriotism should 
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be promoted and Catholicism and Protestantism should be free from foreign 
interference and become the Chinese People’s own social activities. 
After the reference to Lenin’s work, the author of Correct Understanding 
drew the reader’s attention back to ‘patriotism’. At the beginning of the 
paragraph, the author spoke on behalf of ‘the patriotic people’ and clearly 
announced that Christianity should not be banned in China. Then the author 
voiced the ‘patriotic people’’s concern, namely that the church could be 
utilised by the West to ‘invade China’. It should be noticed that the author 
used the word ‘only’, which conveyed a message that Beijing’s sole concern 
about Christianity was its potential to be used by the West. Here, ‘to invade 
China’ means ‘to infringe on Beijing’s rule over China’. If we pay attention to 
the signifier ‘patriotic people’, we will discover the following chain of 
equivalence: 
Patriotic people of China = (tolerating) Protestant/Catholic churches = protecting 
religious freedom = cleansing imperialist influence = turning churches into the 
Chinese People’s own social activities 
The author then used the dialectical method to view the relationship 
between the ruling communists and the Christians, namely the communists 
should not follow the ‘idealism’ of Christianity while the two groups should 
unite against the perceived military threat from the West. The author then 
quoted from Mao Zedong’s work to support this view of dichotomy. The 
quote was from Mao’s treatise On New Democracy, published in 1940 
during the Sino-Japanese War. It would be helpful to have a look at Mao’s 
original text. On New Democracy was a long article written by Mao 
articulating the vision of the CPC in all aspects of nation-building (i.e. 
building a ‘New Democracy’, in Mao’s own words). The quotation is from 
chapter 15 of the treatise, entitled ‘The national, scientific, people’s culture’, 
in which Mao expressed the CPC’s goal in creating a national culture. Two 
of Mao’s main viewpoints in this chapter are especially relevant. First, the 
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culture of ‘New Democracy’ should be indigenized and this indigenization 
also applies to Marxism.  
‘(We) must completely and appropriately unify the universal truth of Marxism and 
the specific experience of the Chinese revolution. In other words, (Marxism) would 
only become useful after its combination with the characteristics of our nation and 
its taking of a certain national form. (We) must not apply it subjectively like a 
formula. Those who treat Marxism like a formula are only joking with Marxism and 
the Chinese Revolution. There should be no position for them among the 
revolutionary ranks of China.’ 242 
From this we can clearly see that Mao advocated a localised version of 
Marxism in China. Hence, in the CPC discourse, the signifier ‘Marxism’ 
actually refers to its indigenised version in China, interpreted by Mao. So 
what would be its implications for the CPC’s religious policy? Mao continued 
to discuss religion’s position in the CPC’s vision: 
‘… The scientific thought of the Chinese Proletariat can form a united front with the 
materialists and natural scientists among the progressive bourgeoisie of China. 
However, (it) should not build a united front with any reactionary idealism. The 
communists can build an anti-imperialist and anti-feudalist united front with 
some idealists and even religious believers in political actions, but they 
should not agree with their idealism and religious creeds.’ 243 
Here we can see the original sentence quoted by Correct Understanding. In 
its original context, Mao defined the CPC’s relationship with religion 
(idealism) from two aspects, namely from the ‘thought front’ and in political 
actions. Despite the fact that the communists did not agree with religious 
believers in the first aspect, they can cooperate in defending China from the 
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perceived Western threat. Here we can see how the indigenization of 
Marxism advocated by Mao affects the CPC’s policing. Different from Lenin, 
when explaining the party’s religious policy, the CPC’s focus was not on 
eradicating the ‘capitalist root’ of religion, but on how to unite religion against 
the threat from the West despite the huge difference between state ideology 
and religious self-understanding. Correct Understanding reaffirmed such a 
stance by creating a reference to Mao’s work.  
Every patriotic Catholic and Protestant should stand with the Chinese People 
and uncover the imperialist conspiracy of using religions to perform spying 
activities. They should oppose the reactionaries in churches that still collaborate 
with imperialism; (they should) realise the church’s self-governing, self-funding and 
self-propagating (actions) step by step while gradually moving away from 
imperialism’s influence and economic ties, (thus) turning the church into the Chinese 
believers’ own enterprise. Regarding the spying elements in the church who 
engage in sabotage and espionage, no matter whether they are foreigners or 
Chinese, the People’s Government shall certainly punish them according to article 
7 of the Common Program. In this regard, we should certainly distinguish between 
the counter-revolutionary activities of the imperialist elements and the religious 
issues; and between the spying elements within the church and the entire church 
(including its buildings and institutions). (These things) should not be mixed up. The 
believers should also be clear about these two issues, lest they should be deceived 
by the imperialists’ subversive propaganda and mistake the People’s 
Government’s suppression of counterrevolutionary activities as cracking down upon 
religious activities. (In fact,) The People’s government’s suppression of anti-
revolutionary activities is determined by the interests of the Chinese People — 
these measures have nothing to do with religious issues and every patriotic 
believer should actively support them in their own initiatives.  
This last paragraph of chapter 2 provided a detailed guideline for applying 
Beijing’s policy towards the Christian churches. The paragraph continues to 
add meanings to the definition of ‘patriotic movement’: 
Patriotic Christians = standing with the Chinese People = uncovering imperialist 
conspiracy = realising the ‘three-self’ movement = supporting the government’s 
effort to supress counterrevolutionary activities and espionage 
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The People’s government = punishing spying elements = distinguishing religious 
activities  
3. Some specific issues of Catholicism and Protestantism 
Regarding the two religions, there are several specific issues that should be dealt 
with properly. First, the proselytising issue. Article 5 of the Common Program 
stipulated that the people have religious freedom. Hence the government certainly 
protects such freedom whilst naturally it does not limit the people’s freedom of 
not believing in or opposing religion. However, when religions’ publicity campaigns 
and their anti-religious counterparts become popular movements, they could affect 
the peacefulness of social order and provoke unnecessary trouble. For the 
peaceful social order, the appropriate solution is that the church should refrain 
from proselytising outside church buildings; in the meantime, other organisations 
and people should not go into church buildings and promote anti-religious thoughts 
there. Furthermore, according to previous experience, in the areas where Land 
Reform is ongoing, church activities could affect the order of Land Reform. Hence, 
before the completion of land allocation, it is appropriate that all activities (including 
weekly services and bible reading sessions) within and outside church buildings 
should temporarily stop. For preaching, the church can publish books and 
magazines promoting general religious creeds. However, these publications 
should not contradict the Common Program. There are some church publications 
which spread rumours slandering the People’s Democracy. Regarding such 
publications, the government shall certainly prohibit them and destroy their stocks. 
The organisations that published these things shall be punished by law.  
From this paragraph onwards the author started to deal with specific issues 
related to the churches in China. The author announced on behalf of the 
government that the freedom of both believers and atheists will be protected 
– in order to avoid ‘unnecessary troubles’ the proselytising activities should 
be confined within church buildings. On the other hand, the author pointed 
out that anti-government views would not be tolerated in church publications 
and warned that anyone who published these things would be punished. 
The following chains of equivalence can be formed: 
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The Government = protecting religious freedom (both to believe and not to believe) 
= punishing anti-government propaganda 
The church = staying inside the church building = ceasing activities during the Land 
Reform = refraining from anti-government propaganda  
Second, the issue related to schools, hospitals and other charity institutions owned 
by the church. Chairman Mao says in his On the United Government: ‘As long as 
the religious believers obey the government’s laws, the government shall give 
them protection. The one who believes and the one who does not believe shall 
each have their freedom and nobody should compel them or discriminate against 
them.’ Regarding the enterprises owned by the church, the same principle applies. 
As long as they obey the Common Program and the government’s laws and orders, 
the People’s Government shall treat them as ordinary privately-owned 
enterprises and take both the state’s interest and the private counterpart into 
account. The schools owned by the church should implement the government’s 
laws and orders together with other schools. The mandatory political modules 
taught in other schools should also be set up in church schools. Religious courses 
shall be permitted to be set up in the higher-education institutions as elective 
modules. The religious students and their non-religious counterparts should not 
attack each other and disturb the school order. By contrast, they should unite under 
the principle of ‘loving one’s country, loving one’s school’ and oppose together 
imperialism and spying elements. 
The author gave detailed instruction about the government’s policy towards 
schools and charities owned by the church. A reference was made to Mao’s 
work On the United Government, an article quite similar to On New 
Democracy in content. Mao’s original words in On United Government were:  
‘According to the principle of religious freedom, the Liberated areas of China tolerate 
the existence of religions. Regardless of Protestantism, Catholicism, Islam, 
Buddhism and other religions, as long as the religious believers obey the People’s 
government’s laws, the government shall give them protection. The one who 
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believes and the one who does not believe shall each have their freedom and 
nobody should compel them or discriminate against them.’244 
Based on this principle, the author of Correct Understanding promised that 
the government would not discriminate against church-owned enterprises. 
Regarding the schools owned by the church, the author pointed out that 
they need to implement the government’s policy of setting up ‘political 
modules’ in their curricula, namely, the government’s ideology should also 
be promoted in schools owned by the church.  
Third, property disputes that occurred in some areas should be solved 
appropriately. As a general guideline, when the government wishes to requisition 
or borrow church buildings, it should negotiate with the church side to solve the 
problem and should not take them by force. On the side of the church, they should 
also consider the difficulties met by the government and lend vacant rooms to the 
government. There are certainly many issues of this kind. As a general principle, 
everything should be carried out according to the government’s laws and orders. 
One should be fair and reasonable (in all these issues), and neither show favour 
to, nor discriminate against the church. 
In the last paragraph of Correct Understanding, the author addressed the 
issue related to church properties. The author called on both local 
governments and the church to understand each other and was against the 
practice of seizing church properties by force. On the other hand, the author 
reminded the reader of the ‘current difficulties’ of the government and asked 
the church to lend empty rooms to the government. Hence, based on the 
last two paragraphs, we can further expand the chain equivalence ‘the 
church’: 
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The church = obeying the government’s laws (regarding enterprises) = setting up 
political modules in schools = understanding the government = lending vacant 
rooms to the government 
It also should be noticed that in this chapter, the author made two references 
to the Common Program, another important document from the side of 
Beijing whose significance will be touched upon in the next section of this 
thesis. 
What Do We Find in the Chains of Equivalence? 
After deriving the chains of equivalence from the analysis of the original text, 
now it is time for us to have a closer look at them together. In fact, the chains 
of equivalence derived from Correct Understanding can be categorised into 
four categories. In doing so, I have also given the chains some minor ‘trims’ 
and deleted repeated signifiers. 
Category 1: Foreign influence 
Foreign missionaries = the ones who expanded the church rapidly = coming after the 
Opium War = leaders of church schools and institutions = the majority of clergymen in 
Chinese churches = mostly belong to UK/US denominations 
Imperialists = received a heavy blow but do not want to retreat = using the church to invade 
China = keeping missionaries in the church = de facto leadership in the church = sowing 
dissension = engaging in anti-revolutionary activities 
The author identified two actors which belong to this category, namely the 
‘foreign missionaries’ and the ‘imperialists’. The two actors have a close 
relationship and the two chains of equivalence have the possibility of 
merging together because they share the signifier ‘leadership in the church’. 
However, it can be discerned from the wording of Correct Understanding 
that the two actors were still distinguished – when talking about foreign 
missionaries, the author did not use highly negative words to define them. 
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In other words, there was no direct suggestion that ‘missionaries are equal 
to imperialists’ in the original text. By these two chains of equivalence, 
Beijing was expressing its fear over the West’s influence in Chinese 
churches. The key point of concern, as shown by these chains, was actually 
the leadership of foreign missionaries in the church. As long as this 
leadership was denied, Beijing’s fear would be dissolved and there would 
be no point in linking foreign missionaries with imperialism. 
Category 2: The People’s Government and the Patriotic people of China 
The government = Marxists, atheists, materialists = punishing spying elements = protecting 
religious freedom (both to believe and not to believe) = punishing anti-government 
propaganda 
Patriotic people of China = (tolerating) Protestant/Catholic churches = protecting religious 
freedom = cleaning imperialist influence = turning churches into the Chinese People’s own 
social activities 
In this category two political actors were named, namely the government 
and the ‘Patriotic People’. The author identified the government as ‘Marxist’ 
and ‘materialist’ and imitated the style and logic of Lenin’s work. However, 
Lenin’s focus on the ‘capitalist root’ of religion and his strong words against 
religion were omitted in Correct Understanding. Hence, for a reader not 
familiar with Marxism and Leninism, the actual meaning of the quotation 
from Lenin was quite vague. Indeed, it could be argued that this vagueness 
was deliberately created by the author. On the one hand, the imitation of 
Lenin’s move structure will be discernible to the ones familiar with Marxism 
and consolidate their in-group identity (commonality). On the other hand, 
the omission of the anti-religious words would make the text less offensive 
in the eyes of ordinary Christians, who tend not to be familiar with Lenin’s 
text. Briefly, it was a watered-downed version of ‘Marxism’. In the following 
paragraphs the author managed to expand this ‘government’ chain of 
equivalence with signifiers related to anti-imperialism and state security.  
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The second point should be noticed is that the relationship between the two 
actors, namely ‘the government’ and ‘the People’ is extremely close in the 
discourse. Actually, if we replace the signifier ‘the People’ with ‘the 
government’, we would discern that there would not be much change in its 
meaning. This means that the author was deliberately creating an 
impression that ‘the People’s Government’ and ‘the People’ share the same 
objective and tasks. The government of Beijing thus identified itself as the 
best advocate of ‘the People’‘s interest.  
Category 3: Christianity in China 
Both religions = related to Imperialist invasion = owning many assets = receiving foreign 
funds = (having) foreign missionaries as leaders = (vulnerable to imperialist influence) 
Believers = among the Chinese People = (living) in rural areas = lived a miserable life = 
(mainly) workers and farmers 
The chains in this category reflected the author’s impression of the churches 
in China. It should be noticed that the article does not address the Vatican 
directly. Correct Understanding did not make an extensive definitive effort 
regarding the nature of Christians. It merely pointed out that the majority of 
Christians were in rural areas of China. The main reason for their belief is 
that in the ‘old society’ (i.e. under KMT rule) they lived a miserable life and 
needed religion to soothe the pain of living. On the one hand, it could be 
argued that this evaluation showed a somewhat hidden sense of superiority 
– Christianity was connected with a miserable life and was regarded as a 
method of self-comforting. Beijing was confident that the influence of religion 
would reduce when the people become more ‘enlightened’ in the new 
society. On the other hand, it should be noticed that by defining Christians 
as mainly workers and rural farmers, the CCP was confirming that they are 
part of ‘the People’, namely the ones protected by the government. In other 
words, in this way, Beijing categorised Christians in China as part of the 
Chinese People and does not regard them as members of ‘foreign 
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organisations’. As we will see later on in this thesis, this categorisation was 
important in Beijing because as long as Christians were regarded as part of 
‘the People’, the main policy aim would be to persuade them to become 
supporters of the government instead of denying their existence in China. 
Category 4: Patriotic Christians 
Patriotic movement = reform movement = appeared in Protestants = moving away from 
imperialism = self-governing, self-funding and self-propagating = (should be supported by 
‘us’) 
Patriotic Christians = standing with the Chinese People = uncovering imperialist conspiracy 
= realising the ‘three-self’ movement = supporting the government’s effort to supress 
counterrevolutionary activities and espionage  
The church = staying inside the church building = ceasing activities during the Land Reform 
= refraining from anti-government propaganda = obeying the government’s laws (regarding 
enterprises) = setting up political modules in schools = understanding the government = 
lending vacant rooms to the government 
The chains in this category reflected the ‘ideal church’ in Beijing’s discourse. 
By describing an ‘ideal church’ Beijing hoped to call on Christians to ‘stand 
together with the People of China’, namely to show their support of the 
government under the context of its fighting with the West. In the last 
chapter, the author offered the church much advice to reassure the 
government, namely the church should keep a low profile during the mass 
movements (e.g. Land Reform) and obey Beijing’s secular rule. The key 
point is that Beijing’s policy towards religion would not be much different 
from its policy towards other social organisations. At the end of Correct 
Understanding, the author made many promises on behalf of Beijing. As 
long as the church could show that it was not a threat towards Beijing’s rule, 
Beijing would leave it space to survive in the new society.  
 151 
Conclusion 
As the first systemic expression of Beijing’s policy towards the church, 
Correct Understanding should be understood as Beijing’s open statement 
about its concerns about the potential threat of the Western presence in the 
churches in China and certainly gives us crucial information about Beijing’s 
initial stance at the beginning of its interaction with Rome. Three aspects of 
the discourse it conveyed are worthy of attention.  
First is the idea of ‘thin communism’ and ‘thick nationalism’ conveyed by the 
text of Correct Understanding. At the beginning of the second chapter, the 
author, as the spokesperson of the government, identified her/himself as 
Marxist and atheist. However, the text did not make any attempts to 
indoctrinate its readers about Marxism’s judgement of religions. Although 
the author referred to Lenin’s classic work on religion and imitated Lenin’s 
move structure, Correct Understanding omitted Lenin’s mentioning of 
‘capitalist roots’ and many strong words used by Lenin against religion. 
Furthermore, the author creates intertextuality with Mao’s works on the 
CPC’s vision of China. A reading of these works of Mao will show that they 
advocated an indigenised version of Marxism in China – this kind of 
‘Marxism’ is different from its Russian counterpart because it focusses more 
on building an independent China free from the West’s interference rather 
than battling capitalism in China. In Correct Understanding we can discern 
this ‘drifting away’ from the discourse of orthodox Marxism. After the brief 
reference to Lenin, the author quickly switched the topic to the threat of 
‘imperialism’ and then called on Christians to support Beijing’s ‘anti-
imperialist’ efforts. This shows that Beijing’s discourse related to religion is 
also accompanied by patriotism and nationalism.  
Second, the use of the undifferentiated signifier ‘two religions’ in Correct 
Understanding shows that Beijing did not develop an independent category 
for Catholicism in its discourse. In other words, Beijing did not have a 
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tailored plan to deal with the Catholic Church and regarded it as generally 
the same as Protestant Christianity. In Correct Understanding we could not 
discern any effort to differentiate the Catholic Church from its Protestant 
counterparts. In calling on Christians to show their patriotism, the author 
took the ongoing ‘three-self’ movement in the Protestant churches as an 
exemplar and asked the readers (which certainly include Catholics) to follow 
suit. This reflects the possibility that the author of Correct Understanding 
may not have had a profound knowledge of the differences between the two 
branches of Christianity and simply regarded them as the same. The 
author’s use of the signifier ‘reform’ also shows that s/he was not familiar 
with the implication of this word in Catholic discourse. In Beijing’s 
revolutionary discourse, the term ‘reform’ has very positive connotations 
and conveys hopes of a new society, but in Catholic discourse, this term 
certainly leads readers to think of ‘the Reformation’ that caused the schism 
in the church. In sum, the lack of differentiation between Protestantism and 
Catholicism in Beijing’s discourse would make the ‘three-self’ movement 
suspicious in the eyes of Catholic readers, including the Vatican. 
Third, the elements in the chains of equivalence concerning ‘religious 
believers’ and ‘foreign missionaries’ show that Beijing did not regard them 
as pre-determined ‘enemies’ at the beginning of their interaction. To be 
more specific, these two chains of equivalence were connected with mainly 
descriptive signifiers and do not contain hostile elements (e.g. espionage, 
invasion), which means that they were far from the image of ‘enemies 
without guns’ in Beijing’s discourse at that time. However, that does not 
mean that Beijing did not show any initial impressions towards the two 
actors. In the chain of equivalence concerning missionaries, the author was 
implying that their leadership made the church vulnerable to imperialism. In 
the chain concerning believers, the author was suggesting they are also part 
of ‘the People’. This shows that Beijing had a different understanding of the 
two actors. Regarding missionaries, Beijing was concerned about their 
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leadership in the church and worried about its security implications. 
Regarding believers, Beijing categorised them as part of the people and 
hoped to make them support the new regime’s rule over China. In sum, all 
these show that Beijing does not hold a pre-determined ‘action plan’ against 
missionaries and the church. Although it has some initial impression of 
missionaries and believers, this does not warrant harsh treatment towards 
the church. Instead, Beijing’s actions and gestures towards the church were 
affected by subsequent interactions with the church, namely with foreign 
missionaries, the Vatican and Chinese believers.   
 
Voice of a New Regime: The Common Program  
After showing all the details of my analytical model in my analysis of Correct 
Understanding, the thesis will proceed to examine a key historical document 
that bears close relationship to Correct Understanding. This document is 
named the Common Program of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference, which acted as the PRC’s temporary constitution until 1954. 
Many clauses of this document touched upon Beijing’s concern regarding 
religion.  
Like Correct Understanding, the Common Program has not received 
enough scholarly attention from previous studies on Sino-Vatican relations 
published in the West. Part of the reason for such negligence perhaps lies 
in the fact that the message conveyed by the Common Program does not 
fit into the popular image of Beijing as a ‘persecutor’. One of the major 
authors on Sino-Vatican relations, Mariani, did notice that the wording in ‘the 
Common Program’ was benign, but pointed out that it was ambiguous in 
many aspects which could be deliberately interpreted in different ways 
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according to the needs of the Communist Party. 245 He gave a brief analysis 
of the wording of the Common Program and argued that the main function 
of this document was propaganda and ‘to present a benign face to the 
outside world’.246 In sum, Mariani considered the Common Program mere 
communist propaganda. However, this thesis would ask, is the Common 
Program just a propaganda text? Can it tell us something about Beijing’s 
policy towards religions at the time of the foundation of the People’s 
Republic? 
In fact, the view of the Common Program as outright communist 
propaganda is oversimplified. Several features of the Common Program 
showed that it was far more than ‘propaganda’. First, even though it was 
initiated by the Communist Party of China (CPC), the making of the 
Common Program was not monopolized by the communists. Indeed, as its 
name suggests, the Common Program was the product of discussion 
between the CPC and other ‘democrats’, namely those who sympathized 
with the CPC’s cause but did not completely adhere to the communists’ 
ideals.  
According to Chen’s historical research, in drafting the Common Program, 
the CPC adopted an inclusive approach towards the ‘democrats’ and 
intellectuals. The CPC invited many prestigious non-communist party 
leaders and intellectuals to discuss the Common Program, during which the 
non-communists’ opinions were valued and absorbed into the draft.247 In 
order to hear the views of the non-communists, the entire consultation 
lasted about two years (1948-1949) and the text of the Common Program 
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had undergone three drafts before its publication.248 Far from the popular 
belief, the debate between the communists and the ‘democrats’ during the 
consultation process was intense and the ‘democrats’ often criticized the 
communists.249 Furthermore, the Common Program does not contain many 
radical goals and statements about communism. Instead, it simply states 
that ‘the People’s Republic of China is a New Democratic State’ (General 
Principles, Article 1) and that it will ‘protect the private properties of workers, 
farmers, petite-bourgeoisie, and national bourgeoisie.’ (General Principles, 
Article 3).  
In sum, both the careful drafting process and the inclusive content of the 
Common Program showed Beijing’s strong desire to rally as many 
supporters as possible and a genuine wish to cooperate with all kinds of 
social actors, including religion. Hence, by treating it as a mere propaganda 
text, Mariani missed many nuances in the unfolding of Sino-Vatican 
relations. This thesis argues that the Common Program is far more 
informative than a propaganda document. A careful reading of the Common 
Program will reveal the new regime’s initial schedule and concern regarding 
religions, especially Christianity. 
In the following part I will provide an analysis of the Common Program 
following the framework established in the methodology chapter. The first 
step is to locate the key signifiers relevant to our study.250 According to the 
main political actors, the content of the Common Program could be 
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summarised into three chains of equivalence. Now let us see the first two 
chains of equivalence: 
 
Chain 1 ‘Progressive power’: 
(Progressive Power) = worker, farmer, petit bourgeoisie, national capitalist, 
other patriots = the owner of the state = (enjoying) many aspects of freedom = 
participants of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC)  
Chain 2 ‘Regressive Power’: 
(Regressive power) = KMT reactionaries, imperialists, feudalists, bureaucratic 
capitalists = those who engage in counter-revolutionary activities = KMT anti-
revolutionary war criminals = (consisting of) essential members and 
ordinary reactionaries  
The author of the document made a clear distinction between the allies and 
the enemies of the new regime, categorising them into two groups: the 
‘progressive power’ and the ‘regressive power’. The first was the 
progressive power — the friends of the new regime, which included many 
strata of society. To be more specific, the definition of ‘friends’ was extended 
to the widest possible extent and they were all invited to the Chinese 
People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), the temporary 
‘parliament' of the PRC. All these allies were considered as ‘owners of the 
state’ and were guaranteed a wide range of freedoms. 
It could be argued that the chain ‘Progressive Power’ is vague by itself, 
because the main characteristics of these social groups were undefined. 
We need to see the difference chain ‘Regressive Power’ to know Beijing’s 
perception of its friends and enemies. So, according to the Common 
Program, who was the enemy? First and foremost, the remaining KMT 
elements in China were listed as the number one enemy. The reason was 
simply that, at the time of the Common Program’s issue, the KMT still held 
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large swathes of land in Southern China and many holdout bases in the 
Chinese hinterland.  
The second kind of enemies, the imperialists, were used to denote the 
West’s economic, political and cultural influence in China, especially the US 
presence in China. Indeed, the US was long denounced by the CPC as the 
biggest backer of the KMT regime. According to the communist publicity 
campaign at that time, the KMT regime sold many core Chinese interests to 
the US and allowed the US to invade China economically and culturally. 
Moreover, the US military presence in China was an eyesore for the 
communists. Even the American aid and donations to China were regarded 
by the CPC as a great shame. 
The third kind of enemies were the feudalists (landowner class), who were 
the remnants of the pre-modern social fabric in China. The CPC regarded 
them as the origin of China’s backwardness and its widespread poverty. 
The fourth kind of foes of the CPC were the bureaucratic capitalists (and 
alongside them, the compradors). They were different from the national 
capitalists because they were extremely close to, and made their profit from 
the KMT regime.  
In light of these two chains of equivalence we can discern that the major 
foes in the CPC's official discourse are: first, the power of the remaining 
KMT members in China and their sympathizers; second, the Western 
presence in China. However, what is their potential threat to the new 
regime? How would they harm the newly born PRC? The answer can be 
found in the third chain of equivalence, the 'People's Government', which 




The Chain 'People’s Government': 
(tasks) = having the responsibility of finishing the people’s liberation war and 
liberating all the Chinese territories, unifying China = cancelling all the privileges 
enjoyed by the imperialist countries = confiscating bureaucratic capitals = reforming 
land ownership and realizing universal ownership of farmlands = protecting the 
properties of national capitalists = cracking down on counterrevolutionary activities 
= allying with the Soviet Union and opposing imperialism together = 
(in education policy) wiping out the influence of feudalists, compradors and fascists 
= reforming the old education system, content and pedagogy = giving revolutionary 
political education to young intellectuals and old-school intellectuals =  
(in diplomatic policy) upholding the principle of independence and the integrity of 
sovereignty = revising, modifying and abolishing different agreements and pacts 
signed by the KMT regime = recovering and establishing diplomatic relationships on 
the basis of equal status and mutual benefit = protecting Chinese people overseas 
= protecting expats in China who obey Chinese laws 
Since it is quite a long chain of equivalence, three brackets have been 
inserted into it to mark its three parts, namely the regime’s urgent tasks, 
education policy and diplomatic policy. This chain of equivalence depicts 
the regime's clear plan to deal with its friends and foes. The new regime 
promised many things to its friends: first, their freedom was guaranteed by 
the Common Program; second, their welfare and properties, including those 
of national capitalists, would be protected and increased under the 
communist rule; third, the government would provide many types of service 
to the people. On the other hand, against its enemies, the Common Program 
also meted out measures to clear China of their influence: first, the CPC 
would carry out the ‘war of liberation’ to the end and annihilate the KMT 
strongholds in China; second, ‘bureaucratic capitals’ would be confiscated 
by the state; third, landowners’ lands in the rural areas would be distributed 
to peasants via ‘land reform’; fourth, the new regime will ally with the Soviet 
Union to combat the Western ‘imperialists’.  
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In reading the Common Program we also need to pay attention to various 
aspects of the new regime’s policies, of which those most related to Sino-
Vatican relations are the education policy and the diplomatic policy. The 
new government’s main aim in the education policy was to purge the KMT 
(who were called ‘fascists’) influence in school curricula. Moreover, the new 
policy, ‘revolutionary political education’, in other words the official ideology, 
would be administered to students. The ‘old-school intellectuals’, namely 
the traditional Confucian literati, would also be subject to this policy.  
Now let us see the part of the chain of equivalence related to diplomatic 
policy. According to the Common Program, Beijing’s first principle of 
diplomacy is the maintenance of independence and sovereignty. Based on 
this principle, Beijing would pursue partnerships of equal status in creating 
diplomatic ties. At that time, in creating diplomatic ties, the most important 
criterion for Beijing was whether the country seeking Beijing’s friendship had 
already shunned, or would be willing to shun the KMT regime. Moreover, 
the new regime also expressed its willingness to protect ‘expats in China 
abiding with Chinese laws’. Briefly, it could be seen from the statements in 
the Common Program that Beijing: (1) was willing to create diplomatic ties 
with other states, including those from the West, provided that the country 
was willing to shun the KMT government. (2) These diplomatic ties should 
provide some benefits instead of obstacles for Beijing. (3) Beijing was willing 
to allow expats that were friendly to the new regime to stay in China. 
Conclusion 
Far from being a mere propaganda text, the Common Program was a key 
document conveying Beijing’s attitude, desires and fears in all aspects of 
state governing and certainly merits due scholarly attention. After analysing 
the text of the Common Program, I argue that this document represents the 
new regime’s first attempt to identify its main obstacles and tasks. The 
domestic political actors were categorised into those who supported Beijing 
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and those who supported the KMT regime. In the meantime, Beijing 
identified its principal task as battling the remnants of KMT in China and 
rebuilding the war-ravaged state. To be more specific, we can discern from 
the text that the new regime was about to: 
(1) put the stress on patriotism, state sovereignty and 'anti-imperialism’ (i.e. 
the expulsion of the West’s ‘unequal privileges’ in China)   
(2) redistribute the rural lands to poor peasants 
(3) realize the state control of the welfare/charity system and the education 
system 
(4) mete out an iron fist against the KMT and their sympathizers 
(5) strive for international recognition (and denial of the KMT’s international 
access) 
It should be noticed that in all these policies, the Catholic Church was not 
the major intended target. (1) The ‘imperialists’ in the communist discourse 
mainly referred to the expats from the major Western states. Though the 
Vatican had many foreign priests in China, not all of them were from the 
major Western states.   (2) The Catholic Church was never the major 
landowner in the rural areas of China. (3) The Catholic Church was not the 
sole religious organization that owned charity and education institutions in 
China. (4) Being a Catholic in China at that time did not mean that someone 
was also a sympathizer of the KMT regime. In other words, the policies listed 
in the Common Program were not designed especially against the Catholic 
Church. Among these policies, the one with harshest implications for the 
church was the state control of educational institutions, which put the 
church-owned schools and universities potentially at risk. In sum, the 
Common Program only identified the KMT remnants as the major threat. As 
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long as a social group distanced itself from the KMT, it should have been 
regarded as the new regime’s friend. Hence, we can discern that at the 
beginning of Beijing-Rome interaction, Beijing did not identify Rome, nor the 
church, as an ‘enemy’ in the state discourse. The following enmity between 
the two sides was not pre-determined, but the result of subsequent 
interactions. 
 
The First Salvo: The Manifesto on Independence and Reform 
As demonstrated by the two documents above, the major concern of the 
PRC is that the foreign churches may be utilised by ‘the imperialists’ to 
threaten the security of the PRC. The way to prevent the imperialists from 
doing this is to make the church autonomous. Based on this assumption, 
the PRC government started to push forward the autonomy process of the 
Christian churches in China. On 30 Nov 1950, in Sichuan Province, a priest 
named Wang Liangzuo led several hundred local Catholics and announced 
the Manifesto on Independence and Reform. This manifesto was 
considered as the start of the ‘three-self’ movement in the Catholic Church 
in China.  
All the previous authors had mentioned this manifesto in their works but few 
had made any analytical effort into the text. Despite the fact that Myers had 
included a full English translation 251 in his book, his aim was only to provide 
an example of government propaganda. Chen and Jiang also included the 
manifesto in their book but made only a simple comment on it: ‘this 
manifesto was certainly arranged by the CPC’. 252  In other words, the 
previous authors do not think that this text represented the genuine opinion 
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of Chinese Catholics and were not willing to spend effort on analysing it. 
However, I argue that for my research purpose (Beijing-Rome interaction), 
this Manifesto is good material to be analysed as long as it represents 
Beijing’s attitude. In other words, whether this text was genuinely composed 
by Fr. Wang or not is less important – Beijing’s strong endorsement means 
that it is part of the desired state discourse. In the following part I will provide 
an analysis of the Manifesto and discuss how it mattered in Sino-Vatican 
relations. My analysis was based on the original Chinese text 253 and the 
quoted sentences are my own translation. 
If we arrange the key signifiers of the Manifesto into chains of equivalences, 
it would appear as below: 
Imperialists = using the church to invade China = killing innocent compatriots  
New church = relying on herself = cutting off ties with imperialism = supporting the 
‘resist America, aid Korea’ movement = struggle for New China 
The Manifesto on Independence and Reform is a short article consisting of 
only several hundred words. The addressee was identified at the very start 
of the article as “Catholic brothers and sisters in China”. The supposed 
author (Father Wang) bitterly accused the imperialists of abusing the local 
churches and making the Chinese churches their ‘spearhead of invasion’. 
The Manifesto identifies ‘American Imperialism’ as the major enemy of 
Chinese Catholics and points out that ‘the aim of American Imperialism is to 
control the local churches in China and turn them into a tool for invading and 
destroying China’. Following this, the writer introduces the current 
background to readers. ‘The Imperialists ...  expanded their warfare to the 
Chinese north-east border, bombarded the peaceful cities and killed our 
innocent compatriots.’ At last, the writer calls on Chinese Catholics ‘to sever 
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all ties with imperialists, and to extinguish all ‘Pro-American and 
Americanophile thinking, while establishing our self-governed, self-funded 
and self-preaching new church.’  
In fact, the text of the Manifesto shows a strong antithesis between the 
church controlled by ‘imperialists’ and the ‘new church’. The author 
identified ‘imperialists’ as brutal killers of the Chinese and drew readers’ 
attention to the alleged US bombing of cities in North-east China. Based on 
the atrocities of ‘imperialists’, the author called for the building of a ‘new 
church’. The signifier ‘New Church’ was actually modelled on the 
catchphrase ‘New China’, which was widely used in the state discourse to 
denote the new regime led by the CPC.  Regarding the content of this ‘new 
church’, the manifesto simply specified that this church should unite with the 
government in an effort to battle ‘imperialists’ in Korea and support the 
rebuilding of China.   
Comment on the Manifesto on Independence and Reform 
As the ‘first salvo’ in Beijing’s effort to promote the ‘three-self’ movement in 
the Catholic Church, how should we evaluate the text of the Manifesto? 
Indeed, despite the fact that the text of the Manifesto is short and full of 
slogans and catchphrases, it was a clear expression of Beijing’s attitude 
towards the Catholic Church in China – the church should not be used by 
the West to sabotage Beijing’s rule over China and its efforts in the Korean 
War. In the three texts we have gone through from the side of Beijing, the 
Manifesto is the shortest in length but the strongest in tone. With this text, 
Beijing drew a red line for the church and Rome. The church needed to clear 
herself of the suspected ‘imperialist’ accusation and reassure Beijing – to 
do so, Beijing suggested that the church should take some actions to 
distance itself from foreign control. Indeed, ‘New Church’ and ‘Reform’ were 
the initial proposal offered by Beijing: the church should model itself on the 
communist Party in its struggle to overthrow the KMT’s Ancien Régime. 
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However, as we shall see later, this wording of Beijing’s proposal touched a 
raw nerve for the church because it hinted at another religious ‘Reformation’ 
in China creating something new from the original Catholic Church – which 
was anathema to Catholic discourse. Beijing would later realise that these 
signifiers would do disservice to the ‘three-self’ movement.  
The Manifesto was quickly endorsed and encouraged by the PRC 
government. The top leaders of the Communist Party made a series of 
speeches to support the autonomy of Chinese churches from foreign 
control. With the support of the PRC government, the “autonomy 
movement” quickly spread into other provinces. Following this, a series of 
‘Declarations of autonomy’ appeared in newspapers nationwide. On 31st 
March, the movement reached Nanjing, where the papal internuncio was 
staying. Father Li Weiguang, the vicar general of Nanjing, signed a 
declaration whose wording is similar to the Manifesto. The vicar general’s 
cooperation with Beijing alerted the Vatican and Archbishop Riberi decided 
to break his silence. This finally led to the expulsion of the papal internuncio 
– the details of which we will explore in the next section. 
 
4.2 The Church’s Replies 
Less than a year after Beijing’s attempt to promote autonomy in the Catholic 
Church in China, the papal internuncio was expelled from China. The 
previous authors usually regarded this as an attack long planned by Beijing. 
For example, Mariani used the catchphrase ‘targeted attack’ to describe 
Beijing’s moves.254 In other words, the expulsion of the papal internuncio 
was pre-determined by Beijing’s communist nature: because the regime 
wanted to take full control of the church, so the papal internuncio became 
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an obstacle who must be removed. Indeed, this argument seems quite 
convincing because the attack against the internuncio was done within such 
a short period of time after the initiation of the ‘three-self’ movement, 
something which causes difficulties for a constructivist explanation. Mariani 
noticed that since June 1951, a huge number of articles appeared in 
newspapers all over China attacking Archbishop Riberi and denouncing him 
as an imperialist. 255  Regarding this campaign against the internuncio, 
Mariani commented: ‘It was a classic campaign of agitation propaganda: stir 
up the “masses”, and then implement the predetermined strategy.’ 256 
Narrating the same event, Myers also pointed out that the attack on 
Archbishop Riberi was carried out in a rapid manner and was done in the 
name of the ‘Chinese people’.257 Chen and Jiang highlighted the fact that 
the media denouncing Riberi were all ‘controlled by the CPC’.258 In sum, 
according to previous authors, the attack on Riberi was pre-determined, 
fierce and rapid and accompanied by propaganda campaigns launched by 
the government-controlled media.  
Indeed, the expulsion of the papal internuncio presents a difficult case for a 
constructivist interpretation not only because of the rapid manner on the 
side of Beijing, but also because of the lack of reports of the Vatican’s moves 
during the unfolding of this event. In other words, the previous literature 
gives us very little account of the Vatican’s gestures towards Beijing around 
the time of the internuncio’s expulsion. There are only several fragments of 
Archbishop Riberi’s speeches mentioned in previous literature. Apart from 
reports of Beijing’s harsh attacks on the internuncio and the Vatican, 
previous books shed almost no light on the question of ‘how Rome acted 
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towards Beijing’. The reason behind this lack of reporting is perhaps twofold: 
first, the writing aim of the previous literature was to show ‘how the church 
suffered under Beijing’s rule’, so the report of how Rome acted towards 
Beijing became unimportant; second, the previous authors may also have 
met obstacles in obtaining first-hand materials of this historical event, which 
happened more than 60 years ago. Both factors contributed to the lack of 
reports about the Vatican’s actions towards Beijing from 1950 to 1951.   
Following the constructivist approach, I do not agree with the view that the 
expulsion of the papal internuncio was pre-determined. However, I have 
faced the same obstacle as the previous authors did in that there are not 
many first-hand accounts showing the Vatican’s moves in China during this 
period. Hence, in providing a constructivist account of the Beijing-Rome 
interaction around the time of the internuncio’s expulsion, I will try to do three 
things. First, I shall make an attempt to reconstruct the internuncio’s moves 
and gestures before his expulsion. Second, I will examine the self-
understanding of the church at that time and how this would affect the 
Beijing-Rome relationship. Third, I will make use of newly discovered 
archival material to show how the church’s publicity campaign against 
Beijing would impact Sino-Vatican relations. 
What did the internuncio do in China before the expulsion?  
The internuncio Archbishop Riberi’s original speeches are hardly mentioned 
in previous literature. According to Mariani, the internuncio was infuriated 
by a manifesto supporting the ‘three-self’ movement published in Chinese 
newspapers.259 The key issue was that the pro-government manifesto was 
signed by Fr. Li Weiguang, the vicar general of Nanjing. The manifesto 
                                            
259 Mariani, p.58. 
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contains many political slogans, in which the following words relate to the 
Vatican: 
‘…We shall obey the laws issued by the government, embrace the Common Program, 
be diligent in our positions and work hard. We must resolutely exterminate all 
imperialism’s forces and influence in the Chinese church. In order to reach this aim, 
we must act proactively and implement the three principles of “self-funding, self-
propagating and self-governing”. Apart from keeping purely religious ties with the 
Vatican in terms of our religious belief, we firmly oppose the Vatican’s interference 
with China’s internal affairs and resolutely cut off the political and economic ties with 
it.’ 260 
When Riberi read this, he immediately sent a letter to every bishop in China, 
which said: 
‘Today, 31 March, the newspapers in Nanjing carried a manifesto. It is reported that 
the priests and laity of our local diocese signed it. I am deeply saddened by this and 
hope to tell you immediately — that the manifesto was issued without my consent and 
I cannot agree with (what it says).  
I offer my fervent prayers to the Holy Spirit and may He grant every layperson and all 
members of the clergy the necessary wisdom and courage in order that they can know 
and courageously beat the enemy’s cunning plots, for the honour of our blessed 
mother church and the pontiff.’ 261 
All the previous major authors noticed that it was this letter that provoked 
Beijing and directly led to Riberi’s expulsion. As Mariani put it: ‘Riberi had 
offended the regime. He had to go.’ 262 Indeed, on 4 Apr 1950, the Renmin 
Ribao published an article denouncing the papal internuncio as a ‘lackey of 
US imperialism’. Five months later, the internuncio was summoned to the 
                                            
260 My own translation from the original Chinese text, which is quoted in Chen and Jiang, 
pp.240-241. 
261 My own translation from the Chinese text, in Chen and Jiang, p.241. 
262 Mariani, p.58. 
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security bureau and expelled from China. Hence, regarding this event, 
Riberi’s letter to the bishops in China and Beijing’s denouncement in 
Renmin Ribao became the only visible Beijing-Rome interactions in the 
previous literature. 
Apart from this denouncement of the ‘three-self’ movement, several 
fragments of Archbishop Riberi’s speeches during this period can be found 
in previous literature. In accounts provided by the Chinese side, it was 
reported that Riberi had sent a letter 263  to Fr. Wang Liangzuo (the 
supposed author of the Manifesto on Independence and Reform) in Latin, 
warning him ‘do not fall into the trap of the enemy.’ Moreover, when 
addressing the Catholic faithful in Nanjing on 2 Jul 1950, the internuncio 
hinted that the CPC’s rule over China would not last long: ‘The situation is 
different now. The darkness before dawn has already passed. Before the 
end of this year things will certainly change.’264 Hence, it can be seen from 
these fragments of speeches that the internuncio expressed no goodwill 
towards Beijing. However, these fragments themselves are far from 
sufficient in conveying the role played by Rome during the first year of the 
CPC’s rule over China.  
Considering this lack of reporting regarding the internuncio’s activities in 
China during this time, it is not easy to reconstruct Rome’s role in the 
breakdown of Sino-Vatican relations in 1951. However, key documents 
circulated in the Chinese church at that time can shed light on Rome’s 
agency in its relationship with Beijing. In the following section I shall analyse 
two things: first, the Chinese church’s systematic reply towards Beijing 
regarding the ‘three-self’ movement; second, the church’s publicity 
                                            
263 Lengzi, ‘Yesterday’s Movement: The start of the Anti-Imperialist Patriotic Movement 
in Chinese Catholicism’,  Zhong Guo Zong Jiao, 1 (2001) 37-39  
<http://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTotal-ZGZJ200101011.htm> [accessed 14 Sep 
2016].  
264 Chen and Jiang. p.239. 
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campaign against communism and Beijing. It is hoped that by shedding light 
on these events we can understand more about how Rome’s action affected 
Chinese Catholics’ self-understanding and Sino-Vatican relations overall. 
 
Matthew Chen Zhemin’s the Church: Holy and Catholic 
In fact, despite the lack of detailed reporting of the internuncio’s activities 
and speeches before his expulsion from China, the Vatican’s reply to 
Beijing’s expression of religious policy was systematically embodied in a key 
text circulated in the Chinese Church at that time, namely an article titled 
The Church: Holy and Catholic, authored by Fr. Matthew Chen Zhemin.  
So could an article written by an individual Chinese priest be regarded as 
the Vatican’s response to Beijing? This thesis argues for an affirmative 
answer for three reasons. First, Fr. Chen was a prominent figure in the 
Chinese Church. He was a member of the Catholic Central Bureau in China 
at the time and had a close working relationship with the internuncio, 
Riberi.265 Second, the article directly touched upon the issues raised by 
Beijing in Correct Understanding, namely the ‘three-self’ initiative and 
‘imperialist’ concerns. Third, the distribution of this article in the Chinese 
Church was endorsed and encouraged by the Vatican – at that time, this 
article was sent by the church authorities to every diocese in China and was 
widely circulated among Catholics. (In fact, the original pamphlets I 
discovered in the Hunan Archive bear the word ‘con approbatione 
ecclesiastica’, which is clear evidence that these materials were approved 
by the church authorities) 
                                            
265 Mariani, p.57. 
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The existence of Holy and Catholic was noted by both Beijing and the 
Western scholars. For Beijing, the church’s distribution of booklets 
containing Holy and Catholic was listed as one of the many activities against 
the PRC government ordered by Riberi. On 5 Sep 1951, Renmin Ribao 
published an article titled ‘Riberi’s Major Crimes’, in which the existence of 
Holy and Catholic was mentioned: 
‘Riberi gave orders to the Catholic Central Bureau (which was under his direct 
command) and printed in Shanghai a huge number of publications that sabotaged the 
government’s reputation, sowed dissention between Catholics and the government 
and slandered the patriotic movement of Chinese Catholics. For example, Study 
Reference and The Church: Holy and Catholic … these publications carry Riberi’s 
reactionary orders and instructions; (they) fool and deceive Catholics and threaten the 
patriotic movement of local Catholics.’ 266 
From here we can see Beijing’s negative attitude towards Holy and Catholic. 
However, in the open publications from the side of Beijing, there is no direct 
quotation of the original text of Holy and Catholic. On the other hand, the 
existence of Fr. Chen’s work was also noticed by Mariani, who pointed out 
that ‘Study Reference’ and ‘Holy and Catholic’ are overlapping texts: ‘Study 
Reference’ was a pamphlet distributed by the church at that time and ‘Holy 
and Catholic’ was included in the pamphlet.267 Mariani had also quoted the 
opening paragraph of Fr. Chen’s Holy and Catholic. However, apart from a 
very brief summary of Holy and Catholic’s main content that was less than 
one page long, Mariani did not provide any detailed analysis of the original 
text. Considering its major influence on Sino-Vatican relations, I argue that 
Mariani’s brief treatment of Holy and Catholic constituted a major omission. 
                                            
266 My own translation from the original text (from Renmin Ribao’s online digital 
archive): Renmin Ribao, ‘The Major Crimes of Riberi’, Renmin Ribao, Page 1, 5 Sep 1951 
< http://58.68.146.102/rmrb/19510905/1> [accessed 16 Sep 2016]. 
267 Mariani, p.57. 
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In the following part I will provide an analysis of Holy and Catholic and 
discuss its implications for Sino-Vatican relations.  
The original full Chinese text of The Church: Holy and Catholic is somewhat 
elusive. Part of the text was included in the appendix of Su’s work The 
Historical Material of the Martyrdom in China from 1948-1957, on which my 
analysis is based. In fact, during my research in the Hunan Provincial 
Archive I have discovered an original copy of The Church: Holy and 
Catholic. However, due to time constraints, it was impossible for me to read 
the entire text into the recorder. What I could do at that time was to take 
note of the pamphlet’s table of contents.268 I discovered that the original 
length of Holy and Catholic was greater than I had previously estimated – 
in fact, the part of the text included in Su’s work was the conclusion of Holy 
and Catholic. Below are the headings of the pamphlet The Church: Holy and 
Catholic: 
The Church: Holy and Catholic 
Fr. Chen Zhemin, 
No.197, Yue Yang Rd, Shanghai269 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
• The universality and unity of the Catholic Church  
• The church is the church of all humanity  
• The Church’s Catholicity and Unity  
• Martyrs are those who sacrifice for unity  
• God transcends nationalities  
• The Catholic Church transcends classes  
• The Catholic Church transcends politics and political systems  
• The Church has no connection with political views  
• The true task of the Catholic Church  
• The Catholic Church nurtures the foundation of society  
• The Catholic Church does not endorse a certain political system  
• The meaning of the church’s works  
 
Chapter 2 Organisations of the Catholic Church 
• The fundamental organisations of the Catholic Church  
                                            
268 Hunan Provincial Archive, 221-1-7. Translated by the author of this thesis. 
269 This address is where the Catholic Central Bureau (CCB) was situated in Shanghai. This 
means that this booklet was issued with the authority of the CCB, which represents the 
official view of the church (and certainly of Rome) at that time. 
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• The Vatican and the Roman Curia  
• The Pope does not have political preferences  
• The Pope’s person should not be divided  
• Ways to compromise the unity of the church  
• The development of the church does not rely on political support  
• The church does not allow any interference from secular regimes  
• The expansion of Catholicism depends totally on her own effort  
• Catholic preachers belong to the church and have no relationships with their 
nationalities  
• The beacon of faith and light  
• Some splendid examples  
• Missionaries coming to China  
• The Catholic Church was a victim of imperialism. The Church opposes invasions.  
• The Catholic Church fights imperialism  
• The Catholic Church does not rely on money to evangelise  
• The Catholic Church does not receive direct or indirect funds from foreign countries  
• The source of the church’s economy: self-donations  
• The donations are done anonymously   
• Five important conclusions  
• The church has only friends  
• Hence, the church does not require secret activities  
• The church has long implemented the ‘three-self’ principles  
• What are genuine ‘self-preaching, self-funding and self-governing’ principles  
• Popular view of ‘self-preaching, self-funding and self-governing’ principles  
• On ‘self-preaching'  
• On ‘self-funding'  
• On ‘self-governing'  
• One should differentiate between the internal issues of the church and the 
patriotic movement  
• Warnings to some fellow Catholics  
• Some points to remember  
• Conclusion  
From this table of content and my quick skimming of the original booklet, I 
found that the part included in Su’s book is actually the last part (I have set 
these headings in bold letters) of Fr. Chen’s Holy and Catholic. Although I 
did not manage to transcribe the rest of Fr. Chen’s original text, this table of 
contents already tells us the overall structure of the original text. The first 
thing we can discern from this table of contents is that Holy and Catholic 
was a detailed treatise on the church’s transcendental self-understanding. 
According to the opinion of Fr. Chen’s text, the church is totally 
transcendental in the face of politics, political systems and classes. Due to 
this transcendental nature, the church, including the Pope, has nothing to 
do with imperialism and invasion. Foreign missionaries should be regarded 
as the church’s preachers alone and their respective nationalities should not 
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be taken into account. Second, the church is uncompromising towards any 
interference from secular governments and does not rely on the support of 
any regime. Third, the church has its own definition of the ‘three-self’ 
principles. In the following part I will provide an analysis of the excerpt 
included in Su’s book, which was the last part of the original text and the 
direct reply to Beijing’s ‘three-self’ initiative.270 
The main content of the last part of Holy and Catholic could be summarised 
into the following chains of equivalence.  
Chain 1: ‘Three-self’ according to the church 
The Catholic Church’s ‘three-self’ = does not rely on any coercive power or political 
power to help preaching = does not rely on political subsidies = is not under direct 
and indirect control of any regime = implemented since creation, uninterrupted   
Chain 2: ‘Three-self’ according to ‘popular view’ 
The ‘three-self’ from a political perspective = expelling every foreign missionary = 
does not receive donations from the universal Catholic church = does not allow 
vertical structure = threatening fundamental creeds = not genuine Catholicism 
Chain 3: Patriotism as defined by the church 
Catholics’ patriotism = encouraged by the church’s creeds = opposing imperialism 
= the church should not be involved in politics = does not mean that every 
missionary should be expelled 
From these chains, we can discern that the main purpose of the last part of 
Holy and Catholic was to challenge the government’s definition of ‘three-
self’ and offer Chinese Catholics an alternative interpretation of ‘three-self’. 
I use chain 1 to summarise Fr. Chen’s effort to re-define the meaning of 
                                            
270 Ruoyi Su, Historical Material, Appendix, pp.15-22. 
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‘three-self’. According to Fr. Chen, the Catholic Church had always 
implemented ‘three-self’ principles since the beginning of the church. 
‘Because the Catholic Church has used her own manpower and economic 
power to preach the gospel to every part of the world from ancient times to 
the present, something which was free from control by any external 
organisation, she is definitely implementing the principle of ‘self-preaching, 
self-funding and self-governing’. ‘So what was the Catholic ‘three-self’ 
according to Fr. Chen? Fr. Chen first defined ‘self-preaching’ – ‘The 
meaning of “self-preaching” in Catholicism is that the church would not use 
any coercive power or political power to help preaching.’  Then Fr. Chen 
argued that the number of Chinese clergy was not sufficient for running the 
church alone: ‘Now, the Chinese clergy has already been formed, but their 
number is far from enough. Therefore, foreign clergy are still needed. In this 
situation, the correct understanding should not be from a political 
perspective, but from the church’s perspective.’  
Fr. Chen then proceeded to discuss the meaning of ‘self-funding’. According 
to him, the funds that the church acquires from abroad do not have the 
slightest relationship with secular regimes: ‘The church is like a human 
body, where the material needs of evangelisation are supplied and 
supported by the power of the whole body. This is just like the heart that 
supplies blood to every limb and maintains the entire body’s life and 
development … therefore, the funds received by the church could not be 
considered as foreign funds.’ In other words, Fr. Chen argued that due to 
the church’s transcendental nature, the money she received from abroad 
should be considered as an internal transfer between the universal church 
and the local church – in this sense this fund is not political and should not 
be considered as ‘foreign’.  
After discussing the first two parts of the concept of ‘three-self’, Fr. Chen 
went on to examine the last part, ‘self-governing’. He argued that this is the 
most essential part of the Catholic faith which often becomes the target of 
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attacks from secular regimes: ‘In the past, every type of politician made 
many attempts to obstruct the universality of the church organisation, under 
every kind of disguise. (The aim) was to create a so-called autonomous 
church and cut off the church’s ties with the Roman Pontiff.’ He further 
pointed out that the call of patriotism and accusation of imperialism could be 
used as a wedge to divide the church, which would compromise the 
catholicity of the church: ‘In this circumstance, the church is no longer a 
‘self-preaching’ Catholic Church, but a ‘self-created’ Catholic Church – that 
is a degenerated version of Catholicism, which is not genuine.’ Fr. Chen 
then appealed for political issues and religious issues to be ‘distinguished 
clearly’ instead of ‘woven together’.  
When defining the church’s understanding of ‘three-self’, Fr. Chen also 
summarised a ‘popular view of three-self’, the idea which I have arranged 
into chain 2. In fact, although Fr. Chen did not specify who was behind such 
a ‘popular view’, it is quite clear that this ‘popular view’ is the church’s 
understanding of Beijing’s version of ‘three-self’. Fr. Chen argued that the 
actual implication of this version of ‘three-self’ was that the church should: 
(1) expel all foreign missionaries; (2) refuse all donations from abroad; (3) 
dismantle every vertical structure in the church. Regarding the third point, 
Fr. Chen pointed out: ‘(the aim of this version of ‘self-governing’) is to 
separate the dioceses of the Chinese Catholic Church from the universal 
church, especially from the Roman Pontiff (who was considered as the 
centre of imperialism). This will make all the dioceses, and every parish, 
completely detached from the bishop and become non-systemic units 
independent from each other.’ As a conclusion, Fr. Chen argued that this 
‘popular version’ of ‘three-self’ was extremely detrimental to the church. 
‘This is a heavy blow to the fundamental creeds of Catholicism. No Catholic 
can remain silent in the face of this.’  
Fr. Chen then pointed out that patriotism was already part of the church’s 
teachings. (Chain 3) He argued that loving one’s country was part of 
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Catholic’s obligation: ‘The Catholic creeds encourage citizens to love their 
own countries. This is part of their obligation as human beings, which is 
fundamental and compulsory.’ He then argued that the church was not 
imperialism and therefore does not need to admit to any connection with 
imperialism: ‘the church herself is against every kind of imperialism, she 
does not need any manifesto, nor any political movement to show this 
stance’. In other words, Fr, Chen does not think the church has any need to 
participate in the ‘anti-imperialist’ movement promoted by Beijing because 
the church’s participation in these movements could be regarded as a tacit 
assent that the church has connections with imperialism. He concluded that 
the church should not be a direct participant in ‘patriotic movements’. 
‘Because she, the church, does not have such a political feature – this is 
outside her boundaries. She cannot interfere with the area of politics. The 
church is the church while the state is the state. The boundary between 
them should be clear.’ 
In the above part I have shown the chains of equivalence in the conclusive 
chapter of Fr. Chen’s Holy and Catholic and explained them in detail. So 
what kind of conclusion can we draw from this textual analysis and how did 
the text influence the relationship between Beijing and Rome?  
The first thing we should bear in mind is that the text of Holy and Catholic, 
despite being written in the individual name of Fr. Chen, carries the authority 
of the church and should be considered as a direct reply towards Beijing’s 
Catholic Policy. In sending this booklet to every diocese in China, the 
Vatican showed its endorsement of Fr. Chen’s view. Holy and Catholic 
attempted to engage with Beijing in defining two key signifiers in church 
discourse, namely what is the exact meaning of ‘three-self’ and what is 
patriotism. I argue that two tendencies reflected in the text are worthy of 
notice. 
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The first tendency shown by the text of Holy and Catholic was its 
conservatism – the idea that the church has no need to make any 
accommodation in the face of the new regime. According to Fr. Chen’s 
opinion, the church does not need to, and would not, change under the rule 
of Beijing because ‘three-self’ had always been part of the church’s 
principles. In Fr. Chen’s argument, ‘self-preaching’ means the church does 
not depend on any external power to evangelise; ‘self-funding’ means the 
church will only receive foreign money if it is from a Catholic source; ‘self-
governing’ means the church is free from the control of any secular regime. 
However, in the historical circumstance of that time, all these wordings 
would sound very unpleasant to Beijing because Fr. Chen’s argument does 
not address Beijing’s safety concerns at all. In fact, from the analysis of key 
texts from Beijing’s side (e.g. Correct Understanding), we could see that 
Beijing’s intention in promoting the ‘three-self’ movement was quite clear: in 
the circumstances of an ongoing war with the US, the church should 
reassure the government that they would not ally with the West and 
sabotage the new regime’s rule. However, Fr. Chen not only refused to 
reassure Beijing, but also totally rejected Beijing’s call to purge imperialism. 
Following Fr. Chen’s logic, as the church has nothing to do with imperialism, 
it would not follow Beijing’s call for ‘cutting off ties with imperialism’ at all. 
Such outright refusal would seem offensive in the eyes of Beijing at the time. 
The second tendency of Holy and Catholic was its strong idealism and its 
stern denial of the church’s political aspects. Fr. Chen iterated again and 
again that the boundary between politics and the church should be clear 
and the government should not interfere with the church’s affairs. This 
argument was based on the church’s transcendence. According to Fr. Chen, 
the church was totally detached from secular regimes and did not depend 
on any regime’s power to promote Catholicism. The church draws funds 
only from the church itself and donations coming from abroad should not be 
considered as foreign funds. Furthermore, Fr. Chen argued that foreign 
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missionaries, because they are church members, should not be considered 
foreign at all. In other words, Fr. Chen described a highly idealized picture 
of the church which has no connection with secular politics and which does 
not care about worldly affairs. However, was this idealised argument 
persuasive in Beijing’s eyes? Perhaps the answer should be negative. 
Again, highlighting the church’s transcendence did not reassure Beijing’s 
security concern. In fact, the intended audience of such a claim of 
transcendence was more likely to be ordinary Chinese Catholics – which I 
will discuss in the next paragraph. 
The third tendency of Holy and Catholic was its frequent attempt to mould 
the self-understanding of ordinary Chinese Catholics and discourage them 
from cooperating with the new regime. Despite touching upon the key issues 
raised by Beijing, the booklet Holy and Catholic did not address Beijing 
directly. Instead, the style and wording shows that it was addressed to 
ordinary Chinese Catholics. The manner of communication (sent from 
Shanghai to dioceses all over China) clearly shows that the author of the 
text (Fr. Chen, endorsed by the Vatican) hoped to directly affect the self-
understanding of ordinary Chinese Catholics and make them follow Rome’s 
stance, regardless of the feelings of Beijing. In the meantime, no evidence 
showed that the Vatican sought a direct dialogue with the PRC government. 
All these reasons meant that Beijing’s authority was ignored by Fr. Chen 
and by the Vatican who was behind him. Therefore, it is not strange that 
Beijing was angry at such a manner of communication which bypassed the 
PRC government and exerted influence on Chinese Catholics directly. 
To conclude, Holy and Catholic was the church’s most influential and 
systematic response to Beijing’s Catholic policy in 1951. However, the text 
shows no willingness to make any accommodation to the regime of Beijing. 
Instead, the text conveys a clear message that the church would not follow 
the government’s ‘three-self’ initiative and would make no effort to reassure 
Beijing’s security concern. Indeed, the text of Holy and Catholic was more 
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eager to influence the understanding of ordinary Catholics in China than it 
was to engage in any dialogue with Beijing. The text was an open challenge 
to the government’s definition of key signifiers in Beijing’s Catholic policy. In 
the discourse represented by Holy and Catholic, Beijing was portrayed as a 
power ‘external to the church’ that harbours malicious intent towards 
Catholicism.  
Hence, it would not be strange that Beijing was irritated by Holy and Catholic 
– in my research in the Hunan Provincial Archive, on the original copy of 
booklet, I discovered a hand-written instruction (which was obviously written 
by the officials at the time), which reads: 
‘Please study fully this reactionary document and then solicit a 
persuasive essay (maximum 3000 Chinese characters) that can 
mercilessly refute its reactionary arguments.’ 271 
From this instruction we can discern that the impact of Holy and Catholic on 
Sino-Vatican relations was that it greatly aroused Beijing’s resentment. 
However, if Fr. Chen’s work annoyed Beijing, activities that occurred in local 
churches turned the prospect of Sino-Vatican relations from bad to worse. 
In the next section I shall reveal a largely forgotten aspect of the church’s 
agency in Sino-Vatican relations: the anti-Beijing publicity campaign. 
The Church’s Anti-Beijing Publicity Campaign 
During my research in the Hunan Provincial Archive I discovered some 
original historical documents which, I believe, could somehow remedy a flaw 
in previous literature and shed light on the church’s actions towards the PRC 
government in its interaction with Beijing before the expulsion of the papal 
                                            
271 The hand-written instruction was dated 18 May 1951. From Hunan Provincial Archive, 
221-1-7. 
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internuncio. These documents are pamphlets and leaflets circulated in local 
Catholic churches in Hunan Province in the year 1951 – they were collected 
by local officials for internal reference and were put in a dedicated folder 
entitled ‘reactionary leaflets’.272 During my data collection, I recorded many 
of them. In the following part I will show the main contents of four typical 
leaflets and provide my analysis of them. 
 
Proposal to create a Catholic Party  
This is a pamphlet bearing the stamp of the Cathedral of Changsha. On the 
first page there is anonymous handwriting saying ‘Humbly seeking the 
advice and correction of Your Excellency’.  
The author of the manifesto was identified as ‘the Committee for Organising 
the Catholic Party’. The pamphlet lamented the situation in China after the 
end of WWII. According to its author, no matter whether they were the 
victorious states (e.g. Britain, France) or the defeated states (e.g. Japan, 
Italy) they had all focused their energy on economic development. By 
contrast, ‘our country – the Republic of China’ was engaged in constant 
warfare between the KMT and the communists and the state was on the 
verge of total collapse. In these circumstances, Catholics should shoulder 
their social responsibility and organise their own party to participate in 
politics. The main task of this Catholic Party would be to contribute to the 
reconstruction of the nation and to supervise and curb corruption. Then the 
author gave a preliminary plan for creating a Catholic Party, their vision for 
participating politics, and the criteria for membership. At the end of the 
pamphlet there was a sample membership CV and a sample membership 
card.  
                                            
272 Hunan Provincial Archive. 221-1-7. 
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From this pamphlet it can be seen that the local church had active plans to 
organise a party and participate in secular politics. The anonymous 
handwriting, according to my guess, indicates that this pamphlet was an 
internal copy sent to Petronius Lacchio, the Archbishop of Changsha at the 
time, for revision before publication. The stamp of the Cathedral of 
Changsha shows that this document was endorsed by the church. It could 
be argued that this pamphlet could be dated prior to 1949, as there was no 
mention of the new regime in Beijing in the text. However, the reason that 
this pamphlet was included in the collection is that it was still in circulation 
up to 1951. We can imagine how this pamphlet would have appeared in the 
eyes of the officials of the Bureau of Religious Affairs at the time – it clearly 
showed that the church had its own ambition for secular politics. 
 
The Truth concerning the Communist Party 
This leaflet was published by the Catholic Truth Society of Hong Kong. The 
author of the leaflet pointed out that the love of riches and loathing of poverty 
is part of human nature. Hence, this selfish nature is the origin of class 
conflicts. It is very hard to find a balanced way to solve such class conflicts. 
The fault of communism was that it only paid attention to ‘one side of the 
conflict’. Therefore, communism caused bloodshed and massacres in the 
world and Soviet Russia was an example of this. Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s ‘the 
Three Principles of the People’273 was a better alternative to communism. 
The author concluded that the widespread hunger and rebellion in Soviet 
Russia was clear proof that communism could not be achieved in the world. 
                                            
273 Dr. Sun Yat-sen was the founding father of the KMT and ‘the Three Principles of the 
People’ was the official ideology of the KMT regime. 
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From the publisher’s information, we can see that this leaflet was published 
and printed in Hong Kong. In fact, the Catholic Truth Society of Hong Kong, 
founded in 1934, has always been the official publisher of the Diocese of 
Hong Kong.274 Its status as a part of series means that other similar anti-
communist leaflets must have been sent to mainland China from Hong 
Kong. Besides its denouncement of communism, it should be noticed that 
the author showed strong sympathy towards the KMT regime’s ideology. 
This siding with the KMT regime obviously contradicted the claim that ‘the 
Pope does not have a political preference’ as argued by Fr. Chen in Holy 
and Catholic. 
Oppose Communism with Resolution 
This short leaflet was published by the Publicity Department of the Chinese 
Catholic Youth Organisation. Below is its full text:  
‘To have a solution to the current political situation of China, the Communist Party 
must be eradicated. To eradicate today’s Communist Party in China, we need to 
strengthen education on morality. To strengthen China’s moral education, the only 
option is Catholic Education.  
Catholicism is the only (acceptable) foundation of morality and includes freedom, 
equality and fraternity. Catholicism is an effective antidote to communism and is 
communism’s arch-enemy.  
Schools should have a Catholic curriculum because they can then strengthen the 
moral foundation of young people and defeat the Communist Party in China. 
Catholicism must be promoted with swiftness. If one wants to seek freedom and 
equality in China, he must devote himself to the promotion of Catholicism. If one wants 
                                            
274 Information from the Catholic Centre of Hong Kong’s official website. From: Catholic 
Centre of Hong Kong, ‘Introduction’ <http://www.catholiccentre.org.hk/intro.htm> 
[Accessed 19 Aug 2016]. 
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to realise the ultimate unification of China, he must promote the spirit of Catholicism.’ 
275 
If the previous leaflet was criticising communism in general, this leaflet 
certainly opened fire directly on the CPC. Filled with short political slogans, 
this leaflet used strong words against the CPC (e.g. eradicate, antidote, 
archenemy) and put the church and the Communist Party in stark 
opposition.  
 
China and the Communist Party 
The leaflet started with a bitter denouncement of the Communist Party of 
China: ‘The Communist Party robs households, murders people, commits 
arson, breaks laws, disturbs society – all these atrocities make Chinese 
people gnash their teeth in anger and they cannot control their hatred. 
Communism is considered by our compatriots as a thought system for 
vipers and beasts.’  Then the author argued that ‘where there is a 
communist government, there will be bloodshed’. The author then went on 
to discuss the situation in the USSR and pointed out that communism will 
‘hurt democracy in China’. 
In the four leaflets I have mentioned above, this leaflet’s denouncement of 
the Communist Party of China was the most vehement. The author of this 
leaflet used the strongest terms possible to attack the CPC and compared 
the communists to criminals. 
So what can these leaflets tell us? In fact, these four pamphlets/leaflets are 
not exhaustive of the total number of Catholic anti-Beijing materials 
                                            
275 The end of the leaflet reads: ‘The Publicity Department of Chinese Catholic Youth 
Organisation. Reprinting is welcomed.’ 
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collected in the archival folder – there are other titles in the collection, such 
as China will Soon Become a Colony of Russia! ; How Catholics Can Fight 
the Communist Party; The Fundamental Theory of Anti-communism. 
Indeed, this leaflet collection was one of my most interesting discoveries in 
the Hunan Provincial Archive because they show a rarely noticed 
‘belligerent side’ of the church’s activities in China before the expulsion of 
the internuncio, namely in that the church had actively engaged in a publicity 
campaign against Beijing. From the content of these leaflets, it can be 
discerned that the church’s publicity campaign against communism had 
already exceeded a metaphysical/doctrinal discussion of communism and 
became a direct attack on Beijing’s rule. In other words, the church had 
acted in contradiction of the transcendence promised in Fr. Chen’s Holy and 
Catholic – it was no longer detached from secular politics but became an 
active participant in it. By expressing sympathy for the KMT and openly 
attacking Beijing, the church was crossing the red line of the new regime. 
 
4.3 Conclusion of the Chapter 
In this chapter I have examined the key texts that led to the expulsion of the 
papal internuncio from China in 1951. In analysing these texts, I have tried 
to draw readers’ attention to two features of Beijing’s discourse: 
First, despite the fact that there are many Marxist signifiers in Beijing’s texts, 
the ideology these texts conveyed showed some distance from orthodox 
Marxism – Beijing’s texts did not touch much upon class struggle and their 
attitude was more benign towards religion compared to Lenin’s works. To 
be more specific, although ‘communism’ was the central signifier chosen by 
the regime of Beijing at the time, its exact meaning was already re-
interpreted by Beijing to accommodate the Chinese situation. Briefly, 
Beijing’s reinterpreted version of ‘communism’ was actually different from 
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the orthodox versions of communism applied in the USSR and other 
European countries in that the Chinese version was focused on Chinese 
nationalism, the desire to exercise sovereignty independently and the 
loathing of Western political interference. However, all this nationalist 
content would still appear under the surface of the central signifier 
‘communism’.  
Second, Beijing’s texts at that time show that the new regime’s perception 
of the Catholic Church in China was not fully matured. To be more specific, 
the church-related signifiers in Beijing’s discourse were not connected to a 
fully-developed identity (e.g. archenemy). In other words, whether the 
church should be identified as friend or enemy was still undecided at that 
time in Beijing’s discourse. However, from the texts we can discern that 
Beijing wished that the church could become a friend, namely part of the 
‘patriotic people’. In the circumstances of the Korean War, Beijing hoped 
that the church could reassure the government by distancing itself from the 
west and putting a stop to the situation where the church was led by foreign 
missionaries. Furthermore, when talking about the church, no strong words, 
nor negative expressions were adopted in Beijing’s texts.  
All these expressions could be regarded as Beijing’s invitation to dialogue 
with the church and the Vatican which was behind it. In sum, the meaning 
of church-related signifiers is not fixed in Beijing’s discourse at the time and 
Beijing was prepared to adjust its definitions according to feedback. 
However, on the other hand, it should also be noticed that Beijing’s 
undifferentiated treatment of Catholicism and Protestantism and the 
regime’s haste to promote the ‘three-self’ movement in the Catholic church 
had raised suspicions from the church and Rome and increased the 
government’s difficulties in winning over Chinese Catholics. 
On the other hand, Fr. Chen’s Holy and Catholic was the church’s 
systematic response to Beijing’s religious policy. Despite its calm tone, Holy 
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and Catholic was a stern refusal to Beijing’s call for patriotism and 
expressed clearly that the church would not make any accommodation to 
the new regime. In his treatise, Fr. Chen highlighted the church’s 
transcendence and her detachment from secular politics. Based on this 
claim, Fr. Chen asked Beijing not to interfere with the church’s internal 
religious affairs. The church’s decision to send this treatise to all dioceses 
in China greatly upset Beijing.  
The anti-communist campaign that occurred in local churches in China was 
unhelpful towards the improvement of Sino-Vatican relations. From the 
leaflets discovered in the Hunan Provincial Archive, it can be discerned that 
the local church had betrayed Fr. Chen’s transcendent claim and actively 
participated in secular politics. In the church’s publicity campaign, 
communism in general was the target for denouncement, but the attack was 
often extended to the CPC and the PRC government as well. The authors 
of these leaflets attempted to connect the CPC with highly negative 
signifiers, such as ‘vipers’ and ‘beasts’. Moreover, the leaflets showed 
strong sympathy for the KMT regime. In this way, the church sided with the 
KMT and engaged in propaganda warfare against Beijing. Hence, this thesis 
argues that any narrative about Beijing’s harsh measures against the church 
should also take the church’s hostile actions towards the government into 
account – the church in 1951 was not a mere victim. In sum, the church’s 
publicity campaign against Beijing undermined Beijing’s rule over China and 
certainly provoked Beijing’s strong reaction.  
In discussing the church’s anti-communist campaign, I need to address one 
question: should the Vatican be held responsible for all these? After all, 
these leaflets were not directly issued by the Vatican. Regarding this 
question, I argue that the Vatican certainly should shoulder responsibility for 
the local church’s anti-Beijing campaign. First, the fact that these anti-
government leaflets were distributed by local churches definitely could not 
escape Rome’s knowledge. Second, the leaflets came from authoritative 
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church sources (e.g. the Catholic Truth Society Hong Kong) outside China 
and their contents were endorsed by Rome. Hence, although there is no 
evidence that Rome actively encouraged the local churches’ political 
propaganda against Beijing, the Vatican should at least be held responsible 
for not acting. With full knowledge of the ongoing publicity campaign against 
Beijing, Rome had never given the local churches any instruction to ‘stop’. 
In the end, the anti-communist campaign in the local churches belied Fr. 
Chen’s claim of transcendence and compelled Beijing to mete out harsh 
measures against the church. The expulsion of the papal internuncio in 
1951 was the direct result of this.  
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5. The Two Deadlocks (1952-58)  
In this chapter, I will go on to discuss the subsequent development of Sino-
Vatican relations from 1952 to 1956, after the expulsion of Archbishop Riberi 
from the Chinese mainland. This is a relatively long time period and I will 
not try to cover all the historical events during this period. Instead, I will focus 
on four flashpoints that exerted a major influence on Sino-Vatican relations. 
First, this thesis will examine the papal internuncio’s 13-month stay in Hong 
Kong after his expulsion. This event led to the relocation of the Vatican’s 
Nunciature to Taipei, which constituted the first ‘deadlock’ of Sino-Vatican 
relations. My aim here is to answer the question of why the internuncio’s 
prolonged stay in Hong Kong failed to improve Rome’s relationship with 
Beijing.  
Second, the thesis will proceed to shed light on the CCP’s internal 
deliberation on Catholic policy in 1952. The aim is to show the ‘inner thinking 
process’ of Beijing during this period and reveal how Beijing adjusted its 
Catholic policy according to feedback from the church and Rome. Third, this 
thesis will analyse the Pope’s message regarding the ‘Year of Mary’ and 
Beijing’s evaluation of this. I will shed light on how Rome’s general message 
towards the worldwide church could exert an influence on Chinese Catholics 
and then impact Beijing’s policy. Last but not least, the thesis will give 
insights into the first episcopal consecration in China without Roman 
approval in 1958, which caused the second ‘deadlock’ of Sino-Vatican 
relations. I will try to illustrate that interactions continued to matter at the 
time of the crisis and how hostile actions would turn the situation from bad 
to worse. 
In fact, among these four events, only the last one was a typical ‘flashpoint’ 
in which Beijing and Rome openly and fiercely clashed – the first three are 
all ‘silent’ flashpoints where there were no open exchanges of fire between 
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the two sides. Due to the absence of overt hostilities, these ‘silent’ 
flashpoints were largely overlooked by previous literature. It was only 
because of the discovery of the relevant historical materials in the archive 
that I could now give more insights into these ‘silent but important’ 
flashpoints in Sino-Vatican relations. It is hoped that by examining these 
forgotten moments of Beijing-Rome interactions, I can shed light on how 
Beijing’s perception of Rome affected the PRC government’s Catholic policy 
and illustrate how Rome’s actions and speeches, even when not addressing 
Beijing, could exert influence on Sino-Vatican relations.  
After examining the three relatively ‘silent’ flashpoints of Sino-Vatican 
relations, at the end of this chapter I shall analyse the clash between Beijing 
and Rome over the episcopal appointment and consecration in 1958. 
Although previous authors have all given some coverage to this event, they 
have not paid enough attention to the underlying constructivist process 
between Beijing and Rome and often drew oversimplified conclusions about 
this historical event. In the light of such shortcomings in previous literature, 
this thesis will go further by using new archival evidence to illustrate Beijing 
and Rome’s respective agencies during the event and discuss why Beijing 
finally decided to push forward the consecrations without approval from 
Rome. A conclusion about the major findings will be given at the end of this 
chapter. 
5.1 After the Expulsion: The Internuncio in Hong 
Kong 
Previous Literature on the Internuncio’s Stay in Hong Kong 
In previous literature on Sino-Vatican relations in the 1950s, very little 
attention was paid to Archbishop Riberi’s activities after his expulsion from 
mainland China and its implications for Sino-Vatican relations. Chen and 
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Jiang gave the most detailed historical account of Riberi’s move from Hong 
Kong to Taiwan based on their studies of the diplomatic archives in 
Taiwan.276 According to Chen and Jiang, after his arrival in Hong Kong, 
Riberi showed great unwillingness to accept the KMT regime’s invitation to 
Taiwan. Riberi’s reluctance worried Taipei, who desperately needed 
international recognition at that time. When the KMT regime’s Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, George Yeh Kung-chao asked Riberi whether he could pay 
a visit to Taiwan, Riberi answered that he feared that if he went to Taiwan, 
the communists might ‘increase their persecution’ against Catholics in 
mainland China. In the light of this, he wished to remain in Hong Kong until 
further instructions from Rome. The KMT regime then contacted Rome to 
ask whether the Holy See could move its embassy to Taipei. Similarly, 
Rome refused Taipei’s request and explained that the Holy See did not want 
to irritate Beijing at that delicate moment.  
After his expulsion from Nanjing, Riberi arrived in Hong Kong on 8 Sep 
1951. On his arrival, the internuncio was welcomed and hailed by large 
crowds of Catholics at the railway station. Riberi issued a written statement 
in which he expressed his feelings after the expulsion: 
‘My love for the Chinese people never changes. I assumed the position 
of ambassador to China on the Holy Father's order, and I always respect 
and sympathise with the Chinese people. Therefore, in spite of all the 
difficulties, I stayed in China up to now. I am greatly saddened by this 
departure from China. But I will continue to pray ardently for the Chinese 
people, the Catholic priests, friars, nuns and laity.’ 277 
                                            
276 Chen and Jiang, pp. 244-251. 
277 My translation from Chinese. Su, Historical Material, pp. [51]28- [51]29. 
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Afterwards, Archbishop Riberi spent 13 months in Hong Kong, with the hope 
that the situation in mainland China could somehow change. However, 
during Riberi’s stay in Hong Kong, the Vatican did not see any positive 
changes on the part of Beijing and the pro-KMT view within the Roman Curia 
gained the upper hand. Rome finally decided to embrace the KMT and, on 
26 Oct 1952, Riberi went to Taiwan and the Nunciature was relocated to 
Taipei.  
Interestingly, according to Wei, 278Riberi’s travel to Taipei was far from a 
happy journey - the KMT regime deliberatively granted him a tourist visa 
instead of a diplomatic one to express their dislike of Riberi. Chen and Jiang 
had also quoted a cold dialogue between Riberi and the vice-minister of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the KMT government, which revealed the far 
less than friendly attitude between the internuncio and the Taipei regime. 279 
All these clearly showed that Riberi’s long stay in Hong Kong and his 
unwillingness to move to Taiwan deeply annoyed the KMT regime. 
Hence, from these historical accounts we can discern an important fact: that 
Riberi’s long stay in Hong Kong was intended to be a reconciliatory gesture 
to Beijing. By Riberi’s gesture, the Vatican showed reluctance to relocate 
the Nunciature to Taipei and patiently waited for positive signals from 
mainland China. On the other hand, this gesture greatly annoyed Taipei, 
who repeatedly requested that the Nunciature should be moved to Taiwan. 
However, in the end, the internuncio’s 13-month wait was in vain and the 
Vatican did not see any positive response from Beijing. It was under these 
circumstances that the Vatican finally decided to embrace Taiwan. What 
was the reason behind that? Why did this reconciliatory gesture fail to obtain 
                                            
278 Louis Tsing-Sing Wei, Le Saint-Siège et la Chine (Paris : Editions A. Allais, 1968), p.221. 
279 Chen and Jiang, pp.250-251. 
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any cordial reply from Beijing? Did Beijing simply ignore Riberi’s prolonged 
stay in Hong Kong? The previous literature did not give us any answers. 
Beijing’s Evaluation of the Internuncio Riberi 
Fortunately, newly discovered material from the side of Beijing may help us 
to better understand Beijing’s attitude towards Riberi after his expulsion 
from mainland China. An internal document shows that the CCP paid close 
attention to Riberi’s activities in Hong Kong and evaluated his speeches 
about Beijing. This document 280 was a report issued by the Religious Affairs 
Office at the State Council and was distributed to local religious affairs 
bureaus on 4 Nov 1952. The title of the report is ‘The Imperialist Riberi’s 13-
month stay in Hong Kong and his reactionary activities’. In the opening 
paragraph, the author of document gave an overall evaluation of Riberi’s 
activities in Hong Kong: 
‘The Roman Curia’s internuncio to China during the reactionary rule of KMT, Riberi, 
was expelled out of Chinese territory by the Military Commission of Nanjing on 4 Sep 
1951. He arrived in Hong Kong on 8 Sep and stayed there for 13 months. In the end, 
he eventually embraced the Chiang Kai-shek’s bandit gang in Taiwan, assuming again 
the post of ‘ambassador’. During Riberi’s 13-month stay in Hong Kong, he organised 
many reactionary activities with intensified efforts – this is sound proof that he has 
been a lackey and an accomplice of American Imperialism and of the Chiang Kai-shek 
bandit gang ever since his arrival in China in Dec 1946. He sternly opposes the 
Chinese people’s liberation endeavours.’ 
Indeed, the above comments have answered a historical question, namely 
how Beijing saw the papal internuncio after his expulsion. As we can see, 
in Beijing’s opinion, the papal internuncio Riberi was defined as a villain, a 
counter-revolutionary and a staunch ally of the KMT regime and the US. 
Such a strong and negative claim prompts us to ask: why, after such a 
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prolonged wait in Hong Kong, had the papal internuncio earned a label 
of ‘counterrevolutionary’? Why had Beijing failed to sense even the slightest 
goodwill from Riberi? Let us see how the author of the document proceeded 
to evaluate Riberi’s deeds in Hong Kong.  
For conciseness and clarity, I arranged the main ideas of the author’s 
evaluation into chains of equivalence. The author had examined Riberi’s 
interaction with three groups of people, namely the expelled foreign 
missionaries in Hong Kong, Chinese Catholic refugees, and the laity in 
Hong Kong. In light of this, the chains of equivalence will be summarised 
according to these main political actors in the text. In constructing the 
chains, I have paid attention to retain the original wording of the text as much 
as possible. We shall start from the first chain: 
 
Chain 1 Overall evaluation 
Antonio Riberi = harbouring foreign agents and spies while organising activities 
against New China = using Hong Kong as a secret anti-revolutionary base and 
applying Truman’s ‘Point Four Program’ = recruiting youths and inciting Catholics 
to oppose the People’s Government 
This chain of equivalence was the basis for Riberi’s label of ‘counter-
revolutionary’. According to Beijing’s interpretation, Riberi’s stay in Hong 
Kong was characterised by his malicious activities against ‘New China’, the 
newly founded PRC. Riberi’s ‘counterrevolutionary activities’ were closely 
connected to the other three kinds of political actors in Hong Kong, namely 
the foreign missionaries expelled from mainland China, the 
Chinese ‘Catholic refugees’ in Hong Kong and the ordinary Catholics in 
Hong Kong. In Beijing’s eyes, Riberi was interacting with these actors 
and rallying them to oppose the People’s Republic. We shall see from the 
chains below how these actors were influenced by Riberi according to 
Beijing’s evaluation: 
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Chain 2: Expelled foreign missionaries in Hong Kong  
Imperialists in the Catholic Church = Spy groups under the cloak of Catholicism = 
those who arrived in Hong Kong and 'reported the conditions during their 
imprisonment in communist-controlled areas’ to Riberi = the ones who were 
received by Riberi and his assistants = the ones who use abusive language to 
describe the PRC national flag = over 2200 people up to 1952, the majority of whom 
left China of their own volition = including organisers of the Legion of Mary expelled 
from China = sent abroad by Riberi to form an espionage 
network encircling New China 
The term ‘imperialists’ was given to the expelled priests because the CPC 
regarded them as troublemakers and spies. The CCP noticed that they 
were warmly welcomed by the internuncio, who provided them with board 
and lodging in Hong Kong. Then the expelled priests would report their 
experiences in ‘communist prisons’ to Riberi. This reporting process may 
have had two meanings for Beijing. First, Beijing would regard these reports 
as a form of intelligence. After all, these priests were the last group of 
foreigners to leave ‘Communist China’ and the Vatican and the West could 
extract a good amount of intelligence from the expelled priests’ descriptions 
of ‘Communist China’. Second, perhaps more importantly, the expelled 
priests’ depiction of China could be used as propaganda against Beijing. 
For a regime that had a deep desire to be recognized and respected by 
international society, the expelled priests’ narrative of their torment in 
prisons would be a major blow to Beijing’s international reputation.  
What further angered Beijing was the expelled priests’ derogatory 
description of the ‘Five-star Red Flag’ of the PRC: 'Yellow stars encircled by 
red blood, does that mean that the Yellow Race will sink into the deep sea 
of blood in great turmoil?’ Moreover, they were in large numbers — over 
2200 expelled priests in Hong Kong would be a nuisance to Beijing. Here, 
the document stressed that the majority of expelled priests left China of their 
own free will, which could be interpreted as a hint that many of them could 
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have stayed longer in China had they been more friendly to the new regime. 
The last part of the chain pointed out the schedule of Riberi — that these 
expelled priests would be sent out of China and would continue to offer their 
expertise to harm the new regime in the international scene. Such was 
Beijing’s evaluation of the interaction between Riberi and the expelled 
foreign priests — what about the Chinese Catholics fleeing to Hong Kong? 
Let us see from the chain of equivalence below: 
 
Chain 3: Chinese Catholic refugees in Hong Kong  
Refugees = being visited by Riberi and Cardinal Spellman, the great American spy = 
gathering in Tiu Keng Leng and living in accommodation funded by Riberi = setting 
up new churches in Diamond Hill, Ngau Tau Kok, Ma On Shan = administered by an 
Italian priest, Fr. Crotti Amelio = baptized by and received confirmation from Riberi 
in great numbers  
In this chain of equivalence, Beijing evaluated Riberi’s influence on the 
Catholic refugee communities in Hong Kong. First, Beijing noticed that 
Riberi, accompanied by Cardinal Spellman, visited the Catholic refugees in 
Hong Kong.  Spellman was vehemently anti-communist and long 
considered by the CCP as an enemy. For Beijing, the joint visit of Riberi and 
Spellman to the Catholic refugees was a reflection of the Vatican’s alliance 
with the US. The Catholic refugee community was recruited by such an 
alliance to engage in anti-PRC activities.  
Second, the Catholic refugees largely gathered in the area of Tiu Keng 
Leng, which had deep political implications. Tiu Keng Leng (English name 
‘Rennie’s Mill') was an isolated neighbourhood in the suburb of Hong 
Kong. The area, nicknamed ‘Little Taiwan’, was famous for its large number 
of KMT sympathizers and widespread anti-communist sentiment — as most 
residents of Tiu Keng Leng were former KMT soldiers and their family 
members who had fled to Hong Kong. Thanks to this, Tiu Keng Leng 
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became an important base and 'service station' for the KMT agents who 
wished to infiltrate Mainland China. The document noticed that the Catholic 
refugees participated in the effort of ‘turning Tiu Keng Leng from a desolate 
hill into a base’. (Before the 1950s, Tiu Keng Leng, a desolate hillside area, 
was largely uninhabited. It was almost entirely developed by the KMT 
refugees) The fact that large numbers of Catholic refugees gathered and 
settled in Tiu Keng Leng was a clear signal to Beijing that these Catholics 
were mixing with the KMT sympathizers and agents and therefore serving 
the KMT cause. Moreover, they received funds from Riberi and the Vatican, 
which proved that the Holy See was also a backer of the KMT.  
Third, the Catholic refugees were quickly establishing new churches in other 
areas of Hong Kong. Beijing was not happy with that as these new churches 
might recruit more new members to oppose Beijing. Fourth, these Catholic 
refugees were administered by Fr. Crotti Amelio, an Italian priest expelled 
from Henan Province and now in charge of managing the Catholic refugees. 
The document quoted a comment from Fr. Amelio: 'These newly initiated 
Catholics from Northern China, having received the Holy Spirit, will act as 
brave soldiers of Christ. The bishops will inject them with a 'stimulant pack' 
from time to time and strengthen their ability to engage the enemies.’ The 
fact that an expelled foreign priest was leading the Chinese Catholic 
refugees would be regarded by Beijing as a further proof that the Vatican 
was trying to recruit them to oppose Beijing.  
Last but not least, Riberi presided at mass events during which large 
numbers of catechumens were baptized or given confirmation. During these 
events, the internuncio was reported to speak out against Beijing. 
According to the document, on 12 Oct 1951, Riberi said to the participants 
in a confirmation ceremony at Ma On Shan, Hong Kong: ‘You are refugees 
here. But do keep calm, as you will soon return to your home town happily 
— after the recovery of the mainland!  The term ‘attack and recover the 
mainland’ was a slogan frequently used in the KMT propaganda. In sum, 
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Riberi’s activities towards the Catholic refugees in Hong Kong led the 
document to conclude that the internuncio was building a 'counter-
revolutionary base' in Hong Kong. However, the document revealed more 
evidence to support the claim that Riberi was an ‘imperialist’, which will be 
shown in the chain of equivalence below: 
 
Chain 4: The Laity in Hong Kong 
Ordinary Catholic youth and laity = visited by Riberi in Catholic schools, encouraged 
by the internuncio = participating in activities of the Legion of Mary, praying for the 
persecuted Catholics in the mainland = several of whom were consecrated by Riberi, 
who Riberi encouraged to learn from the martyrs in the mainland 
The document reviewed Riberi’s interactions with the ordinary Catholic laity, 
especially the youth in Hong Kong. First, according to the document, Riberi 
visited two schools run by Catholic sisters in Hong Kong and encouraged 
students to 'learn from the sisters’ examples of self-sacrifice’. Second, the 
Legion of Mary, considered by the CPC as a ‘reactionary organisation’, was 
encouraged and expanded in Hong Kong by the internuncio. The document 
described an event of the Legion of Mary in Hong Kong on 30 March 
1952: ‘over 1000 members of the Legion of Mary carrying standards of the 
Legion and shouting: “My queen, my mother, we fully belong to you, all that 
we have indeed belongs to you.”’ Then Riberi addressed them, 
saying: ‘Today, let us again devote ourselves and the entire legion to Mary, 
the Queen of the Legion. Let us again take our oath of loyalty and pray to 
her. May she increase our strength, bless us and enable us to fight sins and 
the evil power for another year.’ Furthermore, the document remarked that 
Riberi had also led Catholics to ‘pray for the persecuted church in mainland 
China’. Third, Riberi consecrated many priests in person and encouraged 
them to ‘imitate the just examples of the fathers in the mainland, who laid 
down their lives for the righteous cause.’  Then the document quoted 
another comment from Riberi on 14 Sep 1952, when he attended a 
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memorial service for Bishop Francis Ford who died in the mainland during 
imprisonment:  
 
'The communists often say that they won’t allow Catholics to have the chance to 
become martyrs. However, they don’t know that martyrdom means “to bear 
witness” — to bear witness that Christ is the Lord and to die for bearing such 
witness. The martyrs are like this, and their blood is the seed of converts.’   
The document finally gave a conclusion about Riberi’s 13-month stay in 
Hong Kong:  
'In his 13-month stay in Hong Kong, Riberi was using Hong Kong as his base. Under 
the guidance of American imperialism, he continues to give orders and instructions, 
building a new reactionary fortress with his religious authority and economic power…. 
all these fully demonstrated his political attitude and his intention of 
organizing reactionary activities under the cloak of religion.' 
How Can this Document Inform Us? 
To conclude, from this document we can see clearly see Beijing’s attitude 
towards Riberi after his expulsion. Riberi’s prolonged stay in Hong Kong not 
only failed to improve Beijing’s view of him, but also further convinced 
Beijing that both the internuncio and the Vatican were allies of the KMT and 
the US. Therefore, it could be argued that the internuncio’s stay in Hong 
Kong did not have any positive diplomatic results for the Vatican — on the 
one hand, Taipei regarded Riberi’s unwillingness to come to Taiwan as a 
betrayal; on the other hand, Beijing considered Riberi’s activities in Hong 
Kong as attempts to create a ‘reactionary base’.  
Why so? The two regimes paid attention to different aspects of Riberi’s stay. 
Taipei worried about the internuncio’s long reluctance to visit Taiwan while 
Beijing cared about Riberi’s ability to subvert the communist government. 
On the part of Taipei, the regime's discomfort caused by Riberi’s stay in 
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Hong Kong was easy to understand. When the KMT regime’s international 
recognition was at serious stake, Riberi’s refusal to follow the KMT to 
Taiwan was irritating and could even be considered disloyal. Such a view 
was also echoed by Wei, who commented on Riberi’s deeds after the 
communist takeover of Mainland China: 'The first duty of a foreign 
ambassador is to follow, everywhere and always, the government to which 
he is accredited. In short, Riberi’s Hong Kong stay will surely hurt Taipei’s 
feelings.’ 281 
But why did this gesture also fail to please Beijing? It should be noted that 
Beijing interpreted Riberi’s activities from their details. In other words, the 
events organized by Riberi in Hong Kong (e.g. visiting schools, consecrating 
priests) were part of the normal activities in the Catholic Church — these 
events were not subversive per se, it was the details of these events that 
made them subversive. In other words, Beijing paid close attention to 
Riberi’s activities during these events and found them highly provocative.  
So why did Riberi do and say what he did? A possible explanation could be 
that Riberi personally disliked the communists so much and made no effort 
to conceal his feelings. Or perhaps the internuncio thought these speeches 
were private and insignificant enough to escape Beijing’s attention. 
Furthermore, the fact that Hong Kong was under British rule at that time 
may have given the internuncio a feeling that he was already ‘outside China’ 
and therefore free to speak, despite the fact that Beijing always 
regarded Hong Kong as still ‘inside China’. No matter what the reason was 
behind Riberi’s hostile speeches against Beijing, these details certainly 
antagonized Beijing and precluded any benign reading of Riberi’s activities 
in Hong Kong during his long stay.  
                                            
281 Translated from French by the author of this thesis. From: Wei, Le Saint-Siège et la Chine, 
p.221. 
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In sum, Riberi’s 13-month stay in Hong Kong could be considered another 
case of the Vatican’s clumsy diplomacy, the root of which was Rome’s 
ambivalence in its China policy. On the one hand, the Holy See deeply 
regretted the Church's severe setbacks in mainland China and tried to reach 
at least a truce with the new government in Beijing; on the other hand, Rome 
was burning with deep a hatred of communism and did not want to appear 
soft on a ‘communist regime’. From a discursive viewpoint, it could be 
argued that the Vatican was too entrenched in its old memories of 
converging with KMT regime’s discourse, to the extent that she was far from 
ready to face the new situation in China, namely the emergence of the CCP-
related new discourses — that of absolute sovereignty and anti-West 
nationalism.  
 
5.2 The CPC’s Deliberation on Catholic Policy (1952) 
 ‘Catholic Resistance’ as Described in Previous Literature 
After the expulsion of the papal internuncio and the Nunciature’s relocation 
to Taipei, Beijing and Rome exchanged an intense round of fire. In 1952, 
Pope Pius XII issued an apostolic letter Cupimus Imprimis which bitterly 
denounced Beijing’s expulsion of the internuncio and encouraged Catholics 
in China to stay loyal to the Roman Pontiff. Facing the Holy See’s 
denouncement, Beijing retorted with intensive publicity campaigns against 
the Vatican and further expulsions of foreign priests. Amidst the high tension 
between Beijing and Rome, the church’s situation in China became very 
difficult. Not only had the church lost a huge amount of assets and personnel 
in the clash between Beijing and Rome, she also faced mounting pressure 
from the PRC government. The period from 1952 to 1955 saw increased 
clashes between the PRC government and local churches and the arrests 
of prominent clergy leaders.  
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The previous literature tends to depict these years as a time period during 
which the church suffered but resisted heroically while facing the 
increasingly fierce waves of attacks from the PRC government. Mariani 
argues that the government’s strategy against the church during this period 
became more severe, and the strategy of mass arrests and expulsions 
replaced the previous strategy of targeted attack. 282  According to the 
narrative of previous authors, facing strong pressure from the government, 
Chinese Catholics did not compromise their stance and resisted the 
government’s efforts to build a schismatic church.  
Mariani paid special attention to the strong Catholic resistance in Shanghai 
during this period and argued that the PRC government’s effort of 
subjugating the church was defeated in Shanghai. According to his 
narrative, the communist defeat was marked by three events. The first event 
was the Catholics in Shanghai’s show of defiance during the 
commemoration events for Fr. Beda Chang. According to Mariani, Fr. Beda 
Chang was ‘the first Catholic martyr in Shanghai’ who died in a communist 
prison.283 Fr. Chang was a prominent church leader in Shanghai at the time. 
On 9 Aug 1951, he was suddenly arrested by the local police and was put 
in custody. Three months later, on 11 Nov, Fr. Chang died in prison. 
Regarding Fr. Chang’s death, the explanation given by the government is 
that he died of disease during imprisonment, but it was widely believed by 
local Catholics that his death was caused by torture. Catholics rallied to 
mourn Fr. Chang and to express their defiance of the government. The 
defiance shown by the local Catholics deeply embarrassed the government 
and the local authorities were compelled to launch propaganda articles on 
newspapers against the reputation of the demised Fr. Chang. However, 
                                            
282 Mariani, p.vii. 
283 Ibid., pp.87-91. 
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such propaganda was not very persuasive and local Catholics still 
considered Fr. Chang a martyr.  
The second event was the local government’s failure to dismantle the 
Legion of Mary in Shanghai.284 To be more specific, the communists tried 
every means to make the legionaries register with the government. But this 
effort was largely hindered by the Catholic priests and laity in Shanghai and 
the government failed to solicit large numbers of registration signatures as 
initially planned, let alone make the legionaries denounce the Legion of 
Mary. During the government’s campaign against the Legion of Mary, the 
youth members of the Legion showed great courage when facing pressure 
from the government. In sum, the persistence of the legionaries and the joint 
effort of the clergy became key factors in defeating the communists’ plan 
against the Legion. Mariani concluded that the Legion won their first battle 
and forced the government to abandon its initial policy against the Legion. 
The third event is that the government’s ‘thought reform’ attempt in Aurora 
University met a strong boycott and had to be abandoned. According to 
Mariani’s account, 285  the government organized intensive propaganda 
sessions in Aurora University in Shanghai. But the government’s 
propaganda efforts met staunch resistance from the Catholic clergy and 
students. The clergy, the parish priests and Catholic student leaders formed 
a united front to cope with the communists’ propaganda and indoctrination. 
Meanwhile, the priests in nearby parishes gave a series of sermons to 
strengthen the student’s Catholic faith and compete with communist 
propaganda. The Catholic Youth organization also acted as the backbone 
in the student resistance. With the joint effort of clergy and students, the 
                                            
284 Ibid., pp.91-94. 
285 Ibid., pp.100-106. 
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communist regime’s propaganda effort in the university was greatly 
hampered. 
In sum, the previous literature focused mainly on the suffering and 
resistance of Chinese Catholics in the face of the increasing pressure from 
Beijing. Both Myers 286 and Mariani report that resistance from Catholics 
had forced the PRC government to abandon some parts of their original 
plans against the church. Two arguments made by Mariani were worthy of 
attention here. First, Mariani claims that the CPC’s efforts to interfere with 
the church in Shanghai ‘had largely failed’. 287  In other words, the 
communist setback, especially in Shanghai, should be credited to the 
resistance efforts of local Catholics. Second, he implies that the communist 
goal in interfering with the local church was to create a schismatic church. 
288 I maintain that these two arguments need closer inspection.  
The first issue is how should we evaluate the alleged ‘communist defeat’ in 
Shanghai. Interestingly, according to archival evidences, even the 
communists themselves admitted that they ‘were defeated’ in Shanghai in 
their internal policy deliberation. (I will discuss this in detail in the next 
section). However, let us ask a question: would this ‘defeat’ have happened 
had the communists taken a harsher approach from the outset? 
Regarding the first question, we should bear in mind that one of the central 
arguments of Mariani’s book is that Beijing’s ultimate goal of Catholic policy 
was to ‘destroy the church’. Therefore, following this logic, the communist 
‘defeat’ in Shanghai would be regarded as their temporary defeat in their 
                                            
286 Myers, p.158.  
287 Mariani, p.109. 
288 Ibid. ‘The party also failed in its goal to transform Aurora into “the intellectual and 
administrative center of the schismatic church in all China.’ 
Ibid., p.134. ‘For the regime, a Catholic “schism” was a small price to pay for mastery over 
the Church.’  
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endeavour to wipe out the church. However, would the communists still be 
‘defeated’ had they taken the harshest measures against the church at the 
very beginning? In fact, from previous literature we can clearly see that the 
pro-Vatican high-ranking priests (among which there were many foreign 
missionaries) constituted the backbone of ‘Catholic resistance’. Once this 
backbone was broken, the ‘Catholic resistance’ would stop – this logic was 
well illustrated by the arrest of Bishop Kung and other prominent church 
leaders in Shanghai in 1955. Indeed, immediately after the arrest of these 
church leaders, the ‘resistance’ in Shanghai died down. Hence, the most 
effective way for Beijing to stop ‘Catholic resistance’ was the arrest of pro-
Vatican church leaders and the expulsion of all foreign priests. In other 
words, had Beijing applied its iron fist to the prominent church leaders earlier 
(say, in 1951), the ‘resistance’ in Shanghai from 1952 to 1955 would 
probably not have happened. So why did Beijing wait until 1955 to act? Is 
there any reason behind that?  
In fact, a closer look at Mariani’s account of these historical events would 
reveal that the clergy in Shanghai exerted great influence on the ‘Catholic 
resistance’ from 1952 to 1955. Based on Mariani’s account, it should be 
noticed that all the major defiance movements happened inside and around 
local Catholic chapels and churches. The priests were essential to these 
movements as they were the organizers of these church events. What they 
said and did during the events would have greatly affected local Catholics’ 
views of the government.  
For example, at the funeral mass for Fr. Beda Chang, ‘the priests celebrated 
the Mass of the Holy Cross with red vestments — the liturgical colour for 
martyrs’.289 By doing so, the clergy denied the government’s claim of ‘death 
from illness’ and conveyed a clear signal to local Catholics that ‘Fr. Chang 
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is a martyr’. In other words, the clergy’s decision to use the liturgical red 
colour defined Fr. Chang’s demise as an act of martyrdom, which effectively 
put the blame on the government and rallied local Catholics to mass 
defiance. In another case, namely the registration of the legionaries, we can 
also see the crucial role of clergy leadership. 
According to Mariani’s account we can see that actually it was the clergy 
who decided whether the legionaries should register with the 
government.290 Furthermore, in all these events in Shanghai we can see the 
heavy presence of foreign priests. They proactively participated in these 
events against the PRC government. According to Mariani, a Jesuit foreign 
missionary, Fernand Lacretelle, celebrated the Mass for Fr. Beda Chang.291 
In Aurora University, Fr. John Havas, a Hungarian Jesuit, imbued the 
students with a hatred of communism.292 In his sermons to students, Fr. 
Havas portrayed communism as the devil’s work and encouraged his 
students not to compromise with communism. In sum, from Mariani’s 
account we can see that the priests (local and foreign) were the leadership 
of this ‘Catholic resistance’ against the government.  
If Beijing was really a reckless ‘destroyer of the church’ as suggested by 
previous literature, why did it not arrest/expel all these church leaders 
immediately after the expulsion of the internuncio? I believe that Beijing’s 
unwillingness to mete out the iron fist against church leaders is worthy of 
careful study and discussion. In fact, based on my archival research, I argue 
that there was a constructivist process underlying Beijing’s deliberation on 
Catholic policy from 1952 to 1955. During this process, Beijing closely 
watched both the local churches in China and the Vatican, while adjusting 
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its policy according to its observations. Contrary to the view of ‘destroying 
the church’, I argue that Beijing’s initial aim for Catholic policy was to 
persuade and win over the clergy and turn the entire church into an active 
supporter of the government. However, due to the negative feedback from 
the church and Rome, Beijing’s patience was frustrated and it finally 
resorted to harsh methods to make the church silent. In the following 
sections I shall use archival evidence to support this argument.  
Lu Dingyi’s Speech on Catholic Policy  
In the study of international relations, figuring out a state’s ‘intention’ and 
‘thinking process’ is never an easy task. However, for research taking the 
constructivist approach, the discussion of a state’s ‘intention’ is inevitable. 
In most cases, this is a guessing process where the researcher needs to 
deduce a state’s intention from its observable deeds. Depending on the 
availability of sources and materials, such a ‘guess’ could sometimes be 
very inaccurate. Hence, the access to quality sources is essential to a 
constructivist study.  
The Sino-Vatican relations from 1952 to 1955 was not an easy case for a 
constructivist study due to the shortage of first-hand historical sources. The 
available sources are largely martyrdom accounts from the side of the 
Catholics and propaganda newspaper articles from the side of the PRC. 
Therefore, regarding the question ‘what was Beijing’s intention in its actions 
towards Rome?’ and ‘what was the rationale behind Beijing’s Catholic 
policy?’, previous research could only make a guess and deduce Beijing’s 
intention from its visible deeds. Hence, it is not strange that previous authors 
often draw a conclusion that Beijing aimed to destroy the church because 
the only material available to them was the martyrdom stories. The lack of 
‘insider’s accounts’ from the side of Beijing is always a major shortcoming 
of previous literature in English.  
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In this respect, it should be noticed that Mariani did make some 
breakthroughs in his book Church Militant – he managed to get access to 
the Shanghai Municipal Archive and used some of the CPC’s internal 
documents in his book. This effort should be praised. However, the 
government documents used by Mariani were, according to my point of 
view, too focused on the local level – the internal documents used by him 
were largely about the Shanghai local government’s coercive measures 
against the church and do not include any nation-wide policy guidelines. In 
fact, I argue that this lack of state-level policy guidelines constitutes a flaw 
in his data collection – the detailed internal plan and report about the 
municipal government’s attacks on the church could easily support Mariani’s 
view that Beijing was eradicating the church, but they actually tell us very 
little about Beijing’s rationale and ‘thinking process’ in carrying out these 
attacks.  
During my days in the Hunan Provincial Archive I discovered an important 
document issued by the central government of Beijing on 26 Dec 1952, 
which will certainly give us a rare insight into the ‘inner thinking process’ of 
Beijing regarding its Catholic policy. Indeed, this document was certainly 
one of my most valuable discoveries in my research trip as it answers many 
historical questions. The document 293  was a transcript of Lu Dingyi’s 
speech on Catholic policy during a conference held by the PRC central 
government on religious policy. At the time of issue, this document was 
classified as ‘top secret’. Lu Dingyi was a high-ranking official of the CPC 
and the head of the Publicity Department of the Communist Party of China 
at the time. After this conference, Lu’s long speech was transcribed and 
sent to the local bureaus of religious affairs all over China as essential policy 
instructions.  
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In the speech, Lu gave a comprehensive evaluation of the situation of the 
Catholic Church in China and the results of government policy. This thesis 
will analyse his speech and summarize the main ideas into chains of 
equivalence. It is hoped that the analysis in this section could provide 
answers to the following questions: (1) What was Beijing’s aim in its religious 
policy? (2) What was Beijing’s attitude towards ordinary priests, bishops and 
foreign missionaries? (3) Was Beijing interested in creating a schismatic 
church? 
Textual analysis 
Thanks to its ‘top secret’ nature, Lu’s speech on Catholic policy was 
strikingly different from open material on the side of PRC – he was 
straightforward and unreserved when talking about the central 
government’s goal in religious policy and was very open and honest about 
the setbacks met by the government in dealing with the church. In the 
opening chapter, Lu provided an overall evaluation of the central 
government’s Catholic policy of the previous two years. I have summarised 
his evaluation into the following chain of equivalence, in which his original 
wording was preserved as much as possible: 
Chain 1: Overall evaluation 
The works on the Catholic Church = based on three instructions and some 
supplements from the central government = obtained some results after 2 years of 
struggle = cracked a hole in the copper and iron wall of the Catholic Church = 
significantly reduced the number of imperialists in the church = obtained limited 
achievements but not consolidated, defeated in some areas 
Lu Dingyi gave a brief review of the ‘three instructions and supplements’ on 
Catholic policy from Beijing. According to Lu’s review, Beijing issued three 
major instructions on religious policy, the first two were on both Catholicism 
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and Protestantism while the third was dedicated to Catholic policy. Their 
main content, in Lu’s original words, were as follows: 
 
Instructions on July 1950: 'Help the Catholic Church and Protestant Churches 
develop, but oppose the imperialist influence on them.' 
Instructions on Mar, 1951: ‘Organize anti-imperialist patriotic movements within the 
Catholic Church and Protestant churches.' 
Instructions on Jun, 1951: ‘Paying attention to the difference between Catholicism 
and Protestantism, organize the people to expel the imperialists.' 
Supplements: ‘for example, the prohibition on the Legion of Mary.' 
Lu reiterated that these instructions were ‘still valid’. He explained how these 
instructions had developed over the previous two years. According to Lu, 
the instructions on July 1950 guaranteed the protection of religious freedom 
and warned that ‘administrative measures used in an oversimplified and 
hasty manner’ could not solve religious issues. The July 1950 instructions 
also called for a ‘patriotic education’ for believers. During such education, 
‘the focus should be on patriotism while a dispute between materialism and 
idealism should be avoided in order to avoid offending the religious feelings 
of believers’.  
Lu then pointed out that the ‘Wang Liangzuo Manifesto’ (i.e. the Manifesto 
on Independence and Reform) changed the situation and ‘cracked a hole in 
the copper and iron wall of the Catholic Church’. According to Lu, after Fr. 
Wang’s manifesto, the imperialists 'launched an all-out counter-attack’. It 
was in such a situation that Beijing issued the March 1951 instructions. This 
piece of instruction conveyed Beijing’s decision to initiate ‘anti-imperialist 
patriotic movements’ inside the Catholic Church and Protestant churches. 
Several months later, Beijing issued another piece of instruction in June 
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1951, and the focus of work was switched to ‘expelling the imperialists’. Lu 
mentioned that Beijing had also issued supplements on Catholic policy, 
however he only mentioned the content of one supplement, namely ‘the 
prohibition of the Legion of Mary’.  
Interestingly, Lu also admitted that the government’s Catholic policy was 
‘defeated in some areas’, in other words, the aims of the government were 
not achieved in these areas. In saying this, Lu was referring to Shanghai. Lu 
depicted the Catholic Church as ‘a hardened wall made of copper and iron’, 
which expression showed his appreciation of the church’s resilience and 
defensive capability. Here Lu made an interesting comment on the ‘fighting 
style’ of the Catholic Church: ‘If you say that the Protestant churches are 
playing Tai Chi with us, then the Catholic Church is engaging us head-on 
with the Shao Lin Martial Arts.’ 294 According to Lu, the Catholic resilience 
came from their strict discipline and, unlike Protestant churches in China, 
‘there are no internal helpers (for us) within it’.  
Regarding ‘internal helpers’, Lu took Wu Yaozong, the most prominent 
advocate of the ‘three-self’ movement in the Protestant churches, as an 
example and pointed out that there is no such friend of the Chinese 
government in the Catholic Church. Although the two-years of ‘Catholic 
work’ had already broken a hole in this 'hardened wall', Lu still thought that 
the government’s Catholic policy had not achieved the results that had been 
expected. The reason, as Lu put it, was that the party 'did not give enough 
incentive to the people and did not win over enough members of the high-
ranking clergy.’  He thought that this policy weakness made the 
government-sanctioned ‘reforms’ in the Catholic Church precarious. To be 
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prefers head-on clashes with the opponent.   
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more specific, under the government’s urging, the church may show 
willingness to reform for a short time, but before long the church would 
recede — Lu gave the example of Tianjin, in which previously there were 
15,000 Catholics who had signed petitions for church reform, but where now 
only 200 Catholics remained active participants. Lu commented that this 
precarious situation was worsened by the church in Shanghai: ‘The counter-
attack from the Shanghai church sent its shockwaves all over China, and it 
seemed that the situation in Nanjing could not carry on until next 
February.’ Considering the importance of the church in Shanghai, Lu gave 
an order that ‘the fortress of the Shanghai Catholic Church must be 
captured.’ 
However, Lu also recognized the achievements of the last previous 2 years. 
He remarked that the number of ‘imperialists’ inside the church had been 
significantly reduced — their number dropped from 5500 to around 800. So 
what was Beijing’s notion of these ‘imperialists’? Lu’s description could be 
summarized into the chain of equivalence below: 
Chain 2: Imperialists 
The imperialists inside the Catholic Church = accounting for 50% of foreign expats 
in China = will not leave China unless expelled = gaining struggle experience from 
Eastern Europe = still having the ability to counter-attack though their capability was 
reduced = unevenly distributed in different parts of China = using Shanghai as a 
fortress = using ‘deprivation of religious authority’ as a counter-attack weapon  
The first remark of Lu was about the ‘imperialists’’ willingness to stay in 
China. According to Lu, half of the expats in China at that time 
were ‘imperialists’, which referred to the foreign clergy that were deemed as 
hostile to the government. Lu reminded the cadres that these clergymen 
had already drawn much experience from Eastern Europe, where many 
communist states had already been established prior to the PRC. Regarding 
the capability of these foreign clergy, Lu thought that they were still able 
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to launch major attacks on the new regime despite the fact that many of 
them had already been expelled. Lu also commented on their distribution in 
China. As he put it, the majority of ‘imperialists' in Southwest China had 
already been expelled; but a few ‘imperialists’ remained in the north and 
north-west. In East and South China, the expulsion work was largely 
unfinished and in Shanghai and Guangzhou the ‘imperialists’ still had 
strongholds. Lu again pointed out that Shanghai was the bulwark 
of ‘imperialists’ and the victory in relation to 'Catholic work' could only be 
reached after the fall of this bulwark. Lu thought that the most powerful 
weapon used by the foreign clergy (and certainly the Vatican) was their 
ability to deprive Chinese clergy of their religious authority.  
Such was Lu’s view of the ‘imperialists’. Now let us see his opinion of other 
important political actors, namely the Chinese laity and the bishops.  In the 
first place, Lu evaluated the laity of the Chinese Catholic Church, and his 
view is summarized into a chain of equivalence below: 
Chain 3: the laity 
Ordinary Catholics (the laity) = only 10% participated in the ‘reform’ = whose 
religious freedom should be protected = who should undergo patriotic education = 
to which not enough encouragement was given = still going to hear masses said by 
reactionary priests 
In Lu’s evaluation, the ordinary Catholics were also cold to the government-
sanctioned ‘reform’. Only 10% of them showed some interest, and, as Lu 
put it, that was already 'the most positive estimation’. Lu thought that the 
main reason for their lack of interest in the ‘reform’ was that the government 
was not giving them enough incentive and patriotic education. But, Lu 
reminded, in educating them, the officials should be careful not to offend 
their religious feelings by ‘discussing idealism and materialism’. Lu also 
noticed that ordinary Catholics shunned the ‘reformed priests’ and still went 
to hear Mass said by pro-Vatican priests. Next, Lu started to examine the 
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Chinese clergy, who were essential to the government’s Catholic policy. His 
main idea on bishops could be summarized into the chain of equivalence 
below: 
Chain 4: Bishops 
Bishops = (among whom) 25 reformed bishops and the vicar general, none of whom 
was approved by Rome = none of the bishops bearing rings participated in the 
reform = retaining closer ties with the imperialists and are more reactionary = 
holding idealist thoughts and a completely wrong view of history = extremely loyal 
to Rome = however the ones that we must win over = not to be imprisoned unless 
they are active criminals  
This chain of equivalence reflected Lu’s evaluation of the bishops — despite 
the government’s efforts, virtually none of the Rome-approved bishops 
supported the ‘reform’ advocated by the government. Lu mentioned 
that there were only 25 bishops who were willing to cooperate with 
the government, but they were without Roman approval. Lu argued that the 
reason for their loyalty towards Rome lay in their ties with foreign clergy and 
their ‘wrong view’ of history. But, as Lu put it, the communists had to win 
over these bishops no matter how ‘reactionary’ they were. And extreme 
caution should be taken not to arrest the bishops. Lu warned about the 
danger of bishops being imprisoned: ‘Catching a tiger is easy, but releasing 
it will be hard.’ To be more specific, Lu instructed that the bishops should 
not be arrested unless they were ‘active criminals’ but did not specify which 
'crimes' should be punished. Instead of imprisonment, Lu advised that the 
bishops should be closely watched and thought that supervision could deter 
the bishops from anti-government activities: ‘We will see how far they can 
go under supervision.’ For the Roman-approved bishops, Lu again ordered 
sternly that ‘you must seek central approval before arresting any Roman-
approved bishop.’ 
We can discern from Lu's evaluation that Beijing was very disappointed with 
the bishops' attitude towards the government and the government-
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sanctioned 'reform'. Their antipathy towards the government and profound 
loyalty towards Rome deeply worried Beijing. However, no matter how 
unsatisfactory these bishops were, Beijing fully understood the importance 
of bishops and considered them essential to the government’s Catholic of  
getting their support. Interestingly, from Lu’s speech we can see that the 
Rome-approved bishops were also highly valued by Beijing. To be more 
specific, Lu’s comment on bishops showed Beijing’ ambivalence towards 
the Vatican and papal authority. On the one hand, in open publicity 
campaign Beijing accused the Vatican and the Pope of being lackeys of 
imperialism; on the other hand, Beijing secretly appreciated the value of the 
papal mandate and deeply regretted the fact that all of the pro-
Beijing ‘reformers’ were without the papal mandate and there were no 
Roman-approved bishops who were willing to support the government’s 
cause. 
Interestingly, Lu even suggested a re-interpretation of Catholic Canon 
Law: ‘Up to now, we still do not understand which clauses in Canon Law 
could be used as our weapons.’ However, this suggestion of reinterpretation 
actually reflected Beijing’s tacit recognition of the validity and effectiveness 
of Canon Law. In sum, Beijing was unhappy with the hostility shown by the 
Roman-sanctioned bishops but still wanted to rally them to the 
government’s cause, preferably by persuasive means including 
reinterpretation of Canon Law.  
Beside the bishops, Lu also examined the ordinary priests. His evaluation 
could be summarized into the chain of equivalence below: 
Chain 5: Ordinary priests 
Fathers = 69 participated in the reform, less than 3% of the total number = being very 
different from the bishops = living difficult lives following land reform = needed to 
receive sponsorship from the government, via the ‘reform organizations’ = being 
backward in thought and dreaming about ‘the change of weather’ = having 'only 
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Rome' (to rely upon) = should be listed according to their respective political stance 
and be won over accordingly 
The first thing noticeable from this chain of equivalence is that Lu was also 
unhappy with the participation rate of local priests in the ‘reform’. According 
to Lu, only 69 priests were willing to participate in the government-
sanctioned ‘reform’. Compared with the 2600 (the total number of local 
priests at that time according to Lu), the ‘reformed’ Chinese fathers were 
highly marginal. But Lu thought that they were ‘very different from the 
bishops’ and was confident in being able to recruit them to the government’s 
cause. A pressing problem, as Lu put it, was that the Chinese priests were 
living a difficult life after land reform, during which the church property was 
widely confiscated and many priests in the rural area was labelled as 
‘landowners’ and underwent harsh treatment. Lu thought their hard life was 
a major impediment for them in supporting the government. Hence he 
instructed the cadres to give financial handouts to the priests via the 
government-sanctioned ‘reform organizations’. Besides hardship in living, 
Lu thought that the other reason preventing the priests from cooperating 
with the government was that they were harbouring the dream of a ‘change 
of weather’, (bian tian) an indirect term used to denote a future KMT re-
capture of the Chinese mainland. Regarding how to win over the priests, Lu 
instructed that the local officials should study each priest’s political view, 
categorise them into groups, and try to win over each individual with tailored 
strategies.  
Here we can discern that Beijing was more confident in converting the local 
priests to the government’s cause for several reasons: first, the number of 
priests was certainly larger than that of the bishops. And the priests’ self-
understanding was more varied than that of the bishops, which means that 
Beijing would more easily find somebody benign towards the government 
among the local priests with careful studies of the individual political stances 
of the priests; second, Beijing thought that by improving their life standard 
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with sponsorships, the priests’ hostility would be softened and they would 
be more grateful towards the government; third, the stabilization of Beijing’s 
control over the mainland would dispel the priests’ dream of a KMT re-
conquest and therefore would make them submit to Beijing’s rule. All these 
factors made Beijing believe that the priests were more malleable than the 
bishops. As a conclusion to his evaluation of the Chinese clergy, Lu pointed 
out that the church should be retained in China instead of being destroyed: 
‘If we do not win over the bishops and the fathers, that will be equal to 
eliminating the Catholic Church.' 
After evaluating the political actors in the Chinese Catholic Church, Lu 
Dingyi started to examine the ongoing ‘reform movement’. His overall 
evaluation of the ‘reform movement’ can be summarized into the chain of 
equivalence below: 
Chain 6: Reform movement 
Reform committees = 53 reliable ones (only 1/4 dioceses) = 11 fake ones = greatly 
affected by the counter-attacks from Shanghai, the situation in Nanjing was 
precarious = at first with great enthusiasm, but later gradually declines = proposal 
to build a national committee was too early = distant from the people 
Lu was equally unsatisfied with the ongoing ‘reform movement’. According 
to him, there were only 53 dioceses (25% dioceses) in China that had 
‘reliable reform committees’, namely those trusted by the government. 
Interestingly, as Lu put it, there were another 11 ‘fake reform committees’ in 
other dioceses, which means that the government was still suspicious of 
their true loyalty. Due to the low reliability of the ‘reform committees’, they 
(especially the one in Nanjing) were fragile against the counter-attack from 
pro-Vatican bishops and priests. Under government pressure they might 
show enthusiasm as a kind of façade, but when such pressure eased, the 
superficial enthusiasm would also fade. Lu thought that in such a situation 
there was no point in creating a nation-wide committee, as it was ‘too early’.  
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Here, Lu reiterated that before creating any 'national reform committee’, 
three prerequisites needed to be reached: (1) reliable reform committees 
should be established in most dioceses of China; (2) the ‘reactionaries’ 
should be shunned by the people; (3) over half of the priests should support 
the patriotic movement; (3) a significant number of bishops should support 
the movement. These instructions clearly showed that Beijing set very high 
criteria for the timing of setting up a national ‘patriotic church’, the core 
element of which was winning the support of the majority of both clergy and 
laity. Moreover, Lu paid attention to how local Catholics shunned the ‘reform 
committees’ and their negative attitude toward these organizations. He 
reported: ‘some believers call the reform committees “committee of arrests”, 
“police station” and “brothel’”.’ The reason, as he put it, was that 
the ‘reform committees’ were 'distant from the people’ and the local 
officials failed to ‘win over the backward believers’. In other words, Lu 
clearly defined the communist setback in Catholic policy as a failure to win 
over believers instead of a failure to mete out harsh punishments.  
Up to that point, Lu had already given a comprehensive evaluation of 
the different political actors and the effectiveness of the government’s 
Catholic policy. He then started to give orders on the 
guidelines and measures towards the church in the following years. The 
main idea of his orders could be summarized into the chain of equivalence 
below: 
Chain 7: Guidelines and measures 
guidelines and measures = (for the cadres) stop underestimating enemies, a more 
balanced approach = (towards the laity) the correct name and slogan; leadership of 
committees = (towards the imperialists) hit hard politically, refusing foreign funding, 
but avoid xenophobia = (towards the clergy) patiently win them over, education, 
sponsorship = (towards church properties) dealing with caution, changing and 
utilizing the seminaries  
 218 
Lu prescribed specific strategies in dealing with the Catholic Church. First, 
he asked the cadres not to underestimate the resilience of ‘enemies’ in the 
church. Instead, Lu called for a more balanced approach — an approach 
that was neither too ‘leftist’ (radical) nor ‘rightist’ (conservative). To be more 
specific, Lu thought that ‘we are too ‘rightist’ on the issue of anti-imperialism 
and patriotism ... but overly “leftist” on the issue of protecting religious 
freedom.’ In other words, Lu argued that more strong measures should be 
meted out against the ‘imperialists’ while avoiding overly radical measures 
against the religious activities of ordinary Catholics. 
Second, when talking about strategies towards the laity, Lu advised that the 
local officials should be clear about the correct name and slogan to use in 
pushing forward the ‘reform movement’. Lu noticed that, at that time, 
different names were used by local officials to denote the ‘reform 
movement’. Some used the name ‘Three-self patriotic movement’ and 
others used ‘independent reform movement’. Lu pointed out that these 
names, derived from similar movements in the Protestant churches in 
China, were unsuitable for the Catholic Church because believers will think 
that ‘to become independent is to be separated from Rome’ and that ‘the 
ones separated from Rome cannot go to heaven’.  
The solution, as Lu put it, was to use the name ‘patriotic movement’ instead 
of ‘three-self reform’ or ‘independent reform’. The advantage of doing this, 
Lu argued, was that the question of ‘whether the church 
was separating from Rome’ could be avoided. Moreover, ‘nobody could 
oppose the call to patriotism, even the most stubborn elements cannot 
oppose it.’ However, regarding the dioceses where the wording ‘three-
self’ or ‘independent’ were already in use, Lu ordered that their current 
names should be kept to avoid the confusion that ‘the reform is wrong’.  
Furthermore, Lu criticized several slogans used in the movement. 
Regarding the slogan ‘striving for religious authority’, Lu said: ‘This slogan 
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was a bad example. We, the communists, do not want religious 
authority!’ He then gave two more ‘bad' examples:  
‘The slogan "striving for financial power" was also very inappropriate. Also, do not 
say “raising two flags, one is a patriotic flag, the other a religious flag.” We do not want 
to raise any religious flag nor do we want to lead crusades. Say “love the country and 
religion” instead of ‘first love the country and then love religion. I repeat: just “love the 
country and religion” and “encourage patriotism of the clergy”.’  
Lu also instructed that the leadership of the ‘reform committees’ should be 
given to the laity, not the clergy because ‘the laity would be more determined 
to oppose imperialism and they do not have the problem of ‘being deprived 
of religious authority’.  
Third, regarding the ‘imperialists’, Lu argued that they should be attacked 
politically, not religiously. Regarding ‘counter-attacks’ from foreign clergy, 
Lu instructed that the local officials must fight back. Regarding donations 
from abroad, Lu ordered that ‘foreign money’ given to the Chinese Church 
should be refused and to ‘leave no space for the imperialists’. In this 
process, Lu reminded the officials that the people’s struggle against 
imperialism was essential. “Even if the government has to come forth, it 
should not be regarded as a replacement (of the people’s struggle)”. Hence, 
as Lu put it, 'exhibitions, witnesses and material evidence, study sessions' 
were all good ways to encourage the people. To facilitate the movement, Lu 
suggested that local officials could help Catholics find jobs and improve their 
living standards during the process. Regarding foreign priests, Lu ordered 
the cadres to ‘make a point of retaining some better, harmless ones in 
China.’ Lu remarked that ‘It is necessary to provide for them lest we give a 
xenophobic impression to the world.’ 
Fourth, regarding the clergy, Lu reminded the officials that patience was 
important. To win them over, Lu instructed that local government should 
provide for them and respect their social status. Furthermore, the officials 
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should carefully listen to the advice from the priests and take the correct 
advice. Lu noticed that the priests in the large cities had no problems in 
being self-sufficient, however, the living standards of the rural priests were 
significantly worse. Lu pointed out that ‘funding them is possible now 
because the financial situation (of the PRC) is improving…. the local officials 
should propose funding plans and send them to the central government.’  
Fifth, on church property, Lu ordered that a gradual, cautious 
strategy should be adopted. First, part of the properties confiscated by 
the government before should be given back to the church. Many churches 
should be reopened to convince Catholics that ‘the reformed church was 
better than before’. Lu thought that the core strategy was to transform and 
utilize the seminaries. ‘We should bear in mind that seminaries are 
the “party academies” owned by the Catholic Church,’ Lu pointed out, ‘if we 
do not utilize them, there would be no priests in the future. We should 
encourage patriotic ones to enter, preferably the large seminaries.’ And 
when dealing with the properties owned by seminaries, Lu admonished that 
caution should be taken not to take them over in haste, which may ‘become 
a burden’. 
At the end of the speech, regarding the prospect of Catholic policy, Lu was 
very confident and contended that the communists would finally gain the 
upper hand — ‘They have only Rome. But we have power, a government, 
the people, the economy and experience. We can close the door and strike 
the imperialists and reactionaries, just like “catching a turtle in an urn”.’ 
What Does this Speech Tell Us? 
Due to the document’s internal nature, Lu Dingyi’s comment on and criticism 
of the ‘Catholic work’ of the local officials of the last two years was open and 
unreserved. This thesis argues that this document can answer several 
questions about Sino-Vatican relations of this period: 
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First, the document showed that ‘to destroy the church’ was not the aim of 
Beijing’s religious policy. Up to this point, the Chinese government was still 
applying its staple ‘United Front’ strategy to the Catholic Church, which 
means the government still wished to win over as many friends in the church 
as possible. In contrast to the popular and oversimplified belief that the PRC 
government was simply seeking the elimination of the Catholic Church, the 
guideline prescribed by Lu Dingyi reflected that the government was 
unwilling to crack down on the church with sheer state power. In other 
words, Beijing was still trying to transform the church to be an active 
supporter of the government. And to this end, persuasive means was 
always preferred than coercive and punitive means.  
Second, from Lu Dingyi’s evaluation of the Catholic hierarchy, we can 
discern that Beijing had a clear understanding of the bishops’ (especially 
high-ranking bishops) leadership in the church. Knowing that most bishops 
were staunchly pro-Vatican, Beijing still instructed the local officials 
that ‘winning them over is indispensable’. And Beijing regarded 'the support 
from over half of the bishops’ as a prerequisite for establishing a 
national ‘reformed committee’. (A high aim, indeed. But it showed that 
Beijing thought that a national ‘patriotic church’ with popular support could 
only be established when half of the bishops supported the government’s 
cause). 
Third, this document reveals that, though highly disappointed by the foreign 
clergy, the regime still hoped to find some friendly priests among them and 
keep some non-threatening foreign missionaries in China. The thesis 
argues that the instruction to retain some foreign priests could be 
considered as Beijing’s genuine wish as there was no need for propaganda 
in such a strictly internal document. This revelation is, indeed, very different 
from the popular image of the regime of Beijing as an unrelenting persecutor 
of foreign priests. It was in accordance with Beijing’s ‘winning-over’ strategy 
and explains why it took such a long time for most of the foreign Catholic 
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priests to leave China — the government was still attempting to convert 
some of them to the government’s cause before losing all hope in them and 
expelling them out of China.  
Fourth, from Lu’s comment we can discern that at that time Beijing was not 
interested in creating a church doctrinally different from the worldwide 
Catholic Church. Lu criticized the local cadres who gave any religious 
significance to the government-sanctioned ‘reform movement’ and 
reiterated that the Communist Party has no intention to act as a religious 
leader, nor lead any religious ‘crusade’. In other words, Beijing tried to avoid 
the impression that the government was leading any ‘reformation’ or 
doctrinal revolution, and wanted Chinese Catholics to believe that the 
officially-sanctioned church was still genuinely Catholic.  
To conclude, Lu Dingyi’s speech, as a comprehensive and authoritative 
guideline of the government’s Catholic policy in the late 1952, called for a 
via media approach towards the Catholic Church and argued that Catholics 
(especially the bishops) should be won over while arrests and imprisonment 
should be regarded only as the last resort. In evaluating this document, we 
should not forget that Lu’s speech was made after the expulsion of the papal 
internuncio and an intense round of exchanging fire with the Vatican. With 
the strong tension and enmity between Beijing and Rome, Lu still called on 
the local cadres to stick to a cautious approach and exercise restraint in 
applying Catholic policy. Hence, taking this guideline into consideration, 
now we can understand better why there was a ‘communist defeat’ in 
Shanghai. In fact, the main reason for this ‘defeat’ was not because of the 
strength of Catholic resistance, but due to the government’s unwillingness 
to use an iron fist against the high-ranking clergymen. Even amid great 
tension, Beijing still did not abandon its hope of winning some supporters 
among high-ranking clergy, which even includes foreign missionaries. It was 
only in late 1955 that Beijing gave up the hope of ‘winning over’ the church 
leadership in Shanghai and ordered its arrest. And in the next section I shall 
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discuss what could have contributed to Beijing’s abandonment of the 
cautious approach as suggested by Lu Dingyi. 
 
5.3 “Year of Mary”: How did a Religious Message 
Become Political? (1954) 
In the last section I examined Beijing’s internal deliberation on Catholic 
policy and discussed the relationship between Beijing’s via media policy and 
the ‘communist defeat’ in Shanghai. However, as we can see from the 
subsequent history, the relationship between Beijing and Rome, between 
the government and the local churches, gradually became more intense. In 
late 1955, Beijing finally lost patience and ordered the arrests of the pro-
Vatican church leadership in Shanghai. Hence, it is worth asking: what 
happened in the interaction between Beijing and Rome before 1955, to the 
extent that Beijing was led to believe that harsher measures should be used 
against the church?  
This, again, is not an easy question to answer because there were virtually 
no open communications (including exchanges of fire) that occurred 
between Beijing and Rome over the course of two years. From an 
interactional perspective, this period could be considered as ‘silent’ as there 
were no observable deeds between Beijing and Rome. Hence, previous 
literature has largely omitted the interaction between Beijing and Rome 
during this period. However, the lack of observable deeds between states 
does not mean that no interaction happened between them. Indeed, in my 
archival research, I found that during these two years, Beijing had been 
carefully observing the Vatican and the local churches in China and 
adjusted its policy according to newly perceived situations. I argue that 
these observations were crucial to the making of Catholic policy by Beijing 
and scholarly attention should be given to them. 
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In the following part I am going to examine the Vatican’s call for a ‘Year of 
Mary’ and Beijing’s reaction to this papal message. I shall use archival 
evidence to illustrate Beijing’s observations of Rome during the ‘Year of 
Mary’ and the government’s evaluation of the local church’s situation. It is 
hoped that by doing so, I can fill a gap in previous literature and shed light 
on the question of ‘what led Beijing to abandon its previous via media 
approach’.  
The Year of Mary and Fulgens Corona: Background 
On 8 Sep 1953, Pope Pius XII issued the encyclical Fulgens Corona, which 
consecrated the year 1954 as ‘the Year of Mary’ — the first such year in the 
history of the Catholic Church. It would be helpful to give an overview of the 
encyclical’s main content here. 295 The message of the encyclical was 
largely religious as it focused on the theological development of Marian 
dogmas and their significance for Catholic spiritual life. Firstly, the Pope 
recalled his predecessor, Pius IX’s ex cathedra definition of Mary’s 
Immaculate Conception in 1854. Then he recollected Mary’s apparition to a 
little girl and the miracles a century ago which occurred at the grotto of 
Lourdes, France, four years after Pius IX’s definition. 296 The Pope 
considered this apparition as a special sign from the Virgin Mary herself 
confirming the dogma — according to the Pope’s narrative, the Virgin Mary 
                                            
295  Pope Pius XII, ‘Fulgens Corona’, [The Official Website of the Holy See] 
<http://w2.vatican.va/content/pius-xii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-
xii_enc_08091953_fulgens-corona.html> [accessed 15 Sep 2016]. 
296 The apparition and miracles of the Virgin Mary were reported to have happened in the 
year of 1858, in a grotto near Lourdes, a small mountainside town in south-western 
France. A poor 14-year old girl, Bernadette Soubirous, saw a vision of a young lady in the 
grotto. From February the lady appeared to Bernadette another seventeen times. After 
Bernadette revealed her experience to her parents and other people, her successive visits to 
the grotto attracted wide attention and many spectators. During the Marian apparitions at 
Lourdes, many reports of miracles appeared in that area. Despite initial scepticism, the 
Catholic Church soon accepted Bernadette’s report of a Marian apparition as genuine.  
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spoke to the little girl: ‘Immaculata Conceptio ego sum’ (I am the Immaculate 
Conception). The Pope further argued that the Marian miracles at Lourdes 
proved that Catholicism was the only religion sanctioned by God.  
The Pope then dedicated considerable effort in explaining to readers that 
the dogma of Mary’s Immaculate Conception, despite being defined ex 
cathedra by a Pope only a century ago, has deep roots in the writings of the 
early church fathers and prominent saints and theologians. He then 
addressed a possible challenge from non-Catholic Christians and argued 
that veneration of the Virgin Mary does not reduce Christ’s role as the sole 
saviour. Afterwards, the Pope mentioned his own ex cathedra definition of 
Mary’s Assumption, namely ‘that the Mother of God was assumed body and 
soul into Heaven’. He pointed out that the definition of this dogma was ‘by 
the supreme magisterium of the church’ and satisfied the faithful’s ‘ardent 
hope’. The Pope reminded the readers of the close relationship between the 
dogma of Assumption and that of the Immaculate Conception and argued 
that the two dogmas could complement each other. Subsequently, the Pope 
proceeded to discuss the evils in the world at that time and argued that the 
root of all these evils was abandonment of belief in God. He warned that the 
loss of Christian faith would lead to ‘hatred, envy, discord and rivalries’ 
among people and to the disruption of social order. To avoid this situation, 
the Pope argued, Christian morality must be made to flourish again. Hence, 
he invited Catholics to apply Christian principles to actual life by celebrating 
the Marian Year. The rest of encyclical was dedicated to guidelines for 
organizing events and the encouragement of pilgrimages. At the end of the 
encyclical, the Pope offered his prayers for young people and elders, the 
church’s difficulties, the future unity of the church, and world peace. He 
concluded the letter with his apostolic benediction.  
From the main topics of Fulgens Corona, it could be argued that the 
message of this papal encyclical was not political as it was dedicated to 
theological discussions and religious exhortations on the theme of Marian 
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veneration. And it is understandable that there has been almost no 
academic attention paid to this encyclical’s significance for Sino-Vatican 
relations — indeed, this encyclical did not even mention China. However, 
archival records show that the Chinese government paid close attention to 
this papal encyclical and devised plans to deal with its impact. An analysis 
of it will enable us to see how Beijing read the religious and political 
messages from the papal encyclical, to perceive the impact of the papal 
encyclical on the Chinese church and to understand Beijing’s true feelings 
about Rome at the time.  
 
The ‘Year of Mary’ in the Eyes of PRC Government:  Beijing’s 
Interpretation of Fulgens Corona 
On 26 Feb 1954, the Office of Religious Affairs, Committee of Culture and 
Education, Government Administration Council of the Central People's 
Government 297 issued a classified circular 298 to the local religious bureaus 
regarding the papal encyclical on the Marian year. At the beginning of the 
circular, the author provided an overall evaluation of the Pope’s recent 
deeds: 
Chain 1: The Pope’s recent deeds 
The Pope = issued an encyclical and proclaimed the year 1954 as the Year of Mary = 
demanded that the worldwide 400 million Catholics celebrate = authorized the local 
bishops to grant indulgences in the Marian Year = reiterated the dogma of the 
Immaculate Conception and the apparition of Mary at Lourdes, France.  
It is clear from this chain of equivalence that the PRC government paid 
                                            
297 The Government Administration Council was the highest executive organ of the PRC 
in its first five years.  
298 Hunan Provincial Archive, 221-1-138. 
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attention to all the main religious messages in the papal encyclical. This 
chain of equivalence reflected the government’s perception of the 
relationship between three political actors, namely the Pope, the Catholics 
and the bishops. According to the wording of the document, the Pope is the 
issuer of the encyclical, has the power to proclaim the Marian year and to 
demand a universal celebration by Catholics. Furthermore, the document 
realized that the Pope has the authority to define church dogmas (e.g. the 
Immaculate Conception) and has the power to authorize bishops to 
distribute indulgences.  
It is worthy of notice here that the document paid attention to all these 
aspects of papal power but did not try to challenge him in those same 
aspects. Instead, the focus of the document was on the side of interpretation 
and precaution. In other words, the point of focus was not whether the Pope 
had the power and authority as the leader of world Catholicism but what the 
implications of his religious calls would be for the Chinese Church. In other 
words, the government tacitly admitted that the Pope had the capability of 
religiously influencing Chinese Catholics, but instead of banning 
Catholicism in China, the state would strive to limit and reduce the effects 
of the papal influence that were detrimental to the regime. Regarding the 
Pope's call for a Marian Year, the regime tacitly acknowledged the fact that 
the Pope has strong influence over worldwide Catholics, including Chinese 
Catholics. The regime did not want to contest the Vatican over religious 
leadership (for example setting up a rival pope or banning Catholicism 
entirely), but chose to evaluate the negative impact on the regime of the 
Marian Year activities and to devise plans to neutralise the dangers. 
Hence, Beijing’s interpretation of the papal message of the Marian Year 
would be essential to the regime’s policymaking. Now let us see how the 
regime interpreted the religious message in Fulgens Corona. The chain of 
equivalence below summarizes the document’s opinion of the reports of 
Marian apparitions: 
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Chain 2: Marian apparitions 
The apparitions of Mary = not coming by coincidence, but as the tool of the 
expansion of imperialism = being used by the Pope and the clergy to incite Catholics 
to reactionary activities = encouraging anti-communist crusades = fabricated by 
Catholics (under the clergy’s encouragement) = promoting fake peace, expanding 
religious influence and concealing their reactionary nature  
We can discern from the above chain of equivalence that the PRC 
government did not hold a positive view of the claims of Marian apparitions. 
The apparitions of Mary, in the eyes of the regime, were closely connected 
with the expansion of imperialism and reactionary activities. Why did Beijing 
come to such a conclusion? How did the apparitions of Mary, which was 
supposed to be purely religious, get a political meaning in the minds of PRC 
officials? The same document explained the reason for such an 
interpretation.  
First, the document argued that in the 20th century Catholicism cooperated 
closely with imperialism and for this reason was called ‘the best century for 
evangelization’. Furthermore, as the document puts it, ‘in this century, the 
Roman Pope and his clergy often use Mary’s apparitions to incite Catholics 
to reactionary activities at critical junctions, especially during the time 
between the First and the Second World War.’  
Second, the document pointed out that the messages of the Marian 
apparitions were highly hostile towards communism. The document paid 
special attention to the Marian apparition at Fatima and argued that the 
purpose of this apparition was to help imperialism attack the Soviet Union. 
The document then quoted two slogans related to the Marian apparitions at 
Fatima (‘Cracking the serpent’s head’ and ‘the Consecration of Russia’) and 
concluded that they were strengthening the power of anti-communist 
crusades. The document then mentioned the establishment of the Legion of 
Mary in 1921 under papal approval and pointed out that the legion was ‘a 
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community of knights aiming at defending the Holy Mother’ and its purpose 
was to ‘organize all kinds of reactionary activities around the world’.  
Third, the document argued that the Virgin Mary was close to the US Army 
— ‘No matter where the US soldiers went, the Holy Mother was usually 
there, cooperating with them and giving apparitions.’ To prove this, the 
document listed two cases of alleged Marian apparitions in the year 1948: 
the first one was at Lipa, in the Philippines, and the second one was in 
Czechoslovakia. The document reported that in the Czechoslovakian 
apparition, Mary was said to ’stand on the top of a tank surrounded by 
American soldiers and waving the American flag in her hand’. This 
description was regarded by the document as fabricated by Catholics under 
the encouragement of the clergy. Furthermore, the document also regarded 
the alleged ‘weeping statue’ at Lublin Cathedral, Poland, as an example of 
an ‘anti-people movement’ by the church. Though the document did not 
explain why the appearance of the ‘weeping statue’ in Poland was 
reactionary, it was clear that mass pilgrimages following the alleged miracle 
attracted Beijing’s attention and were considered a potential challenge to 
the regime’s stability. The fact that the church can amass a great number of 
people to a certain cause seemed a threat to Beijing, as it was an 
unpredictable force in society. After reviewing all these connotations of 
Marian Apparitions, the document concluded that the Pope’s promotion of 
Our Lady of Lourdes, despite its pacifist claim, was reactionary in its core 
and had malicious intentions towards China.  
After reviewing the Pope’s call for the Year of Mary, the document started 
to examine the reaction of the church in China. How would the papal 
encyclical affect the Chinese Catholic Church? The main opinion of the 
document could be summarized into the chain of equivalence below: 
Chain 3: The Church in China 
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(The Chinese Church) = secretly receiving booklets from Hong Kong containing the 
encyclical = re-publishing the encyclical verbatim by Kung Pin-mei, the Bishop of 
Shanghai, under the command of Riberi = issuing a circular written by Kung on the 
Year of Mary = organizing veneration activities and pilgrimages 
The first thing we can discern from this chain of equivalence is that, despite 
the harsher political environment, the papal encyclical could still reach 
Chinese Catholics at that time and was circulated all over China. In sending 
the papal message to the mainland dioceses, the diocese of Hong Kong 
undertook a major responsibility by printing encyclical booklets and sending 
them to mainland dioceses in a secretive manner. Second, the church in 
Shanghai and Bishop Kung gained prominence throughout the entire 
Chinese church. According to the document, Kung reprinted the entire papal 
encyclical and sent it to his diocese. Moreover, Kung also wrote a circular, 
which was sent to dioceses all over China, from Fushun (in Northeast China) 
to Guangzhou (in South China) and was read as important guidance.  
Third, the church faithfully followed the papal instructions by organizing 
Marian venerations and pilgrimages. According to the document, Catholic 
churches all over China organized various events to celebrate the Year of 
Mary, including:  
(1) the opening ceremonies of the Marian Year according to the stipulation of the Vatican 
(on 8 Dec 1953)  
(2) Penance sacraments, reciting of rosaries and prayers for sinners, especially for young 
people. 
(3) Mass veneration of the Virgin Mary  
(4) Organizing rosary recitations in front of statues of Mary from morning to night.  
The document viewed these activities in a negative light and 
paid special attention to Bishop Kung’s circular on the Year of Mary. 
According to the document, Kung made several appeals to Catholics, 
including: 
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(1) defining the ‘general guideline for the laity’ as ‘attaining heaven as the ultimate purpose 
of life’ and arguing that such a guideline can protect laity from errors and from going astray  
(2) Echoing the exhortation of Mary: ‘Penance, penance, penance’ and warning 
that ‘without penance all will perish’  
(3) a call to ‘demonstrate our faith’. ‘Faith is our glory, our comfort and reliance.’  
However, the document regarded all these appeals as subversive. 
According to the author’s evaluation, firstly, the call for ‘heaven as the 
ultimate purpose of life’ was considered contradictory to the Socialist 
General Guidelines. Secondly, the Marian exhortation and the warning 
of ‘penance or perish’ was regarded as a measure to control the Chinese 
clergy and a threat to the ‘patriotic movement’. Thirdly, Bishop Kung’s call 
to faith was regarded as a ‘mind-controlling’ strategy with the purpose of 
utilizing believers to organize reactionary activities.  
In fact, if we read from this document alone we may find that the accusations 
towards Bishop Kung’s appeals seemed arbitrary. Kung’s call to 
make ‘attaining heaven the ultimate purpose’ is an ordinary religious 
exhortation and could hardly be called political. The only thing that could be 
considered suspicious was the name Bishop Kung gave to his exhortation 
— ’the general guideline for the laity’. This was, indeed, an imitation of the 
popular political slogan at that time: ’the general guideline for the transitory 
period’.299 This similarity may make the officials think that the ‘Catholic 
general guideline’ was trying to lead the believers away from its socialist 
counterpart. But that accusation could still be considered too harsh –after 
all, Bishop Kung’s message did not directly challenge the government rule, 
at least not at first glance. Similarly, government officials held an equally 
negative view of Kung’s other appeals to Catholics and considered them as 
                                            
299 The term ‘transitory period’ was put forward by the CPC in 1953 to denote the period 
where China would be transferred from the stage of ‘New Democracy’ to the stage of 
‘Socialism’. Hence, the CPC’s open expression of its vision during this period was called 
‘the general guidelines for the transitory period’. 
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subversive. Why did they think so? In fact, the official’s comments on Kung’s 
circular cannot be viewed on their own, we need to look back at the 
papal encyclical Fulgens Corona.    
A Glance Back at Fulgens Corona 
To gain a better insight into the PRC government’s negative view on Kung’s 
circular, we need to look again at the encyclical Fulgens Corona. In fact, 
Kung’s circular was not an isolated text, but a response to the papal 
exhortations in the encyclical. In a similar manner, the government officials’ 
evaluation of Kung’s circular was also based on their understanding of 
Fulgens Corona – why, and how did the religious messages in this 
encyclical gain political meaning? This thesis will try to provide an answer 
with the analysis below. 
My textual analysis was based on the version provided by the Vatican at its 
official website.300 The English version of the encyclical was subdivided 
officially into 48 paragraphs. I argue that the contents of paragraph 1-24 are 
mainly theological and distant from secular politics. But from paragraph 25, 
the focus of the encyclical suddenly switched to the secular world. The Pope 
started to denounce the evils of this world and the church’s tribulations 
under secular governments. Indeed, the way in which the Pope elaborated 
on secular evils is worthy of our attention.  
In paragraph 24, the Pope mentioned the Virgin Mary’s suffering and 
praised her virtue of obeying God. Mary’s words at the Marriage at Cana 
were quoted as an exemplar of faith: ‘Whatsoever He shall say to you, do 
ye’ (John 2:5) This absolute compliance with God’s will, argued the Pope, 
                                            
300  Pope Pius XII, ‘Fulgens Corona’, [The Official Website of the Holy See] 
<http://w2.vatican.va/content/pius-xii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-
xii_enc_08091953_fulgens-corona.html> [accessed 15 Sep 2016]. 
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was also crucial to Catholic life today. So what was the situation of ‘today’? 
The Pope argued that the situation was dire as ‘men are harshly and 
violently afflicted and peoples and notions straitened’ (Paragraph 25). The 
root of such a dire situation was, as the Pope put it, that people had forsaken 
God. From here, the Pope described the evils in the world and the church’s 
sufferings in this world. While doing so, he also contrasted the evil and 
tribulation with Catholic moral teaching and suggested prayer as the remedy 
for evil. Here, this thesis would like to summarize the Pope’s teaching 
(thesis) and the evil he described (antithesis) into chains of equivalence. 
Chain of equivalence ‘Christian faith’: 
Christian faith (paragraph 26) = The fountain of living water (25) = Way, the truth and 
the life (25) = Holy religion, Divine Majesty (27) = hope and expectation of eternal 
reward (27) = remedy for such great evils coming from a higher source (28) = 
establishing justice and charity among the classes (29) = can be productive only 
when actually put into practice (30) 
Antithesis ‘the evils' 
the evils (25) = harshly and violently afflicting men and peoples (25) = originating 
from the forsaking of God (25) = trying to root out the Christian Faith (26) = the so-
called ‘glory of this progressive and enlightened age’ (26) = fallacious doctrines, by 
which men will covet their neighbour’s goods (27) = provoking hatred among classes 
and the shedding of blood (29)  
From paragraph 25 to 30, the Pope described the characteristics of the 
Christian faith and the evils of this world and put the two forces in stark 
contrast to each other. According to the Pope, the Christian faith, namely 
faith in God and Christ is the fountain of living water, the truth and the 
life. ‘Holy religion’ has the right to define good and evil and religion is 
the foundation of laws and public authority. The Pope also pointed out that 
an essential component of Catholic belief is ‘hope and expectation of eternal 
reward’. By contrast, the evil power, seeking to harm and persecute 
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people, originates from rejecting God. The Pope warned that such evil 
power was rooting out Christian faith from believers ‘by cunning and secret 
snares’. He sarcastically pointed out that in preaching errors, the evil powers 
‘wantonly boast, as if they were to be considered the glory of this 
progressive and enlightened age’. According to the Pope, if people follow 
the evil power’s fallacious doctrines, they will covet 
their neighbours’ properties and attempt to grab them by violence. Under 
this evil power, hatred between different social classes will become rampant 
and there will be no more public order. To rectify such evil, the Pope argued, 
Christian morals must be promoted and the power from a higher source 
must be invoked. He pointed out that the Catholic religion could promote 
harmony and establish justice between the upper and lower classes. As a 
conclusion, the Pope reminded the reader, that Catholic belief can only be 
fruitful when it was put into practice — celebrating the Year of Mary was one 
of the best ways to practise it.  
Now the Pope had described the features of the evil power and promoted 
Christian belief as the way to tackle it. So what was the papal advice on 
practicing Catholic belief in real life? The encyclical gave two instructions, 
namely engage in Marian Year activities and offer ardent 
prayers. The details of these two instructions could be summarized below: 
MARIAN YEAR ACTIVITIES AS SUGGESTED BY THE POPE:  
(Paragraph 31) Appropriate sermons in each diocese for the purpose of the Marian 
Year 
(32) The Faithful should go to a local Marian sanctuary/altar to venerate the Virgin 
Mary 
(33-34) Catholics should be encouraged to make pilgrimages to famous Marian 
shrines (e.g. Rome, Lourdes) 
PRAYERS: 
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(35) that the faithful can live their lives according to Christian Commandments 
(36) that young people can grow up pure and unblemished 
(37-38) elders 'shine by their Christian probity and fortitude' and 'rejoice over the 
fruits of a well-spent life'. 
(39) that the hungry, the oppressed, the exiled, the imprisoned and those separated 
by hatred can get justice, comfort and reconciliation. 
(40) the church throughout the world may be allowed to enjoy freedom 
(41-42) for the persecuted pastors, the civil liberty of the church 
(43) divine consolation for the leaders of persecuted Christian communities 
(44) church unity and the realization of ‘one fold and one shepherd' 
(46) men be united in friendly agreement under the patronage of the Virgin Mary 
In Fulgens Corona, we can see how a supposedly neutral religious 
message was correlated, in a subtle manner, to secular politics. The Pope, 
as the leader of the worldwide Catholic Church, issued an encyclical to 
promote Marian veneration — an action intended to be religious rather than 
political. However, in the description of Christian virtues, the Pope 
constructed a chain of equivalence to highlight the important values of the 
Christian faith. But he chose to build his narrative by contrasting the virtues 
with the opposite ‘evils’. Therefore, a chain of difference was formed and 
was closely interwoven with the original chain of equivalence (Christian 
faith).  
Although the encyclical never mentioned the word ‘communism’, let 
alone ‘China’, the Pope’s description of ‘evils’  led readers to think of 
communism — ‘forsaking of God’ alluded to atheist ideology; 
and ‘coveting neighbours’ goods’ hints at the socialist common ownership 
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programs. Hence, the encyclical combined loyalty to the church with anti-
communist sentiment while mixing Marian veneration with a boycott of 
secular policies of those governments that were led by communist parties.  
Now, looking again at Bishop Kung’s circular, we can easily discern its 
intertextual relationship with the papal encyclical and the reason why the 
government was discomforted by his circular. Kung’s appeal to 
make ‘attaining heaven the ultimate purpose’ was an echo of the Pope’s 
definition of Christian faith — always having hope and expectation of eternal 
reward. If the antithesis of ‘hope of eternal reward’ was defined as where 
people ‘vehemently covet their neighbour’s goods, and even take them by 
force as often as occasion or opportunity is given’. (para. 27 Fulgens 
Corona) Then it would be easier to understand why the government took 
Kung’s call to make ‘attaining heaven the ultimate purpose’ as a challenge 
to the Socialist General Guidelines. The reference to the anti-communist 
chain of difference in Fulgens Corona had imposed anti-communist political 
meanings on Kung’s religious message. Although Fulgens Corona also 
called for peace and reconciliation, these calls are far weaker than its anti-
communist message and were unlikely to make any positive contribution to 
the relationship between the Holy See and the governments ruled by 
communists. Hence document 221-1-138 used derogative words to 
comment on the papal encyclical: ‘(The Pope is) promoting the Holy Mother 
of Lourdes to fake peace and to cover his reactionary face’. 
  
The Church in Hunan Province and the Year of Mary 
From the document issued by Beijing we can see that despite the 
displeasure of the PRC government, the papal encyclical, together with 
Bishop Kung’s circular, reached dioceses all over China. How would 
the encyclical affect the religious life of local churches in China? How did 
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the local churches react to the papal encyclical and how did the local 
governments deal with them? And how would these local events affect 
Sino-Vatican relations?  These questions were left unanswered by previous 
scholarly works because of the lack of trustable sources. 
In the context of the Cold War, it was hard to get faithful information from 
mainland China, let alone the details of religious life of Catholic churches in 
the hinterland of China. The former scholarly works on this period largely 
depend on news reports from Hong Kong (e.g. Kung Kao Po, the newspaper 
owned by the Diocese of Hong Kong), and the narratives and memoirs of 
expelled priests and Catholic refugees. But these sources were prone 
to inaccuracy and subject to personal biases. Hence, besides the stories 
of ‘persecution’, and of the ‘tribulations in communist prisons’, can we know 
more about how the local priests organized religious life following the papal 
encyclical and how the government reacted to them? Faithful accounts of 
these events were not recorded by Western sources and it is also unlikely 
that we could find them in open newspapers published in the PRC at that 
time. Hence, in the following part I will disclose and analyse an internal 
document containing a record of church activities in Hunan Province in 
1954, the Marian Year.  
This document is an internal report 301 issued to the local government 
organs and offices of religious affairs by the provincial government 
regarding the situation of the ‘Year of Mary’ in Hunan and also secretive 
religious activities. The date of the document is 29 Jun 1954. This document 
can be considered as a local response to the circular 221-1-138 issued by 
the central government, which I have just discussed. Issued several months 
after the central government circular, this report is a faithful record of the 
government’s concern over the local church’s response to the encyclical 
                                            
301 Hunan Provincial Archive, 221-1-334. 
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and the strategies devised by the officials. From it we can discern how 
Rome’s encyclical could affect local religious life and politics even in the 
remotest regions of China.  
The report started with an evaluation of ‘reactionary activities’. Let us see 
this chain of equivalence: 
Chain 1: the reactionaries 
(the reactionaries in Hunan) = receiving booklets of the papal encyclical from Hong 
Kong = using miracle claims to incite reformed believers to quit the reform = 
organizing grand masses and dispensing ‘holy water’ = hinting that the reformers 
cannot go to heaven = fabricating news about our grain policy = sabotaging the 
Socialist General Guidelines = Declaring May as the ‘Month of the Holy Mother’ and 
secretively recruiting participants = sending letters to Shanghai and 
organizing pilgrimages to Sheshan 
Here, from the local officials’ eyes, we can see how the Hunan clergy 
reacted to the papal encyclical. First, the document pointed out the clergy’s 
source of information about the Marian Year: ‘After the Roman Pontiff 
issued the encyclical, the Kung Kao Po302 in Hong Kong immediately printed 
it in booklets and secretively sent them to the mainland. Kun Pin-mei, the 
Bishop of Shanghai, translated the encyclical into Chinese and sent it to all 
areas under the direction of Riberi.’ Hence, the document attributed the 
reason for Marian veneration activities to foreign interference. Second, the 
document noticed that miracle reports of Mary became widespread in the 
local Catholic community during the Year of Mary. According to the 
document, reports of Marian apparitions outside China were widely 
circulated in Catholic communities in Hunan and were endorsed 
by the clergy.  
                                            
302 Kung Kao Po is the official newspaper of the Diocese of Hong Kong. 
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The document also noted that local Catholics may have helped to transfer 
letters from foreign missionaries to the local church concerning Marian 
apparitions: ‘A stubborn believer in Changsha surnamed Liu circulated 
photos among Catholics showing a weeping statue of Mary, photos which 
were sent by Fr. Gabriele Allegra from Hong Kong, and transferred via Fr. 
Francis Tan at Guangzhou.’ The document recounted the miracle narrative 
among local Catholics: ‘Many Catholics recovered from illnesses because 
of the weeping statue in Sicily. The blind opened their eyes, the deaf heard, 
the paralyzed walked again and the dead were resurrected.’ According to 
the document, the ‘reactionaries’ tried to use these miracle narratives to 
incite ‘reformed Catholics’ to quit the ‘reform’.  
Furthermore, as the document put it, the Bishop of Hengyang, Joseph Wan 
Tsu-Chang, endorsed these miracle accounts and organised ‘grand 
masses’ for them. The scale of these masses, according to the document, 
was very large. For example, on 18 Apr, three masses were held at three 
churches in the city of Hengyang, and 1300 Catholics attended these 
masses. The document noticed that a priest said in his sermon: ‘God is the 
master of all things. He is the chairman of Chairman Mao.’  
Third, the document noticed that the clergy were warning the pro-
government Catholics that betraying the church will forfeit their salvation in 
heaven. For example, a local priest, Father Qian Qinghe, told the laity 
that ‘the current world is covered by a heap of dark clouds. We should not 
be confused by temptations from the devil. Instead we should stand firm in 
our stance of sacred virtue.’ In the meantime, the Bishop of Hengyang was 
reported to admonish the faithful: ‘Jesus’ disciple Judas sold Jesus, and his 
end was to hang himself.’ While warning the traitors they could not go to 
heaven, the bishop also pointed out that they still had the option of penance. 
This was interpreted by the document as an attempt to coerce the pro-
government Catholics to quit and boycott the ‘reform movement’ sponsored 
by the government.   
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Fourth, the document noted that priests were making negative comments 
about government policies. For example, a priest said: ‘In Xixiang there are 
many people eating grass as food and many people do not even have rice 
for cooking porridge.’ This comment was embarrassing to the government 
and was considered by the document as an open attack on 
the government’s grain policy. Fifth, the document also recorded Fr. Qian 
Qinghe’s speech and interpreted it as sabotaging the Socialist General 
Guidelines: ‘The Holy Mother is like a compass and beacon shining upon 
us. On the battlefield, the best weapons to vanquish the enemy are a 
cannon and a machine gun. For us faithful, in order to vanquish the devil, 
we must pay more respect to the church and our Holy Mother.’  
Sixth, the document expressed concern about the Hunan church’s decision 
to proclaim 1st May as a feast day for the Virgin Mary. Indeed, the church’s 
choice of 1st May angered the government as the same day was also 
declared an important celebration day in the PRC — the Workers' Day. The 
church’s decision to organise masses on 1st May was considered by the 
officials as deliberately competing with the Workers’ Day March organized 
by the government. The document also recorded how the officials fought 
back: ‘Having obtained intelligence beforehand, we instructed the security 
squads in residential areas to systematically organize the people to 
participate in the mass meeting of the Workers’ Day. As a result, only around 
200 Catholics attended the masses organized by three churches in 
Hengyang, most of them are disabled, elders, women and 
children.’ Seventh, the document paid attention to the church’s attempt to 
organize pilgrimages to Shanghai and noticed that a number of Catholics 
had already started to make pilgrimages to Sheshan, Shanghai, one of the 
most renowned Marian shrines in China.  
Facing this situation, the document gives several instructions about the 
handling of the Marian Year activities of the church in Hunan. Contingency 
plans were devised to deal with all kinds of Year of Mary activities, which 
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can be summarized into the chain of equivalence below: 
Chain 2: Contingency plans 
(contingency plans) = advising the clergymen not to lead pilgrimages = using the 
hukou (household registration) and unit leave system to forestall pilgrimages = 
educating and persuading the laity instead of ‘fighting head-on’ with them = limiting 
proselytizing activities outside churches = strengthening the investigation of 
secretive proselytizing by the church and their internal situation  
The above chain shows that the officials deemed that the clergy were 
central to the organization of Marian Year pilgrimages. In their mind, there 
would be no mass pilgrimages if the clergy did not encourage and organize 
them. Hence, the officials dealing with religious affairs were instructed 
to ‘advise’ the clergy to refrain from organizing pilgrimages. The claimed 
rationale against these pilgrimages, according to the document, 
was ‘negative effects on agriculture production’. In dealing with the 
clergy, persuasion was preferred, but if the clergy were indifferent 
to persuasion, a warning would be given to them:  'those persisting in 
organizing pilgrimages should be summoned and given a warning. 
Admonish them and clarify that the organizers of pilgrimages should take 
responsibility for all the negative outcomes of pilgrimages.’  
The document also instructed that administrative measures could be used 
to prevent pilgrimages. Here we see the mention of two important 
mechanisms, namely the Hukou system and the unit leave system. The first 
one, Hukou, was the household registration system implemented by the 
PRC government. The Hukou documents, which made a distinction 
between a ‘rural household’ and an ‘urban household’, functioned as a kind 
of ‘internal passport’ which strictly limited migration within China, especially 
that from rural areas to cities. The second one, the unit leave system, 
reflected the nature of the command economy in the PRC at that time. In 
such a command economy, almost all companies, factories, farms and 
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organizations were controlled by the state and under close supervision. All 
these state-controlled entities were called ‘units’ and every PRC citizen was 
supposed to belong to at least one of these ‘units’. Hence, by granting or 
denying leave to individual unit members, the state could exert 
effective control of society. The same certainly applied to Hunan — 
by refusing to grant leave to Catholics working in different ‘units’, the local 
government could effectively forestall any mass pilgrimages. The document 
then reiterated that officials should use persuasive and educative ways to 
deal with local Catholics and warned that 'fighting head-on like a bull with 
them would only make a mess.’ Regarding expansion of the church, the 
document thought the key issue was to keep proselytizing activities under 
control. Namely, proselytizing should be confined within church buildings 
and the government should keep an eye on the content of internal 
preaching. At the end of the document, officials were instructed that any 
new information on pilgrimages and secretive proselytizing should be 
reported to the provincial government in time ‘to facilitate investigation and 
response’.  
 
What Can We Learn from the Texts? 
In the above parts I have provided a detailed analysis of the papal 
encyclical Fulgens Corona and Beijing’s observation of and reaction to it. 
The first point to be noticed is that these internal documents clearly 
illustrated the source of Beijing's fear. This fear came from two aspects, 
namely the Vatican's formidable influence in the Chinese church and the 
limited effect of the 'winning over' policy in the previous two years. 	
First, we can see how the Vatican can exert a huge influence on the church 
in China despite the expulsion of foreign missionaries and the papal 
internuncio. The papal encyclical was quickly printed into booklets and was 
sent to the Chinese mainland via Hong Kong. Without significant difficulties, 
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it reached dioceses all over China and was widely read by the local clergy. 
From this fact we can deduce that the communicative channel between 
Rome and local churches in China was not blocked at that time — not only 
the encyclical, but also letters from missionaries outside mainland China 
and the Marian miracle reports from other countries could reach the 
grassroots level of the church. This situation should not be attributed solely 
to the Vatican's efficiency in sending messages to mainland China, but also 
to the PRC government’s policy focus. Indeed, we can still see the influence 
of Lu Dingyi’s guidelines here – despite being unhappy with the messages 
sent to the Chinese Church by Rome, Beijing did not put much focus on 
cutting off the message channel between the Vatican and the Chinese 
Church, instead, the focus was still on winning over the church to patriotism.  
Second, two years after Lu Dingyi’s speech, Beijing’s ‘winning over’ policy 
still did not have much desired effect on the clergy. Distrust still prevailed 
between the local governments and the clergy. From the report on the 
situation in Hunan we can see that the local priests were still preaching 
against the government-sanctioned ‘patriotic movement’ and hinted that the 
salvation of those who participated in the movement would be forfeited. On 
the other hand, the government also looked at the priests with suspicion. 
The priest’s comment about Chairman Mao and the mention of an alleged 
famine in rural areas were interpreted politically and were regarded as 
expressions of defiance. The government also worried about the priests’ 
action of organising mass pilgrimages and regarded these activities as 
potentially subversive.  
Briefly, these things show that Beijing’s ‘winning over’ policy did not achieve 
a good result among the local clergy and the priests’ attitude towards the 
government was still less than friendly. By contrast, the government officials 
could have been surprised by how swiftly the Chinese local clergy 
responded to papal calls. Indeed, not only did the papal messages reach 
Hunan (a province in central China which is over 1000km from the Chinese 
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border) in no time, but the local clergy also tried their best to carry out the 
papal exhortations faithfully and organized various Marian Year activities 
according to the instructions of the encyclical. As we can see from the 
internal documents, most of the suggested activities in Fulgens Corona 
were duly carried out in the Chinese Church, even in the hinterland villages 
of Hunan.  That clearly shows that the centrality of the Pope in the Chinese 
Church did not decrease despite Beijing’s publicity campaigns against the 
Vatican.  
Indeed, from the internal documents we can discern that the church 
leadership in Shanghai was still hugely influential in the entire Chinese 
Church. The circular issued by Bishop Kung was widely read by Catholics 
in Hunan Province (far from Shanghai) and the local church in Hunan made 
efforts to contact Kung. This prominence of church leadership in Shanghai 
was duly noted by the government and Bishop Kung’s deeds were singled 
out in the internal documents. It can be discerned from the document that 
the government still tried to apply Lu Dingyi’s guidelines and reiterated the 
idea that persuasive means were always preferred over violent ones and 
that officials should do their best to avoid fighting head-on with the Catholic 
laity. However, Beijing seemed less patient with the clergy leaders in 
Shanghai as the evaluation of Bishop Kung in the internal documents 
became highly negative. This was a sign that Beijing was losing hope in 
rallying Bishop Kung and other high-ranking clergymen in Shanghai to the 
government’s cause. In fact, less than one year after the ‘Year of Mary’, the 
government finally took harsh actions towards the church leaders in 
Shanghai and Bishop Kung was arrested on 8 Sep 1955. 
On the other hand, these documents also showed that Beijing's reading of 
Fulgens Corona and the 'Year of Mary' was overly politicised and did not 
take the larger religious context into consideration. Despite the fact that 
Fulgens Corona was not a papal document dedicated to China affairs, in 
Beijing's understanding, the Vatican's call for Marian veneration and the 
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entire 'Year of Mary' were no more than an anti-communist crusade and 
were the evidence of the Vatican's alliance with the US and the Western 
imperialism. In the light of this, can we say that Beijing's evaluation of 
Fulgens Corona and ‘Marian Year’ was fully justified? Regarding this 
question, it would be helpful for us to have a glance at the church's own 
interpretation of Fulgens Corona. 
Not long after the issue of Fulgens Corona, Giuseppe Filograssi S.J., a 
prestigious Catholic theologian, published a detailed analysis of the papal 
encyclical.303 In his paper, Filograssi considered Fulgens Corona as the 
continuation of the Mariological discussion of previous papal texts, namely 
Ineffabilis Deus (Pius IX, 1854) and Ad Diem Illum (Pius X, 1904). Filograssi 
also pointed out that the Pope's defence of Marian dogmas in the encyclical 
was well-supported by church traditions and the Bible. Interestingly, as an 
authoritative analysis of Fulgens Corona of that time, Filograssi's paper did 
not mention at all the potential anti-communist meanings in the encyclical. 
Apart from Filograssi's theological analysis, on 4 Jan 1954, the Apostolic 
Delegate to the United States, Amleto Cicognani, made a speech 304 during 
the annual convention of the Mariological Society of America, in which he 
expressed his understanding of the papal encyclical and the 'Year of Mary'. 
According to Cigognani, Fulgens Corona was the Pope's effort to confirm 
the Marian dogmas and encourage worldwide devotion to Mary. Similar to 
Filograssi, Cicognani did not touch upon the 'evils' mentioned by Pius XII. 
From these examples we can see that the contemporary Catholic readings 
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of Fulgens Corona focused entirely on the theological aspect of the 
encyclical and did not regard the Pope's depiction of 'evils' as important. 
Therefore, if one inspects Beijing’s claim in comparison with the church’s 
own interpretation, one would discover that Beijing may have exaggerated 
the 'threat' of the papal message and the call for Marian veneration. To be 
more specific, when evaluating Fulgens Corona and the Pope's call for the 
Marian Year, the officials did not care about the religious background of the 
encyclical while sparing no effort to 'dig out' political significance from the 
papal calls and connect Marian veneration with ‘reactionary activities’. It 
could be argued that Pius XII's depiction of 'evils' in his encyclical reflected 
the Pope's personal anti-communist sentiment and provided Beijing with a 
basis for suspicion, but one should also notice that the potential political 
content only accounted for a tiny part of the encyclical. In other words, 
secular politics had never been the focus of the encyclical itself and the 
contemporary Catholic interpretation of it.  
Beijing's politicised reading of Fulgens Corona was largely based on a rigid 
and stereotypical impression of the Vatican. In other words, the officials who 
were in charge of Catholic policy in the central government failed to notice 
the theological context of this encyclical. In fact, veneration of the Virgin 
Mary could be traced to the earliest days of the church; while the church's 
dogmatic discussions in Mariology had a history far longer than communism 
had. The call for veneration of Mary should not be simplified as an 
equivalent of anti-communism. Therefore, Beijing's interpretation of Fulgens 
Corona and the 'Year of Mary' created an abritrary chain of equivalence 
connecting 'Marian venerations' with 'reactionary activities' in the central 
government's discourse. When Beijing's directives reached local bureaux, 
local officials tended to overreact by politicising religious activities and 
attributing subversive meanings to the speeches and exhortations made by 
priests. In sending such overly politicised observations of local churches 
back to the central government, local officials further strengthened Beijing's 
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distrust for the Catholic Church and the Vatican.  
In sum, the entire event of Fulgens Corona showed how a supposed 
religious message was imbued with political meaning and how Beijing's rigid 
impression of the Vatican affected Sino-Vatican relations. From the 
perspective of constructivism, the event of Fulgens Corona illustrated the 
persistence of an 'a priori definition' in Beijing-Rome interaction and the 
difficulty of changing it.  The policymaking of both Beijing and Rome were 
heavily influenced by their a priori definitions. Under the guidance thereof, 
the apolitical content of the encyclical was politicised, and the mutual trust 
between the two states was further reduced.   
 
 
5.4 The Last Round of Clashes (1956-58) 
The Assessment of ‘Self-consecration’ in Previous 
Literature 
The two-year period from 1956 to 1958 was a crucial period in the history of 
the Catholic Church in China. In this period, the church in China saw the 
first episcopal consecrations without Roman approval and the 
establishment of the national Catholic Patriotic Association (CPA). If the 
papal internuncio’s move to Taiwan created the first deadlock in the Sino-
Vatican stalemate, the self-consecrations and the creation of CPA formed 
the second. How do we evaluate this period? Why did the Sino-Vatican 
dispute over the selection of bishops end up with consecrations without 
papal mandates? Different observers and scholars had given different 
answers to these questions.  
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The official position of the Chinese government and the CPA regards the 
self-consecration of bishops and the establishment of the CPA as a triumph 
of the Chinese Catholic Church against imperialism. In 2000, at a ceremony 
for the 50-year anniversary of the foundation of the CPA, the then head of 
the CPA, Fu Tieshan, argued that the ‘anti-imperialist patriotic movement’ 
in the 1950s freed the church from her colonial past and purified the church 
from imperialism.’305 Fu contended that the CPA was indispensable to the 
Chinese Church: ‘We can say that if there was no CPA, the Chinese Church 
would not have obtained the amazing achievements it has today.’306  
In 2007, the vice-president of the CPA, Liu Bainian, pointed out that the CPA 
had made great contributions to the Chinese Catholic Church in several 
aspects. First, the CPA-led anti-imperialist patriotic movement in the late 
1950s helped the Chinese Church to regain her own ‘sovereignty of 
management’. Second, the CPA persisted in its correct political stance while 
maintaining the traditional teachings of the Catholic Church. Third, the CPA 
saved the Chinese church from a shortage of clergy by self-consecrating 
bishops, when the Vatican was hostile to China and was maintaining its 
relationship with Taiwan. Fourth, the CPA restored the church after the 
Cultural Revolution. Fifth, the CPA harmonized the church’s relationship 
with society. 307  Academic books published in mainland China are usually 
similar to the government’s stance. For example, Gu Yulu argued that the 
self-consecrations in the late 1950s showed that the Chinese Church truly 
became a church run by Chinese people. These self-consecrations, as Gu 
put it, were in accordance with the interests of both the Chinese people and 
                                            
305 Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association, The Holy Spirit is with the Chinese Church: The Fifty 
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Culture Publishing House, 2008), p.9. 
306 Ibid., p.11.  
307 Ibid., p.41. 
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the Chinese Church and were a ‘triumph’. 308  Regarding the future, Li 
Mingshu, a bishop from the official-sanctioned church, argued that the 
Chinese Church ‘will strive to continue with self-elections and self-
consecrations’ even if Sino-Vatican relations improve in the future.309 
A very representative scholarly account of this historical period from the 
Chinese side came from Gu Yulu, who himself was an auditor during the 
first conference of the Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association of the Laity 
(CPAL)310 in 1958. According to Gu, the origins of the foundation of a 
national patriotic organization could be traced to the year 1956, when many 
leaders of the Chinese clergy were invited to participate in the Second 
Meeting of the 2nd National Committee of the Chinese People's Political 
Consultative Conference (CPPCC). During this meeting, many leaders of 
the clergy expressed their personal appreciation of the rising international 
status of the PRC and their pride in it. 311  Furthermore, eight bishops 
participating in the meeting called for the foundation of a national patriotic 
organization whose chosen name was the ‘Chinese Patriotic Catholic 
Association of the Laity’. Afterwards, bishops of 37 dioceses showed their 
support by becoming initiators of the CPAL.312  
On 26 July 1956, Zhou Enlai, the Chinese premier, met church leaders 
supporting the patriotic movement and sent Chairman Mao’s regards to 
them. Premier Zhou’s speech deeply moved the participating clergy 
and greatly encouraged the patriotic church leaders. On 17 Jun 1957, the 
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first conference of CPAL was opened in Beijing and lasted over 50 days. At 
the end of the conference, the representatives passed a resolution which 
defined the relationship between the local church and the Vatican: 
‘maintaining a purely religious relationship with the Vatican without violating 
the national interests and dignity, obeying the Pope in terms of the doctrines 
that should be believed and should be followed.’ 313 In the meantime, the 
Vatican was trying to sabotage the conference by any means possible, for 
example by forbidding Catholics to attend and denying the religious 
authorities of patriotic priests. Such deeds from the Vatican angered the 
participating clergymen, who issued a letter of protest to Rome.314  
According to Gu, in the following months, the Chinese church self-elected a 
good number of bishops. Before their consecration, the Chinese church sent 
telegrams to notify the Vatican about the oncoming episcopal consecrations 
— only to receive fierce denouncements from Rome.315 From then on, the 
Chinese church decided to independently consecrate bishops without 
waiting for Roman approval.  Briefly, Gu’s narrative represents the typical 
official view from the side of the PRC. This view highlights the priests’ 
national pride and their increasing identification with the People’s Republic 
along the way to self-consecration. According to this narrative, the Vatican 
should shoulder the main responsibility for the Chinese church’s decision to 
consecrate bishops without a papal mandate.  
In stark contrast to the PRC government’s official stance and the accounts 
offered by scholars from mainland China, authors on Sino-Vatican relations 
from outside China generally hold highly critical views about the self-
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consecrations in the late 1950s and the foundation of the CPA. Ladany, the 
Jesuit father who wrote the earliest English book dedicated to Sino-Vatican 
relations, viewed the self-consecrations in the late 1950s and the CPA in a 
negative light. He argued that the self-consecrations and the foundation of 
the CPA were steps to make ‘a Catholic church completely subject to the 
Party’.316 Myers, who held the view that the PRC government’s ultimate aim 
was to destroy the church, echoed Ladany’s view that self-consecration 
from 1957-58 was a ‘fait accompli’ presented to Rome. Myers also pointed 
out that these self-consecrations occurred after ‘ten years of bloody and 
bitter persecution of Catholics in China…. Thousands of Catholics had been 
brutalized, tortured, and executed.’ 317  In other words, the self-
consecrations and the foundation of the CPA was part of the persecution 
carried out by the PRC government. Mariani, who also viewed the PRC 
government as the ruthless persecutor of the Catholic Church, saw self-
consecration and the creation of the CPA as the government’s attempt to 
build a puppet church.318 According to Mariani, such an attempt was part of 
the government’s plan to eliminate the Catholic Church in China. Mariani 
argued that the arrest of Bishop Kung and other church leaders created a 
power vacuum in the church, which enabled the government to find some 
compromised clergymen and set up a puppet church.  
Both Myers and Mariani’s argument were based on their claim that the PRC 
government’s ultimate aim was to destroy the Catholic Church. To support 
this claim, both authors 319 provided as evidence a document alleged to be 
issued in 1959 by Li Weihan, the head of the United Front Work Department 
of the CCP. According to the two authors, the so-called ‘Li Weihan 
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document’ was intended to be sent to the Communist Party of Cuba as 
advice on Catholic policy. According to Mariani, the document defined the 
Catholic Church as a ‘reactionary organization, the source of 
counterrevolutionary activities’ and clarified the government’s aim as the 
ultimate destruction of the church: ‘to destroy the Catholic Church. This is 
the objective we aim to reach and it is for this that we struggle.’  
According to both authors, the Li Weihan document advocated for a step-
by-step approach to destroy the church. First, the state should create the 
Bureau of Religious Affairs to put religion under its control while the church 
should be divided into ‘counterrevolutionaries’ and those who oppose them. 
Second, the ‘unpatriotic elements’ of the church should be purged and the 
link between the Holy See and the Chinese Catholic Church should be 
severed. Third, the entire clergy should be subjugated to the government’s 
will. The desired outcome in this alleged CPC document was: ‘…when the 
practice of religion becomes no more than an individual responsibility, it is 
slowly forgotten. New generations will follow the old, and religion will be no 
more than an episode of the past, worthy of being dealt with in the history 
of the world communist movement.’320 As a conclusion, Myers made the 
following statement:  
‘It is much more difficult to argue, however, based on this rather clear documentary 
evidence (combined with ample historical evidence as well), that the aim of the 
People’s Government was merely control and regulation, and that had the Catholic 
Church been more flexible or conciliatory it might have achieved some sort of 
accommodation or modus vivendi with the new communist governors of China after 
1949.’ 
This thesis disagrees with Myers and Mariani’s view that the PRC 
government had always been seeking to destroy the church. Indeed, I argue 
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that such a rigid viewpoint held by the two authors had led to their 
oversimplified evaluation of the PRC’s Catholic policy. Both authors made 
references to the ‘Li Weihan documents’ to support their argument that the 
PRC’s ultimate aim was to destroy and eliminate Catholicism in China. 
However, this thesis argues that the so-called ‘Li Weihan document’, even 
if it was genuine, did not reflect the CPC’s normal Catholic policy in most of 
the 1950s. The alleged ‘Li Weihan document’ was issued in 1959 – that was 
after the start of the Great Leap Forward when the PRC general policy was 
greatly radicalized. During the Great Leap Forward, the PRC government 
discarded its previous gradual, prudent policies of the early 1950s and opted 
for overzealous social development plans. The documents issued during 
this period were marked by unrealistic aims and over-optimistic slogans. 
Hence, the ‘Li Weihan document’ should be regarded as an abnormality, 
rather than a truthful reflection of the CPC’s more prudent Catholic policy 
for most of the 1950s. Even if we acknowledge that the ‘Li Weihan 
document’ reflected the CPC’s negative perception of the Catholic Church 
as a ‘reactionary organization’ in the late 1950s, such a sentiment was the 
result of long-term mutual identity construction, not the cause. In sum, I 
argue that the ‘destruction’ view held by Myers and Mariani is anachronistic, 
oversimplified and therefore deeply flawed. A study on Sino-Vatican 
relations without consideration of the identity-articulating process and the 
impact of interactions on policymaking would be highly one-sided and 
unhelpful to a rational understanding of the Beijing-Rome relationship. 
 
Key question: Did Beijing Genuinely Seek Roman Approval? 
As we see from above, the accounts offered by the side of the PRC and by 
Western scholars are radically different. The Chinese official accounts often 
lay the blame on the Vatican’s anti-PRC stance and Rome’s disregard for 
the Chinese Catholics’ patriotic sentiment. By contrast, accounts outside 
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mainland China often highlight the government’s interference in the election 
of bishops and Beijing’s enmity towards religion together with its effort to 
control the church. However, as this thesis maintains, we should not ignore 
the implications of Beijing-Rome interactions on the outcome of these 
historical events. Hence, when evaluating the Chinese Catholic Church’s 
‘self-consecrations’ in the late 1950s, two questions related to Beijing-Rome 
interaction are essential to our understanding of these historical events – 
did Beijing seek Roman approval before these consecrations? How did 
Rome respond to Beijing’s gestures?  
In discussing the communication between the Chinese Church and Rome 
before the self-consecrations, accounts from both mainland China and the 
West had noted that there were telegram exchanges between mainland 
China and Rome regarding the selection of bishops in three areas, namely 
the Shanghai Diocese (1956) and the Hankou and Wuchang Dioceses 
(1958). The outline of the two events is thus: 
(1) In 1956, the priests of Shanghai Diocese elected Fr. Francis Zhang 
Shilang as the vicar capitular of Shanghai. On this matter, the Shanghai 
Diocese sent telegrams to the Propaganda Fide seeking papal 
endorsement. However, Rome refused to endorse Fr. Zhang as the 
legitimate vicar.  
(2) In 1958, the local churches of Hankou and Wuchang elected their own 
bishops. Before the self-consecration of the two bishops, a telegram was 
sent in the name of the two dioceses to Rome notifying the Vatican about 
the oncoming consecrations. Rome replied with a severe warning that 
these self-consecrated bishops would be excommunicated.  
As we can see, the courses of the two events were very similar. First, all 
these dioceses were leaderless at that time because their foreign bishops 
had already been expelled from mainland China. Second, in both cases, 
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telegrams were sent to Rome in the name of the local church regarding the 
selection of new bishops. Third, Rome gave negative replies to these 
telegrams and refused to endorse the proposed candidates. The accounts 
from both sides agree with each other in the basic historical facts but 
disagree in the evaluation of these facts.  
The Chinese sources often stress the harshness of the Vatican’s replies and 
its deep hostility towards the priests friendly to Beijing. For example, Yan 
argues: ‘the Roman Curia did not care much about the real needs of the 
Church in China and continued its anti-new government policy that could 
only be offensive to patriotic Chinese clergy and laity.’ 321 Gu argues that 
the Chinese Church’s action of sending a telegram to Rome was an attempt 
to apply the principle of ‘obeying the Vatican in the religious creeds that 
should be believed and should be carried out’. 322 Gu holds that the Vatican 
refused the Chinese Church’s requests ‘unjustly’— the reply telegram sent 
by the Vatican defined the consecrations as ‘invalid’, ‘useless’ and ‘equal to 
nothing’. Such wordings, according to Gu, were blackmail towards the 
Chinese clergy. 323  Gu argues that the Vatican’s excommunications of 
Chinese priests infringed the Chinese church’s self-governing rights:  
‘Excommunicatio specialissima reservata is a religious punitive measure in 
Catholicism. It was only used to punish those who committed grave sins. And only the 
Pope could forgive such grave sins. However, the priests in Hankou and Wuchang 
were exercising their lawful rights to run the church autonomously, so how could that 
be considered a sin? The Chinese clergy refused to be bullied by the Excommunicatio. 
By contrast, they saw clearly the true face of the Vatican – trying to control the Chinese 
church by religious authority to serve its political aim of opposing the New China.’ 324 
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On the other hand, previous scholars who wrote in English often question 
Beijing’s intention in sending these telegrams to Rome and regard these 
gestures as insincere and lacking in goodwill. For example, Ladany was 
strongly against the view that the Sino-Vatican relationship could be better 
had the Vatican been friendlier towards Beijing in the selection of the 
bishops of Hankou and Wuchang. Instead, he argued that the Holy See did 
make the right choice in refusing to endorse the candidate elected as bishop 
and recommended by the clergy in mainland China. 325  Regarding the 
criticism that the Holy See had not consecrated enough local bishops in 
mainland China before 1949, Ladany argued that the localization process 
had already started, as evinced by the consecration of Chinese Cardinals. 
It was the PRC government who disrupted this localization process.326 
Another scholar, Myers, also took a similar standpoint. He argued that 
Beijing sent cables to Rome as ‘a test of strength’ instead of as a means of 
consultation.327 According to Myers, due to Beijing’s lack of sincerity, ‘it is 
difficult to see how Pius XII could have acted differently than he did.’ Myers 
argued that Beijing did not have any intention to improve Sino-Vatican 
relations: ‘Nor, as suggested above, does it appear at any point during this 
period, that such was the desire and intention of the Chinese 
authorities.’ Mariani also offered his evaluation of Beijing’s 1956 telegrams 
to Rome. Regarding the selection of Fr. Zhang Shilang as the episcopal 
candidate and the telegram sent to Rome on this matter, Mariani viewed it 
as a deliberate ‘fait accompli’ presented to the Holy See. According to 
Mariani, the government’s choice of Fr. Zhang Shilang was only because 
Fr. Zhang was pliable and submissive enough to the government.  
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As we can see, Ladany and Myers held negative opinion towards Beijing’s 
act of sending telegrams to Rome. But why did they come to such a 
conclusion? First and foremost, the two authors derive Beijing’s intention 
from its previous acts. Let us consider Ladany’s rationale for his evaluation 
of Beijing’s intention in sending the telegrams. First, the PRC government 
had been promoting anti-Vatican church reform since 1950. Second, it was 
the PRC government who arrested the church leaders and expelled the 
foreign missionaries. Third, the PRC propaganda had demonized the 
Vatican for a long time.328 Hence, Ladany argued that the intention of the 
letter to Rome was malevolent, with the purpose of sending a ‘fait accompli’ 
to Rome — it was the PRC government who should be blamed for Rome’s 
refusal. In other words, according to Ladany’s reasoning, Beijing’s intention 
to send these telegrams could only be considered malevolent after the PRC 
government did so many wrongs to the church in China. Myers also uses a 
similar rationale and argues that Beijing had no sincerity in consulting Rome 
because the telegrams to Rome happened in the context of ‘ten years of 
bloody and bitter persecution of the Catholics in China’.329 He then used the 
so-called ‘Li Weihan Document’ to support his negative reading of Beijing’s 
telegrams to Rome.330 
Secondly, in previous English literature on Sino-Vatican relations, the 
judgments of Beijing’s intention were often based on extremely limited 
original material. For instance, in his book, Myers did not mention the 1956 
telegrams at all while pointing out that the 1958 ones were inaccessible to 
him.331 When Mariani mentioned the 1956 telegrams sent by Beijing to 
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Rome, he quoted only two sentences from the original telegram, which 
reads: ‘Bishop Kung Pin-mei has been arrested by the government because 
of treason. According to Canon 429, article 3, we have made Zhang X X the 
acting bishop.’ 332 Based on these sentences alone, Mariani reached his 
conclusion that Beijing’s act of sending such a fait accompli to Rome was 
just ‘bold power play’.  
Is the sentence quoted by Mariani the only content of these telegrams, or, 
could it represent the main message of these telegrams? In fact, Chinese 
sources give us a far more nuanced interpretation of these telegrams than 
those given in Mariani’s book. The Shanghai Chronicle of Religion shows a 
far more vivid picture of interaction between the local church and the Vatican 
regarding Fr. Zhang’s election as the vicar of Shanghai. Below is my 
summary: 333 
Communications between the church in Shanghai and Rome: A Timeline 
(According to the Shanghai Chronicle of Religion) 
16 Mar 1956 The committee  consulted people in the Shanghai Diocese and elected 
Fr. Francis Zhang Shilang as the vicar capitular 
21 Mar 1956 The head of the committee, Fr. Xu Yuanrong, sent a telegram to the 
Propaganda Fide notifying Rome of the election of Fr. Zhang 
27 Mar 1956 The Propaganda Fide replied to Fr. Xu, confirming Bishop Kung’s 
authority and refusing to recognize Fr. Xu as vicar capitular 
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23 Apr 1956 Fr. Xu sent another telegram to Rome, providing more details and 
seeking approval   
7 Mar 1957 The Propaganda Fide replied to Fr. Xu with a letter after 10 months. The 
letter reiterated that Fr. Zhang’s election was illicit and insisted that the successor 
appointed by Bishop Kung should be the legitimate vicar capitular.  
17 Mar 1957 Fr. Xu sent a letter to Propaganda Fide persuading Rome to recognize 
Fr. Zhang 
31 Mar 1957 Fr. Zhang, the elected vicar capitular himself sent a letter to the 
Propaganda Fide explaining his motives behind the election and seeking Roman 
approval 
10 Jul 1957 The Propaganda Fide sent the final telegram reaffirming its denial of Fr. 
Zhang’s legitimacy.  
22 Jul 1957 The clergy in Shanghai issued an open letter, bitterly accusing the 
Vatican of ‘unjustly destroying the Shanghai diocese’. 
Although the Shanghai Chronicle of Religion described the timeline of 
telegram exchanges between Beijing and Rome, it only includes two 
fragments of the original wording of the telegrams/letters. Interestingly, the 
first fragment quoted by the Shanghai Chronicle, which was from the first 
telegram sent by Fr. Xu to the Propaganda Fide (21 Mar 1956), reads 
exactly the same as in Mariani’s quote. However, the Shanghai Chronicle 
of Religion includes a second fragment, which was not mentioned in 
Mariani’s book. It is a part of Fr. Zhang, the elected vicar capitular’s, 
explanatory letter to Rome, which reads:  
‘As I ponder over the fact that I am already at the age of 77 – old, decrepit and useless 
– my inner nature urges me to shun such a daunting task. But after serious consideration 
before God, I decide to accept this bitter task in both the interests of laity and the needs 
of our diocese. I hope that I can still serve the church in my remaining days; and that my 
self-sacrifice could bring God’s blessings to our diocese.’ 334 
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From the timeline and the second fragment offered by the Shanghai 
Chronicle of Religion, we can see that the entire course of the 
communications between Beijing and Rome was far more complex than has 
been described by Mariani. Indeed, what Mariani quoted was from the first 
telegram sent by Fr. Xu to the Propaganda Fide (21 Mar 1956) because the 
Shanghai Chronicle of Religion recorded exactly the same sentence and 
specified its date. But Mariani did not mention at all the subsequent letter 
exchanges between Beijing and Rome. In reality, over a period of two years, 
Beijing (in the name of the Shanghai Diocese) exchanged three rounds of 
telegrams/letters with Rome regarding Fr. Zhang’s election as the vicar 
capitular of Shanghai.  
The fact that Mariani omitted these exchanges altogether could be 
considered a major flaw in his account of this event. So what could 
contribute to this omission? It could be argued that the scarcity of the original 
material is an important factor. Even to this day, access to these original 
telegrams/letters between Beijing and Rome was restricted and the 
published books and articles do not contain much of the original wording of 
these telegrams and letters except for the two fragments mentioned above. 
So it may be understandable that Mariani drew a swift conclusion from 
merely two sentences. However, Mariani’s omission of the second fragment 
as quoted in Shanghai Chronicle is less excusable. The second fragment, 
long published in Chinese sources, deserves attention no less than the first 
one. In fact, as we can see, not only was the second fragment longer than 
the first one, but also it was very different from the first one in its style and 
mood. The omission of the second fragment would certainly lead to 
unbalanced report. Indeed, the language of the second fragment was soft 
and religious in tone and therefore unhelpful in depicting Beijing as a 
reckless destroyer of religions – perhaps that was the reason why Mariani 
did not include this second fragment in his book. 
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In sum, previous scholarly accounts written in English about communication 
between Beijing and Rome before the 1958 self-consecrations are flawed. 
The result is an unbalanced evaluation of Beijing’s intention and the 
oversimplification of the entire event. Here is the gap which this thesis 
attempts to fill. In the following part, this thesis will try to provide a new 
insight into the impact of Beijing-Rome communications on Sino-Vatican 
relations, based on analysis of the original documents and texts from the 
side of the PRC government. Based on archival evidences, the thesis will 
discuss the three questions: 
(1) What was Beijing’s goal in Catholic policy before the 1958 self-
consecrations? 
(2) Had Beijing genuinely sought Roman approval before the self-
consecrations and how did Rome reply?  
(3) How did Beijing-Rome communication affect Beijing’s decision-making? 
 
The Church and State in Czechoslovakia as Described by Fr. 
Plojhar: Beijing’s Ideal World 
This thesis now touches upon Beijing’s aim in its Catholic policy before the 
1958 self-consecrations. Again, this thesis challenges the claims of Myers 
and Mariani that Beijing’s aim in its Catholic policy before 1958 was the utter 
destruction of the church. Both authors cited the ‘Li Weihan document’ as 
strong evidence of Beijing’s intention to destroy Catholicism. However, on 
this issue, this thesis argues that the so-called ‘Li Weihan document’, issued 
in the political turmoil of the Great Leap Forward, could not represent 
Beijing’s aim in its Catholic policy before 1958. In my research in the Hunan 
Provincial Archive, I did not find any evidence during this period to show that 
Beijing aimed to exterminate the Catholic Church in China. In fact, in 
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previous sections, I have argued that Beijing’s principle goal in Catholic 
policy from 1952 was ‘winning over the church’, which was evidenced by Lu 
Dingyi’s guidelines. However, this ‘winning over’ policy did not achieve 
many of the effects desired by Beijing and the government and the clergy 
were still in a state of mutual distrust up to 1954. The loyalty towards Rome 
shown by the high-ranking clergy in Shanghai and the hidden anti-
communist calls conveyed by the papal messages convinced Beijing that 
the clerical leadership in Shanghai should be dismantled.  
Hence, it could be argued that the arrest of Bishop Kung and other 
prominent church leaders in Shanghai in September 1955 marked a serious 
turning point in Beijing’s Catholic policy. However, does it mean that after 
the arrests of church leaders in Shanghai, Beijing had switched to an 
eradication policy, as suggested by the alleged ‘Li Weihan document’? I 
argue for a ‘no’ answer. In fact, archival evidence shows a far more nuanced 
picture of Beijing’s policymaking than that described by Myers and Mariani. 
So what was Beijing’s goal in Catholic policy before the 1958 self-
consecrations? In this section I shall analyse an internal document issued 
by Beijing to local bureaus of religious affairs all over China – it will shed 
light on Beijing’s policy aims in 1956, right before the Beijing-Rome clashes 
over the episcopal consecrations.  
On 3 Jul 1956, the Bureau of Religious Affairs at the State Council issued a 
document about the visit to China of Josef Plojhar, the head of the Ministry 
of Health in Czechoslovakia. Plojhar visited Beijing again on 7th May of the 
same year in his capacity as the Minister of Health in Czechoslovakia and 
the leader of the People’s Party. However, besides his official functions, 
Plojhar was also invited to give a lecture on church-state relationships to the 
local clergy in Beijing – an arrangement highly unusual for a foreign 
minister visiting China. (Considering Beijing’s usual suspicious attitude 
towards foreign religious interference at the time, this invitation was even 
more interesting.) 
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The fact that Fr. Plojhar was invited to speak to local clergy is clear proof 
that he was trusted by Beijing and the government believed that his lecture 
could help the government in state-church relations. So what did Fr. Plojhar 
say during his lecture? While the open publications did not reveal any detail 
of this lecture, the Bureau of Religious Affairs at the State Council put the 
key points of Fr. Plojhar’s lecture into an internal circular 335 and sent it to 
local religious affairs offices in each province. Hence, Fr. Plojhar’s view of 
state-church relationships could be considered as being endorsed by 
Beijing. So what is the major content of his speech and what did he convey 
to the Chinese clergy? I have summarised the key points of Fr. Plojhar’s 
speech into the following chains of equivalence: 
 
Chain of Equivalence: The church in Czechoslovakia 
The Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia = enjoying complete freedom of belief = 
cooperating full-heartedly with the government = collaborating with the Communist 
Party without violating church discipline, creeds and canon law = acknowledging the 
Pope’s status as the head of the church and submitting absolutely to Roman 
leadership in terms of creeds and canon law = putting our country’s interests first 
and refusing to be influenced by the US via Rome = never seeking schism = fighting 
selfish interests, colonialism and the danger of a third world war 
From this chain of equivalence, we can perceive that Fr. Plojhar described 
an ideal picture of the relationship between church and government, and 
between the local church and Rome. First, Fr. Plojhar claimed that the 
church in Czechoslovakia enjoyed a high degree of religious freedom. To 
persuade his audience, Fr. Plojhar used himself as evidence. ‘Catholics 
have complete religious freedom and do not meet any obstacles. My current 
position as the Minister of Health is strong proof of this.’ Not only was the 
church enjoying freedom of belief in Czechoslovakia, but, as Fr. Plojhar put 
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it, she was also having a good relationship with the government: ‘We and 
the government cooperate with each other full-heartedly and respect each 
other’s beliefs.’ Here, it was clear that what Fr. Plojhar meant by ‘respecting 
each other’s beliefs’ was that there was mutual respect between 
Catholicism and state ideology.  
Second, Fr. Plojhar touched upon the church’s relationship with Rome and 
voiced his belief that collaborating with the Communist Party did not mean 
a compromise of church discipline and canon law. He revealed that he had 
tried to consult Rome on this matter: “In 1949 I went to Rome and discussed 
with the clergy in Rome the issue of collaborating with a communist 
government. We quarrelled with each other … but they did not give me any 
answer in the end.’  For the future, Fr. Plojhar was confident: 'Today, the 
number of those who oppose us is diminishing while the number of our 
supporters is increasing day by day.’  
Third, Fr, Plojhar affirmed papal primacy and stressed that the 
Czechoslovakian church was subject ‘absolutely' to the Pope’s authority 
regarding religious creeds and canon law. As an example, he said: ‘On the 
Holy Father's birthday this year, we sent letters and telegrams to 
congratulate him. And the Holy Father also replied to us and thanked our 
bishops, friars and nuns. Religious decrees from Rome were also published 
in newspapers and magazines in Czechoslovakia. The Pope’s views 
against the combative usage of atomic weapons was also supported by us.’ 
Fourth, Fr. Plojhar clarified the Czechoslovakian church’s stance on political 
issues, namely that the local church should prioritize national interests and 
refuse to be influenced by the US through the Vatican. The reason, as Fr. 
Plojhar put it, was that the Vatican was supporting American imperialism in 
politics and was receiving cash aid from the US. So what was the Vatican’s 
attitude towards the church in Czechoslovakia? Fr. Plojhar said: 'The 
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Vatican opposes communism. They would not openly agree with us when 
we do the right things. The best thing they could do is to keep silent.’  
Fifth, Fr. Plojhar stated the stance of his local church on church unity: ‘We 
are not seeking schism and will never do so.’ He pointed out that a radio 
station was built in the Vatican to broadcast to Czechoslovakia in the Czech 
language, ‘defaming (us) and trying to divide the unity between the 
government and the church.’ According to his account, in 1952, Fr. Plojhar 
visited Rome to find out the truth: ‘I finally discovered that those who did this 
were not the Pope, nor the cardinals, but some people politically influenced 
by the US inside the Vatican and reactionaries who had fled from 
Czechoslovakia. It was they who accused us of schism.’ Lastly, at the end 
of his speech, Fr. Plojhar illustrated the three tasks of the church in 
Czechoslovakia, namely: fighting selfish interests, opposing colonialism in 
Asia and Africa, and campaigning against the possibility of a third world war. 
Fr. Plojhar concluded his speech with a strong denouncement of 
warmongers: 'Those warmongers who want to launch new wars, let them 
be cursed!' 
How should we see church-state relationships in Czechoslovakia as 
described by Fr. Plojhar? We could say that the picture depicted by Fr. 
Plojhar was highly idealized in which the state, the local church and the 
Vatican coexisted peacefully. However, it could be argued that the actual 
relationship between the Vatican and the officially-sanctioned church in 
Czechoslovakia was less peaceful than the description of Fr. Plojhar. 
Similar to China, the Czechoslovakian government and the Vatican 
contested with each other on various aspects of church life, including the 
appointment of priests, church institutions, church publications, the link with 
Rome and the monastic life — as part of the conflict, Fr. Plojhar was 
excommunicated by the Vatican in 1949 due to his pro-government 
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stance. 336  But no matter what the state-church relationship in 
Czechoslovakia really was at that time, Fr. Plojhar’s lecture in Beijing, as a 
speech aimed at educating the Chinese clergy, spoke more about Beijing’s 
desire than the actual situation in Czechoslovakia. In other words, as a 
friend trusted by Beijing, Fr. Plojhar’s speech was regarded by Beijing as a 
persuasive account of the ideal relationship between church and state in 
Beijing’s understanding. The intended audience was the Chinese clergy and 
the actual situation in Czechoslovakia was less important – in this respect, 
Fr. Plojhar’s account of state and church relations in Czechoslovakia is very 
similar to Fr. Matthew Chen’s Holy and Catholic in that both texts depict a 
highly idealized vision, regardless of the actual situation in the world.  
In this ideal picture of state-church relationships endorsed by Beijing, 
harmony was realized between state interests and church interests. Instead 
of challenging the communist party’s rule and competing with the state 
ideology, the church becomes a supporter of the state. In return, the 
government respects the church’s discipline, canon law and creeds and 
allows the church to be in communion with Rome. Members of clergy could 
even be accepted into the decision-making process of the state, as shown 
by Fr. Plojhar’s position as Minister of Health. Despite the radical 
differences between the belief system of Catholicism and communism, the 
state and church could still cooperate in various fields. As noticed by Fr. 
Plojhar, the possible fields of cooperation could be in the area of social 
justice, and the struggle against colonialism and wars. It is worthy of notice 
that at the time when Fr. Plojhar delivered his speech to his Chinese 
audience, he was already excommunicated and defrocked by the Vatican. 
However, in his speech we did not see strong accusations against the 
Vatican apart from the criticism that the Vatican followed US imperialism. 
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Instead, Fr. Plojhar stressed his church’s loyalty towards the Pope and 
reiterated that schism was not an option.  
When talking about papal primacy, Fr. Plojhar used the wording ‘submitting 
absolutely to Roman leadership’ in terms of creeds and canon 
law. Regarding Rome’s offensive gestures against Czechoslovakia, Fr. 
Plojhar exonerated the Pope and the cardinals and laid the blame on 
imperialists and exiles from Czechoslovakia. When commenting on the 
Vatican’s attitude towards the church collaborating with the 
Czechoslovakian government, Fr. Plojhar predicted that the Vatican might 
not express open support but may instead remain silent. In sum, despite the 
fact of his being an excommunicated priest, Fr. Plojhar’s speech still 
respected papal primacy and canon law, while exempting the Pope and the 
cardinals from blame. Instead of open support, he only expected the Vatican 
to remain silent. Therefore, as a speech endorsed by Beijing, we can also 
deduce Beijing’s attitude on the same issues: despite the Vatican’s long-
time anti-communist stance, the state and the church could still seek 
peaceful coexistence if the Holy See did not encourage Catholics to boycott 
the communist party. If the harmony of interests between the two parties 
could not be realised in a short time, silence from the Holy See would be 
helpful in improving mutual relationships. Furthermore, Beijing, in endorsing 
Fr. Plojhar’s speech, still wished to respect papal primacy in the church and 
canon law. That the blame should be laid on a group of imperialists inside 
the Vatican instead of the Pope and the cardinals also left the possibility of 
reconciliation between the Chinese state and the Vatican leadership.  
So what kind of conclusion could we draw from Fr. Plojhar’s depiction of 
state-church relations? Indeed, unlike Lu Dingyi’s speech in 1952, Fr. 
Plojhar’s speech does not include any systematic discussion of state policy 
nor any detailed guidelines. However, it does tell us some important things. 
First, Beijing’s action in inviting Plojhar to give such a speech to the Chinese 
clergy showed that up to that point the government had not abandoned its 
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hope of ‘winning over’ the clergy. The speech was clearly intended to be a 
persuasive account to rally the clergy to the government’s cause and give 
them hope that church and state could coexist and collaborate in a state 
ruled by communists. In other words, after the arrests of church leaders in 
Shanghai, Beijing did not abandon the moderate line, as suggested by Lu 
Dingyi – this is in stark contrast to Myers and Mariani’s claim that Beijing 
was aiming to exterminate the church.  
Second, as I have argued, that instead of a faithful description of the real 
situation in Czechoslovakia, Plojhar’s depiction was actually Beijing’s 
utopian vision in which state and church have a modus vivendi. Following 
the speech’s logic, as long as the church could align herself with the 
government politically, the government would respect the church’s beliefs 
and dogma, including its spiritual ties with Rome. In its utopian tendency, it 
could be argued that the speech of Plojhar is similar to Matthew Chen’s Holy 
and Catholic. However, Matthew Chen’s ideal world was one in which state 
and church have clear boundaries and do not interfere with each other; while 
the one depicted by Plojhar was marked by the friendly collaboration 
between state and church along political lines.  
Last but not least, the speech shows that papal primacy and canon law were 
still acknowledged in Beijing’s discourse. In his speech, Plojhar mentioned 
many times the relationship between Rome and the church in 
Czechoslovakia and expressed the local church’s obedience to the Pope in 
terms of religious issues. This is evidence that Beijing was still willing to 
solve the government’s conflict with the church within the limits of papal 
primacy and church laws – indeed, this is in accordance with Lu Dingyi’s 
suggestion in 1952 that the church’s canon law could be re-interpreted to 
solve the state-church conflict. In sum, the acknowledgement of papal 
primacy and canon law in this document shows that Beijing still wished to 
solve the Catholic issue within the Catholic framework, namely the church’s 
own traditions and regulations. To put it very briefly, the via media policy 
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guidelines prescribed by Lu Dingyi were still at work in 1956. And we shall 
see how Beijing’s Catholic policy would be adjusted by Beijing-Rome 
interactions over the vicar capitular election in Shanghai in the next section 
of this thesis. 
 
Previous Literature on the Election of the Vicar Capitular in 
Shanghai 
In the last part I have used archival material to illustrate the tendency of 
Beijing’s Catholic policy in 1956 and have argued that Beijing showed 
willingness to solve the Catholic problem within the church’s own 
framework. In other words, ‘papal primacy’ and ‘canon law’ were still neutral 
signifiers (i.e. not connected with other negative signifiers) in Beijing’s 
discourse up to that time. In this part I shall go on to examine how interaction 
between Beijing and Rome would affect Beijing’s discourse and Sino-
Vatican relations.  
In 1956, the Diocese of Shanghai, the former ‘bulwark of resistance’, was in 
a difficult situation after the arrests of prominent clergy in Shanghai – the 
diocese was virtually leaderless. In these circumstances, on 15 Mar, the 
diocesan consultors elected Fr. Francis Xavier Zhang Shilang as the vicar 
capitular of Shanghai. On 20 Mar, a telegram was sent to Rome notifying 
Propaganda Fide about Fr. Zhang’s election. The event of Fr. Zhang’s 
election initiated the last round of Beijing-Rome interaction in the 1950s and 
would exert a great impact on Sino-Vatican relations. 
As I have discussed before, previous authors usually hold highly critical 
views regarding Beijing’s role in this event. Mariani pointed out that the 
leaderless situation in the Shanghai Diocese itself was created by Beijing: 
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‘Having created a power vacuum, the CCP then moved to fill it.’ 337 
Regarding Fr. Zhang’s election, Mariani argued that the council of priests 
was convened under duress from the government. He further pointed out 
that the reason behind Fr. Zhang’s election was his submissiveness – to 
prove this, he quoted two sentences from a CPC internal document held in 
the Shanghai Municipal Archive: 
‘We created the new leadership of the church. We can control this 
leader, and we are using different methods to help this church leader 
gain the believers’ and the priests’ support.’ 338 
In this excerpt, ‘this leader’ stands for Fr. Francis Zhang. Hence, Mariani 
based his claim on the word ‘control’ in the excerpt. Apart from the 
submissiveness of Fr. Zhang, Mariani also highlighted the bluntness of the 
Shanghai diocese’s telegram to Rome regarding Fr. Zhang’s election. 
According to Mariani, the telegram was merely a fait accompli presented to 
Rome by Beijing. In sum, based on his interpretation of the rationale behind 
Fr. Zhang’s election as vicar capitular and on Beijing’s manner of contacting 
Rome, Mariani argued that the election of Fr. Zhang was merely a step in 
Beijing’s effort to set up a ‘puppet church’ 339 and implied that Beijing’s 
telegram to Rome was not a genuine act of seeking consultation.  
Regarding this historical event, I hold a different opinion from Mariani. 
Firstly, I do not agree with his interpretation of Beijing’s rationale behind Fr. 
Zhang’s election. As I have argued in previous chapters, the centre of 
gravity of Beijing’s Catholic policy since 1952 was ‘winning over’ the high-
ranking clergy in China. Hence, although the arrests of church leaders in 
Shanghai happened in 1955, that was certainly not a desirable outcome for 
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Beijing because it marked the failure of the ‘winning over’ policy. Therefore, 
the leaderless ‘power vacuum’ in Shanghai should not be regarded as 
something sought after by Beijing.  
Secondly, I think Mariani’s evaluation of Fr. Zhang was oversimplified – was 
submissiveness the only reason behind Fr. Zhang’s selection by Beijing? I 
do not think so. The quotation from the CPC internal document was used 
by Mariani as the main evidence for his claim – however, if we pay closer 
attention to this quotation, we would find ‘we can control this leader’ was 
only part of the rationale for choosing Fr. Zhang. The other, and more 
important, factor behind the selection of Fr. Zhang was that he had the 
potential to ‘gain the believers’ support’. In other words, the ideal candidate 
for the government should be one who was able to garner support from local 
Catholics. Hence, being friendly enough to the government was not the only 
reason behind Fr.Zhang’s election – the regime was hoping that Fr. Zhang 
could have some influence over local Catholics and therefore reduce the 
enmity between Catholics and the government.  
In fact, the account from Fr. Jin Luxian, one of the prominent church leaders 
in Shanghai who was also arrested in 1955, could shed light on the 
personality traits of Fr. Zhang Shilang – in his memoirs, Jin remarked that 
Fr. Zhang was ‘virtuous and with a good reputation’ (de gao wang zhong).340 
Moreover, even Mariani himself noticed that Fr. Zhang Shilang ‘never fully 
met CCP expectations’ because he was reported to have expressed his 
sympathy for the arrested Bishop Kung – more evidence showing that 
submissiveness to the government was not the most important reason 
behind Fr. Zhang’s election as the vicar capitular of Shanghai. In sum, I 
argue that Mariani’s oversimplified evaluation of Fr. Zhang does not take all 
the factors into consideration – the most important reason behind Beijing’s 
                                            
340 Luxian Jin, The Memoirs, p.126. 
 272 
endorsement was perhaps Fr. Zhang was considered by the government as 
potentially influential in the Shanghai church and therefore more helpful in 
‘winning over’ Catholics. This was in accordance with Beijing’s goal in 
Catholic policy since 1952. 
Thirdly, and most importantly, I do not agree with Mariani’s claim that 
Beijing’s intention of allowing the church to send Rome messages was 
merely presenting a fait accompli. Instead, I argue that the telegrams and 
letters sent to Rome marked Beijing’s last attempt to reach a ceasefire with 
Rome in the 1950s. The Beijing-Rome interaction regarding Fr. Zhang’s 
election as vicar capitular in Shanghai would greatly impact Sino-Vatican 
relations and was essential to the formation of the second ‘deadlock’ 
between Beijing and Rome. In the following part, I shall use archival 
evidence to prove my point. 
 
Beijing-Rome Interaction over the Election of the Vicar 
Capitular in Shanghai 
As I have discussed above, one of the pieces of evidence used by Mariani 
to show the lack of sincerity from the side of Beijing was the blunt wording 
of the telegram sent from the diocese to Propaganda Fide on 20 Mar 1956, 
consisting of two sentences: ‘Bishop Kung Pin-mei has been arrested by 
the government because of treason. According to Canon 429, article 3, we 
have made Zhang X X the acting bishop’.341 If this was the only message 
sent by Beijing to Rome, then Mariani’s claim of insincerity could be justified 
because it was clear that the sender of this telegram made no effort to 
negotiate with the receiver. However, as I have pointed out in the above 
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parts, this blunt excerpt was only a small fragment of the entire message 
exchanged between Beijing and Rome regarding the election of the vicar 
capitular in Shanghai. To draw a conclusion merely from this fragment, I 
argue, is one-sided and facile.  
If we look back at the timeline according to the Shanghai Chronicle (see p. 
284 of this thesis) we would find that the blunt wording quoted by Mariani 
was actually from Fr. Xu Yuanrong’s first telegram to Propaganda Fide (the 
date was 21 Mar according to the Shanghai Chronicle, perhaps due to the 
time zone difference). Mariani claimed that he quoted the two sentences 
from an internal document A22-1-233 from the Shanghai Municipal Archive. 
However, he did not specify whether these two sentences were the entire 
content of the telegram, or whether there was other content besides these 
two sentences. Mariani also mentioned the Propaganda Fide’s reply to Fr. 
Xu on 27 Mar, in which Rome stressed that Bishop Kung was ‘unjustly 
imprisoned’ and refused to endorse Fr. Zhang’s election. 342 The problem in 
Mariani’s narrative is that he totally ignores the subsequent interaction 
between Beijing and Rome from Apr 1956 to Jul 1957. In other words, he 
hastily reached his fait accompli conclusion based merely on two sentences 
from the Chinese side – it was a pity that he completely missed the 
underlying constructivist process in the subsequent communication 
between Beijing and Rome.  
Fortunately, the discovery I made in the Hunan Provincial Archive could 
remedy this major omission. During my research in the archive, I discovered 
the following material related to the election of the vicar capitular in 
Shanghai, namely the Propaganda Fide’s reply to Fr. Xu (7 Mar 1957), Fr. 
Xu’s letter to Rome (17 Mar 1957), Fr. Zhang Shilang’s explanatory letter to 
Rome (31 Mar 1957) and the Propaganda Fide’s final letter (10 Jul 1957). 
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In this section I will provide an in-depth analysis of these texts, which would 
be the first such attempt in the English language on Sino-Vatican relations. 
Fr. Xu Yuanrong’s Letter to Propaganda Fide 
The full text of this letter (17 Mar 1957) was kept in the Hunan Provincial 
Archive as an internal document of the Bureau of Religious Affairs (the title 
of document is ‘Fr. Xu Yuanrong from Shanghai, a letter to Propaganda Fide 
in Rome’).343 As a letter originating from Shanghai, its being included in the 
Hunan Provincial Archive shows that this document was forwarded by 
Beijing to bureaus of religious affairs all over China and therefore had 
national significance. Considering the political situation at the time, it was 
unimaginable that Fr. Xu could send this message to Rome without Beijing’s 
approval. Hence, despite being written in Fr. Xu’s individual name, the letter 
should be considered as endorsed by Beijing. 
The letter was addressed to the prefect of Propaganda Fide, Fumasoni 
Biondi. It was written in a highly polite style close to Classical Chinese. The 
telegram has a three-part structure: in the opening part, Fr. Xu expressed 
the Shanghai diocese's gratitude towards the Pope for the last letter sent to 
Shanghai by the Propaganda Fide. The second part reported the entire 
process of Fr. Zhang's election in detail. The third part again expressed the 
diocese's respect of and submission to the Holy See while seeking Rome's 
decision on several matters.  
 
The opening paragraph of the letter is worthy of attention: 
For the reference of Your Eminence: 
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I feel so underserved that you bestowed the letter with attached order on me (number 
1023/57). I have received (them) on the 17th of this month and now I wish to offer this 
letter to you with deference. The priests and laity of the Shanghai Diocese had been 
in a perplexed situation for a long time. Hence, when receiving the last letter from your 
Eminence, they deeply felt the caring love and benevolent arrangements from the 
representative of Christ and the Most Holy Father; and (now they) know the issues 
that should be dealt with in the future. Regarding the order from the Propaganda Fide, 
as long as it is related to the leadership of (our) diocese, I humbly wish to ask Your 
Eminence’s opinion on this leadership issue. Hence, regarding that order, if I may, I 
wish to promulgate it after receiving Your Eminence’s new advice — I hope this 
request could be granted by Your Eminence. 
As we can see from this paragraph, the text of Fr. Xu’s letter shows far more 
nuances than the blunt excerpt quoted by Mariani did. The first point worthy 
of notice is the style of the telegram. The entire telegram was composed in 
a conservative form of written Chinese, which exhibits intensive usage of 
vocabulary from Classical Chinese. When writing in this style, the writer has 
to pay close attention to the relative social status between himself/herself 
and the addressee. Different relationships between the writer and the 
addressee may require radically different wording. This style was the 
preferred style of the KMT regime. (Hence, the messages sent by Nanjing 
to Rome were often written in this style, while Rome’s messages to Nanjing 
were also translated into the same style.) However, this conservative style 
was disliked and abandoned by the PRC government due to its link to the 
‘reactionary’ government of Chiang Kai-shek and to the traditional 
Confucian social hierarchy. Hence, the fact that Beijing chose to endorse a 
telegram written in a style preferred by the KMT regime and sent it to Rome 
—seven years after the founding of the PRC —clearly showed that the 
telegram was intended to be a soft gesture towards Rome. 
The second point worthy of attention is that Fr. Xu, the supposed author, 
made reference to the last letter and an attached order (No. 1023/57) sent 
to the Shanghai Diocese by Propaganda Fide. Regarding the attached 
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order, Mariani had noticed the existence of this 1023/57 order from 
Propaganda Fide and summarised the main content of this order as ‘giving 
priests special permission to administer the sacraments with little episcopal 
oversight’.344 Namely, this order was Rome’s contingent response to the 
arrest of Bishop Kung and other church leaders in Shanghai. By this order, 
every priest (not censured by Rome) in the Diocese of Shanghai, including 
the adjacent Diocese of Suzhou and Archdiocese of Nanjing, would have 
the privilege to issue marriage dispensations and administer other 
sacraments in the absence of a functioning bishop. During my research I 
also discovered the full Chinese version of both the letter to Shanghai 
Diocese and the attached order 1023/57 in the Hunan Provincial Archive.345 
The letter, addressed to Fr. Xu, ordered Fr. Xu to promulgate the order 
1023/57 in all the related dioceses and stressed that the rationale behind 
the order was ‘the unjust arrest and imprisonment of Kung, the Bishop of 
Shanghai and the Apostolic Prefect of the Archdiocese of Nanjing.’ 
Indeed, from Beijing’s perspective, this letter with attached order was 
certainly not a friendly gesture from Rome because the order facilitates the 
underground existence of the local church, let alone its open denouncement 
of Beijing’s arrest of Bishop Kung. However, in Fr. Xu’s letter to Propaganda 
Fide we can see that the author used the wording ‘caring love’ and 
‘benevolent arrangements’ to denote the 1023/57 order, which shows that 
the author did not wish to read the Holy See’s intention maliciously. 
Nonetheless, the author made a polite refusal to carry out Rome’s order 
immediately and hoped the Propaganda Fide could take the new 
information provided in this letter into consideration. In the following part of 
the letter, Fr. Xu narrated the detail of Fr. Zhang Shilang’s election as vicar 
capitular.  
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To facilitate analysis, the main contents of this telegram are now 
summarised into chains of equivalence, according to actors: 
Chain 1: The Shanghai Diocese and the reason for electing a vicar capitular 
The Shanghai Diocese = deeply worried and perplexed = seeking your Excellency’s 
forgiveness for not reporting = not knowing who is the appointed successor = having 
the urgent need to convene a council of priests and elect a vicar capitular according 
to Canon Law 
This chain of equivalence was derived from the author’s description of the 
situation in the Shanghai Diocese and his explanation of the motives behind 
electing a vicar capitular. According to the author, the priests and laity of the 
Shanghai Diocese had been in a worried and perplexed situation for a long 
time and the Propaganda Fide’s latest letter and order to the Shanghai 
Diocese reflected the Holy See’s deep love for the diocese. Then, the author 
started to explain the reason for electing a vicar capitular after the arrest of 
Bishop Kung. First, the author sought the Holy See’s forgiveness for not 
notifying Rome before and during the vicar capitular election process: 
‘During the election of the vicar capitular, we met many difficulties. Hence, 
before presenting any facts before Your Eminence, we beg for your 
forgiveness and hope that you would not blame us for not notifying you 
before the election.’ 
Second, the author pointed out that it is impossible to know who the 
successor appointed by Bishop Kung is. According to the author, nobody 
knew Bishop Kung’s choice of successors before his arrest. From 1955, 
there were rumours that Bishop Kung’s choice of successor was recorded 
in a hand-written note, in which Fr. Lucas Chen Tianxiang was chosen as 
the 1st successor and Fr. Xu Yuanrong, the supposed author himself, as 
the 2nd successor. However, those who claimed that they saw the hand-
written note also denied that the note had any formal authority. Furthermore, 
the alleged hand-written note was confiscated by the government during the 
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arrest of Bishop Kung. Hence, it was impossible to know who the successor 
named by Bishop Kung really was. According to the author’s narrative, 
some priests suggested Fr. Xu should assume the position of vicar capitular 
because the alleged first successor, Fr. Chen Tianxiang, was also arrested 
alongside Bishop Kung. However, Fr. Xu refused this proposal, saying: ‘the 
Bishop never told me anything about his successor and there was no formal 
document proving he named a successor. How could I assume the power 
of the diocese?’  In these circumstances, as the author put it, as the bishop 
and other high-ranking clergy of the diocese were prevented from fulfilling 
their responsibilities for six months, five priests formed a council of priests 
to elected Fr. Francis Zhang as the vicar capitular. The author claimed their 
action was according to Clause 3, Canon Law 429.  
Here, the reference to Canon Law deserves attention. In fact, despite only 
quoting two sentences from the telegram, Mariani also noted that ‘the CCP 
attempted to interpret church law for the church’.346 Indeed, in this letter, the 
author showed great eagerness to persuade Rome that the election of Fr. 
Zhang Shilang complied with Canon Law. I have summarised the underlying 
legal reasoning in the letter as below:  
(1) The Bishop of the diocese (Kung) was impeded from carrying out his 
role by imprisonment. 347 So efforts should be made to find out who the 
named successor of Bishop Kung was. 348 
(2) However, as it was impossible to be sure who the successor really was, 
Canon 429, Clause 3 would be applicable in this situation: ‘These being 
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absent, or, as mentioned above, impeded, the Chapter of the cathedral 
church will constitute its Vicar, who will assume governance with the power 
of a Vicar Capitulary.’ 349  
(3) In the case of Shanghai Diocese at the time, the committee of diocesan 
consultors functioned as the Chapter of the cathedral. As Canon 427 
stipulated: ‘The committee of diocesan consultors, like a senate of the 
Bishop, takes the place of the cathedral Chapter.’ 350  
(4) Five diocesan consultors had participated in the election of the vicar 
capitular. This had exceeded the minimum number of four consultors 
stipulated in Canon 425, Clause 1. Therefore, Fr. Zhang Shilang’s election 
as the vicar capitular was in accordance with Canon Law. 
After explaining the rationale and the supposed church law basis underlying 
the election, the author went on to describe the attitude of Fr. Zhang, the 
elected vicar capitular, the idea of which can be summarised into the 
following chain of equivalence: 
Chain 2: The elected vicar capitular’s attitude 
The elected vicar capitular, Fr. Zhang = believing his election is in accordance with 
Canon Law and the original intention of the Bishop = thinking he had obtained tacit 
approval from Rome = assuming the post of vicar capitular with good intentions = 
always waiting instructions from Your Excellency 
With this chain of equivalence, the author tried to persuade the Holy See to 
trust Fr. Francis Zhang Shilang, the vicar capitular elected by the diocesan 
consultors. First, the author conveyed Fr. Zhang’s opinion to Rome — Fr. 
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Zhang did not 'feel guilty’ in assuming the position of vicar capitular for two 
reasons: 
First, Fr. Zhang believed that his election not only complied with Canon Law, 
but also followed the original intention of Bishop Kung. Fr. Zhang’s 
confidence came from a claim made by Ignatius Zhou, the secretary to 
Bishop Kung. According to Zhou’s claim, Bishop Kung did nominate some 
potential successors before his incarceration in a formal document (also lost 
after his arrest), however, in the same document, Kung also instructed that 
the named successors would only assume that position when an election 
by diocesan consultors could not be held. Therefore, following this logic, the 
election result of the council of priests took precedence over appointed 
successors. Hence, Fr. Zhang believed that his election as vicar capitular 
followed Bishop Kung’s original intention. 
Second, Fr. Zhang had goodwill towards Rome. Fr. Xu Yuanrong sent a 
telegram to Rome immediately after knowing the result of the election. And 
up to the time of Fr. Xu’s 17th March letter, Rome made no explicit objections 
to Fr. Zhang’s election. Zhang took it as evidence of Rome’s tacit approval. 
The author tried to convince Rome of Fr. Zhang’s goodwill and loyalty 
towards Rome: ‘I would dare to prove to Your Eminence that Francis Zhang 
was compelled to assume the position of vicar capitular out of his good will 
and his concern for the welfare of the laity and our diocese. He is always 
ready to submit to instructions from the Holy See.’  
At the end of the letter, Fr. Xu requested the Propaganda Fide’s decision 
and instructions:  
‘I humbly ask Your Eminence to judge and decide, and instruct us on 
the things to be done — Can Francis Zhang continue to assume the 
post of vicar capitular? If not, then which nominated successor should 
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take the position? How should we deal with the dispensations issued by 
Francis Zhang?’  
The telegram ended with Fr. Xu’s request for blessings: ‘I humbly express, 
on behalf of the entire clergy and laity, our submission towards and respect 
of Your Excellency and the Holy Father. Please grant us your blessings.' 
We now need to ask, how might this letter inform us? Throughout this letter, 
the author was trying his best to convince Rome that the election of the vicar 
capitular in Shanghai was not intended to be a malicious act towards the 
Holy See. The author also made huge effort to persuade Rome to endorse 
Fr. Zhang Shilang as the vicar capitular. It should be noted that at the end 
of letter the author even invited the Holy See to suggest an alternative 
should they find Fr. Zhang unacceptable. The language style and wording 
used by the letter showed deep respect for papal primacy and the Holy 
See’s authority over the leadership of local churches. Hence, based on 
these, I argue that the claim in previous literature that Beijing was merely 
presenting a fait accompli to Rome does not hold true. All the traits of this 
letter showed Beijing’s strong desire to engage in a dialogue with the 
Vatican over the election of the vicar capitular in Shanghai. Although 
previous interactions between Beijing and Rome were marked by increasing 
hostility, in this letter the author used an almost supplicant tone to ask for 
Rome’s understanding and expressed due respect for papal primacy. 
Hence, this letter should be regarded as Beijing’s friendly gesture to Rome 
and its attempt to break the vicious circle of Sino-Vatican relations. 
Nonetheless, in such attempt to re-interpret the Canon Law, Beijing may 
have unintentionally touched a raw nerve for Pope Pius XII. The reason was 
that the Pope, Eugenio Pacelli, before ascending the throne, had been one 
of the major architects of the 1917 Canon Law. Beijing’s deed of making use 
of Canon Law in the face of its creator may arouse the Pope’s personal 
antipathy. In other words, the Pope, seeing his brainchild being utilised to 
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the advantage of a secular government, may regard Beijing’s attempt as a 
sign of arrogance, if not adding insult to injury. In fact, this attempt to re-
interpret Canon Law showed Beijing’s facile understanding of the church’s 
law at the time and may have greatly reduced the effectiveness of this 
attempt to engage the Vatican.  
Despite the insufficient understanding of Canon Law, the most prominent 
aspect of this letter is the author’s effort to solve the issue within the legal 
framework of the Catholic Church. Truly, as Mariani observed, this can be 
regarded as the PRC government’s effort to ‘interpret church law for the 
church’. 351 However, based on the evidence of this letter, I do not think such 
an effort of Beijing was with ill intention. The reference to Canon Law 
clauses and the underlying legal reasoning in the letter, despite being facile, 
could be regarded as Beijing’s attempt to find a solution that was acceptable 
and face-saving for both sides. The wording of the letter conveyed a 
message to the Vatican: the government was still trying to solve the 
succession crisis in the Shanghai Diocese within the legal framework of 
Canon Law. If Rome could endorse the proposed candidate (Fr. Zhang), 
then a face-saving consensus for both would be reached. Even if Rome was 
not happy with the proposed candidate, it was welcomed to suggest an 
alternative candidate. In sum, in this way, Beijing expressed its willingness 
to respect Canon Law and negotiate with Rome for the appropriate 
candidate for vicar capitular in Shanghai. Hence, on sending this letter to 
Rome, Sino-Vatican relations had reached a crucial junction – how Rome 
responded would be hugely influential for the church’s fate in China and the 
relationship between Beijing and Rome in the following decades.  
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The Way to ‘Self-consecrations’: The Subsequent 
Interaction between Beijing and Rome 
Several days after Fr. Xu’s letter was sent to Rome, on 31 Mar 1957, the 
vicar capitular candidate, Fr. Zhang Shilang himself also sent a letter to 
Propaganda Fide. This text of this letter is also included in the Hunan 
Provincial Archive.352 This letter was shorter in length than Fr. Xu’s letter 
and touched upon the same issues. Thanks to its similarity to Fr. Xu’s 
counterpart, I will not provide a detailed analysis of Fr. Zhang’s letter here. 
However, the tone of the letter was more personal – Fr. Zhang, the 
supposed author, expressed the difficulties he felt in accepting the result of 
election. (see p.259 of this thesis) At the end of letter, the author expressed 
his absolute loyalty towards the Holy See: ‘I hereby state that I shall be 
forever loyal to the Holy See of Saint Peter, and completely submit to, 
embrace and respect (the Pope’s order). May peace be with Your 
Eminence.’ 
According to my archival research, the Holy See did not reply to the two 
letters until July of the same year. However, an internal circular in the Hunan 
Provincial Archive, dated 18 May, shows that Rome was still sending anti-
Beijing leaflets to the clergy in Shanghai. One leaflet, entitled ‘why the Holy 
Catholic Church cannot accept the Patriotic Association’, reads:  
‘…Not long ago, a Patriotic Association was created in Beijing. The aim of this 
organisation is to subjugate the church to the atheist government and its ultimate 
goal is to eradicate the church. For these reasons, the Catholic Church advocates 
patriotism, but she cannot agree with the Catholic Patriotic Association of the Laity 
and the creators of this organisation, along with those (laity) who participate. 
Although the superficial situation (in China) seems to have improved now, in reality, 
                                            
352 Hunan Provincial Archive, 221-1-349. 
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Red China has not changed its attitude towards religion. Now, the Chinese clergy 
and laity will have to make a decision for the future: either they should choose to be 
loyal to the Holy Church, or they should choose to be pseudo-patriotic. To make a 
choice is a really hard decision – it seems that to pour out one’s blood and become a 
martyr becomes a better option.’ 353 
Indeed, the content of this leaflet does not show any friendly signs from 
Rome. However, Beijing continued to wait for a definitive reply from the Holy 
See. Finally, on 10 Jul 1957, Rome sent its decision to the Diocese of 
Shanghai. The Chinese version of this letter is also kept in the Hunan 
Archive. It was written in the name of the prefect of Propaganda Fide, 
Fumasoni Biondi. The addressee was Fr. Xu Yuanrong. The full text was as 
below: 
‘Despite a delay, your letter (dated 19 Mar) and Fr. Zhang’s letter (dated 30 Mar) have 
reached me and I have read them carefully. In the interest of the church in China and 
for the salvation of the souls in the Shanghai Diocese, after careful consideration in 
the face of God, Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide has decided that the initial 
ruling should be maintained. Hence, you are requested to promulgate the order 
1023/57, issued by Propaganda Fide on 1 Mar 1957 in the name and authority of the 
Holy Father. Effort should be made to make all the fathers know this order.  
Please pay careful attention to the privileges granted by the abovementioned order – 
they should only be given to those fathers in Shanghai Diocese that are in peaceful 
communion with the Apostolic See. Others are not entitled to these privileges. 
Moreover, please report to us every case of dispensation granted by Fr. Francis 
Zhang, so that they can be examined and dealt with. Fr. Francis Zhang had said in his 
letter that he would forever submit to the Saint Peter’s seat full-heartedly and would 
completely obey, embrace and be loyal to (the papal decision). And you have 
mentioned in your letter that you will humbly wait for the Holy See’s decisions and 
                                            
353 Hunan Provincial Archive. 221-1-349. My own translation from Chinese. The original 
circular has a short comment on the leaflet: ‘The Shanghai Diocese has received a sabotage 
letter. The original letter is written in French.’ 
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faithfully carry them out. In the light of this, I am confident that, on your part, you will 
carry out the order faithfully. Regarding the fathers in the diocese, (I believe) they will 
certainly obey all the things stipulated by the order with their sincere piety. We shall 
deal with the issue regarding the Archdiocese of Nanjing and Diocese of Suzhou as a 
separate case. Hereby we send our heartfelt greetings to you and wish you all the 
best.’ 354 
By this letter, Rome gave its final reply to the Shanghai Diocese and the 
PRC government. From the text we can discern that Rome refused to 
endorse Fr. Zhang as the legitimate vicar capitular nor follow Beijing’s 
interpretation of the Canon Law. Moreover, Rome’s letter firmly ordered Fr. 
Xu to promulgate and carry out order 1023/57, which means the church in 
China was ordered to continue to boycott the PRC government and maintain 
its underground presence. Thus, one of the most precious opportunities for 
a Sino-Vatican ceasefire in 1950 was missed. The relationship between 
Rome and Beijing took was turning in the worst direction.  
When the Propaganda Fide’s reply to Fr. Xu reached the Shanghai Diocese, 
the CPAL was holding its first conference in Beijing. On 22 Jul, the 
conference discussed Propaganda Fide’s reply and issued a letter of protest 
towards the Holy See. 355  Now Beijing had largely abandoned hope of 
reaching a ceasefire with Rome and decided to push forward the ‘self-
consecration’ of bishops in China regardless of Rome’s approval. However, 
Beijing made a final effort before the first episcopal self-consecration. On 24 
Mar 1958, a letter was sent from the Diocese of Hankou seeking Roman 
approval for the self-elected bishop – Fr. Dong Guangqing. As expected, 
Rome quickly replied and refused to endorse Fr. Dong as the bishop. On 13 
                                            
354 Hunan Provincial Archive. 221-1-349. My translation from Chinese. 
355  Editorial Committee of the Shanghai Chronicle, ‘The Anti-Imperialist Patriotic 
Movement’<http://www.shtong.gov.cn/node2/node2245/node75195/node75203/nod
e75287/node75301/userobject1ai92012.html> [accessed 15 Sep 2016] 
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Apr, Fr. Dong was self-consecrated by the officially-sanctioned church as 
the Bishop of Hankou. Now the relationship between Beijing and Rome had 
passed the point of no return. 
On 12 Apr 1958, the Bureau of Religious Affairs at the State Council issued  
guidelines on Catholic policy and send it to local bureaus all over China.356 
The document instructed officials to push forward self-consecrations and 
launch a publicity campaign against the Vatican. Among the instructions, 
these words are worthy of attention: 
‘(The situation where) the Vatican utilises Canon Law and other regulations and 
dogmas to shackle the patriotic laity and clergy should be broken…. The bishops self-
elected by the Chinese laity and clergy should have not only the right to govern the 
diocese, but also the religious authority (due to) a bishop.’ 
It can be discerned from here that Beijing had adjusted its Catholic policy 
and no longer attempted to solve the Catholic issue within the legal 
framework of the church. In Beijing’s discourse, ‘Canon Law’ was no longer 
a neutral signifier – it was now connected with the idea of a ‘shackle’ that 
should be ‘broken’. The same document also gave instructions on whether 
Rome should be notified regarding the consecration of bishops: 
‘Regarding whether the Vatican should be notified after the episcopal elections, our 
view is: in normal circumstances, no. However, if any diocese has a need for 
struggle,357 they should report to the Bureau of Religious Affairs at the State Council 
for consideration and approval.’ 
Hence, at this point, Beijing has abandoned all hope of engaging in dialogue 
with Rome. According to the document’s instructions, in normal 
circumstances the officially-sanctioned church would self-consecrate 
                                            
356 Hunan Provincial Archive, 221-1-72. 
357 The meaning of ‘struggle’ (douzheng) here is vague. It could be interpreted as ‘a struggle 
with the Vatican’s interference’.  
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bishops without even notifying the Holy See — hence, the second ‘deadlock’ 
of Beijing-Rome relations had now finally come into being.  
5.5 Conclusion of the Chapter 
In this chapter I have examined four flashpoints, namely the internuncio’s 
13-month stay in Hong Kong, the CPC’s internal deliberations on Catholic 
policy in 1952, the 1954 ‘Year of Mary’ and the 1957 election of a vicar 
capitular in Shanghai. These events, though having exerted a major 
influence on Sino-Vatican relations, were largely ignored in previous 
literature on the topic. With the help of newly discovered archival material, I 
have brought them to scholarly attention and shed new light on the 
constructivist process between Beijing and Rome.  
A major debate between this thesis and previous literature is on the question 
‘did Beijing plan to destroy the Catholic Church in China in the 1950s?’. 
Based on my archival research, I argue for a ‘no’ answer. Instead, I argue 
that Beijing’s principal aim in Catholic policy in the 1950s was to rally the 
church to the patriotic cause, namely to make the church become an active 
supporter of the government. However, due to Rome’s staunch anti-Beijing 
stance and the continuing boycott from the local churches, Beijing was 
frustrated again and again in applying its ‘winning over’ policy and therefore 
gradually lost good feeling and hope towards Rome and the local church 
leaders. Nonetheless, despite consistent negative feedback from the 
Vatican and local churches, for most of the 1950s, Beijing exercised a 
degree of restraint in its Catholic policy – the internal documents from 
Beijing frequently admonished local officials that ‘oversimplified and hasty 
administrative measures’ would hamper the implementation of religious 
policy. Although keeping a suspicious eye on Rome for most of the time, in 
1957 Beijing made a bold attempt to break the vicious circle of Sino-Vatican 
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relations by seeking Roman approval of the vicar capitular in Shanghai, 
however, this effort did not result in any positive feedback from Rome. 
On the side of Rome, the Holy See’s policy towards Beijing during the 1950s 
did not show many traits of pragmatism and it could be argued that Rome’s 
China policy during this period was simply part of its efforts to fight global 
communism. To be more specific, Rome’s overall China policy was not well 
tailored for the circumstances in China and could be considered ill-informed 
and self-contradicting in many cases. This tendency was well illustrated by 
the papal internuncio’s 13-month stay in Hong Kong, where the 
internuncio’s frequent anti-Beijing speeches had totally belied his supposed 
friendly gestures. After the Nunciature’s relocation to Taipei, Rome’s policy 
towards Beijing had become more rigid and uncompromising, and the policy 
focus was on encouraging the local clergy and laity to be loyal to the Pope 
and to boycott Beijing’s call for patriotism. Rome’s hostility towards Beijing 
caused grave consequences for the local churches – the continued high 
tension between Beijing and Rome had led to mutual distrust between the 
PRC government and local church leaders. The church’s follow-up of the 
Vatican’s call during the ‘Year of Mary’ was closely watched by the PRC 
government and made Beijing lose patience with the local church leaders. 
The arrest of high-ranking church leaders in Shanghai was a tragic event 
that resulted from such long-standing Beijing-Rome enmity.  
From a discursive perspective, it could be argued that the conflict between 
Beijing and Rome was largely around three key signifiers, namely 
‘communism’, ‘patriotism’ and ‘schism’ and the root of the conflict was 
Rome’s misreading of Beijing’s central key signifier ‘communism’. The main 
aim of the Vatican in the 1950s was to defend the Catholic discourse from 
the threat of state atheism. And in Vatican’s understanding at the time, this 
atheism was an inseparable part of communism. Hence, to defend 
Catholicism, the church must fight communism. However, in dealing with 
China, Rome did not perceive the significant difference between Beijing and 
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other communist regimes – in the 1950s, the focus of Beijing’s state 
discourse was on Chinese patriotism and nationalism instead of on 
‘eradicating capitalism’ and ‘class struggle’. A failure to perceive this crucial 
difference had led Rome to believe that to avoid a ‘schism’ in China, 
‘communism’ in China, including the CPC, must be battled against. 
However, as we can see from the analysis of the internal documents from 
the side of Beijing, the PRC government did not have any interest in 
modifying the church’s creeds and dogmas, nor did it plan to lead a religious 
revolution. Therefore, Rome was raging a war against the wrong opponent 
and for the wrong reason – the Holy See thought that it was fighting 
‘communism’ in China, however, in reality, it was actually attacking 
‘patriotism’ which was hidden under the central signifier ‘communism’ in 
Beijing’s discourse. This misreading had led to many unnecessary clashes 
between Beijing and Rome.   
At the end of this chapter, I have examined in detail the constructivist 
process between Beijing and Rome before the 1958 episcopal ‘self-
consecrations’ in China. My argument in this chapter is that Beijing’s attempt 
to contact Rome regarding the vicar capitular in Shanghai between 1956 
and 1957 should not be considered as presenting a mere fait accompli. 
Instead, as shown by the archival evidence, Beijing had endorsed Shanghai 
Diocese’s soft and supplicant letter to Rome and invited the Holy See to 
engage in a dialogue over the suitable leader of the Shanghai Diocese. In 
these letters, Beijing had shown its willingness to solve the problem within 
the legal framework of Canon Law. However, Beijing’s gesture of 
interpreting the church’s law for the church may have had unintended 
consequence of irritating the Vatican since Pope Pius XII was one of the 
main architects behind the Canon Law of the time. On the other hand, Rome 
failed to notice Beijing’s desire to reach a ceasefire and failed to utilise this 
desire to the church’s interest. The subsequent ‘self-consecration’ without 
Roman approval should be regarded as Beijing’s retaliation towards Rome’s 
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coldness. In other words, this second ‘deadlock’ in the contemporary Sino-
Vatican relations was the result of the unfriendly interaction between Rome 
and Beijing from 1956 to 1958, instead of something long planned by 
Beijing.  
Looking back at the history now, I argue that the Vatican missed an 
important historical opportunity in 1957, when Beijing showed a genuine 
wish to reach some consensus with the Holy See regarding the appointment 
of the Vicar Capitular in Shanghai. In fact, as we can perceive from the 
archival evidence, even up to 1957, ‘papal primacy’ and ‘Canon Law’ were 
still neutral signifiers in Beijing’s discourse and had no negative 
connections. In other words, Beijing had hoped to keep the Vatican’s 
spiritual leadership in the Chinese church and wished to solve the Sino-
Vatican conflicts within the church’s own framework. Had Rome replied to 
Beijing with some conciliatory gesture, or at least ceased the anti-Beijing 
instructions to the church in China, Sino-Vatican relations would have 
headed in a different, and certainly better, direction. Although we cannot 
predict ‘what would have happened had they behaved differently’, I argue it 
was highly likely that Beijing and Rome could have reached some tacit 
consensus regarding the episcopal appointments in the Chinese Church – 
if so, the second ‘deadlock’ between Beijing and Rome would not have been 
formed at all and Sino-Vatican interactional history in the subsequent 




6.1 Findings: Substantive Level 
The question of this thesis is why the Vatican and China severed diplomatic 
ties in the 1950s to the extent that more than 60 years later they still have 
not realised a rapprochement. I have argued that an understanding of Sino-
Vatican relations from 1949 to 1958 is indispensable to understanding the 
contemporary Beijing-Rome interaction because today’s clashes between 
Rome and Beijing are actually the continuation of a long-standing stalemate 
rooted in the 1950s. Hence, in order to provide a fresh insight into the seeds 
of this long-standing stalemate, this thesis attempts to address this question 
from a constructivist perspective and aims to find out how PRC-Vatican 
interactions impacted on their respective identities, and influenced their 
relationships in the first nine years of the People’s Republic.  
My substantive findings in this thesis, in a nutshell, could be summarised 
into three points. First, the rigid view of identity in previous studies on Sino-
Vatican relations in the 1950s prevents a deeper understanding of this 
relationship and has led to unbalanced reports. The actual Beijing-Rome 
interaction in the 1950s showed more nuances than the rigid view of 
‘communism vs theism’ could offer. To avoid such a rigid view of identity, 
this thesis advocates a ‘non-identitarian’ social constructivist approach 
based on in-depth discourse analysis.  Second, contrary to what is asserted 
by many previous authors, based on archival evidence, I argue that Beijing’s 
policy towards the Catholic Church in the 1950s should not be oversimplified 
as ‘destroying the church’. Instead, the PRC government’s primary aim in 
the 1950s was to rally the church to the cause of nationalism/patriotism and 
make the church an active supporter of the government. Third, the Beijing-
Rome interaction in the 1950s is not pre-determined. Instead, it is a long 
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constructivist process spanning nine years where both Beijing and Rome 
had engaged in multiple rounds of identification processes. Despite their 
radical difference in state ideologies, Beijing and Rome did not automatically 
attack each other in their first encounter and coexisted peacefully for a year. 
Indeed, the initial policy goals of both sides were simple and not inherently 
hostile towards each other. However, due to oversimplifications in religious 
policy and ill-informed diplomatic gestures, the tension between Beijing and 
Rome gradually increased and finally resulted in many ‘flashpoints’. The 
final outcome of their interaction in the 1950s was worse than expected by 
both sides.  
In chapter 2, I have firstly provided a concise review of the general situation 
in previous literature on Sino-Vatican relations. According to my point of 
view, previous works on Sino-Vatican relations could be roughly divided into 
three categories, namely martyrdom literature, biographies and studies from 
an IR perspective. The majority of previous works belong to the category of 
martyrdom literature, and very few books were dedicated exclusively to the 
study of Sino-Vatican relations from an IR perspective. After the concise 
general review, the thesis draws the reader’s attention to the key works on 
Sino-Vatican relations that are most related to my current study. To be more 
specific, Myers’s Enemies without guns, Mariani’s Church Militant and Chen 
and Jiang’s Sino-Vatican Diplomatic History were milestone works in this 
area and they cover the same historical period (1948-1958) to be studied in 
this thesis. While acknowledging their important contributions to this field, 
this thesis argues that an obvious shortcoming could be found in their works. 
Namely, previous literature shares a highly rigid view of identity in their 
interpretation of Sino-Vatican relations – Beijing was regarded as a brutal, 
anti-religious ‘communist’ regime while the Vatican was regarded as an 
innocent victim.  I argue this rigid view of identity has led to several flaws in 
previous accounts of Sino-Vatican relations. Taking the books of Myers, 
Mariani, Chen and Jiang as examples, I discussed the negative implications 
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caused by this rigid view of identity – namely, the malevolent readings of 
Beijing’s Catholic policy; the one-sided and biased account of church history 
in the1950s; the ignoring of historical sources from the side of the PRC; the 
hasty conclusions based on scanty evidence and the strong pro-Vatican 
tendency. I think all these flaws are not conducive to a deeper, balanced 
and rational understanding of Sino-Vatican relations in the 1950s. Hence, 
to achieve a better insight into Beijing-Rome relationships, we need to 
dismantle this rigid view of identity and take a new approach to the study of 
Sino-Vatican relations – the constructivist process between Beijing and 
Rome should always be taken into account. 
Chapter 3 is dedicated exclusively to methodological discussions. Sections 
3.1 and 3.2 endeavour to build a bridge between mainstream IR theories 
and Sino-Vatican relations, which, I believe, is the first attempt in studies of 
this field. In section 3.1 I discussed the ‘statehood’ of the Vatican and argued 
that despite the peculiarities and religious characteristics of the Holy See, 
the Vatican should be regarded as a state in its dealing with the PRC. 
Afterwards, in section 3.2, I introduced readers to the fundamental tenets of 
the three major schools of IR studies (realism, liberalism and constructivism) 
and discussed their respective relevance to the study of Sino-Vatican 
relations. Firstly, I drew readers’ attention to the basic concepts (power and 
Realpolitik) of realism and used these concepts to examine Sino-Vatican 
relations – I have argued that Rome’s power over opinions should be taken 
into account and that the Vatican is far from powerless in its dealings with 
Beijing. Moreover, despite the fact that the concept of Realpolitik seems to 
explain the clashes between Beijing and Rome, it actually misses many 
nuances in Sino-Vatican relations and could not explain changes. After 
discussing realism, the thesis went on to examine liberalism’s relevance to 
Sino-Vatican relations. My main argument in this part is that the fact that the 
PRC is not a Western-style liberal democracy should not be regarded as 
the origin of every problem in Sino-Vatican relations, while the conflict 
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between Beijing and Rome should not be simplified as ‘a war between an 
authoritarian regime and democracy’. In the last of section 3.2 I proceed to 
discuss constructivism, which is the theoretical foundation of this study. I 
have provided an overview of Alexander Wendt’s theory, which is the most 
influential version of constructivist IR theory. My argument here is that 
Wendtian theory’s focuses, namely on the power of ideas, interactions 
between states, identity-casting and the possibilities of changes, fit the aim 
of my thesis very well. Hence, among the three mainstream IR schools, I 
argue that constructivism is most suitable for this study. 
After choosing the school of constructivism as the approach to be used, this 
thesis started to examine the concept of identity, which is crucial to any 
research based on social constructivism. I pointed out that Wendt’s view of 
identity is a ‘weak point’ of his theory, which needed to be supplemented by 
Brubaker and Cooper’s critique. According to Brubaker and Cooper, the 
traditional notion of identity has inherent essentialist connotations and 
therefore may hinder constructivist analysis. In the light of this, they argued 
that alternative terms such as identification, categorisation and self-
understanding should be used in place of ‘identity’. I agreed with Brubaker 
and Cooper and argued that the use of these alternative terms in this thesis 
would certainly be helpful to a better understanding of Sino-Vatican 
relations. Hence, in this thesis, I will use Brubaker and Cooper’s alternative 
terms to describe the constructivist process between Beijing and Rome. 
However, in limited cases I opted to retain the term ‘identity’ to denote ‘a 
point in the ongoing constructivist process’ in Sino-Vatican relations. 
The next section is dedicated to the discussion of the concept of ‘discourse’. 
As the entire process of identification is mediated via discourse, the analysis 
of discourses between Beijing and Rome will certainly give us deeper 
insights into the dynamics of Sino-Vatican relations. After briefly reviewing 
the origin of the term ‘discourse’ in social sciences, I provided the definition 
of ‘discourse’ in this research – ‘a language system and the only way to 
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perceive identity’. Based on this definition, I proceeded to develop a suitable 
analytical framework to carry out discourse analysis. In section 3.4, I 
developed a four-step model as the guidelines for analysis, which is based 
on Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory. My analytical model is centred on 
the concept of ‘chain of equivalence’ as proposed by Laclau and Mouffe. In 
section 3.5, I explained my rationale for choosing the period 1949-1958 as 
the research target and argued that this period is the most important period 
in Sino-Vatican identity articulation. Then I acknowledged the sources I 
used in this research – the majority of historical sources were from the 
Hunan Provincial Archive and most of them have never been revealed 
before.  
After chapter 3, I started to carry out substantive research and analysis. In 
chapter 4 I discussed the first two years of Beijing-Rome interaction and 
shed light on the first ‘flashpoint’, namely the expulsion of the papal 
internuncio from China. In the two years leading to this incident, the two 
states experienced their first encounter and started to articulate their 
respective identities. Both states were trying to adapt to the new situation in 
China and figure out what kind of role was being played by each other in 
this relationship. Beijing voiced its concern over foreign leadership in the 
church in Correct Understanding and called on the Christians take back 
control of the churches in China. The thesis went on to analyse a key 
document from the same time period, namely the PRC’s temporary 
constitution, the Common Program, and discussed how it expressed the 
priority of state construction and key concerns. After the discussion of the 
two key documents issued by Beijing, the thesis proceeded to examine the 
Manifesto on Independence and Reform, which marks the start of the ‘three-
self’ movement in the Chinese Catholic Church. The general message of 
the first document was rational and benign while the latter one showed a 
more militant stance towards the church’s foreign connections. I have 
argued that regarding these documents as mere propaganda texts is an 
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oversimplification. Instead, they are Beijing’s important expression of self-
identification at the beginning of its interaction with the church and the 
Vatican. In these texts, Beijing had clearly announced its dislike of the 
leadership of the foreign missionaries in the church and sent a crucial 
message to the Vatican: that the current situation where foreign 
missionaries led the Chinese Church could not be continued. 
Facing the new regime in China, the Vatican’s response to Beijing was not 
helpful to the survival of the church in China. After the establishment of the 
PRC, the Vatican chose to ‘stay in China’ and ordered the bishops to remain 
in their posts. However, the internuncio’s continuing stay in Nanjing 
reflected the Vatican’s ambivalent China policy – on the one hand, the 
internuncio’s stay in mainland China could be regarded as a friendly 
message to the new regime; on the other hand, the internuncio’s passive 
attitude towards Beijing belied this friendly message. Beijing later on 
interpreted Riberi’s stay in China as the West’s effort to interfere with 
China’s internal affairs. The sudden break of the Korean War became the 
‘acid test’ of Sino-Vatican relations. The war put the new regime directly at 
war with the US, the strongest power of the times. In these circumstances, 
the Vatican’s internuncio misjudged the prospect of communist rule in China 
and expressed sympathy for the KMT regime and local churches did not 
cease to spread pro-KMT messages. From the pamphlets distributed by 
local Catholic churches at that time, we can see that both the local church 
and the Vatican made no attempt to disguise their pro-KMT and anti-Beijing 
stance. All these greatly alerted Beijing and led the new regime to believe 
that the church was an ally of the West and the KMT regime. The 
subsequent crackdown on the church in China was the inevitable 
consequence of the Vatican’s misjudgement and inability to distance itself 
from the KMT regime. The expulsion of the internuncio was Beijing’s gesture 
of defiance towards Rome. It marked the total breakdown of official 
channels between Beijing and Rome. After the expulsion of the internuncio, 
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Beijing quickly confiscated the church’s institutions in the areas of education 
and charity-work. The foreign missionaries were expelled from China and 
the church suffered huge losses of personnel and assets. When evaluating 
this period, I argue that the Vatican’s self-conflicting and cumbersome 
diplomacy in the face of the new regime in Beijing was the important reason 
behind the breakdown of relationships between Beijing and Rome. 
The first part of Chapter 5 examined several relatively ‘silent’ flashpoints in 
Beijing-Rome interactions from 1952 to 1954. In contrast to the expulsion of 
the internuncio, these flashpoints were ‘hidden conflicts’ between Beijing 
and Rome that were largely overlooked by previous scholars. With the 
newly discovered archival evidence, this thesis shed light on these forgotten 
moments of Sino-Vatican interaction and revealed for the first time the 
PRC’s internal guidelines for Catholic policy. The first flashpoint to be 
examined was the papal internuncio’s activities in Hong Kong after his 
expulsion from the Chinese mainland. Making use of archival material, this 
thesis analysed Beijing’s internal evaluation of Archbishop Riberi’s 13-
month stay in Hong Kong. The second flashpoint was Beijing’s efforts to 
clear the Chinese church of foreign influence and its setbacks. To illustrate 
this process, this thesis provided a detailed analysis of a formerly ‘top secret’ 
document – Lu Dingyi’s internal address to the officials of religious bureaus. 
The third flashpoint to be examined was the Pope’s call to worldwide 
Catholics to observe the ‘Year of Mary’ and Beijing’s internal evaluation of 
this. It shows the persistence of ‘a priori definitions’ in Sino-Vatican relations 
and how the Vatican’s messages, even those intended to be religious in 
content, exerted political implications on the self-understanding of Chinese 
Catholics and finally affected Sino-Vatican relations.  
Rome persisted in its non-compromising stance towards communism and 
the Chinese government. In messages towards Chinese Catholics, loyalty 
towards Rome was always stressed and the martyrs were highly praised. 
Therefore, while there was no direct channel of communication between 
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Rome and Beijing, the church in China became an ‘arena’ where both sides 
fought each other over influence. The so-called ‘Catholic resistance’ started 
and the priests loyal to Rome made many efforts to boycott Beijing’s effort 
to transform the church. On the other hand, looking from Beijing’s 
perspective, these six years were a period where the government tried its 
best to win over the Chinese clergy (especially the bishops and 
archbishops). This thesis argues that Beijing’s primary aim was to make the 
Chinese church become a supporter of the government instead of 
destroying the church. However, Beijing’s effort was largely hindered by 
Rome and the pro-Vatican priests. In this situation, Beijing finally lost 
patience and resorted to coercive measures.  
At the end of chapter 5, this thesis examined the flashpoint where the 
second deadlock in Sino-Vatican relations was finally formed, namely the 
‘self-consecration’ mechanism in the officially-sanctioned church in China. 
After the arrest of Bishop Kung and other prominent clergymen in 1955, 
‘Catholic resistance’ died down and the last phase of Sino-Vatican 
interactions in the 1950s started. Due to the heavy loss of institutions, 
assets, priests and other personnel, the Chinese Church was in serious 
crisis and suffered from a dire shortage of active bishops. In deep mutual 
distrust, the interaction between Beijing and Rome, lacking any direct 
channel, focused almost entirely on their rivalry over influence on the 
Chinese Church. The Vatican, facing the shortage of bishops in China, 
continued to encourage the growing secrecy of the church by granting 
privileges to the local priests and delegating a portion of bishops’ 
responsibilities to them. The Vatican’s instructions and directives to the 
Chinese Church were closely monitored by the Chinese government and 
deepened the mutual distrust between Rome and Beijing. Despite the 
enmity between the two sides, in 1957 Beijing made a bold attempt to break 
the vicious circle in the event of the appointment of a vicar capitular in 
Shanghai. Based on archival evidence, this thesis argues that Beijing had 
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made a genuine effort to persuade the Vatican to accept a candidate trusted 
by Beijing. However, Beijing’s facile understanding of the Canon Law and 
Rome’s stern refusal made the situation go from bad to worse. Beijing finally 
decided to disregard papal authority and push forward the ‘self-
consecration’. Thus, the second ‘deadlock’ of Sino-Vatican relations was 
constructed by their interactions. 
 
6.2 Findings: Discursive Level  
In the above section I have reviewed the major substantive findings of this 
thesis and pointed out that Beijing should not be regarded as the sole 
‘culprit’ in Sino-Vatican relations and Rome should shoulder some 
responsibilities for the formation of the two deadlocks. Now I shall bring this 
conclusion to a deeper level and discuss the discursive root of Sino-Vatican 
conflicts. To put it very briefly, my conclusion is that the conflicts between 
Beijing and Rome resulted from misreading of each other’s central key 
signifiers in state ideologies.  
On the side of Rome, the Holy See’s rigid view of the central key signifier 
‘communism’ in Beijing’s ideology led to grave consequences in Rome’s 
China policy. Beijing, as a regime ruled by the CPC, had picked 
‘communism’ as the central signifier in state ideology long before the 
foundation of the PRC. However, after 1949, this central signifier was 
connected with ideas of ‘patriotism’ far more than with ones of orthodox 
communism. The CPC’s focus on patriotism and nationalism had deep roots 
in China’s previous humiliation in front of the colonial powers and long-
suppressed national pride. In the face of this, Rome did not sense this 
important discursive difference between China and other countries ruled by 
communist parties – the Vatican simply regarded China as ‘another 
communist regime’ that was inherently hostile towards religion and did not 
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carefully analyse what actually lay under the key central signifier 
‘communism’. In other words, Rome did not notice that in Beijing’s discourse 
‘patriotism’ was far more central than ‘atheism’. This made the Vatican’s 
China policy in the 1950s overly focused on preserving the purity of the 
church in the face of the ‘communist’ and atheist threat rather than adapting 
to the new government’s call for patriotism and addressing Beijing’s desire 
for security. 
In Beijing’s discourse there was a dichotomy between ‘patriotic’ and 
‘reactionary’. Similarly, in Rome’s counterpart, there was also one between 
‘atheism’ and the ‘Catholic faith’. Both ‘patriotism’ and ‘atheism’, as 
signifiers, were connected to the central key signifier ‘communism’. Hence, 
whenever the PRC tried to promote patriotism, the signifier ‘communism’ 
was inevitably invoked. This, when perceived by the Vatican, would entail 
the concept of ‘atheism’ – the archenemy of the Catholic faith. Hence, from 
the discursive perspective, the Vatican’s oversimplified view of the PRC’s 
version of communism became the origin of the subsequent 
misunderstandings and the church’s conflict with Beijing. To be more 
specific, for Beijing the dichotomy was ‘patriotic vs reactionary’; for Rome it 
was ‘atheism vs Catholicism’. Initially, these signifiers are not necessarily 
connected with each other, but now due to the central key signifier of 
‘communism’, Rome regarded Beijing’s ‘patriotism’ as the equivalent of 
‘atheism’ within the mind-set of the Cold War – this oversimplification bears 
huge consequences for later conflicts. With the continuous negative 
feedback from Rome, in Beijing’s political discourse, the Vatican was 
gradually connected with the signifier ‘reactionary’ and the dichotomy of 
Beijing’s Catholic policy became ‘patriotism vs the Vatican’.358 
                                            
358 I argue that the clash between Beijing and Rome is indeed similar to Wittgenstein’s ‘The 
parable of the beetle’, which was a famous thought experiment devised by him in his work 
 301 
On the other side, Beijing also made mistakes of oversimplification in 
understanding Rome’s central key signifier ‘Catholicism’ at the beginning of 
the 1950s. To be more specific, in the early stage of the PRC’s religious 
policy-making, Beijing did not pay enough attention to the difference 
between ‘Catholicism’ and ‘Christianity’ and treated the two signifiers as 
largely the same thing. This undifferentiated treatment brought forth 
negative results and contributed to the vicious circle between Beijing, Rome 
and the church in China. In the context of the Korean War, Beijing was 
concerned about the close ties between the local Christian churches with 
the West and hoped to impose the signifier ‘patriotic’ to church discourse 
and make ‘patriotism’ a part of Chinese Christians’ self-understanding. 
Indeed, Beijing’s desired outcome of this discursive intervention was this: 
The Christian Churches should not only accept the signifier ‘patriotism’ into 
their discursive system, but also understand that being ‘patriotic’ meant that 
the CPC’s secular rule over China should be accepted and supported. To 
realise this, Beijing started to promote the ‘three-self’ movement in both 
Protestantism and Catholicism and regarded ‘three-self’ as the equivalent 
of ‘patriotism’ and an acid test for the churches in China. The initial success 
of the ‘three-self’ movement in Chinese Protestant churches greatly 
encouraged Beijing, who then believed that a similar success could be 
easily replicated in the Catholic Church.  
However, the government’s hasty promotion of the two signifiers, namely 
‘three-self’ and ‘reform’, in the Catholic Church caused unexpected 
consequences – the Catholic discourse was far more sensitive to these two 
signifiers than her Protestant counterpart, as they had strong connotations 
                                            
Philosophical Investigations. It depicts a situation like this: two (or more) people met each other, 
and each person holds a non-transparent small box labelled ‘beetle’ in his/her hands. 
Everyone thinks that s/he is holding a beetle and all the people are holding the same thing. 
So they start to talk about each other’s ‘beetle’ and it seems everybody understands what 
the others are saying. However, when they open each other’s box together, they discover 
that in fact the boxes contain other creatures rather than beetles (e.g. snails, worms, crickets, 
mice). In the case of Sino-Vatican conflict, the ‘beetle’ is the signifier ‘communism’.  
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of a religious ‘Reformation’ and schism. In view of this, the Vatican was on 
high alert and assumed that Beijing was planning a schism following the 
style of Henry VIII. Therefore, in its China-related discourse, the Vatican 
expended huge efforts to reiterate the importance of loyalty to the Pope 
(papal primacy) as a tenet of Catholic faith. This was to counteract the 
perceived schism perpetrated by Beijing. Under the Vatican’s instruction, 
the Chinese Church refused to cooperate with the government and 
boycotted Beijing’s call for ‘patriotism’. The Vatican’s deed, in turn, greatly 
irritated Beijing and the two sides started to exchange fire. In fact, Beijing 
soon realised that the signifier ‘reform’ was doing a disservice to its Catholic 
policy and quickly revised its strategy to focus exclusively on ‘patriotism’ – 
however, the damage had already been done. Now Beijing, Rome and the 
local church have already been locked into a vicious circle. 
Despite the formation of antagonism in the respective discourses of Beijing 
and Rome, this research, based on the analysis of internal documents, finds 
that Beijing still showed pragmatism in its religious discourse and made 
efforts to leave some discursive space for the church in China. In spite of 
the enmity between Beijing and Rome, in the internal documents Beijing 
reiterated that the aim of Catholic policy was not to destroy the church, but 
to promote patriotism in the church. In other words, Beijing took care not to 
create an antithesis between ‘patriotism’ and ‘Catholicism’ in discourse – 
the ideal outcome was that the Catholic Church, especially her central key 
signifier ‘Catholicism’, could be kept in China but with the signifier 
‘patriotism’ (i.e. the support of Beijing’s rule over China) fully incorporated 
into the church discourse.  
In this way, Beijing had taken an approach different from the creation of the 
Church of England. The central key signifier ‘Catholicism’ was deliberately 
conserved in China and Beijing strove to incorporate it into the national 
discourse of ‘patriotism’. However, this brought to Beijing the tricky problem 
of papal primacy – if Beijing chooses to keep the signifier ‘Catholicism’, then 
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it logically entails ‘papal primacy’ in global Catholic discourse, which 
enables the Pope to exert his influence on the self-understanding of 
Chinese Catholics. In other words, by opting to share a common key 
signifier ‘Catholicism’ with Rome, Beijing left a permanent discursive space 
for Rome to intervene.  
Different from the English Reformation where the English state chose to 
develop a church discourse completely devoid of Rome’s influence, in the 
Chinese case Beijing still engaged with Rome within the same system of 
church discourse. The two sides were still contesting in the same discursive 
field and no one could ever reach absolute hegemony in this ‘discursive 
arena’. Interestingly, contrary to popular belief, archival evidence shows that 
‘papal primacy’ and ‘Canon Law’ were still neutral signifiers (i.e. not 
connected to negative meanings) as late as the year 1957 in PRC discourse 
despite the continuous negative feedback from both the local church and 
Rome. The PRC’s key internal documents issued from 1952 to 1957, which 
were analysed by this thesis, showed Beijing’s long-standing desire to 
realise state interests within the framework of church tradition and Canon 
Law. Beijing’s 1957 letters to Rome regarding the issue of the vicar capitular 
in Shanghai were the regime’s last attempt to maintain ‘papal primacy’ and 
‘Canon Law’ as neutral signifiers in church discourse. Unfortunately, this 
reconciliatory gesture became furtile due to Beijing’s facile understanding of 
church law and the Rome’s uncompromising stance. Greatly angered by 
Rome’s reaction, Beijing was finally convinced that ‘papal primacy’ and 
‘Canon Law’ were threats –  they became ‘shackles’ for their capability to 
impact on the self-understanding of Chinese Catholics and should be 
purged from the officially-sanctioned church discourse.  
To conclude, the oversimplified understanding of each other’s central key 
signifiers in Beijing-Rome interaction led to grave consequences in Sino-
Vatican relations. Based on my archival research, I argue that the 
discourses between Beijing and Rome were not necessarily incompatible 
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with each other at the beginning of their interaction. To be more specific, 
‘patriotism’ does not necessarily conflict with ‘Catholicism’ while ‘three-self’ 
was not inevitably incompatible with ‘papal primacy’ and ‘Canon Law’.  The 
meanings of all these key signifiers were not unchangeable. Depending on 
how one ‘decodes’ another’s signifier and how one acts towards each other, 
the meanings of every key signifier in state discourses could be constantly 
modified, contested and re-interpreted. In fact, from the history of Beijing-
Rome interaction, we can see that it took almost a decade for the two sides 
to establish the two ‘deadlocks’ in their discourse, namely ‘the KMT regime 
as the legitimate government of China’ and ‘self-consecration as the only 
acceptable way of creating bishops’ – neither of the two deadlocks was 
inevitable. Had they carefully analysed what the exact meanings hidden 
under key signifiers were in each other’s discourses, Sino-Vatican history 
would have been rewritten. However, unfortunately, both Rome and Beijing 
had missed many historical opportunities in the course of nine years and 
they realised the worst possible outcome at the end of their interaction in 
the 1950s.  
 
6.3 Towards a Better Relationship 
In the last two sections I have summarised the major findings of this 
research, on both the substantive and discursive levels. So, based on these 
findings, what can we say about the old question of ‘why has rapprochement 
still not been reached’? I think the answer is clear: because they continue 
to misunderstand each other’s central key signifiers (i.e. ‘communism’ and 
‘Catholicism’) in their state ideologies. Paradoxically, although both Beijing 
and Rome attempted to prevent the creation of a schismatic church in 
China, their interventions in the Chinese Church in the 1950s, under the 
influence of such misunderstanding, actually brought the church to the brink 
of schism. In the light of this, the possible contribution of this case study to 
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IR theory and discourse theory is that key signifiers in a state’s discourse 
do matter as they may cause serious misunderstandings and 
oversimplification by other states. To avoid such misunderstandings, it is 
essential to precisely analyse the meaning of the ideological key signifiers 
in interactions and diplomacy. 
After the 1958 ‘self-consecrations’ in China, Sino-Vatican relations came to 
their worst point. In June 1958 the Pope issued the encyclical Ad 
Apostolorum Principis to Chinese Catholics, in which he bitterly accused 
Beijing of consecrating the bishops without a papal mandate. Beijing 
retorted with a fierce publicity campaign against Rome. Later on in the same 
year, Pope Pius XII passed away and Chairman Mao launched the Great 
Leap Forward in China. In these circumstances, the interaction between 
Beijing and Rome came to a halt and the Vatican lost all contact with the 
Chinese Church. After a long interval of nearly two decades, the two sides 
finally resumed their dialogue. As I have discussed in chapter 4, despite the 
efforts made by both sides and many positive signs, the long-standing 
stalemate and the two deadlocks continue to trouble Sino-Vatican relations 
and a rapprochement is still not realised. Hence, how could the findings of 
this research inform today’s Sino-Vatican relations and make contributions 
to a future reconciliation? 
According my point of view, although the global context and the respective 
situation of both China and the Vatican have changed greatly in the past 60 
years, interactions between Beijing and Rome still have not broken the 
vicious circle formed in the 1950s. So what could they do to improve 
relationships? Based on the findings of this thesis, I have some advice for 
the policymakers of both Rome and Beijing. 
On the part of Rome, the Holy See should analyse the PRC’s state 
discourses more carefully and pay more attention to their 
nationalist/patriotic content. In fact, in the contemporary PRC political 
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discourse, the importance of Mao-era ‘revolutionary’ signifiers has been 
greatly reduced. However, if there is one thing that has not changed a lot 
from the beginning of the PRC to this day, it is the signifier ‘patriotism’. In 
fact, over the past 60 years, the signifier ‘patriotism’ has never faded in 
Beijing’s discourse. No matter how the key central signifier changed in PRC 
state discourse (for example, from ‘communism’ to ‘economic development’ 
and then to ‘Chinese Dream’), the signifier ‘patriotism’ has always been an 
important part of state ideology. It should be noted that ‘patriotism’ in 
Chinese state ideology not only demands citizens’ love for traditional 
Chinese Culture, but also their active support of Beijing’s rule over China. 
Hence, if Rome simply interprets ‘patriotism’ in PRC discourse as ‘love for 
Chinese culture’, that will be far from enough – indeed, the Popes since the 
1980s have all expressed their deep feeling for Chinese culture and 
reiterated that ‘a good Catholic also loves his/her country’. However, such 
expressions may not be very effective as a reconciliatory gesture to Beijing 
– because Beijing’s desired version of ‘patriotism’ demands loyalty and 
support from citizens of the PRC. If the Vatican could be more explicit in 
encouraging Catholics in China, as PRC citizens, to support Beijing’s rule, 
it would certainly have a very good effect in promoting the rapprochement 
between Rome and Beijing.  
Furthermore, the Vatican should pay attention not to provoke Beijing 
unnecessarily regarding the signifier ‘patriotism’. This point could be best 
illustrated by the Vatican’s canonisation of Chinese Saints in the year 2000. 
Originally intended to be a conciliatory gesture towards China, this event 
turned out to be another flashpoint between Rome and Beijing. The problem 
lay in the selection of saints to be canonised – most of them had died in the 
Boxer Rebellion (1899-1901), where large numbers of Catholics in China 
were killed by the anti-Christian ‘boxers’ (peasant militias). In fact, from a 
Catholic perspective, the Vatican’s decision to canonise these martyrs could 
be justified because they died for their Catholic faith. However, in terms of 
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Beijing-Rome relations, the entire Canonisation was extremely ill-advised – 
the historical event of the Boxer Rebellion (the Yihetuan Movement in 
Chinese) was highly regarded in PRC state discourse and was regarded as 
an exemplar of Chinese patriotism. In the official discourse at the time, the 
‘boxers’ were long portrayed as national heroes who laid down their lives to 
defend China from Western colonialism. Hence, the Vatican’s canonisation 
of these saints will certainly constitute a challenge to the PRC’s patriotic 
discourse. As if to make things worse, the Vatican chose 1 Oct as the date 
of canonisation – that day is the same day as the PRC’s national day. 
Hence, it is not strange that Beijing became furious about the Vatican’s 
canonisation. Briefly, the 2000 canonisation incident provoked Beijing 
unnecessarily, which clearly showed that the Vatican did not have a 
thorough understanding of the importance of ‘patriotism’ in PRC discourse. 
In the future, it is hoped that the Vatican could avoid such diplomatic 
mistakes and encourage Catholics in China to build a better relationship 
with the government.  
On the part of Beijing, my advice is that the PRC government should be 
more proactive in engaging the Vatican and be bolder in promoting Sino-
Vatican reconciliation. Indeed, it could be argued that in Sino-Vatican 
relations, Rome needs China more than vice versa.  The number of 
Catholics in today’s China, according to different estimations, varies from 
5.5 million to 12 million – the absolute number of Catholics in China is 
indeed large (more than the number in Ireland). Hence, the Holy See could 
never ignore such a large number of Catholics in its state policy. By contrast, 
considering the vast population of China, Chinese Catholics only account 
for a tiny percentage of the total population of China (less than 0.5%). 
Hence, in Beijing’s policy making, it can be expected that Catholic policy 
constitutes only a small part of the overall state policy. And from Beijing’s 
perspective, the importance of Sino-Vatican relations may never rival other 
relationships (say, Sino-American, Sino-Japanese relations). Despite these 
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facts, I argue that being more proactive in Sino-Vatican relations is still in 
the great interest of Beijing. In dealing with the Vatican, Beijing should not 
overestimate the Vatican’s ‘threat’ in China – considering the fact that the 
Holy See was already quite careful and prudent in speaking to China in 
recent years. On the other hand, Beijing should be confident that today the 
vast majority of Catholics in China, including the clergy, are loyal to the PRC 
government and are willing to actively support Beijing. Apart from this, 
Beijing should also avoid a rigid view of the Vatican as a staunch ‘anti-
Beijing power’. Indeed, among high-ranking clergy both globally and inside 
the Vatican there are many voices who are friendly to Beijing.  
In fact, this thesis argues that both Beijing and Rome should realise that 
they have already reached a tacit consensus regarding the church in China: 
there is indeed only one Catholic Church in China. This tacit consensus 
means that Beijing acknowledges that the Church in China is also part of 
the universal Catholic Church; while Rome also considers the officially-
sanctioned church in China as a form of Catholic presence in China. In other 
words, China no longer forces Catholics to sever ties with Rome while Rome 
no longer regards the officially sanctioned church as a ‘schism’. To put it 
briefly, each side acknowledges that ‘there is one Catholic Church’ but 
allows different interpretations from each side. This research maintains that 
this tacit consensus could form a basis for future dialogues between Beijing 
and Rome. 
The foundation of the ‘one church’ consensus is the shared signifiers 
between Rome and Beijing concerning the church in China. As discussed 
in this thesis, quarrels and conflicts often occurred in interactions between 
the two states, but this consensus was formed as early as the 1960s, when 
Beijing announced that the Chinese Church ‘should obey the Pope 
regarding the teachings that should be believed and should be performed’ 
and when Rome ceased to apply the term ‘schism’ to the Chinese Church. 
In other words, despite the initial and subsequent clashes, both states 
 309 
perceived that sharing the key signifier ‘genuine Catholicism’ is in their best 
interests. Endorsed by Beijing, the officially sanctioned church leaders 
reiterated again and again that ‘they belong to the universal church’. Beijing 
also allows the Chinese Church to follow Rome’s teachings as long as they 
are perceived as non-political and often tends to welcome the visits of 
foreign priests. On the other hand, the Vatican also draws benefits from this 
common signifier and uses it to exert influence on Chinese Catholics. In 
fact, the Vatican’s efforts to reach Chinese Catholics (e.g. papal messages) 
were based on the assumption that there is no ‘schismatic church’ in China. 
Rome’s actions of sending aid to seminaries run by the officially sanctioned 
church also shows that it still regards them as part of the Catholic Church. 
In sum, from the interactions between the two states it can be perceived that 
a tacit consensus indeed exists – the oneness of the church is 
acknowledged by both sides and their policies almost never deny this 
principle.  
While sharing the common signifier of ‘genuine Catholicism’, both sides 
have different interpretations of it. For Beijing, that means ‘the church led by 
patriotic priests’. Hence, the Chinese government always reiterates that 
‘patriotism’ is one of the prerequisites of priesthood and the church needs 
to comply with Chinese laws and regulations. In Beijing’s discourse, the 
Patriotic Association is defined as a ‘mass organisation’ that acts as a bridge 
between the government and the Catholic priests and masses. It facilitates 
communication between Beijing and the local churches and helps the 
application of Beijing’s policies (including aid given by the government to 
the church). According to Beijing, the CPA by definition is not a religious 
institution and therefore does not compromise the ‘Catholicity’ of the 
Chinese Church. Hence, with this interpretation, Beijing claims that the 
officially-sanctioned church is also part of the worldwide church, adhering to 
genuine Catholicism. On the other hand, Rome also offers its own 
interpretation of this shared signifier. According to Rome, the Chinese 
 310 
Church also belongs to the universal Catholic Church thanks to her ties with 
the Roman Pontiff. The Popes, in their speeches and letters towards 
Chinese Catholics, have always stressed the importance of papal primacy 
and of the church’s communion with Rome. All the above facts show that 
the tacit consensus allows different interpretations from Beijing and Rome 
and both sides can give their own definitions to the common signifier 
‘genuine Catholicism’. 
To put it briefly, Beijing and Rome have constructed a tacit consensus of 
‘one church’, which allows them to seek common ground while keeping 
different interpretations. From the nature of such a consensus, it is not hard 
to notice that it is highly similar to the ‘1992 consensus’ between Beijing and 
Taipei, namely the ‘one China’ principle. With the ‘1992 consensus’, both 
Beijing and Taipei agree that ‘there is only one China’ but interpret the 
signifier ‘China’ differently. For Beijing, ‘China’ equals ‘People’s Republic of 
China’ and Taiwan is a part of the PRC; for Taipei, ‘China’ stands for the 
‘Republic of China (ROC)’ which was established in 1911 and whose 
government continues to exercise sovereignty in Taipei. Despite the radical 
differences between their respective interpretations, both sides consent to 
share a common key signifier ‘China’ in their discourses. Indeed, today the 
‘1992 consensus’ has already become the cornerstone of cross-strait 
(Beijing-Taipei) interactions and cooperation. 
A careful analysis of the ‘1992 consensus’ is beyond the scope of this 
conclusion. But a few glances at it here would show how the two previous 
enemies could maintain peaceful coexistence and carry out meaningful 
cooperation by simply sharing a common signifier. In fact, the Beijing-Taipei 
conflict was far more dangerous and complicated than the Beijing-Rome 
counterpart. Despite all these difficulties, the ‘1992 consensus’ proved to be 
an effective way to de-escalate the Beijing-Taipei conflict and promote 
peace and cooperation across the Taiwan Strait. Since 2008, Taiwan’s 
ruling party, the KMT, has openly accepted the ‘1992 consensus’ and used 
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it as the guideline of the KMT government’s policy toward Beijing. Beijing 
quickly replied with friendly gestures and the tension across the strait was 
swiftly relieved. With this consensus, Beijing and Taipei signed over 40 
agreements on many issues, including direct flights and mail across the 
strait, closer economic ties and cooperation in fighting crimes. During the 
eight years of KMT rule, the tension between Beijing and Taipei dropped to 
the lowest level in 60 years. In 2016, the leaders of both sides of the strait, 
Xi Jinping and Ma Ying-jeou, met each other in Singapore and hence 
realised the first meeting of such a kind in the interactions between Beijing 
and Taipei, which was unimaginable a decade ago. During the meeting, Xi 
and Ma addressed each other as ‘Mister’ instead of ‘President’, which loyally 
reflected the ‘1992 consensus’ and showed respect for each side’s 
interpretations. Despite the fact that the ‘1992 consensus’ falls short of 
Beijing’s desired aim for cross-strait relations (unification), Taiwan had 
indeed used this consensus to de-escalate the tension across the strait and 
find a way to co-exist peacefully with its former sworn enemy. With this 
consensus, Taiwan had also secured its fragile international space by 
reaching a ‘diplomatic ceasefire’ with Beijing. In sum, by simply sharing a 
common key signifier ‘China’, Beijing and Taipei had successfully defused 
‘the time bomb of East Asia’ and realised peaceful coexistence.  
Considering the similar nature between this and the tacit consensus 
between Rome and Beijing, the success of the ‘1992 consensus’ should be 
noted by the policymakers from both Beijing and Rome with the hope of 
future rapprochement. It is hoped that both Beijing and Rome could be more 
proactive in seeking a formal consensus and realising a face-to-face 
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